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1 | Institutional Change in the House of Representatives 
 
 
 
Organized factions of individuals united by some common interest or cause have been a 
dominant feature of American politics since before the signing of the Constitution.  Formal 
political parties may not have been present in early American history, but the founders were 
keenly aware of the potential role that well-organized interests might play in shaping policy 
outcomes in government.  The politics of faction was at the forefront of the founders’ careful 
efforts to shape early American political institutions.  In arguably the most well-known Federalist 
Paper (No. 10), James Madison advocated that while factions were an inevitable feature of a 
democratic nation, their “harmful” or “wicked” effects could be controlled by a set of institutional 
processes and structures that would limit their influence, especially over policy outcomes.  Nearly 
all governmental institutions were designed (and subsequently evolved) to make it difficult – 
though not impossible – for new groups or factions to gain significant power.  The potential 
permeability of the U.S. Congress to factions was at the heart of these questions about 
institutional design, and the balance between minority and majority rights.  Cognizant that 
factions would continuously develop and emerge in American politics, the founders (and other 
political elites) structured institutional rules and processes to ensure that minority factions would 
not supplant majority opinion, nor would they gain enough power to change the very rules and 
processes limiting their influence.1  And throughout the historical and contemporary Congress, 
                                                          
1 Of course, it is important to note that the founders’ conception of majority and minority opinion was very 
narrow – inclusive of white, male landowners only.  While the wealth of American “citizens” varied during 
this period, their interests were not especially diverse.  Moreover, the founders and other early political 
leaders designed institutions to limit not only minority-driven change, but majority-driven change too.  If 
majority opinion shifted on monetary policy, for example, then institutional rules and norms facilitated a 
slow incorporation of these views into concrete policy outcomes in government, rather than an immediate 
change to the status quo.  Institutions are inherently conservative, fostering a slow, years-long process of 
change.      
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the often-junior members of new factions have struggled to achieve official leadership positions, 
and the adoption of policies favorable to their members and constituents.     
The development of the two-party system reinforced both the propensity for Americans 
to form and join groups, and for political parties to serve as the primary outlet through which 
those groups emerge (Duverger 1954; de Tocqueville 1865).  Indeed, while Madison may not 
have foreseen the pivotal role factions within political parties would play over the next two 
hundred years of American history in shaping the internal structures of Congress, it is unlikely he 
would be surprised.  If Congress, and in particular, the majoritarian House of Representatives, 
was designed to limit the power of new factions to influence majority decision-making, strategic 
political actors in factions have an incentive to devise ways to change the internal structure, 
organization and byways in the legislature to better reflect their interests.  And at numerous points 
in congressional history – in the 1820s, the 1860s, the 1920s, and most recently, in the period 
during the civil rights era (the 1950s-1970s), key institutional reforms were undertaken amidst the 
rise of a new faction of interests (Schickler 2001; Jenkins and Stewart 2007; Rohde 1991).  In 
each of these cases, institutional reform led to significant leadership and policy changes in 
Congress as well (Jenkins and Stewart 2007) – an unsurprising consequence given the founders’ 
concerns about the role of organized interests in American politics.   
The terms of institutional change in Congress are largely unwritten. The U.S. 
Constitution spends a considerable amount of its precious page space prescribing the power, 
responsibilities, and limitations of the Congress – significantly more than for any other branch of 
government.  But it does not provide a mechanism to ensure the legislative branch is running 
effectively and efficiently, or responding to the needs of new constituency groups.  And nowhere 
does it require that once a group comprises a certain size or distribution of preferences should 
Congress adapt internal institutions to further their interests.  Most major legislation is written 
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with a five-year timetable for re-authorization; no similar mechanism of self-reflection exists for 
congressional organization.  The rarity of major institutional change in Congress reflects these 
unwritten norms and requirements.  And yet, historically, Congress has succeeded in gradually 
and incrementally adopting new rules and procedures to incorporate and promote the 
representation of new groups in prevailing electoral coalitions, including most notably, women 
and African-Americans.  The emergence of new interests inside and outside of Congress appears 
to be the rare endogenous and exogenous force necessary to galvanize members to change the 
static institutions of Congress.   
For example, in 1961 and 1963, the House of Representatives expanded the Rules 
Committee from 12 to 15 members to incorporate the preferences of the growing liberal voters 
and their representatives in Congress.2  The expansion provided for a liberal majority, and 
prevented the committee’s conservative chairman, Rep. Howard J. Smith (D-VA), from single-
handedly blocking congressional consideration of civil rights legislation and other liberal bills he 
personally opposed.  The organization of liberal Democrats – known as the Democratic Study 
Group, or DSG – originally proposed a variation of this reform in 1958.  The Rules Committee 
expansion was necessary to promote the consideration of legislation symbolically and 
substantively important to the growing base of liberal and African-American voters in the 
Democratic party.  This group-driven change is merely one example of the institutions of 
Congress adapting to represent the views of an emerging constituency group and their 
representatives.    
Extensive political science research on the legislative branch throughout the twentieth 
century and beyond has been driven by questions about Congress’s institutional and policy 
                                                          
2 The Rules Committee sets the terms of floor debate in the House of Representatives.   
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responsiveness to new interests.  How does Congress adapt to the emergence of new groups?  Do 
policy goals motivate members to support institutional change in Congress?  How do rules and 
procedures change to further new policy goals?  The historic reforms of the 1970s in the House of 
Representatives, which dramatically redistributed power between committee chairs, party leaders, 
and rank and file members, fostered a robust subfield on these questions.  Nearly all research 
based at least in part on this significant period of legislative change concluded that the Congress 
is not immune to the emergence of new groups or interests in American politics.  On the contrary, 
institutional change and group interests are irrevocably linked.   
In this chapter, I examine how and why the emergence of new groups of likeminded 
members serve as the primary “agents of change” in the U.S. Congress, and specifically in the 
House of Representatives.3  In so doing, a puzzle emerges in political science approaches to 
understanding the dynamics of institutional change and the role, agency, and responsibility of 
new factions or groups in leading challenges to the status quo.  New groups emerge more often 
than Congress undergoes major institutional change.  Why are some groups empowered to 
successfully force change in Congress, while other groups struggle and often fail to do so?  
Prevailing explanations of change predicated on the impact of group size and internal 
cohesiveness in empowering groups falls short in answering this question.  I propose a 
moderating theory of factional-driven institutional change that accounts for the role of 
organization in empowering groups to successfully challenge congressional institutions.  The 
theory is tested here against the most recent case of grassroots, factional-driven change in 
                                                          
3 This project focuses on the House of Representatives, but the Senate provides an obvious and 
undoubtedly important future extension of this research.  There are many reasons to expect that the theory 
offered here about the role of organization in empowering group influence will not be upheld within the 
Senate – simply put, many of the hurdles to minority power, group influence, and junior member 
participation are not present in the Senate.  However, anecdotal evidence uncovered in the course of this 
project provides an alternative view.  Junior senators faced many of the same hurdles to influence – 
committee chairs opposed to their policy goals, informational asymmetries, etc. (see chapter 7 for more 
information).    
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Congress – the case of liberal Democrats and the 1970s reform era in the House.  In this chapter, I 
review previous work on institutional change, explain my theoretical and empirical contribution, 
and conclude with a brief introduction to the organization of liberal Democrats in the House, the 
Democratic Study Group (DSG), and an outline of the chapters to follow.   
Institutional Approaches to Change in Congress 
The close temporal and spatial relationship between the emergence of new factions in 
Congress and the adoption of major institutional changes has led many scholars to conclude that 
these two phenomena are causally related (Rohde 1991; Schickler 2001; Wright 2000; Aldrich 
1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003).  In these accounts, parties 
are comprised of certain groups (or factions) with overlapping goals, and parties are motivated to 
pursue these overlapping goals.  Institutional change emerges when the internal party 
composition shifts, new incentives develop, and party structures need to adapt to facilitate the 
pursuit of these new overlapping goals. These theoretical accounts of institutional change 
generally fall into three schools of thought based on their assessment of the internal composition 
and motivations of party elites.  In nearly all political science theories of change however, the 
incentives and motivations of legislators remain paramount, and processes of change are usually 
overlooked. 
The first school analyzes institutional change in Congress through the lens of ideology 
and a rational choice paradigm.  Conditional party government theory (CPG) is the most well-
known of theories in this literature (Rohde 1991).  CPG uses changes in congressional rules and 
procedures as a framework for understanding party strength over time in the House, and suggests 
that centralized party power is “conditional” on the relative ideological homogeneity of the 
majority party.  Parties have an incentive to centralize power (such as empowering the Speaker to 
make appointments to the Rules Committee) within the leadership when party members generally 
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agree on policy matters; they have an incentive to decentralize power (to committee chairs) when 
they do not agree on policy.  Rohde (1991) and Rohde and Aldrich (2000) argue that the growth 
of strong, centralized parties through internally passed reforms is the result of increased 
ideological homogeneity within both parties.  Neither party groups nor factions play a large 
explicit role, rather the aggregate distribution of preferences within the party is most important.   
The second school of thought (DiSalvo 2012; Wright 2000; Schickler 2001; Schickler, 
McGhee and Sides 2003) places group or factional interests at the center of institutional change 
(though electoral goals remain important). Wright (2000) relies on interest group theory to argue 
that rules changes promoting specific policy outcomes are the result of pressure from organized 
interests.  Party elites observe the prevailing preferences of “intense policy demanders” and make 
strategic decisions in anticipation of these preferences (a theory expanded on in Cohen et al. 
2007).  Schickler’s Disjointed Pluralism (2001) builds on accounts that emphasize the emergence 
of new groups (termed “interests”) in explaining congressional reform over time, but provides an 
explicit role for strategic decision-making and leadership in his model of change.  Schickler 
argues that reform coalitions are often comprised of a diverse set of interests with some 
underlying shared goal, and are often quite temporary.  Rule and procedural reform is therefore 
usually incremental and piecemeal, accomplished through changes that are layered onto pre-
existing institutional structures.  While all large groups struggle to sustain long-term coordinated 
action, the diversity of interests inherent to most reform coalitions limit the extent and speed 
through which institutional change develops in Congress.  Schickler, McGhee and Sides (2003) 
build on this work and explain individual-level support for the passage of reform.  While prior 
research emphasized group size and policy goals in driving reform, Schickler and colleagues 
marshal new data on member preferences for reform to account for the role of power and 
ambition in driving institutional change.  Their work suggests that a large influx of junior 
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members may spur rules changes, especially changes to increase the participation of rank and file 
members.   
In recent years, a third set of theories (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; DiSalvo 2012) 
developed to bridge these two schools of thought on the drivers of institutional change and the 
role of party factions.  Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) argue that institutional rules provide an 
incentive for party members to work together and delegate power to a central authority (party 
leaders and committee chairs).  While the Cartel Model does not seek to explain historical 
procedural change to the extent of other theories, Cox and McCubbins argue that when the 
relationship between rank and file members and the central authority changes, ideologically-
based groups within the party are responsible for leading the charge.  The reforms of the 1970s, 
for example, are a “predictable consequence of the shrinkage and liberalization of the southern 
wing of the [Democratic] party” (1993, 278).  DiSalvo (2012) builds on the Cartel Model 
framework to argue that intraparty competition between factions, or a single faction and the rest 
of the party, fuels changes to the party’s ideological coalition, leadership, and “brand name.”  
Here the congressional literature’s emphasis on power battles between party and committee 
leaders, and the rank and file, is supplanted with a focus on the shifting power of factions within 
the party.  It is the competition between groups (each rooted in their own ideology) that is 
fundamental to understanding party change over time.     
All three schools of thought on the drivers of institutional change in Congress suggest 
that the emergence of new groups and changing ideological coalitions within parties set into 
motion a series of conflicts and/or incentive structure changes.  These changes precipitate the 
adoption of necessary compensatory institutional changes to ensure policy output reflects new 
preferences.  The drive to fulfill power, electoral, and policy goals – in varying degrees of 
importance – underscore all members’ incentives and motivations. Research on historical reforms 
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has revealed significant evidence in support of a causal relationship between the emergence of 
new groups, and rule and procedural changes in Congress (especially Schickler 2001, Rohde 
1991; and Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003).  And yet, the historical success of factions at 
precipitating major procedural, policy, and leadership change in a stagnant institution like 
Congress reveals a significant puzzle in our understanding of broader processes of institutional 
change.   
New groups emerge in political parties far more often than the institutions of Congress 
undergo major reform.  In the past one hundred years, Congress has only organized three Joint 
Committees on the Organization of Congress (1945-1947, 1965-1966, and 1993-1994) to study 
and propose changes to the structure of the legislative branch.  And despite numerous other 
demographic, ideological, and geographic changes in both parties’ electoral coalitions, the most 
significant rules changes in the House can be isolated to two specific time periods: 1970-1975 
(amidst Nixon’s impeachment and the election of the Watergate Babies) and 1995 (in response to 
Republicans’ takeover of the House after 40 years in the minority).  If the 1970s reforms 
gradually gave rise to strong, centralized party power, Speaker Newt Gingrich’s (R-GA)’s swift 
turn towards leadership consolidation in 1995 largely did away with any pretense of reform as the 
product of careful majority party study.4  Even the most cursory review of recent congressional 
history would reveal the emergence of numerous other factions and groups without corresponding 
rules changes.  In recent years, the rise of Hispanic Americans as a critical voting bloc, 
enthusiastically fought over by both Democrats and Republicans alike, has not spurred changes to 
congressional rules that would promote immigration reform – a policy goal of particular interest 
to that group.  And the emergence of the “Tea Party” in the Republican Party in 2010 did not lead 
to major rule and procedural changes to promote their policy goals; if anything, Republican 
                                                          
4 See chapter 8 for more information about the 1995 Republican reforms.   
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leaders often used existing rules to suppress Tea Party legislation.  These dynamics suggest that 
there are hurdles to change that not all groups can successfully overcome.   
The assumptions underlying group-based models of change rarely comport with the 
realities of group organization and coordination, the legislative environment and the slow pace of 
institutional change, or factional politics.  Why should we automatically expect the members of 
factions to recognize the benefits of working together – and choose to do so – when all members 
regularly struggle to do this?  In theory, legislative parties solve the collective action problem 
inherent to any large group (Olson 1965) by controlling the flow of selective benefits to 
contributing members of the party.  Committee assignments, campaign funds, floor votes on 
legislation, plum office space – these benefits all flow from an agreement among party members 
that the party will subsidize pursuit of their goals if they participate and contribute to the pursuit 
of shared party goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Peabody 1967; Pearson 2015).  Factions 
in Congress do not have the same inherent leverage over their members or natural ideological 
allies. Factional leaders cannot simply force their allies to work with them, and the selective 
benefits necessary to motivate participation are not inherent to any large group, no matter their 
internal cohesion.  Coordination between ideological allies and partisans doesn’t simply happen.  
And the assumption that groups will automatically work together to reform Congress when their 
interests are at stake obscures how difficult reform actually is to achieve.   
Recent research outside of the spatial, group-driven schools of thought underscores these 
difficulties, and highlights the role of overlapping political, economic, and social phenomena in 
explaining long-term institutional change.  This research suggests that the struggle between 
institutions, as well as cultural and historical developments outside the legislative branch, explain 
shifts in internal institutional rules and procedures.  Historian Julian Zelizer (2004), for example, 
critiques the political science literature for its focus on member motivations without an 
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appreciation for the difficult, slow-moving dynamics of institutional change.  Zelizer argues that 
change to how government works is the result of a “slow reconfiguration of the relationship 
between different political institutions as well as on shifts in the national culture” (2004, 3).  The 
“protracted struggle” between these institutions (including the executive branch) and changes 
outside of Congress leads to significant internal restructuring of rules and procedures.   
Polsby’s (2003) account of recent congressional history highlights one of these cultural 
shifts, which links electoral and demographic developments in the American south (which in turn 
shaped the electoral and policy goals of the Democratic and Republican parties) to a 
technological development entirely out of the hands of members of Congress.  The rise and 
spread of air conditioning, Polsby argues, precipitated a historic migration of (largely white) 
Republicans to the south, as well as corresponding economic changes, including the spread of 
manufacturing jobs to the south.  Gradually, these changes shaped the ideological and electoral 
coalitions in both parties; in turn, the institutions of Congress adopted compensatory changes to 
reflect new electoral and policy aims.   
Polsby’s account (along with Wright (2000) and others) suggests that institutional change 
is driven by, in spatial terms, exogenous factors.  But recent work by Jenkins and Stewart (2007) 
on the rise and development of the Speakership in the House argues that institutional change is 
uniquely endogenous (though their account does not foreclose the role of external factors).  
Jenkins and Stewart argue that the procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) considered 
critical by most scholars to contemporary agenda-setting processes was preceded by the 
development of an “organizational cartel.”  Before the majority party could monopolize agenda-
setting in Congress, they first had to monopolize organizational power in Congress (in other 
words, the power to decide who has power).  Most research on reform does not distinguish 
between procedural control over the legislative process and organizational control over the 
11 
 
leadership offices of the legislature.  Jenkins and Stewart’s close examination of the historical 
development of the Speaker and other leadership offices reveal that political parties developed 
organizational control long before they developed agenda control, suggesting that organization 
empowered party coalitions to pursue their mutual legislative goals.   
The diverse theoretical accounts of congressional reform cited above reveal a significant 
puzzle in theories of institutional change in Congress.  If the emergence of new groups or 
elections reveal apparent shifts in public opinion, why does Congress so rarely adopt rules 
changes?  Why do so many groups fail? Existing theories of reform that proffer new groups as the 
singular agents of change in Congress often fail to appreciate the many, significant hurdles that 
confront groups desiring to change the status quo (though see Schickler 2001, Stewart and 
Jenkins 2007, and Zelizer 2004 for an exception). If groups shape the capacity of congressional 
institutions to change – as so many assert – so too do congressional institutions shape the capacity 
of groups.  Congress was designed to make it difficult for groups to develop a majority or gain 
enough power to significantly influence the institution.  Over time, it has evolved to make it 
nearly impossible.   
Expectations of Failure: Hurdles to Change in Congress 
When a new faction emerges in the House to call for change to the status quo, close 
observers of Congress have every reason to expect the group to fail in their efforts over the long-
term.5  The founders designed the institution of Congress to make it difficult for new groups to 
                                                          
5 In most cases, it is not analytically or theoretically useful to categorize the “success” and “failure” of 
groups in stark, dichotomous terms. Even if a group “fails” in achieving passage of their policy agenda, 
they may succeed in accomplishing a compromise between their preferred position and the status quo, or 
they may succeed in “softening” the conditions necessary for consideration of their goals in the future.  
Failure can also be understood in other terms, including local vs. national (or legislative vs. judicial) 
change, and short vs. long-term change.  Here I define failure broadly to denote those cases where factions 
of members united by some shared agenda fail to achieve that agenda in their party in Congress over a 
long-term period.    
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gain enough power to effect substantial change to the processes governing the institution or 
relevant policy output.  And over time, Congress has evolved to make it even more difficult for 
minority factions and groups representing marginalized interests to achieve consideration of their 
policy goals.  The majoritarian House of Representatives places numerous hurdles before groups 
desiring to challenge the status quo.  In conventional models of institutional change, the number 
and magnitude of the hurdles confronting groups and individuals pushing for procedural, policy, 
and leadership change in Congress are often obscured. Moreover, hurdles to minority 
representation are compounded by the fact that new or changing policy preferences are most 
likely to emerge among new and junior members in Congress – a group that is least likely to have 
access to the formal levers of power, even in the post-reform House.  Indeed, these barriers 
underscore why grassroots-based change efforts in the House are so rare, and suggest that most 
factions will fail in their efforts to achieve their goals over the long-term.6  Change is not 
inevitable, and absent an understanding of these barriers – and how groups historically have 
overcome them – strategic pathways to repairing the “broken branch” remain obscured.   
The democratic ideal of Congress as a legislative body that develops and marshals policy 
expertise among many members to promote quality legislation has always been just that – an 
ideal.  Historically, congressional rules and norms have promoted the participation, power and 
leadership of the few.  New groups struggle to break into this existing cycle of participation – if 
they try to challenge it, we have every reason to expect them to fail.  Below, I explain the specific 
hurdles confronting factions in Congress. 
Seniority Norms. Arguably the most persistent challenge to factional interests throughout 
much of the twentieth century is the seniority system (Polsby 2004).  Seniority was the largely 
                                                          
6 Most reform efforts in the House are initiated and led by party leaders, including recent efforts by 
Speakers Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and Dennis Hastert (R-IL), and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).  
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unwritten norm that committees would be headed by the member with the most years of service 
on the committee.  Accountable to only their own constituents back home, the seniority system 
provided no mechanism to force out chairs (or ranking members) unrepresentative of, or 
unaccountable to their party, nor could the party challenge members too old to fulfill the 
responsibilities of the chair.  The growth of careerism in the House throughout the twentieth 
century led to and reinforced these patterns of leadership (Hibbing 1991).  As a result, the central 
locus of policy leadership and power was unobtainable to not only junior members, but many 
mid-seniority career members.  And over time, incumbent chairs – and those next in line – had 
enough of a stake in the system that they had little reason to accept or support challenges to their 
own (anticipated) power.    
Majority Status.  Majority party status – or the pursuit of majority party status – provides 
a strong incentive to suppress factional interests within legislative parties.  Party leaders in 
particular, are often among the most significant agents of opposition to new factions and 
individual members desiring to improve representation of their interests in legislation, or to push 
for institutional reform to ease the consideration and passage of legislation reflective of their 
interests.  Historically, party leaders have been far more moderate – ideological “middlemen” 
(Harris and Nelson 2008) – than the rest of their party.  While moderate leaders are logical 
choices for parties with deep internal cleavages, they often make procedural and policy change 
within parties extraordinarily difficult.  Leaders desiring to maintain their coalition of support 
within the party must tread carefully and avoid angering any one specific faction within the party.  
Speaker Sam Rayburn’s (D-TX) reticence to support any major challenges to committee chairs 
throughout the late 1950s reflects the careful balance he strived to maintain between southern 
conservatives, western and mid-western liberals, and urban, big machine Democrats (Polsby 
2004). Majority party leaders (the Majority Leader in consultation with the Speaker) offer the 
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resolution setting the rules at the start of each Congress, and have significant prerogative to 
construct the rules to maintain – rather than challenge – the existing party coalition.     
Moreover, Congress is designed to make major leadership turnover in Congress 
exceedingly rare. frequent leadership turnover signals to the public (and the media) an instability 
within the party, which hinders majority party status (or the pursuit of majority party status) 
(Peabody 1967; Cox and McCubbins 1993).   Incumbent party leaders have a number of 
advantages that make it difficult for their fellow partisans to challenge them, including the ability 
to “grant favors, create obligations, and build credit,” in addition to the ability to sanction 
members by “withholding of patronage and the vetoing of committee assignments” (Peabody 
1967, 678).  Factions confronted an institutional environment fraught with potential risks if they 
choose to challenge leaders.  And throughout the twentieth century, many of these self-
reinforcing advantages extended to committee leaders as well.  In 1971, for example, District 
Committee Chair John L. McMillian (D-SC) punished two members of his committee, Reps. 
Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) and Andrew Jacob Jr. (D-IN), for their efforts to bypass his seniority 
to install second-ranking committee member Charlie Diggs (D-MI) as chairman.  In response, 
McMillian punished both members for their challenge to his seniority by disregarding their own.  
6th-ranking Fraser and 7th-ranking Jacobs were next in line for subcommittee chairmanships on 
the District Committee.   
Access to information. The overlapping historical phenomena of committee government 
and seniority norms created stark informational asymmetries between junior and senior members, 
and committee chairs and rank and file members.  The Democratic leadership did not develop 
their own independent legislative research or information services until the party lost their 
majority in 1994 – all legislative information stemmed from the committee system.  Committee 
reports were generally too long for members not on the committee to read prior to a vote (let 
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alone members who actually served on the committee), were too legalistic, and tended to suppress 
key divisions or points of controversy within the committee itself.  Junior members were 
especially reliant on committee reports for information about legislation because they did not 
have committee or subcommittee staffs of their own to conduct their own independent research.   
The (real or perceived) disorganization of the parliamentarian’s office posed another 
informational disadvantage for junior members.  The official compilation of congressional 
precedents was not updated between 1946 and 1971, and most precedents were stored on loose 
leaf paper (in single copy bound books) in the parliamentarian’s office.  If members wanted to 
craft complicated legislative strategy – perhaps on a bill that might need to bypass its original 
committee of jurisdiction – they would have to go to the parliamentarian’s office in-person to 
research past precedent.  This created an advantage for senior members with better firsthand 
knowledge and experience with precedent – a fact that was acknowledged by former 
Parliamentarian Lewis Deschler in the foreword to what became known as Deschler’s Precedents: 
“In the past, the older and more experienced members have held an obvious advantage over 
younger Members who had not yet mastered the necessary parliamentary skills” (1971, IX-X, 
emphasis added).    
Party meetings.  Party bylaws pose another frequent hurdle to change.  Historically, the 
two parties were procedural coalitions that met once a Congress to elect their leaders and cast a 
perfunctory vote on the rules package arranged by the majority leadership.  There was no regular 
meeting requirement within the party.  Attendance has never been mandated, and often drops 
propitiously after votes for leadership races are cast.  In theory, these once-a-Congress meetings 
provided an opportunity for members to engage with one and other, and party and committee 
leaders, and discuss potential changes to House rules.  However, the agenda was set by the 
leadership and the meeting abruptly ended after the votes were cast on leadership races and the 
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rules package.  After the organizing meeting in January, there were no formal opportunities for 
rank and file members to interact with and question the inner structure or policies of their party.   
Rules enforcement. Party leaders are granted significant prerogative to determine how 
(and sometimes whether to) enforce party rules.  On the House floor, the parliamentarian serves 
as a constant check on the appropriate application and interpretation of existing rules.7  Inside the 
party caucuses however, enforcement has been comparatively far more lax. Moreover, 
historically leaders have expressed significant opposition to the initial passage of many major 
institutional reforms, including Speaker Carl Albert’s opposition to the change empowering 
himself to appoint majority party members of the Rules Committee (in 1974) and Majority 
Leader (and later Speaker) O’Neill’s steadfast opposition to the transition from an appointed to an 
elected Democratic whip (throughout the 1970s and 1980s).8  Leaders have been reluctant to 
enforce many rules changes throughout the mid-twentieth century, including rules relating to 
regular party meetings, using the caucus to instruct committee members, and the responsibilities 
of party steering and policy committees.9  Some rules have also been enforced differently than 
they were intended.  For example, while rules changes that empower the Speaker to appoint 
                                                          
7 It is important to note that even some House rules are open to interpretation and/or sporadic enforcement.  
For example, rules providing for a layover period for conference reports (ostensibly to give members and 
their staff time to read them) prior to a vote are open to wide interpretation.  Do weekends and holidays 
count as part of a three-day layover period?    
8 Speaker Albert was opposed to empowering himself to appoint majority party members of the Rules 
Committee and spoke out against the rules change immediately before the Caucus vote approving it 
(“Many House Democrats Critical of New Leaders,” New York Times, June 6, 1973, DSG papers, Part II, 
box 122, folder 8: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Pierson, John, “Shaking Up the House: Will It 
Help?”, Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1974.). The proposal to transition to an elected majority whip 
received considerable leadership opposition, including by then-Majority Leader Tip O’Neill who spoke out 
vociferously against it (January 4, 1974 Transcript of the Democratic Caucus Organizational Meeting, 
discussion of Rosenthal and Hays’ amendments to elect the whip, Part II, box 136, folder 4.) O’Neill 
viewed it as a personal attack on his power, as one of the powers of the Majority Leader was the 
appointment of the whip.   
9 For example, party leaders expressed their opposition to regular meetings of the Democratic Caucus by 
encouraging Caucus chairs to cancel as many meetings as possible (August 6th, 2015 interview with a 
congressional staffer working for the Democratic leadership in the 1970s). 
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members of key committees and the Steering and Policy Committee are intended to 
geographically, ideologically or otherwise balance the committee membership, they may be used 
to weaken the underlying committee.  For example, the Democratic Steering & Policy Committee 
is viewed by many as an institution strategically rendered ineffective because of leadership 
appointments – contrary to liberal reformers’ intention to create a strong and robust agenda-
setting committee within the party.10   
Hurdles Confronting Factions in the Contemporary U.S. Congress 
In recent decades, the U.S. Congress has further evolved to make it even more difficult 
for new groups to develop the power necessary to pursue their mutual goals. Most of the hurdles 
listed above remain true, but power and informational asymmetries between party leaders and 
rank and file members have only grown.   
Today, party power has been heavily centralized to further limit the role and participation 
of individual members.  Party leaders rigidly control the floor schedule (and thus which 
legislation receives an on the record vote). Legislation that might internally divide party members 
is likely to be suppressed by party leaders (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  And most legislation is 
authored by party leaders, and the committee system as a site where members’ expertise is 
                                                          
10 The archival record and interviews with current and former congressional staffers characterize leadership 
appointments as rendering S&P so divided that it is unlikely the group would ever be able to reach a 
consensus (and thus affect policy change) ((August 6th Interview with a congressional staffer; April 16, 
1974 “Memo to Myself” written by Richard Conlon, DSG Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 7). A weak and 
ineffectual S&P is different than originally intended by the liberal reformers who campaigned for its 
creation. For example, in a 1977 Democratic Caucus meeting, Rep. Neal Smith described the 
representational differences between S&P and The Committee on Organization, Study and Review (which 
he believed operated the way it was intended): “The Steering Committee does not represent the Caucus. It 
represents the leadership. We have the trickle-down theory for the Steering Committee…We wanted the 
Steering Committee to be the other way around, but…the leadership controls the Steering Committee. The 
leadership controls the Rules Committee and that is the way it ought to be, but the only way a cross-section 
of this Caucus can have its views reflected is through this Committee on Organization and Review [the 
Committee on Organization, Study and Review, or OSR].” DSG papers, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C. Part II, box 139, folder 1.   
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employed to draft quality legislation has been incredibly weakened (Sinclair 2011).  Junior 
members outside of the leadership’s inner circle or without regular access to the leadership 
struggle to seek consideration or passage of legislation they authored.  The declining power and 
efficacy of committees has limited the ability of factions to improve the party’s responsiveness to 
their interests by promoting their representatives into leadership positions.  Whereas in the past, 
factions could increase responsiveness by shepherding their leaders on to exclusive committees 
and committee chair positions, this strategy is now less effective. Committee positions are simply 
less useful than they used to be (Sinclair 1999, 2011).   
Though parties infrequently replace their leaders, leadership turnover continues to pose a 
threat to the party brand and discourages the expression of minority views within parties.  Indeed, 
the development of the 24-hour news cycle brought a new intensity to any real or perceived 
division within legislative parties, and in particular the majority party.  The media’s constant 
“horserace style” coverage of the divisions within the Republican Conference in the 114th 
Congress, which culminated in a tumultuous month-long October 2015 leadership race, 
underscores this new reality.  In many ways, parties have adapted by providing leaders with a 
considerable number of rewards and sanctions to maintain their leadership position and suppress 
dissension among the ranks (Pearson 2015).  It is simply easier for leaders to punish those 
partisans who don’t fall in line and support party goals and leaders. And there are significant 
limits to the capacity of factions to leverage their votes in leadership races to pressure party 
leaders to enforce existing rules or support legislation that reflects their constituents’ interests.  
The numerous failed historical attempts by factions to challenge their leaders by casting 
opposition votes before the party or on the House floor is a testament to both the difficult of this 
strategy and the fraught incentives for the faction’s allies to support their leaders despite policy 
differences.  In 2015, Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) decision to remove 2 Republican members 
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of the Rules Committee (Reps. Daniel Webster and Richard Nugent) was widely viewed as 
punishment for their insurgency against his leadership, as Webster had run against Boehner for 
Speaker with Nugent’s support (Sherman and Bresnahan 2015).  Punishments like these can 
ultimately hinder members’ re-election efforts.  Boehner’s removal of Tea Party and Freedom 
Caucus member, Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-KS), from the Agriculture Committee in 2012 – a 
political imperative for his rural, farming district – is widely believed to have contributed to his 
primary loss in 2016.  Rep. Huelskamp, who also received a primary challenge in 2014, 
repeatedly criticized Boehner on a wide range of issues, including numerous budgetary matters, 
and helped lead efforts to unseat him from January 2013 to his eventual resignation in 2015 
(Chokshi and Mele 2016).   
Moreover, party leaders increasingly discourage rank and file members from 
participating in this process or learning about House procedure altogether.  Former House 
parliamentarian, Charles Johnson, recalled in an interview: “When I first started [in 1964], the 
party leadership was not averse to allowing their members to be instructed through introductory 
seminars through our office. We would give to both sides upon request. But relatively recently, I 
would say parliamentarians’ exposure to new members for any in-depth discussion of 
procedures” is very limited.  Former Majority Leader Tom Delay (R-TX), in particular, “didn’t 
want the members to come be oriented by the Parliamentarians. And that’s been true ever 
since.”11   
Junior members continue to be less likely than more senior members to hold either party 
leadership positions, or to head committees (even after the 1970s reforms expanding 
subcommittee chairmanship positions) (Loomis 1984).  Junior members’ participation is 
                                                          
11 February 16, 2016 in-person interview. 
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handicapped throughout the legislative process.  They participate less in committee proceedings 
than more senior members (Hall 1996).  They have fewer resources to offer legislators to support 
their legislation (Evans 2004; Wawro 2004; Arnold 1990), and are far less likely to receive a 
floor vote on legislation they sponsored.   
And party members today still often lack a forum to meet, engage, and challenge their 
leaders.12  Even after the introduction of regular party meetings in the Democratic Caucus, it has 
never fully realized its potential as a forum for junior members or minority groups within the 
party to debate ideas with senior members and the majority, respectively.  While the efficacy and 
power of the Caucus undoubtedly increased over time (Rohde 1991), attendance often remained 
poor and leaders frequently cancelled regular meetings at will. 13  These conditions weakened the 
capacity of the Caucus as a mechanism of accountability for party leaders to their fellow partisans 
and the primary institutional forum for policy and rules changes to be considered.  A minority of 
members in both parties (40 in the Democratic Caucus) are empowered to call a meeting at any 
time, but a quorum (of a simple majority of the party) must be met prior to the conduct of official 
business.  In practice, this means that a majority of party members must already agree about the 
need for rules reform before the meeting can even be called.  Factions thus require – and often 
lack – the same resources and leadership necessary to insert new environmental or education 
policy legislation on the House agenda.  Rules change often require extensive consideration and 
study by staff and/or members (likely effects of the desired change, likelihood of passage before 
                                                          
12 I conducted multiple interviews with long-time congressional staffers (including current and recent 
staffers) and they all confirmed that the Democratic Caucus never became a forum for members to debate 
with one and other, and with the leadership. A core group of members routinely attended and participated 
in meetings, but Caucus meetings rarely met a quorum.  The archival record also confirms that Members 
routinely commiserated with one and other about how Caucus meetings had become a place for the 
leadership to tell them how to vote, rather than a place to talk about the substance of legislation.  
13 And when attendance did not appear to constitute a quorum of members (a simple majority of 
Democrats), a single member could call for a quorum.  If the quorum was not met, the meeting was 
immediately called to a close.   
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the Caucus and/or on the House floor, and so forth); lobbying to the leadership to support the 
changes (or conversely, in the case of leadership-led reform, lobbying by the leadership to 
individual members); the construction of coalitions of members likely to support the proposed 
changes; and materials prepared (and speakers recruited) to advocate on behalf of the proposed 
changes, and to rebut arguments against the proposed changes.   
Existing caucus rules also provide party leaders with significant agenda-setting power to 
shape potential rules changes.  In theory, all majority party rank and file members can introduce 
measures designed to change party and House rules, but party leaders have the right of first 
recognition to offer rules changes in party organizational meetings in November and December 
after the election (prior to the start of the new Congress).14 This agenda-setting power is 
advantageous in two ways. First, the right of first recognition empowers party leaders to weaken 
or expand the scope of proposed changes to their benefit.  The Democratic Caucus bylaws require 
that members provide advance notification of any item offered by members.  If leaders are 
opposed to a proposed rules change, they can offer a modified or weakened version of the 
proposed change at the beginning of the meeting (limiting vote support for subsequent stronger 
rule change proposals), or refer it for consideration by a Caucus committee (which usually, 
though not always results in killing the proposal).15  Resolutions offered by party leaders are more 
likely to be considered before a quorum of the party, whereas rules change resolutions at the 
bottom of the meeting agenda may not be considered whatsoever.  The result is that party bylaws 
                                                          
14 Historically, party organizational meetings occurred in January immediately prior to the start of the new 
Congress.  The meetings were shifted to November and December to give the party more time to conduct 
party business before the new Congress.   
15 The archival record is rife with numerous examples of these leadership rules strategies. In the mid-1970s, 
Richard Bolling’s proposal to dramatically change committee jurisdictions (as part of the 1973-74 House 
Select Committee on Committees) was referred to the Democratic Caucus Committee on Organization, 
Study and Review (known as OSR), which was effectively viewed as a death-knell for the bill. It was 
widely acknowledged that the effect of OSR’s review would be the failure of much of Bolling’s proposal in 
the Caucus debate on the resolution to forward the proposal.   
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(and party norms) empower leaders with significant prerogative to shape the slate of rules 
changes considered each congress.  And rules enforcement continues to serve as an obstacle to 
many factions – issues that continue to reverberate in the 114th Congress.16  During his five years 
as Speaker, Boehner exercised his prerogative (as many leaders had before him) to enforce party 
rules however he believed to be most effective within the bounds of his institutional 
responsibilities.  In the House Freedom Caucus’s near constant criticism of Boehner, the focus 
was largely on the lack of rules enforcement by party leaders – a chorus of pleas for a “return to 
regular order” – not necessarily demands for the passage of new rules (Sherman 2015).17   
Ethics reforms over the past couple decades has made it increasingly difficult for 
members to build alliances with one and other, or with groups outside of Congress. 18 The 
abolition of legislative service organizations (LSOs) in December 1994 upon the election of a 
Republican majority in the House for the first time in forty years placed a significant barrier 
before members interested in coordinated action with other members of either party.19  The LSO 
designation allowed members to conduct line item appropriations from their personal office 
                                                          
16 The motivation for leadership support varies from theory to theory.  Conditional party government 
theory, for example, assumes that rank and file members have an incentive to support rules changes that 
empower their party leaders when the party is relatively ideologically unified, whereas they have an 
incentive to support rules changes that empower committee chairs when the party is relatively ideologically 
diverse.  While leadership support or opposition is not an explicit part of CPG, leadership incentives likely 
mirror those of rank and file members (i.e. leaders are likely driven to support the changes to receive the 
support of their party in their own leadership race).  Wright (2000), on the other hand, assumes that 
electoral incentives drives leadership support for rules changes.  If interest groups important to the party 
support rules changes, then leaders interested in maintaining their party’s majority status (and by extension, 
their own leadership post), will support those changes too.   
17 It is worth noting that some of these “rules” are norms of practice, rather than rules formally inscribed in 
party bylaws or House procedure.  
18 I do not comment on the efficacy of these changes here – I merely want to stress that these rules changes 
have made it more difficult for organized groups in Congress to work together and with interests outside of 
Congress.   
19 Today, member groups register as congressional member organizations, or CMOs.  CMOs may not have 
a separate website or office space, access to franking privileges, or stationary resources (though the group’s 
leader may devote a page on their own personal website for the group’s official purpose).  A member’s 
staff may devote some official worktime to a CMO, but it cannot constitute their primary professional 
responsibilities.   
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budget for official groups in Congress.  In practice, the policy enabled members to pool financial 
resources together to pursue their collective goals.  It was also especially advantageous for junior 
members who did not have a committee or subcommittee staff at their disposal in addition to their 
personal staff.  As a result, leaders of both parties viewed LSOs as a threat to their power and 
capacity to get their fellow partisans to vote the party line (Kernell 1997).20  Some member 
groups that existed prior to the abolition of LSOs created external foundations to support and 
fund their activities, including groups like the Congressional Black Caucus (Singh 1998), but this 
poses a significant hurdle for new groups without resources to develop these external resource 
bases.  Other ethics reforms have made it more difficult for members to form alliances and share 
information with interest groups outside of Congress. 
The House of Representatives is rife with embedded power and informational 
asymmetries that make it difficult for members to achieve their goals individually or in 
coordination with likeminded allies.  They were prominent in recent historical eras, and they have 
only grown over time.  The hurdles described in the pages above are only a small number of those 
confronting party factions and individual members in pursuit of changes to congressional rules, 
structures and byways, or to improve representation of marginalized or under-represented 
interests.  They limit the ability of groups to mobilize likeminded allies, to coordinate their efforts 
with other members or groups, to move their representatives into formal leadership positions, or 
to improve representation of their constituency groups in legislation passed by Congress.  And 
they limit the ability of these groups to push for the passage of procedural and rules reform that 
would enable better representation of their own and their constituents’ interests.  Group size and 
                                                          
20 The hesitation party leaders felt towards LSOs was confirmed in numerous interviews throughout the 
course of this research.  One staffer (August 6, 2015) described the leadership’s “wariness” this way: “No 
leadership wanted a significant power base that is outside of the leadership.”      
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ideological cohesiveness are necessary conditions for group power in Congress, but they are 
alone insufficient to foster the intra-party competition necessary for institutional change.   
 
Beyond Institutional Explanations of Change in Congress 
In its simplest terms, this project argues that the capacity of groups to serve as critical 
‘agents’ of change in Congress is moderated by their organizational capacity.  Group size and 
ideological cohesion are necessary, but alone insufficient conditions to overcome the institutional 
hurdles to change.  Institutional change is hard.  Most groups do not have the internal strength to 
consistently pursue coordinated action – let alone to resolve their internal differences and work 
together in a legislative environment that rewards members for keeping their head down and 
punishes them for not falling in line.  Change is not a “predictable” or passive process that 
naturally develops when new groups emerge or policy preferences shift in the majority party.  
The capacity of new groups to spur changes to rules and procedures, leadership pathways, and 
policy agendas, is predicated on their ability to work together and speak authoritatively as one.  In 
short, group effectiveness is a function of their level of organization.   
A strong internal infrastructure enables groups to capitalize on, and leverage, members’ 
shared resources, expertise, and enthusiasm in the pursuit of their shared goals.  More 
specifically, group organization is the development of mechanisms to promote members’ 
participation and contribution to the group; a regular resource stream to support group activities; a 
strong, representative leadership to advocate on behalf of group members; decision-making 
mechanisms to resolve conflict between group members; and tools to mobilize members when 
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their interests are at stake.21  The development of these features is a strategic and iterative choice 
made by members.  They are not inherent or naturally developed by groups – no matter their size 
or internal cohesiveness – nor are they the consequence of a static, one-time decision with infinite 
returns.22  Indeed, likeminded members require a specific set of internal structures to overcome 
the realities of group politics (Olson 1965; Weinstein 1969; DiSalvo 2011), and participation in 
Congress (Hall 1998).   
The theory of factional-driven change offered here builds upon existing models that 
suggest the emergence of new groups within parties set into motion a series of conflicts and/or 
incentive structure changes that precipitate the adoption of necessary compensatory institutional 
changes to ensure policy output reflects new preferences.  However, I depart from this literature 
in three respects.  
First, I re-conceive of institutional change in Congress (the outcome of interest here) as a 
process with a series of distinct steps.  Dominant theories of institutional change view the 
adoption of new rules – and subsequent changes to public policy and leadership pipelines – as a 
static event that occurs when enough likeminded members are elected to office (Rohde 1991; Cox 
and McCubbins 1991).  The congressional reform literature continues to reflect Kingdon’s 1984 
critique – “pre-decision processes remain relatively uncharted territory” (1).   The theory offered 
here expands beyond the individual votes cast by members to reform rules and procedures.   
Existing models are right to emphasize observable outcomes such as these, but they often 
overlook the important “pre-decision processes” that occur before rules changes ever come to a 
                                                          
21 These five dimensions of organization are mutually reinforcing, and strength along one dimension 
alternatively strengthens and compensates for weaknesses along another.   
22 The internal composition of Congress changes with each election every two years.  The start of each 
congress brings a new set of group members and leaders who must make a renewed decision to work 
together and develop their own strategies to do so.   
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vote.  I provide evidence that institutional change in Congress is a preceded by a complex series 
of specific, observable steps not unlike the normal legislative process.   
Second, I re-center the role of party organizations (the primary explanatory concept here) 
within the study of Congress and theories of institutional change.  Whereas most approaches 
exclusively focus on institutions and various institutional arrangements, including seniority norms 
and the committee system, party organizations are an important site and source of power in the 
House in their own right.  Although critically positioned as part of V.O. Key’s (1964) tri-parte 
model of political parties, the decline of party organization in the states amidst the rise of 
candidate centered elections and party reforms inside and outside of Congress limited future 
research on parties as organizations.23  In light of these changes, political scientists concluded that 
party organizations are relatively weak – and thus the role of party organization in shaping 
institutional change in Congress itself was left unaddressed.  The theory of change adopted here 
re-centers the role of party organization as a site and source of power in the House independent of 
congressional institutions and institutional arrangements.   
And third, I restore the responsibility and agency for change in Congress to members of 
Congress themselves.  In contrast to some theoretical approach that assume grassroots-led 
institutional change is “inevitable” (and therefore arguably impossible in the contemporary era of 
ideologically homogeneous parties), members themselves can strategically develop and lead 
reform efforts.  The theory offered here restores the active role of individual members and groups 
as the central drivers of institutional change in Congress.  Existing models are right to place 
members themselves at the center of our understanding of institutional change (Rohde 1991; 
Jenkins and Stewart 2007; Schickler 2001; Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003), though their role 
                                                          
23 There has been a small but notable resurgence of studies of party organizations recently, including Seth 
Masket’s (2009) recent book on local party organizations.    
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is often far too passive.  Change to institutional rules and procedure is a uniquely member-driven 
affair. Historically, even the most engaged outside groups have been reticent to participate in 
efforts to change them.24   
Case Selection & the Democratic Study Group 
In most research studies, it is not appropriate to investigate research questions or test 
theories solely or primarily based on what might be called an “extreme” case (Gerring 2007).  
Extreme cases are unrepresentative of broader classes of cases, which makes generalizability 
difficult.  Extreme cases are however, analytically useful when the proposed theory links the 
phenomena of interest to an extreme case.  If the theory is not initially confirmed in an extreme 
case, it may not make sense to falsify the theory using other, typical cases.  Extreme case analysis 
is also appropriate when many of the parameters of interest itself are unknown – when we do not 
necessarily know what it is that distinguishes between the “extreme” and other cases.  Is the case 
extreme because it was observed a priori to be related to an extreme “effect,” or is it extreme 
because there is something unique about the case itself?  In these instances, extreme case analysis 
is appropriate.  The Democratic Study Group (DSG) is one such case.   
The Democratic Study Group, or DSG, was the official organization of liberal Democrats 
in the House of Representatives from 1959 to 1994, and leader of the 1970s reform era.  DSG was 
the first modern group of organized members inside the House, organizing prior the development 
of the congressional caucus and legislative organization systems, and groups such as the 
Republican Study Committee (1971) or the Congressional Black Caucus (1973).  But DSG was 
                                                          
24 In 1970, the legislative counsel for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Argyle Campbell, explained that the 
Chamber did not lobby on the Legislative Reorganization Act because they regarded it as “strictly an ‘in-
house’ matter. It would be much better for them (Members) to handle it themselves. Members should 
decide how they will conduct their legislative affairs and not outside pressure groups.” DSG papers, Part II, 
box 125, folder 2.  
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not merely a group of ideologically likeminded members.  It was a whip system that mobilized 
members to come to the floor when the Democratic system faltered.  It was a leadership platform 
for the most activist and ambitious liberal Democrats.  It was a resource-sharing arrangement 
between Democrats (and a small number of Republicans) to develop and distribute unbiased 
policy research.  DSG was much more than a sizable group of likeminded liberal Democrats – it 
was an organization intentionally designed to empower liberals to work together to achieve their 
mutual and individual goals.     
The reforms DSG oversaw have been the subject of extensive analysis by political 
scientists, but the organization and work of the group itself is more or less absent.  Most accounts 
of reform explicitly cite DSG’s work in drafting the committee and leadership reforms adopted in 
the 1970s.  Rohde writes that “The leadership of the DSG…initiated or articulated the case for 
most the changes the Democrats adopted” (1991, 19).  Polsby notes that “the Democratic Study 
Group (DSG) took the lead in proposing rules changes in the Democratic caucus” (2004, 57).  
And Schickler makes clear that “The DSG initiated the challenge to seniority in the late 1960s…” 
(2001, 231).  These accounts often make some note to the group’s information research services 
or its whip system, or detail the rationale behind some of DSG’s decision-making, but the focus 
on DSG is ancillary.  The full extent of the group’s role in reform is thus left unclear.  And the 
accounts of DSG that do exist begin in the late 1960s – a full decade after the group was founded.  
Organizational development is assumed as a precondition of the growing minority of liberals in 
the House, rather than treated as an analytical unit in its own right worthy of investigation.  This 
project is an attempt to change that.   
The focus on a sole case of reform enables me to probe in-depth the institutional 
conditions that motivate group organization, and the role of organization in promoting the intra-
party competition necessary to spur changes to institutional rules, norms, and structures.  And the 
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faction of liberal Democrats and the 1970s reform era in the House of Representatives is an 
especially ideal case to provide the first test of the moderating theory of factional-driven change 
offered above.  These reforms – the bulk of which were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s – 
occurred relatively recently in congressional history.  And they remain significant to party politics 
and the legislative process in the contemporary U.S. Congress – their impact still hard-felt in the 
current legislative environment.   
 
Methods 
It seems almost trite to note that this project has been conducted using a multi-method 
approach.  I spent approximately 10 months over a period of two and a half years conducting 
archival research at the Library of Congress on the DSG and House Democratic Caucus papers.  I 
read every single archival document in the DSG collection, totaling some 90,750 documents and 
spanning from the early 1950s to the early 1990s.  The initial three months constituted an 
extensive period of what Richard Fenno referred to as “soaking and poking” – an attempt to learn 
the tone and rhythms of a legislative office, intra-party politics, and a historical period by reading 
the documents key figures left behind.  From there, the project evolved into a systematic analysis 
whereby documents were read to identify the major institutional process or phenomena of interest 
they had bearing on, including processes of agenda-setting, information distribution, coalition-
building, leadership training, and so forth.  The scope of the archival collection necessitated these 
groupings, but it also strengthens the validity of the analyses presented here.  Analyses are 
developed and drawn from multiple archival documents, rather than any single document.  This 
approach also fostered significant within-case variation, whereby failed legislative fights, 
leadership races, and reform proposals, are readily apparent.  As these “failed” cases provide as 
much insight into processes of change as the “successful” cases do, I include several in the 
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empirical chapters that follow.   In addition to the official records maintained by the Library of 
Congress, one former DSG staffer passed on a small number of documents from their personal 
papers.  These documents date from 1994 and 1995, and are not part of the DSG archival 
collection.  Some materials were coded into empirical datasets to be combined with data taken 
from Congressional Quarterly and Thomas.gov, as well as existing congressional data sources, 
and analyzed in several of the empirical chapters.  These data were used to conduct the large-N 
statistical analyses presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5.    
One of the primary weaknesses of extensive reliance on archival materials, especially that 
of a single collection, is that the official record is often strategically left behind by policy actors, 
which can over- and under-state the importance of specific actors and groups during key events 
(George and Bennett 2005).  It may also be difficult to assess the extent to which the perspectives 
and views expressed in documents can be attributed to specific policymakers and not their staff 
members.  This project benefits greatly from the fact that the historical period covered here 
overlaps with a significant growth in the use of computers and printers to maintain records, and 
that DSG was – as one former staffer interviewed succinctly noted – “a paper generating 
organization.”  The DSG collection includes a wide variety of materials that would not be out of 
place in an average workplace, including receipts for coffee and ice, and handwritten notes passed 
between bored staffers during meetings, but also condolence letters to members upon the death of 
a loved one, and materials that would likely have caused embarrassment to members of Congress 
should they be made public.25  The extensive record of these sorts of materials increases my 
confidence in the “evidentiary value” of the archival papers.   
                                                          
25 A good example of materials that would cause embarrassment for Members is a whip call dated 
November 5, 1969 (4:45pm) that reads: “This is a DSG whip call. Please remind your member of the 
weekly DSG Beer Party and Orgy to be held Thursday night. This week the party will be a surprise one at 
John Rarick’s place. Dates are invited, of course, but no wives.” [Part I, box 71, folder 1: DSG Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.] The question of whether this whip call should be taken at face 
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I strive to simultaneously rely on what might be termed “public documents” (press 
releases, research reports, speeches) and “private documents” (memos and letters between 
members, meeting minutes, transcripts of party meetings).  To the extent possible, I also 
incorporate materials that were clearly written by members themselves (short memos and letters), 
with materials written by staff documenting or transcribing member behavior and activity (in 
particular, DSG meeting minutes and Caucus meeting transcripts), and communication between 
DSG and other congressional staffers which may or may not attribute preferences, behavior and 
activities to specific Members (memos and letters).26  In addition to the archival record, I also 
incorporate media coverage of events in national newspapers (the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, etc.) and daily Capitol Hill newspapers (Congressional Quarterly, the Hill, Roll 
Call, and National Journal), and members’ own words in the Congressional Record.  
                                                          
value remains unclear (and certainly no other records of this particular event exist to my knowledge).  
Regardless of the true facts surrounding this event or the participants involved (John Rarick was obviously 
no friend of DSG), in the contemporary context, this whip call does not portray members of Congress (or 
staff) associated with DSG in the most flattering light.  If the DSG papers were strategically constructed to 
protect the reputation of specific individuals, it is likely that this type of document (and similar materials 
identified by the author in the collection) would have been destroyed or at least eliminated from the 
collection before donation to the Library of Congress. An interview conducted by the author confirmed that 
the DSG papers were archived by DSG staffers who did not work for any one particular member.  Unlike 
member’s personal staff who may have been loyal to a specific member and had an incentive to protect 
their legacy, DSG staffers did not have the same potential incentive.  The content of the papers no doubt 
reflects this.   
26 Identifying and categorizing the source or authorship of many archival records is extraordinarily difficult. 
While it is relatively easy to identify documents written by staff members, it is far more difficult to identify 
documents personally written by members themselves. However, the extensive archival research conducted 
by this author revealed several common features.  Letters and memos written by members themselves often 
used nicknames (such as referring to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) as “Rosty” or Rep. Frank Thompson 
(D-NJ) as “Thompy”), which was less likely in materials written by congressional staffers (although some 
high level staffers did use nicknames for Members).  In addition, members often signed their names to 
documents in unique ways. For example, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) signed her name with a smiley 
face inside the loop of the “P” in her first name. And finally, these materials tended to be very dense and 
short in length, and were far more likely to reveal the author’s opinion and personality (a large portion of 
these documents were rife with sarcasm). Documents written by staff – with a few exceptions, including 
notably former DSG Executive Director Richard Conlon (who was never reluctant to express his opinion) – 
were more factual, often recounting the specifics of an event or proceeding without commentary.   
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Considerable effort is made in the following chapters to draw conclusions that can be validated 
across multiple types of evidence from multiple sources.   
Nearly two dozen interviews with relevant congressional staffers and members of 
Congress were included to provide first-person accounts of key events and decision-making 
processes.  I interviewed a few figures outside of DSG’s organization but present inside the halls 
of Congress to help situate the relationship of DSG to other key figures and groups.  The 
interviews ranged in length between 45 minutes and 4 hours, although the average interview was 
about 2 hours in length.  They were conducted in-person in Washington, D.C. and in St. Paul and 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, or via telephone.  While the identity of most of the interviews will 
remain confidential, names were identified through archival papers or by referral from other 
interview subjects.27  Contact information for each interview was either publicly available 
through an internet search, or was obtained via referral from other interviews.      
This project combines elements of historical institutionalism and process tracing 
approaches, but is perhaps best defined by Paul Pierson’s (2010) notion of “placing politics in 
time” and John Kingdon’s (1984) method of building theory about decision-making processes 
from careful empirical observation.  I employ the available archival materials to identify and 
record processes of institutional change according to the actual historical sequence of events. This 
was a considerable task that necessitated integrating documents collected months, if not years, 
apart from each other, as well as actual events and decisions that occurred years apart from each 
other.  The scope of publicly available information helps to fill any gaps in the historical 
sequence, and I strived to note any persistent gaps.   
                                                          
27 A small number of interview subjects agreed to be identified by name (and I do so throughout the 
following pages). 
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The goal of any good study of institutional change in Congress is to identify some 
general conclusion(s) that can be applied to the contemporary (and future) U.S. Congress.  This is 
one of the goals of this project, but it is certainly not the only one.  The historical particulars of 
the case analyzed here – of DSG and reform in the 1960s and 1970s – matter in and of 
themselves.  It provides insights into how the first modern group of members organized 
themselves absent any pre-existing model to follow, how the programs of the Great Society 
passed despite great divisions within the Democratic Party, and how specific notable figures 
within the Democratic leadership, including Reps. Tip O’Neill (D-MA), Thomas Foley (D-WA), 
and Phillip Burton (D-CA), strategically developed a base of support within the House.  The 
ultimate goal of this project is to give due credit to these historically-bounded developments, 
while also abstracting those lessons that can and do carry to the contemporary U.S. Congress.  I 
leave it to the reader to determine whether either or both of these phenomena is more interesting. 
 
A roadmap for the chapters that follow 
In the next six chapters, I probe deeper into the institutional arrangements that drove 
liberal Democrats to organize DSG, how the group developed organizationally, and ultimately, 
how DSG’s organizational structure shaped leadership pathways, rules and procedures, and 
legislative agenda-setting and coalition building, within the House of Representatives.  Chapter 
two outlines the moderating theory of factional-driven change in Congress, and how organization 
promoted liberals’ shared goals.  Chapter three examines the origins of DSG and how liberals 
strategically structured the group’s organization to empower their natural allies to work together.  
In chapter four, I analyze the informational asymmetries that limited junior liberals’ legislative 
participation in the textbook Congress, ultimately providing a continuous motivation for members 
to participate in DSG.   
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 Chapter five examines how DSG developed an alternative leadership training ground for 
liberals, providing ambitious members with the policy expertise, visibility and connections, 
coalition building experience, and institutional prestige necessary for them to be competitive for 
appointed and elected leadership posts.  Chapter six examines how DSG empowered liberal 
leaders to launch an information and mobilization campaign to reform legislative rules to enable 
their policy and power goals, and evaluates liberals’ procedural reform agenda from 1960 to 
1976.  And in chapter seven, I examine how DSG expanded agenda-setting and coalition-building 
resources and tools, and evaluate their success in three policy areas (civil rights, defense, and 
campaign finance).  The focus in each chapter is on the process of change – how liberals 
developed organizationally; how specific organizational features in DSG supported liberal 
representation in the House and the Democratic Caucus; how House procedure, leadership 
pathways, and policy agendas changed in response to the emerging power of this group of 
liberals.  My goal is to not only demonstrate that organization is strategically and intentionally 
developed by members, but to marshal the available evidence to show that the organizational 
capacity of groups empowers them to pursue their varied goals.   
In chapter eight, I turn to the post-reform House.  I analyze the impact of reform on party 
organization in the House, the response by other factions inside and outside of the party to DSG’s 
effectiveness, and how the group evolved (and failed to evolve) to adapt to the changing 
institutional landscape.  I then briefly analyze the rise of the Freedom Caucus, which splintered 
from the Republican Study Committee in February 2015, and examine how organization (or lack 
thereof) shaped the successes and failures of these two factions in recent years, including their 
efforts to mobilize, coordinate, and unify conservatives within their party.  I conclude with a 
discussion of how institutional arrangements in the contemporary U.S. House limit the ability of 
members to work together to achieve their goals, and what the success of the strategy adopted by 
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liberal Democrats in DSG says about the nature of grassroots congressional reform efforts.  And I 
will outline future areas of research, including the historical and contemporary role of state 
legislatures in serving as “laboratories of democracy” for reform proposals in the U.S. Congress.  
And finally, I will conclude by offering specific recommendations to members of Congress 
interested in improving representation of their and their constituents’ interests in the House.   
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2 | From Organization to Action  
 
 
 
The 1970s “reform era” in Congress was the long-delayed culmination of years of 
unsuccessful efforts by Democrats to repair the growing ideological, geographic, and 
demographic cracks within the House Democratic Caucus – and with it, the remains of the New 
Deal coalition.  The inability of party leaders to overcome the disproportionate, and arguably 
undemocratic, power of southern, conservative committee chairs, and the persistent under-
representation of the liberal wing of the party in the legislative process, led to mounting 
frustrations among many Democrats (and liberal Republicans).  Over time, these fissures became 
impossible to ignore or suppress, and the party took action to change their internal rules, 
leadership, and policy agenda to better reflect so-called “national Democrats.”  This historic 
period of tumultuous change inside and outside of Congress shifted the site of Democratic party 
power and policy away from the south and increasingly towards western, mid-western, and 
northern states – permanently dissolving southern members’ coalition with urban, big machine 
Democrats.1  Intra- and inter-party politics today in Congress are defined by this era of 
institutional change. 
  The majority of reforms were adopted between 1970 and 1975, but the incremental path 
away from arbitrary committee power towards a more democratic system in the House began in 
1961 with the expansion of the Rules Committee (made permanent in 1963).  These reforms 
continued with the temporary adoption of the 21-day rule in 1965, which allowed the party to 
bypass the Rules Committee and enabled the passage of many Great Society programs; the 
                                                          
1 These power shifts arguably benefitted urban interests and constituencies more than the individual power 
of the machine Democrats who represented them.  While these Democrats did not lose power or 
institutional status post-reform (it merely changed form), machine Democrats from cities like Boston, 
Chicago, and St. Louis held power in the textbook Congress too.   
  
37 
 
introduction of regular (monthly) meetings of the Democratic Caucus when Congress is in 
session (1969); the introduction of recorded teller votes on amendments in the Committee of the 
Whole, and open committee meetings and hearings (1970); the introduction of formal Caucus 
votes on committee chairs (1971-1973); empowering the Speaker to appoint majority party 
members of the Rules Committee and shifting the Democratic Committee-on-Committees to the 
Steering & Policy Committee (from Ways & Means) (1975); and the transition to a Caucus-
elected (rather than leadership-appointed) Democratic whip (1986).  Nearly all political scientists 
and close observers of Congress agree that these reforms – along with many others passed by 
majority vote in the House and the Democratic Caucus – increased the capacity of the party to be 
responsive to its members and to unite behind a coherent policy program.   
 Why did the House adopt so many significant reforms to the committee system, 
leadership and party power during this period?  The dominant theories of reform posit that the 
incentive structures within the Democratic party shifted such that it was in the broader party’s 
interest to support the adoption of procedural changes.  If Democrats wanted to maintain a 
majority in Congress, they needed to pass legislation that responded to the needs of new 
constituency groups, and allowed for the (re)election of the growing numbers of liberal members 
in Congress.  If the status quo was maintained, the party would have failed to pass legislation on a 
range of issues, including civil rights, union rights, federal aid to housing and education, and 
many others.  The shifting of new geographic and demographic groups into the party’s electoral 
coalition shifted members’ governing incentives.  The passage of the 1970s reforms to the 
committee system, leadership power, and rank and file participation, merely provide evidence 
that the party chose to act on those incentives.  These explanations go a long way towards 
explaining individual and party-level motivations, but they fall short in explaining why this effort 
was successful where others had failed.  Liberal Democrats had tried and failed to reform 
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congressional rules and expand the party’s agenda in the past.  In 1949, they succeeded in leading 
the adoption of the 21-day rule, but it was overturned two years later.  In 1957, they developed an 
expansive liberal policy agenda termed the “Liberal Manifesto,” including proposals to increase 
federal aid to local schools, provide for federal housing program for low-income families and 
senior citizens, tax reform, and civil rights legislation.  The Manifesto was later widely mocked 
for revealing their hand to the opposition too early (Ferber 1965), and the proposals went 
nowhere that session.  Why were the efforts of liberals in the 1960s successful, while the earlier 
efforts failed?  Existing spatial theories of institutional change do not explain these failures; 
ideological, policy, and geographic cohesion remained roughly unchanged.     
 The struggles of liberal Democrats during the late 1940s and 1950s are not unique.  In the 
late nineteenth and twentieth century, Progressive Republicans emerged as a force for reform 
within the Republican Conference.  They accomplished an extensive list of policy goals (e.g. 
increased corporate regulation, labor protections) and many governmental reforms (e.g. direct 
election of U.S. senators, direct democracy in the states).  By 1910, the group totaled 47 members 
in the House – a significant number for a party they held a bare majority (219) of seats.  The 
group was so united that they jointly “declared themselves unbounded by the position of the 
Republican Conference” in 1910 in a bid to push policies toward the Progressive position 
(DiSalvo 2012).  Despite the group’s overwhelming policy successes and their historic overthrow 
of Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-IL) in 1910, reform inside the halls of Congress would prove to 
be too much of a hurdle to overcome.  Their comparatively minor proposal to remove the 
Speaker’s ability to appoint committees (official House procedure under Cannon) failed.2  And 
with time, Progressives gradually faded from the Republican party altogether.   
                                                          
2 When Democrats became the majority in 1911 (after winning the majority in the 1910 election), they 
adopted a rules change providing for House election of committees.   
  
39 
 
The unwritten terms of congressional organization – largely absent from the Constitution 
– elevates the emergence of new groups as natural points of self-reflection for a static institution.  
But the historical failure of several factional-led change efforts suggest that change is not an 
“inevitable” or “predictable” consequence of the emergence of new groups.  New groups emerge 
in Congress more often than the institution itself undergoes major change.  We have every reason 
to expect that liberals’ efforts to secure consideration of their policy goals and gain access to 
leadership positions in the House should have failed.  The institution was stacked against their 
interests – seniority norms that left liberals disproportionately out of the legislative process, 
incentive structures that prioritized suppression of policy differences over thoughtful debate, the 
absence of any forum for liberals to question their leaders or even introduce rules reform 
proposals, and so forth.  The prevailing assumption among scholars of congressional reform 
(Wright 2000; Schickler 2001; Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003; Rohde 1991) that liberals 
would recognize – and act on – the incentive to work together does not comport with the realities 
of the legislative environment, or the pitfalls of group organization and coordination.   
How do we explain those relatively rare cases of factions – like liberals in the Democratic 
Party in the 1960s and 1970s – that successfully overcame these pitfalls and the hurdles to 
institutional change in Congress?  This chapter proposes a moderating theory of factional-driven 
institutional change in Congress.  It is not sufficient for elections to reveal apparent shifts in 
public opinion, or for new groups of a sizable number and strong internal cohesion to simply 
emerge in Congress.  The legislative branch is designed to make it extraordinarily difficult for the 
often-junior members of new groups to gain enough power to receive votes on legislation they 
sponsored, or gain access to leadership pipelines.  I argue that the emergence of new groups or 
shifting policy preferences is a necessary, but alone insufficient condition to spur major 
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institutional change.  Rather, the capacity of new groups to serve as critical “agents of 
institutional change” is moderated by the extent to which they develop organizationally.     
A Moderating Theory of Group-Driven Institutional Change in Congress 
The moderating theory of factional-led institutional change offered here is 
straightforward, and builds on existing models of party and group organization.  I posit that 
group-led change develops in Congress when groups develop the internal infrastructure necessary 
to empower their members to overcome institutional hurdles to challenge the status quo.  If 
Congress is designed to prevent junior members or representatives of marginalized groups from 
accessing and exercising formal power, then the development of a strong group organization 
provides members with an alternative source of power.   Organization moderates the capacity of 
party factions to drive procedural, policy, and leadership change.  The better organized the group, 
the greater their capacity to subsidize the pursuit of their members’ individual and group goals 
regardless of party and/or leadership support.  Organizationally-weak factions will struggle to 
unite their members behind a coherent agenda or leadership, or mobilize them when their 
interests are at stake. Organizationally-strong factions will develop specific agendas 
representative of their interests, and will succeed in mobilizing their members to support their 
mutual goals.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the model of group-driven institutional change offered here.  
In the pages that follow, I introduce the components of group organization necessary for members 
to overcome the common coordination problems and succeed in a challenging legislative 
environment.  
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Figure 2.1: Moderating Theory of Group-Driven Institutional Change in Congress 
 
Legislative scholars have long recognized the inherent transactional nature of party 
membership in Congress.  Coordination between members with inevitably competing interests 
and goals is inherently difficult; parties incentivize individual participation and contribution to 
compensate for, and marshal, these competing interests (Aldrich 1995).  Members will participate 
and contribute to upholding the party brand, and in exchange, parties help members fulfill their 
(re)electoral, good public policy, and prestige goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  
Incentives include not only material and purposive selective benefits, but also a range of services 
to subsidize their responsibilities to represent their district.  In more specific terms, if members 
participate and contribute to the party, the party will give them plum committee assignments and 
leadership positions, the party will support them in tough re-election races, the party will ensure 
they receive floor votes on legislation and amendments they sponsored, and so forth (Pearson 
2015).  This arrangement between party members and leaders is not inherent to the U.S. Congress 
or political parties – it was strategically developed by the parties themselves (Stewart and Jenkins 
2009).   
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Party factions confront the same organizational problems as the broader party.  If they 
want to encourage members to contribute and participate in the group, and to reconcile members’ 
often competing goals and interests, they need to develop a similar set of internal mechanisms, 
tools, and resources to encourage individual participation in the group (Olson 1965; Schwartz 
2006; Weinstein 1967; DiSalvo 2012).  Coordination within parties does not just happen – the 
seeds of cooperation between leaders, members, and constituents were gradually developed by all 
involved over time.  Party factions and groups are no different.  Organized factions incentivize 
individual contribution, regularly mobilize members to participate, resolve conflict consistently 
and transparently, and elevate leaders reflective of the broader membership.  
Prior research on the pitfalls of group coordination (Olson 1965; Weinstein 1967; Matson 
1958) and the realities of the legislative environment (Hall 1998; Aldrich 1995; Cox and 
McCubbins 2005) reveal five critical aspects of organization, each of which I examine 
extensively:  
• Mechanisms to promote the participation of members;  
• Resources to support group activities;  
• Strong leadership to advocate on behalf of group interests;   
• Established group decision-making processes; and  
• Tools to share information between group members.    
Each of these indicators of organization are strategically developed by members.  They are not 
inherent or naturally developed by groups – no matter their size or internal cohesiveness – nor are 
they the consequence of a static, one-time decision with infinite returns.  Just as party elites must 
make a continual decision to invest in the development of internal resources and tools, so too 
must party groups and factions.   
When new groups initially emerge in the political environment, they often have some 
organizational structure – for example, a specific leader(ship) and a membership, a set of 
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principles that guides decision-making, even a physical office or building that ostensibly 
represents the group itself.  But structure does not inherently imbue the group with the capacity to 
promote member cooperation in support of their collective goals, or that the group follows some 
well-developed, coherent internal order.  Many groups form around the ambitions of a single 
charismatic leader with no long-term collective goals or strategy to achieve them, or the group 
emerges only sporadically to protest the status quo or challenge legislation on the agenda without 
long-term coordination of their efforts or the resources to develop a legitimate alternative 
(DiSalvo 2011; Hammond 2001).  Other groups form as more of a social outlet for members with 
similar policy preferences, but lack the motivation to coordinate strategic collective action around 
those preferences.   
Organized factions are rendered distinct from these groups through their decision to focus 
on their own internal group development as a strategy for external impact.3  Group power here is 
a product not of group size, the internal cohesion of their ideological convictions, or the salience 
of their policy agenda.  The power of groups of members to overcome the significant barriers to 
institutional change, including the stark power asymmetries and informational asymmetries 
between junior and senior members (see chapter one and four for more detail), is a function of 
their organization.  The more organized groups are, the greater their capacity to develop and 
marshal their members’ competing interests and expertise towards the common pursuit of the 
group’s shared and individual goals.    
In addition to rule and procedural reform, organization enables factions to overcome the 
two central barriers to long-term representation of their interests – leadership advancement and 
                                                          
3 Of course, organization is not a dichotomous concept such that groups are either “organized” or “not 
organized.”  Rather, organization is understood here as an ordered concept (with high, moderate, and low 
levels) with specific observable indicators that can be empirically measured and employed to construct 
variables of interest (see Cotter at al. 1989).   
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policymaking participation.  Organized groups provide members with the training and experience 
necessary to be competitive for leadership positions, including policy experience outside of their 
own committee assignment; visibility and connections in the House with other members, the 
leadership, interest groups, and the media; access to tools and resources for building legislative 
coalitions around important policy priorities in the House; and almost instantaneous prestige and 
cachet that comes with being a part of a group with a known reputation in the House.  If 
leadership advancement depends on either recruitment by current party leaders or the self-starting 
initiative of ambitious rank and file Members (Loomis 1984; Peabody 1967; Canon 1989), 
organized party factions can bridge the gap – simultaneously helping self-starters while grooming 
members unlikely to be recruited by party leaders.  Further, organization empowers groups with 
the resources to inform and mobilize their members about policy problems and relevant 
proposals, the authority and legitimacy to negotiate between policy allies inside and outside of 
Congress (including party leaders, the Administration, and interest groups), as well as the tools 
necessary to coordinate legislative coalitions around specific policy proposals.  These are all 
critical components of agenda-setting with the public, at the committee stage, and on the floor 
(Kingdon 2010).   
Here I depart from the sequence of institutional change outcomes commonly assumed in 
most theories (see Figure 2.1 above).  Procedural, policy, and leadership change are irrevocably 
linked in the House of Representatives.  But whereas most theories assume that procedural 
change alternatively and simultaneously promotes leadership (Schickler, Sides, and McGhee 
2003) and policy change (Rohde 1991), I argue that each of these three dimensions of change 
shapes the processes and outcomes of the other dimensions.  Members themselves are keenly 
aware of the close interplay between these three dimensions of change; they often pursue 
procedural change first and foremost because it enables policy change – both of which in turn are 
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mediated by party leaders.  Success along one dimension can be leveraged to achieve and further 
success along another.  When groups succeed in the passage of formal rule and procedural 
changes, organization enables factions to capitalize on that success to pursue their policy agenda.  
And when groups are successful at moving their ambitious allies and representatives into formal 
leadership positions, these leaders use their institutional power to enforce procedural reforms and 
place into practice the group’s policy goals.  Long-term representation of group interests is 
dependent on simultaneous pursuit of all three dimensions of institutional change.   
The role prescribed here for party organization in promoting leadership emergence and 
policy agendas is in keeping with a vast literature on organization at all levels of government.  
Jenkins and Stewart (2007) explain agenda-setting power in the House through organization.  The 
historical development of the majority party’s organizational monopoly empowered the 
development of the procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and centralized agenda-setting 
processes in the contemporary House (Rohde 1991).   
In Key’s (1964) conception of party organization, organization serves as a thoroughfare 
through which relationships are developed and maintained between elected officials and the party 
members that elect them.  The congressional caucus literature, especially work by Susan 
Hammond (1989, 1991, 2001) and Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist (1980), builds on this 
theory and applies it to organizations of members in Congress.  Caucus organization empowers 
members involved to place issues on the agenda, and receive the leadership experience necessary 
to be competitive for leadership races (or to be recruited by existing party leaders).  Organization 
helps foster relationships between future and current leaders, as well as other party members in 
Congress.  The state and local parties’ literature provides further evidence that organization 
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enables both “programmatic” agenda-setting activities by parties at the state level (Cotter et al. 
1989), and control over candidates for local elections (Masket 2009).   
There is also evidence that organizational weakness negatively shapes group longevity.  
For example, Rae (1989) found that liberal Republicans’ failure to organize inside and outside of 
Congress explains their inability to regain the agenda-setting success they enjoyed during the 
Johnson, Nixon and Ford Administrations.  The group simply did not have the capacity to 
leverage the initial agenda momentum they gained in the 1960s and 1970s, and ultimately 
disappeared from the party altogether.  
Contributions to Existing Literature 
The theory of institutional change offered here builds on the foundational theories of the 
relationship between the emergence of new groups or factions in parties and the roots of 
congressional reform.  In contrast to existing approaches however, I explain how groups or 
factions in parties develop the capacity to bring about institutional reform.  My aim is to show 
how organizational capacity shapes everything from the mobilization and coordination of group 
interests, to the development of future party leaders, to agenda-setting power within political 
parties, and ultimately, to rule and procedural reform in Congress.  Whereas most scholars 
(Rohde 1991; Wright 2000; Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003) explain the linkage between new 
groups and the passage of reform through shifts in relatively abstract incentive structures in 
Congress, I argue factions must be strategic and empower themselves first in order to force their 
party to vote to pass specific reforms.  My theory moderates the predominant theories of reform 
in Congress, and speaks to why some groups are successful at spurring reform in Congress, while 
others are not.  Groups will not be able to force a vote in party caucuses or on the House floor 
simply because of the size of the group or the strength of their ideological convictions.  In 
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contrast to the dominant research on political parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), party 
factions (DiSalvo 2012; Schwartz 2006), and congressional reform (Rohde 1991; Wright 2000), 
my theory does not assume that institutional reform is an inevitable byproduct of shifting policy 
preferences or the emergence of new groups.  Here these are necessary, but alone insufficient 
conditions, for the adoption of long-term institutional change in Congress.  Rather, grassroots 
change in Congress emerges when party factions strategically develop the organizational capacity 
necessary to challenge status quo rules and procedures, and more critically, party leadership 
pathways, and agenda-setting processes.   
Beyond refocusing the lens of scholarly research on the process of change, the model of 
institutional change through organizational capacity presented here integrates scholarly accounts 
of rule and procedural reform with theories of party leadership and agenda-setting change.  The 
well-documented increase in more ideologically extreme party leaders (Peabody 1967; Harris and 
Nelson 2008) is usually explained through shifting ideological cleavages and formal rules 
changes that expanded members’ access to leadership pipelines.  To this literature, I identify a 
third mechanism of leadership change through which factions expand leadership pipelines by 
providing expertise, visibility, coalition building experience, and institutional cachet for members 
who may not otherwise receive it in the formal structures of the House.  In addition, I build on 
prior work that suggests factions play a role in shaping group representation in agenda-setting 
processes in the House (Pearson and Schickler 2009) to explain how factions can represent 
constituent interests regardless of the initial level of support or opposition within the party. Cotter 
et al.’s (1989) research linking the development of organizational capacity to programmatic 
capacity in state and local political parties suggests that the representatives of organized party 
factions should be empowered to advance the group’s policy agenda in Congress, irrespective of 
their junior status or controversy of the issues involved (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Procedural 
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reform is thus not the only mechanism available to factions to shape party agendas – organization, 
I argue, provides another.   
 Collectively, this project makes three primary contributions to the literature on intra-party 
politics and institutional change in the U.S. Congress:  
• Reconceive of “institutional change” as a process with a series of distinct steps;  
• Restores the significant and distinct role of party organization in Congress; and  
• Restores member agency and responsibility in processes of institutional change.  
Most group-driven and spatial explanations of institutional change in Congress conceive 
of “change” as a static event.  The “outcome” is defined by a singular observable outcome – 
formal votes cast by members in parties and on the floor to adopt new rules and procedures.  
While scholars often rightly note the “incremental” nature of congressional reform (Rohde 1991), 
increments are measured in votes – not in the emergence of a specific reform from a potential 
idea to a formal proposal to its eventual adoption and enforcement.  Institutional change is thus 
dichotomous – it either happens or it doesn’t happen.  In this approach, key questions about the 
content of specific adopted reforms, the motivations of the enacting coalition, and potential 
unintended consequences, are assumed based on the success of the final “yay” or “nay” vote.  The 
preliminary work necessary to secure a formal vote in the first place is ancillary to the outcome 
itself.  The theory and research presented here reconceives of institutional change in Congress as 
a process with several distinct steps and observable indicators. 
The adoption of new rules and procedures in Congress is the product of careful study, 
compromise, and mobilization – a series of steps not unlike the normal legislative process.  
Members have a strong individual incentive to support rules changes that increase the number of 
leadership positions available (Schickler, Sides and McGhee 2003), or to (de)centralize power 
between committees or the leadership based on their own policy preferences (Rohde 1991; 
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Schickler 2001; Wright 2000).  But if members are not even aware of the effect of rules reforms 
on their power and policy goals, then we cannot expect them to act on these incentives and 
support rules changes on the floor.  Members are often apathetic about legislative procedure, 
uncertain over the effects of potential changes, and absenteeism within party caucuses on rules 
votes is high.  Successful floor votes on rules reform requires overcoming each of these difficult 
preliminary hurdles.  If members are going to support the adoption of new rules, they need to be 
persuaded that reform is in their own interest and mobilized to participate when they come to a 
vote. 
One of the consequences of conceptualizing institutional change as an event that either 
occurs or does not occur, is that key questions about the dynamics of reform are assumed based 
on the outcome of the vote.  Spatial theories, for example, often make assumptions about the 
content of specific reforms based on the composition of the enacting coalition and with the 
benefit of historical perspective.  We take for granted that there are many ways that rules can be 
changed to (de)centralize power in committees and/or the leadership, or that members are 
motivated by their own self-interest.  And yet, these “pre-decision processes” (Kingdon 1973) are 
as fundamental to the scope, type, and effects of congressional reform as the final observed vote 
cast by members.  The content of specific reforms, members’ motivations for supporting a given 
rules change, and the (un)intended consequences of reform, are not fixed points, but significant 
links in a broader causal chain worthy of investigation.  Institutional change is a thorny process; it 
often occurs in fits and starts, with long lag times between key events, decisions, and processes 
(Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004).  The approach adopted here accounts for these complex phenomena 
in understanding how a static institution like the U.S. Congress adopts to respond to its changing 
membership.   
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In addition, this project seeks to restore the significant role of party organization in 
understanding congressional politics and institutional change.  The dominant approaches to 
understanding leadership development, policymaking, power, and congressional reform, have 
focused almost exclusively on institutional features of Congress – that is, systems of rules that 
structure behavior and decision-making.  Party organizations as distinct and separate entities 
independent of the institutional features of Congress are usually overlooked.  Although critically 
positioned as part of V.O. Key’s (1964) tri-parte model of political parties, the decline of party 
organization in the states amidst the rise of candidate centered elections and party reforms inside 
and outside of Congress limited future research on parties as organizations at the national, state, 
and local level.  In light of these changes, political scientists concluded that party organizations 
are relatively weak – and thus the role of party organization in shaping institutional change in 
Congress itself was left unaddressed.  The theory of change offered here re-centers the role of 
party organization as a site and source of power in the House independent of congressional 
institutions and institutional arrangements.   
If political parties serve as the primary linkage between governmental institutions and 
constituents, then party organizations in Congress play a key role in promoting and challenging 
inevitable biases in formal institutional structures.  The majority party sets the legislative rules 
adopted at the start of each congress and writes the bulk of legislation produced by the chamber 
(Sinclair 2011; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  And both parties, of course, determine their 
own leadership pathways (Peabody 1967; Pearson 2015).  These biases are challenged by group 
or faction organizations representing party interests that play a significant role in expanding 
policymaking participation and access to leadership positions for members (Hammond 1989, 
1991, 2001; Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist 1980).  At both levels, party organizations play 
key roles in shaping legislative institutions and providing an outlet for members to develop and 
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marshal their collective resources, expertise, connections, and reputation, in pursuit of shared 
goals.   
Organization is often assumed as an inherent feature of strong, party institutions.  But 
party organizations are distinct entities and their development often occurs independent of 
institutions.  Nelson Polsby’s (1968) seminal argument about the strong status of House 
institutions emerged during an era in which legislative parties themselves were extraordinarily 
weak – constituting a procedural coalition rather than a political party (Schickler and Rich 1997).  
A basic level of organization is often assumed in theories of parties inside and outside of 
Congress (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) – parties can hardly incentivize 
membership and participation without some degree of internal resources and tools.  But party 
organizations are rarely a unit of investigation in their own right.4  Instead, we make theoretical 
and methodological assumptions that strong organization is embedded in strong parties and strong 
institutions.  The theory offered here restores party organizations as analytical units in their own 
right to account for the development, application, and consequences of party organization in the 
House.   
In addition, I restore the active role played by members themselves in driving 
institutional change.  An additional consequence of the decline of research on parties as 
organization (and the emphasis on institutional approaches) is that theories of change in Congress 
usually understand group dynamics solely in terms of group size and ideology.  Most models of 
institutional reform assume that once a new ideological group reaches some critical mass in size, 
some type of (de)centralizing change will inevitably follow.  In these approaches, members 
themselves are rather passive in processes of institutional change, and strategy altogether is 
                                                          
4 There has been a small but notable resurgence of studies of party organizations recently, including Seth 
Masket’s (2009) recent book on local party organizations.    
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largely absent (see Schickler 2001 for an exception).  If change is inevitable, the strategies 
adopted by members to pursue their procedural, policy and leadership goals matter little – what is 
most important is a particular set of institutional arrangements.  The theory and research 
presented here restores the responsibility and agency of members to improve the very institution 
they are intended to serve.   
The decision by individual members of Congress to organize as a group – like most 
decisions by political actors – is strategic.  Usually, the rewards of majority party status (or the 
pursuit of majority party status) provide a strong incentive to maintain party unity and avoid 
crystallizing group interests unrepresentative of the broader party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 
2005).  But if party members do not receive the benefits of majority party status – i.e. the party 
does not subsidize pursuit of their electoral, policy and power goals (Fenno 1974) – then they 
have little incentive to suppress their divisions with other members, groups, and party leaders to 
protect the party brand.  Competition between factions and their fellow partisans over the rewards 
of majority party status, including power and policy outcomes, spurs factions to develop 
organizationally.  As V.O. Key argued in his foundational work on political parties (1964), 
competition provides a strong incentive for parties to achieve organizational strength.5  Thus if 
party factions emerge out of some dissatisfaction with the status quo in their party, organized 
party factions develop strategically in order to empower factions to compete with other party 
members.  The better organized the group, the greater their capacity to subsidize the pursuit of 
their members’ individual and group goals.   
Despite the implicit assumption in many theories of institutional reform in Congress and 
party factions, group size – and the abstract incentives they activate within the party – is a poor 
                                                          
5 While Key was specifically referring to electoral competition between different parties, his argument 
about the role of competition in driving organizational development holds here as well.   
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proxy for organization.  Electoral and organizational strength are two distinct components in 
parties. We cannot assume that large factions will be organizationally strong, or that small 
factions will be organizationally weak.  Prior research on state party strength in the United States 
(Cotter et al. 1989) concluded that Republican state parties strategically developed strong 
organizational complexity to overcome their weak electoral support in many states.  In Cotter and 
colleagues’ research, the size of the Republican Party in the states (measured through electoral 
success) had no relationship to the complexity and strength of the party organization.  
Organization is not a passive byproduct of large numbers of people with similar policy 
preferences; rather, it is a strategy adopted to increase the capacity of the party to compete, 
electorally and otherwise, with the opposition.   
The role of process, party organization, and member responsibility, in theories of 
institutional change has arguably never been more important in an era in which congressional 
reform is seemingly impossible.  The dominant paradigm obscures the significant barriers rules 
changes face before they ever come to a vote.  In the contemporary institutional environment of 
ideologically cohesive parties, strongly centralized leadership power, and the abolition of 
legislative service organization, theories suggest that members interested in reform have no 
recourse to act on their frustrations with the state of the legislative branch.  The theory and 
research presented here provides an alternative view – illuminating both the barriers to change 
and how members and groups strategically overcome them.  Institutional change is not a passive 
event, but a process with multiple steps that requires the active participation and leadership of 
individual members.  The emergence of new groups or party factions has the potential to 
challenge the status quo in Congress, but their power to affect legislative power, procedure, and 
policy, is a function of their organization.   
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The DSG & the 1970s Reforms 
This project is motivated by a simple question: why did liberal Democrats succeed in 
challenging and reshaping the institutions of Congress, while other groups failed?  In the face of 
numerous, significant hurdles to change in the House, the efforts of liberal Democrats in DSG to 
challenge status quo rules and procedures, to advance their own allies into leadership positions, 
and to contribute to the congressional agenda, should have failed.  This chapter advances the 
argument that liberal Democrats succeeded because they strategically chose to focus on 
developing their own organization in DSG to advocate on behalf of their collective interests.  
Liberals confronted an institutional environment that left them with no recourse to challenge the 
undemocratic power of conservative committee chairs and the prerogative of party leaders, to 
mobilize their fellow members when issues of concern to their constituents were at stake, or to 
gain the experience necessary to be competitive for appointed and elected leadership positions.  
Observing this environment, liberal Democrats chose to focus on developing their 
capacity to work together as a group.  They encouraged individual participation in the group by 
holding regular meetings (providing a forum for members prior to the introduction of regular 
Democratic Caucus meetings), developing a campaign arm to recruit liberal candidates as 
members before they were even elected to Congress, and providing numerous selective benefits 
(including policy research) to encourage member contributions. They developed regular resource 
streams to support the group’s activities, including House office space (the first member group to 
receive it) and a telephone line; a large and diversified staff; strong alliances with outside groups, 
including AFL-CIO, UAW, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and others that regularly 
financially contributed to the group; and a large base of research subscribers (and clerk hire 
contributors) to provide the bulk of the group’s yearly operating budget.  Liberals developed a 
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rotating slate of ambitious leaders to speak for and advocate on behalf of the group through the 
DSG executive committee, ensuring that the group was represented in policy negotiations, 
adapted to new political environments, and remained consistently active during DSG’s tenure in 
the House.  They established specific mechanisms for the group to make decisions, including 
whip checks and polls to decide whether DSG should endorse legislation or advance specific 
procedural reforms in the Democratic Caucus, and delegation to the executive committee 
(especially the group chair and executive director) when necessary to make decisions about where 
to devote group resources and what policy issues to emphasize in the group’s research 
publications.  And liberals developed tools to share information and communicate with each 
other, including a whip system to mobilize members to come to the floor on key votes of 
importance to their interests; and legislative information and research publications to inform 
members about legislative procedure and the content of legislation.  
Collectively, the archival record provides considerable evidence of long-term, conscious 
coordination and organization.  These organizational features fostered collaboration between 
liberal Democrats, and ultimately enabled their successful efforts to improve representation of 
their interests in the House and the Democratic Caucus.  I now turn to a close examination of the 
institutional conditions that drove liberal Democrats to organize, and the defining contours of 
group organization inside DSG.   
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3 | The Official Organization of Liberal Democrats 
 
 
 
On September 9th, 1959, 60 or so members of the liberal “Select Planning Committee” 
met in secret in the House Judiciary Committee Room.  Their task was neither simple nor 
straightforward.  After years of failed efforts to pass legislation reflective of their constituents’ 
concerns about civil rights, education, and housing policy, they needed to develop a strategy 
going forward.  Among the members in attendance were Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), Edith Green 
(D-OR), Wayne Hays (D-OH), John Brademas (D-IN), and Neal Smith (D-IA).  Nearly every 
member attended the meeting themselves (only four sent staffers to represent them) – a strong 
sign of their personal interest in the meeting’s agenda.  The members in attendance had been 
invited on the initiative of Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ), Henry Reuss (D-WI), George Rhodes 
(D-PA), and Lee Metcalf (D-WY).  Almost immediately, their leadership of the group was 
formalized.  Rep. Metcalf was nominated and unanimously elected as the group’s permanent 
chairman, Rep. Roosevelt as vice-chair and Rep. Thompson as secretary.  The group also decided 
that they needed a whip system of their own to mobilize members to come to the House floor.  At 
Thompson’s suggestion, a rudimentary whip operation was added to the secretary’s office under 
his direction.  They made plans to meet shortly with the full planned membership before the next 
session of Congress, and adopted a resolution that members would “be polled on the question of 
the principal issues upon which the group would concentrate in the next session.”1  The group 
decided to rename themselves the “Democratic Study Group” – or DSG – to avoid being typified 
as “insurgent” or “activist” in the press.  The name was meant to imply that the group studied 
                                                          
1 September 9th, 1959 Meeting Minutes of the Policy Committee Meeting, House Judiciary Committee 
Room. DSG papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., part I, box 135, folder 10.  
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policy issues of interest to Democrats, rather than as a radical group emerging to challenge their 
party leaders.  
The actions taken by liberal Democrats to organize themselves on September 9th 
represent a historic first.  In 1959, there were no “legislative service organizations” or 
“congressional caucuses” for liberals to model themselves after – they were the first modern 
group of members to do so.  And the organizational strategy they adopted would provide the 
blueprint for countless other groups that emerged in the following years, including the 
Congressional Black Caucus (organized in 1971) and the Republican Study Committee 
(organized in 1973).2  Why did these members choose to organize themselves?  What drove them 
to establish their own base of power in the House?  And absent a model for rank and file 
members like themselves, how did liberals develop an organizational structure, and to what end?      
These questions about the motivations and actions of a single group in 1959 may initially 
appear to be relatively unimportant or trivial – except that the group in question precipitated and 
led the most significant grassroots-based campaign for reform in the House (Rohde 1991).  The 
decision to organize DSG was a critical first step in liberal Democrats’ campaign for change in 
the House, much of which came to fruition in the 1970s.  And yet, this decision to organize – 
independent of the Democratic Caucus and party leaders – is often obscured by legislative 
scholars’ emphasis on other institutional dynamics during this era. Conventional accounts of 
intra-party politics in the 1950s and 1960s typically focus on the ideological division between 
liberal rank and file Democrats and southern, conservative committee chairs, or power battles 
between party leaders and committee chairs.  However, a closer analysis of the broader 
institutional dynamics in the 1950s and 1960s reveals that the decision by liberals to organize 
                                                          
2 For example, the Republican Study Committee follows DSG’s practice of empowering prior group 
chairmen (“the founders”) to nominate future group chairmen (subject to a membership vote).  The 
Congressional Black Caucus follows DSG’s practice of rotating its leaders every two years.   
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DSG reflect internal party divisions and institutional hurdles that went much deeper than those 
typically emphasized by legislative scholars.  Liberal participation was suppressed in nearly every 
aspect of congressional and party organization.  Their organizational strategy provides insights 
into how these hurdles to change in Congress can be overcome, and the role of organization in 
promoting the participation of groups and interests under-represented in the normal legislative 
byways.     
In this chapter, I evaluate the theory presented in chapter two about the role of intra-party 
competition in driving new factions to organize themselves against the case of liberal Democrats 
in the 1950s.  I advance the argument that liberals chose to organize DSG because the party did 
not subsidize – and sometimes thwarted – their electoral, policy, and power goals.  Liberals had 
no incentive to protect the ‘party brand’ because the benefits of majority party status went to their 
more senior, conservative colleagues (Cox and McCubbins 2005; DiSalvo 2012).   
The bulk of the chapter traces how liberal leaders developed and structured the 
Democratic Study Group (DSG) to empower their likeminded allies to advocate on behalf of their 
collective interests.  While members themselves play a relatively passive role in existing models 
of institutional change (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993), I find that members were active 
and engaged leaders of nearly every facet of institutional change in the House from the late 1950s 
to the early 1990s.  If rules and norms in the House suppressed liberal participation in the 
legislative process and party politics, then DSG was strategically designed by group leaders to 
enable liberals’ collective power, policy, and re-election goals.  The organization was designed to 
foster the participation of individual members, to balance members’ ideological demands with 
necessary pragmatism, to develop and share critical legislative resources between members, to 
empower ambitious leaders to advocate on behalf of the group, and to mobilize members when 
their interests were at stake.  These organizational features were not a simple byproduct of DSG’s 
size or the strength of their ideological convictions, as suggested by conventional (spatial) 
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theories of institutional change.  Indeed, the group developed long before the election of the 
Watergate Babies and or the development of a liberal majority in the Democratic Caucus.  The 
organization of liberal Democrats was strategically established, developed, and maintained, by 
liberals to further their shared interests.   
The Failure to Subsidize Liberals’ Electoral, Policy & Power Goals 
Liberals were keenly aware of the significance of their decision to organize – a decision 
with far reaching implications for the Democratic party brand and the reputation of their party 
leaders.  The initial reluctance by liberal leaders to formalize the association between themselves 
and their likeminded partisans underscores this fact.  Throughout the 1950s, liberals met 
frequently to vent and share their frustrations over their lack of power and inability to fulfill 
policy promises to their constituents.  This relatively amorphous group of junior members of 
Congress met under a variety of names, including the Mustangs, McCarthy’s Mavericks (for 
Representative, and later Senator, Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), the Select Planning Committee, the 
Liberal Study Group, and the Liberal Steering Committee.  Absent regular meetings of the 
Democratic Caucus, liberals lacked any other forum for meeting with their fellow partisans to 
discuss policy, issues back home in their districts or in their own re-election races, intra-party 
politics, or complaints with their party leaders.  But lacking a majority in the Democratic Caucus 
and access to formal power in the House, these meetings were more of a social – rather than 
legislative – forum for members to meet with one and other.  They were not a venue for long-
term strategic planning or coordination.  Their most visible activity to date was the “Liberal 
Manifesto,” an outline of liberals’ major legislative goals that was introduced on the House floor 
on January 8, 1957, and widely viewed as a strategic misstep for revealing their hand to the 
opposition too early (Ferber 1965).   
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 The 1958 midterm election raised the stakes for liberals. They knew they needed a 
majority within the Democratic Caucus to accomplish any of their goals, and they believed this 
election was their chance.  Anticipating a watershed election for Democrats, a small group of 
liberals, including Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ), Henry Reuss (D-WI), George Rhodes (D-PA), 
and Lee Metcalf (D-WY), began contacting Democratic candidates to inform them of their 
“liberal Democratic program.”  They worked with a small volunteer group of staffers to offer 
candidates “assistance…in supplying certain specific types of research data which might be 
useful to them in their campaign against the Republican incumbent.”3  Their efforts included 
warning Democratic incumbents and candidates in advance of interest group attacks (such as the 
Chamber of Commerce), and preparing candidate responses to them. The goal was to engender 
support among these Democrats prior to their election to Congress, with the hope that they would 
join the group after they got elected (a strategy DSG would adopt for much of their tenure in the 
House).  The 1958 election ultimately increased the Democratic majority by 49 seats to 283, and 
as anticipated, many of these new Democratic members wanted to join the “liberal group.”   
 To prepare for this larger Democratic majority, Reps. Thompson, Reuss, Rhodes and 
Metcalf sent a Dear Colleague letter to 80 liberal members in December 1958 stressing the key 
gatekeeping power provided by the Rules Committee, which “strangled liberal legislation of vital 
importance to our constituencies and the well-being of the country as a whole.”4  The letter asked 
members to respond with their opinion about whether or not Democrats “should endeavor to 
liberalize House rules at the beginning of the 86th Congress,” the specific types of changes should 
be advanced, and their opinion as to the best strategy to adopt to achieve these rules changes.  
Enclosed with the letter was a memo outlining proposed changes in House rules, including 
                                                          
3 November 12, 1958 letter from Reps. Thompson, Rhodes, Reuss, and Metcalf to Rep. John E. Moss.  
DSG papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1. 
4 December 2nd, 1958 Dear Colleague letter, DSG papers, Part II, box 37, folder 1. 
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reinstating the 21-day rule, decreasing the number of signatories (votes) required for a discharge 
petition, various proposals to strengthen party responsibility, modifying the functions and power 
of the Rules Committee, and liberalizing procedures for sending bills to Conference.5  The 
majority of the proposed reforms outlined in the memo targeted the committee system, rather than 
the number of leadership positions available to members, the type of power wielded by party 
leaders, or the function and power of the Democratic Caucus.  Though reforms targeting these 
areas were discussed, they were pushed off for future congresses.     
 These early efforts were guided by a strategic plan, entitled the “Proposed Master Plan 
and Timetable for Efforts to Liberalize House Rules.”  The plan underscores how wary party 
leaders initially were of this emerging group of liberals.  The Master Plan stressed personal, 
member-to-member recruitment tactics to reassure and offset “Leadership attempts to dissuade 
them from joining us by use of special favors, promises of committee assignments, threats, etc.”6  
These concerns provide first-hand evidence that individual members and factions in Congress are 
hampered by the leadership’s unique access to carrots and sticks to induce their fellow partisans 
to fall in line (Peabody 1967; Pearson 2015).  The Master Plan also advanced a strategy to 
maintain contact with Democrats on the “Leadership fringe” to gauge the leadership’s counter-
activity and potential areas of compromise.  Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), a Rules committee 
                                                          
5 The 21-day rule stipulated that if a bill had been held in the Rules Committee (after referral to the 
committee) for 21 calendar days, the chairman of the relevant committee of jurisdiction for the bill could 
bring the bill directly to the floor of the House on the second and fourth Mondays of every month.  The 
discharge petition provides a mechanism for a large plurality (at times, 150) or simple majority (no more 
than 218) of members to bring a bill directly to the floor if the relevant committee of jurisdiction refuses to 
report the bill.    
6 These recruitment tactics will be discussed briefly below and in detail in chapter four, but the tangible 
benefits of membership were stressed at every point. DSG members gained access to a wide array of 
information and research services on legislation before the House and other policy issues, as well as a 
variety of campaign services (polling services, interest group contacts for donations, etc.).  
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member and procedural expert, played a key role here as the major connection between liberals 
and the leadership, and Rayburn often sent Bolling to speak as his representative to liberals.7   
 Cognizant of the need for the leadership’s support to pursue any rules changes, liberals 
dispatched Rep. Chet Holifield of California, a comparatively moderate member, to lobby 
Speaker Rayburn immediately prior to the beginning of the 86th Congress.8  Holifield advocated 
for three specific reforms intended to address liberals’ concerns: (1) add an extra Democrat to the 
Rules Committee (Holifield advocated for a western liberal), (2) allow as few as 150 members to 
discharge legislation from committees (rather than 218), and/or (3) reinstate the 21-day rule, 
which provided that if the Rules Committee did not act within 21 days on a bill duly reported to 
its jurisdiction, the bill could be automatically brought to the floor for a vote.9  At issue for the 
liberals was the strong belief that liberal and conservative Democrats “should not be protected 
from controversial legislation. They should vote on important committee reported bills.”  Party 
and committee leaders who suppressed critical policy issues (in part to “protect” members from 
controversial legislation) limited the capacity of liberals to cast meaningful votes on issues 
important to their constituents.  To liberals, this was a violation of their institutional and 
representational responsibilities – and as Holifield remarked from the House floor, “If a 
Congressman does not have the ‘guts’ to vote on legislation, he needs a ‘wet nurse.’”10   
                                                          
7 While this document did not explicitly state which Democrats were considered to be on the “leadership 
fringe,” Bolling is the most likely candidate.  In earlier communication between Holifield, Blatnik and 
Rayburn, Rayburn stated that he would send Bolling as his representative to address liberals. 
8 Memo from Holifield re his telephone call with Speaker Rayburn. DSG papers, Part I, box 55, folder 3.  
9In theory, the Rules Committee serves as a “traffic cop,” responsible for determining the “rules” of debate 
governing legislation voted on the House floor and ensuring the orderly and fair consideration of 
legislation.  Many members – Democrat and Republican alike – also viewed the Rules Committee as – in 
the words of Rep. Charles Halleck (R-IN) – a critical check on the “unwise, unsound, ill-timed, spendthrift 
and socialistic measures” (CQ Almanac 1951). However, during much of this period, the ideological 
divisions within and between the two parties and the absolute power of the Rules committee chairman, 
Rep. Smith, enabled the committee to serve as a veto point for liberal legislation.  Chairman Smith would – 
as congressional folklore has popularized – go home to his Virginia farm to “milk his cows,” and the Rules 
Committee would simply not assign a rule.  
10 October 20, 1960 DSG Legal Memo “Oppositions in the House of Representatives to a Change in the 
Rules,” DSG Papers, Part II, box 3, folder 5.  
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 The Speaker informed Holifield that Rep. Howard Smith (D-VA), Chair of the Rules 
Committee, had turned down proposals to increase the size of his Committee, and Rayburn was 
not currently interested in the other proposals.  Holifield left the call with the impression that 
Rayburn was chiefly interested in sowing up the southern vote for Speaker.  And indeed, Rayburn 
had no intention of breaking up the long-fought coalition between the leadership and southern, 
conservative Democrats for a group of junior members.  He was especially unsympathetic to 
liberals’ demand for a westerner on Rules, replying “You boys can raise this in the next Caucus if 
you want to, but I think you better not.”11  After the meeting – and over the Speaker’s warnings 
not to speak to the press – Holifield released a statement that simultaneously proclaimed success 
and held Rayburn accountable for potential legislative failures: “We have received assurance 
from Speaker Rayburn that legislation which has been duly considered and reported will be 
brought before the House for consideration within a reasonable period of time.”12 Rayburn’s 
concerns over how the press would interpret their conversion was not unfounded.  After 
Holifield’s pronouncement, a Washington Post editorial declared that “The Speaker has a clear 
obligation now to redeem that pledge. Indeed, he faces a determination whether he or Rules 
Committee Chairman Howard Smith is the leader of the House.”  Nevertheless, in exchange for 
Rayburn’s pledge, liberals promised to forgo their efforts to reform House rules and the “Master 
Plan” was put on hold.           
                                                          
11 Undated 1959 meeting minutes between Speaker Sam Rayburn and John Blatnik. DSG papers, Part I, 
box 55, folder 7. As the Democratic Caucus only met immediately prior to the beginning of each Congress 
during this time period, this conversation likely occurred immediately prior to the January 1959 
organizational meeting of the Caucus. The request by DSG for a “westerner” on the Rules Committee may 
seem surprising at first to congressional scholars well versed in speaking in terms of “Northerners” and 
“Southerners.”  However, the archival record reveals that liberal Democrats rarely identified themselves as 
or advocated on behalf of “Northern Democrats” (though they did routinely speak of “Southern 
Democrats”). DSG usually advocated on behalf of “National Democrats” or “westerners,” who the group 
believed were systematically under-represented in leadership positions in the party and on committees.   
12 June 24, 1960. Washington Post, “Third House of congress.”  DSG papers, Part II, box 159, folder 2.  
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The archival record does not reveal whether liberals actually trusted Rayburn to deliver 
on his promise, or whether they believed they simply had no other options after their 
conversation.  But within a few months, liberals learned that not only was Rayburn unable to 
fulfill his promise to rein in the Rules Committee, but if they wanted to accomplish their 
procedural reform agenda, they needed strong allies of their own in the leadership – and their own 
site of institutional power in the House.13  Despite his assurances, Rayburn could not fulfill his 
promises to them that the Rules Committee would not block liberal legislation. A powerful and 
beloved Speaker, Rayburn simply did not have the institutional power to bypass the Rules 
Committee on his own, and he was unwilling to spend his precious political capital and risk his 
own leadership position to press the issue (Polsby 2005).  Absent leadership support, liberals 
needed a majority in either the Democratic Caucus and/or on the House floor. Despite large 
increases in their Democratic majority in 1958, liberals did not have the votes for any formal 
rules changes. Thus, they needed to not only increase their ranks electorally, but to win the 
support of Democrats already in Congress who may not have foreseen the need for change.  This 
task was not insignificant; the hurdles confronting them seemingly insurmountable.  But on 
September 9th – a mere 8 months after Holifield’s unsuccessful phone call with Rayburn and his 
promise to place the “Master Plan” on hold – the Select Planning Committee met in the Judiciary 
Committee room and the Democratic Study Group emerged.   
Despite strenuous efforts by liberals to avoid DSG being seen as a threat or challenge to 
party leaders, the Washington Press Corps immediately seized on the story of this group of 
“Mustangs” who came into the open [in December 1958]…when it sent a mimeographed fact 
                                                          
13 Liberals were keenly aware that their reform proposals would go nowhere without strong support in the 
leadership.  In a December 30, 1960 DSG meeting at the George Washington Inn, a subcommittee devoted 
to the “Rules Committee problem” reported that “there is little chance of correcting the Rules situation 
unless the Group has the approval of the Speaker” (part II, box 159, folder 2).  Rayburn would eventually 
push (a temporary) proposal to expand the Rules Committee, but not until the start of the 87 th Congress.   
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sheet on the Rules Committee to prospective supporters.”14  These press accounts highlight the 
complex position the formalization of this group placed upon Democratic leaders in Congress.  
When Rep. Holifield proclaimed that Speaker Rayburn had promised liberals that legislation 
“duly considered and reported” from committee would receive votes on the House floor, 
Rayburn’s ability to deliver on that promise was viewed as a reflection of his power in the House.  
While the emergence of this new faction of liberals in the Democratic Caucus may not have 
necessarily weakened Rayburn directly, it certainly exposed weaknesses in his own institutional 
power and leadership – weaknesses he likely did not want brought to light (Peabody 1967; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 2005).   
But Rayburn was a shrewd political strategist.  He recognized the critical negotiating 
leverage this group of liberals would provide him, especially on the types of social policy issues 
prioritized by DSG.  In an interview, former DSG executive director and longtime congressional 
staffer Scott Lilly, described how the group’s emergence shaped Rayburn’s strategic position 
within the party:   
“Rayburn was smart and knew that if he was going to help Johnson or Kennedy deliver 
on any kind of program as president, he knew they needed to get control over the Rules 
Committee.  He thought it was going to be a really good thing for younger progressive 
members to start giving [Rules Committee Chairman] Judge Smith a hard time, and then 
he could come in as a mediator when the time came. He could come in here as a 
mediator.”15   
 
The assumption was that if liberals pushed legislation (and rules changes) to the left of what 
Democrats in the House – and southern, conservative committee chairs – would normally pursue, 
                                                          
14 Don Irwin. “House Rules Group Curb is Sought: Liberals Act to Cut Its Power.” New York Herald 
Tribune. December 7, 1958.  
15 Lilly’s account of the relationship between DSG and party leaders was reinforced through interviews 
with other staffers.  For example, a long-time DSG staffer recalled a similar symbiotic relationship between 
DSG and Speaker Wright during the Iran-Contras affair in the 1980s.  In an interview (August 6, 2015), 
one staffer said that “Wright was opposed to the whole Nicaragua thing and so he found DSG useful to 
kind of gin up opposition to Reagan, and DSG was able to finally get opposition to cut off funding [to the 
Contras]. And DSG was willing to do this because it was the kind of thing they would do regularly.”  
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Rayburn could negotiate a compromise somewhere between where the two groups stood, but 
ultimately more liberal than would ordinarily emerge.  The most important facet of the group was 
not necessarily their size and ideological coherence, so much as their legitimacy, which only 
became apparent through organization.  Absent DSG, it was harder for Rayburn to make the 
argument before staunch conservatives like Chairman Smith (D-VA) that there was a coherent 
group of members supporting institutional change – a force within the party that needed to be 
reckoned with.   
 It is important not to overstate the potentially hostile relationship between liberals and 
their party leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Zelizer 2015).  Nevertheless, liberals’ 
perception that the leadership and the Democratic Caucus did not represent their interests 
provides the foundation of their decision to organize themselves.  Liberal Democrats had no 
incentive to suppress differences with their colleagues and protect the “party brand” because the 
benefits of majority party status went to their more conservative, senior colleagues (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005).  The party did not further their policy, electoral, or perhaps most 
critically, power goals in the House (Fenno 1974).  And party leaders, for their part, failed to 
mobilize and coordinate liberals, to elevate their policy priorities, or to support the leadership 
ambitions of liberal Democrats in Congress.  Their first-hand experiences in the 1950s made it 
abundantly clear to liberals that their procedural, policy, and leadership change agenda was 
mediated by formal sites of power in Congress.  The only way to combat the rampant power and 
informational asymmetries in the House was to strategically organize their own site of leadership 
power in DSG.  While this task would ultimately take years – a fact liberals were keenly aware of 
– it is a critical factor in explaining the transformation of the House and the Democratic Caucus 
throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century.   
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The Official Organization of Liberal Democrats 
In the months and years following the September 9, 1959 meeting of the newly named 
Democratic Study Group, liberal Democrats strategically developed into an organized party 
faction with the capacity to pursue their collective goals. They studied the institutional 
environment to identify their members’ most pressing needs, and shaped their services and 
activities to meet them.  With a keen appreciation for the major institutional hurdles limiting their 
members’ pursuit of their electoral, policy, and power goals, they sought to challenge them point-
by-point.  Among other things, they learned how to best motivate members to participate in the 
group, how to mobilize their members to come to the floor for important votes, and how to make 
decisions about specific rule and procedural reforms to place before the Democratic Caucus.  
Despite the quick adoption of a formal title, DSG did not develop as an organization immediately 
in 1959.  They worked tirelessly to build up DSG’s organizational capacity, including its financial 
and political resources, the authority of its leaders to speak on the group’s behalf, and the tools 
necessary to unite and mobilize their members when important issues were at stake.  They made 
sure no facet of their organization stood alone – each and every component fed into and supported 
another.   
Organization enables parties to capitalize on their numerical strengths, while also 
compensating for numerical weaknesses (Key 1964; Cotter et al. 1989).  In an era of weak party 
organization, DSG fulfilled this organizational role for liberal Democrats.  The proportion of 
liberals in the House Democratic Caucus – and their internal ideological cohesion – 
unequivocally grew throughout the mid to late-twentieth century, but for much of this period (the 
1950s-1970s), strong liberals constituted a minority (or bare majority) of Democrats (see Figure 
3.1 below).  DSG simultaneously contributed to this growth (through the group’s campaign 
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activities and services), while also compensating for liberals’ consistent minority status within the 
Democratic Caucus.   
The organization of liberal Democrats provides a model for how members can work 
together to improve their capacity to participate in Congress despite their minority status, and in 
the face of leadership opposition, internal divisions within their party, and minimal access to the 
formal power, tools and resources so critical to change in the House.  Indeed, liberals’ model of 
organization has never been more relevant in the highly centralized and divisive contemporary 
U.S. Congress.   
  
Promoting Group Participation 
Arguably the most significant organizational step confronting liberal leaders in the 1950s 
centered on how to promote collective action among and between their natural ideological allies.  
It was one thing for a small group of activist liberals (such as Reps. Metcalf, Rhodes, Thompson 
and Roosevelt) to be actively engaged in the group, it was quite another to unite enough liberals 
together that they could constitute a majority force within the majority party.  The challenges 
inherent to mobilizing a large number of members (ranging between 75 and 125 in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s), as well as the multiple, competing demands on members’ time, provided a 
significant hurdle for liberal leaders in DSG (Olson 1965).  The Democratic Caucus was merely a 
procedural coalition during this era (Schickler and Rich 1997), and liberals routinely constituted a 
minority or bare majority of members. There was no institutional apparatus through which 
liberals could build a coalition of their likeminded partisans and press for procedural, policy, or 
leadership change.  Liberal leaders’ first task focused on filling this gap.  They needed to not only 
encourage Democrats to become DSG members, but to foster their active participation thereafter.  
To promote membership and participation, the group developed a strategy that emphasized early 
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recruitment of members prior to their first election to Congress; personal, member-to-member 
lobbying; and the cultivating and distribution of selective benefits. 
From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, DSG was able to capitalize on the Democratic 
Caucus and the leadership’s organizational weaknesses to recruit new DSG members prior to 
their initial election to Congress.16  DSG did not get involved in contested primary races as a 
matter of practice, but once a candidate was nominated, they readily helped raise money for 
candidates (directly or through the DSG Campaign Fund) and provided numerous other 
services.17  They disseminated information (including opposition research) to candidates, and 
developed “special television films and radio programs, campaign brochures” to distribute to 
members, as well as a ”buddy system” where senior members were assigned to give campaign 
advice and assistance to Democratic Congressional candidates from their own state or region.”18  
These resources and services engendered significant loyalty in candidates to DSG, and made 
them far more likely to become a member of DSG when they entered Congress.   
Liberal leaders in DSG learned early on how effective this recruitment strategy could be 
in achieving higher membership numbers.  After the effort in the 1958 election, Reps. Thompson 
(D-NJ), Reuss (D-WI), Rhodes (D-PA), and Metcalf (D-MO) documented its success in a letter to 
Rep. John Moss (D-CA):  
“Pursuant to our informal agreement last August, Democratic candidates for the House 
were contacted and informed of our liberal Democratic program and 
accomplishments…Assistance was offered in supplying certain specific types of research 
data which might be useful to them in their campaign against the Republican incumbent. 
A large number of these candidates availed themselves of this offer. Special campaign 
                                                          
16 DNC state committeemen/women subsidized DSG’s recruitment efforts here by frequently cc’ing the 
DSG chairman or executive director when submitting official primary results to the DNC and other party 
committees.   
17 DSG worked with may groups to fundraise money for liberal candidates, including civil rights groups 
like the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and labor unions, including AFL-CIO and UAW.  In some 
cases, these groups would send money to DSG earmarked for specific candidates; in other cases, these 
groups donated to the DSG Campaign Fund with the assumption that DSG would donate the funds to the 
best candidates and/or most in-need campaigns.   
18 Undated 1964 memo from DSG chairman Blatnik (D-MN) to DSG members re 1964 campaign plans. 
DSG papers, Part II, box 132, folder 7.   
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material was prepared for them, as well as other material of our group. A significant 
number of these newly-elected Democrats have already asked to become associated with 
our liberal group in the 86th Congress” (emphasis added).19  
 
The letter was dated November 12, 1958 – a mere 8 days after the election, suggesting a 
remarkably successful recruitment strategy.  DSG followed this strategy throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and into the 1980s.  And indeed, within a few short years of adopting this strategy, many 
liberal candidates (and their top campaign staffers) knew to contact DSG for assistance during 
their campaign – the group did not even need to identify candidates beforehand.  An interview 
with a long-time DSG staffer recalled how:  
“we were very much involved, and very much talking to other organizations like the 
NCEC [National Committee for an Effective Congress] that pay attention to candidates 
so we were able to identify really good people and really have an impact. They would 
know that going in and they would immediately join the DSG so they could get the 
[legislative research] reports.”20   
 
For many newly elected members, DSG leaders and staff were their only personal connection to 
the House prior to their arrival in January – these personal connections were strengthened during 
new members’ participation in DSG’s orientation sessions, which helped to solidify the link 
between early campaign assistance and membership after candidates entered office.21  The 
sessions were held prior to the start of each Congress, and included seminars on how to build up a 
staff and split their allotted office budget between the district and Capitol Hill.  New members 
undoubtedly learned that DSG research services subsidized the work of their new legislative 
assistants and legislative correspondents.  DSG membership and research subscription fees were 
framed as a sensible use of a small portion of their office budget.  But all new members left the 
                                                          
19 November 12, 1958 letter from Reps. Thompson, Reuss, Rhodes and Metcalf to Moss. DSG papers, Part 
II, box 159, folder 1.  
20 September 23, 2015 interview with former staffer.  
21 The leadership did not begin offering their own orientation session until the late 1970s (at which point, 
former DSG leaders now in the formal party leadership applied lessons they learned from DSG’s 
orientation sessions to develop their own).   
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orientation session better equipped to immediately adjust to the responsibilities and privileges of 
serving in the House, including participating in the legislative process.      
DSG’s information and research services constituted a significant selective benefit for 
rank and file members, and provided a strong motivation for rank and file members to contribute 
to the group (Olson 1965).  These services, which included simple summaries of complex 
legislation and the politics surrounding policy issues, subsidized member and staff efforts to 
remain informed and active on a range of policy issues (Kingdon 1989; Klein 2011).  In addition 
to these fact-based research services, the group provided numerous other information services for 
members that simultaneously encouraged them to remain active in the group and in the House.  
Among these services were draft constituent letters, a job service to collect resumes of qualified 
candidates for staff openings, and training sessions on parliamentary procedure for members and 
staff.  In order to make sure that new members were aware of the range of services offered by 
DSG, the group’s chairman would usually send a letter welcoming them to the House, describing 
the research and other services offered by the group, and offering a free trial to the services for a 
short period of time.  In most cases, this letter – in combination with recruitment efforts during 
their election – was enough to convince the new member to become a dues-paying contributor to 
DSG.  Occasionally, alternative methods were employed too.  For example, the group sometimes 
offered “sticks” to discourage “free riders” from borrowing DSG materials from contributing 
offices.22  DSG leaders would also personally lobby members from their region to pay their bill in 
                                                          
22 The DSG chair sent Dear Colleague letters discouraging this practice, and sometimes warning 
contributing offices that they would stop providing them with more than one copy of research if the 
practice continued.  For example, in 1979, Obey sent a memo to members discouraging this practice, 
describing DSG as “a pooling arrangement whereby each Member is expected to carry a fair share of the 
burden.  Free riders hurt all.” 
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full.  Collectively, these efforts ensured that nearly every Democrat subscribed to DSG’s research 
by the end of the 1970s.23 
 
 
 
DSG’s promise that membership lists would be kept confidential promoted membership 
too.  Liberal leaders were keenly aware that some members may have been reticent to join DSG if 
membership would harm them electorally.  In the 1950s and 1960s especially, liberals were 
disproportionately elected from marginal districts.  To encourage participation, DSG’s official 
policy promoted confidential group membership (not unlike the Freedom Caucus’s practice of 
secret membership lists today).24  The promise of confidentiality provided reassurance to hesitant 
                                                          
23 It is important to note that just because Democrats subscribed to DSG’s research services, it does not 
necessarily mean they considered themselves “DSG members” (or paid membership dues, which beginning 
in 1979, were collected separate from research subscriber fees).   
24 Of course, the archival record strongly contradicts any claims made about this policy. DSG kept 
numerous, detailed records of its members and research subscribers each Congress, including records of 
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members that their opponents in future elections could not use their DSG membership against 
them.  For example, in 1965, future Speaker of the House, Thomas Foley (D-WA), represented a 
relatively conservative district – which Rep. Mo Udall (D-AZ) had to negotiate around in his 
efforts to recruit Foley.  In a letter thanking him for a check for his membership dues, Udall noted 
that, “As I told you this morning, the DSG officers are keenly aware of the nature of your district 
and the special problems that you face. There are no DSG membership lists, but we are happy to 
provide you with the benefit of research and assistance of our group” (emphasis added).25  Udall’s 
letter suggests that Foley’s membership in DSG was conditional on its secrecy.  Obviously by 
1975 when Foley became DSG chairman, the benefits and power of public association with DSG 
outweighed the potential negative electoral consequences. 
                                                          
member financial contributions.  The policy was, more accurately, a promise that DSG would not disclose 
membership lists to the press, the leadership, or anyone else – a promise that DSG strenuously upheld 
throughout their tenure in the House.  
25 June 24, 1965 letter from Udall to Foley. DSG papers, Part II, box 132, folder 6.  
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Group participation was also reinforced by providing numerous, regular forums for 
members to meet with one and other.  Membership meetings, for example, were organized 
roughly once a month when Congress was in session and noticed to members via a brightly 
printed orange meeting notice.  These meetings were, especially in the 1960s, the only regular 
opportunity for members to meet with their likeminded colleagues to discuss policy, concerns or 
problems with congressional institutions and/or their party leaders, and ask for support from their 
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colleagues for legislation they sponsored (Rohde 1991).26  These meetings helped build 
relationships with one and other and with DSG leaders, ultimately solidifying their association 
with and commitment to the group.   
And of course, there were some significant differences between the institutional position, 
policy preferences, and constituencies, between DSG members and other Democrats.  Table 3.1 
presents logistic regression results of membership in the Democratic Study Group in the 87th 
Congress, which comprises the first full congress after DSG was founded in September 1959.27   
DSG members were more junior, voted more often with their fellow partisans against 
Republicans, and were more likely to represent a large labor union constituency in Congress.28  
At the group’s founding, the average DSG member had served just under 6 years, or 3 terms, in 
the House, and voted with the majority of their party against a majority of Republicans 77% of 
the time.  The probability of a member joining DSG decreases by about .15 with each standard 
deviation increase in seniority (or about 8 years, or 4 terms in office), holding all other variables 
at the mean.  And the probability of a member joining DSG increases by about .20 with a 
standard deviation increase in district union membership (about 11.5%), and by about .16 with a 
standard deviation increase in party unity support (or about 20.5% vote support), holding all other 
                                                          
26 The Democratic Caucus did not begin meeting regularly until 1969 as part of a compromise negotiated 
between DSG leaders and Speaker McCormack in exchange for their promise not to protest Rep. William 
M. Colmer’s (D-MS) assumption of the Rules Committee chairmanship after incumbent chairman Howard 
J. Smith (D-VA) lost his seat. Even after the introduction of regular meetings of the Democratic Caucus, 
DSG membership meetings remained important for many rank and file liberals. Widespread problems with 
obtaining quorums in the Caucus, and critiques that Caucus meetings evolved to become merely another 
forum for the leadership to tell members how to vote, elevated the importance of a separate, grassroots-
based forum for members as provided by DSG.   
27 While regression analysis is normally pre-ceded by a set of hypotheses, the data offered here is merely 
descriptive; it is not intended to predict a members’ decision to join DSG.  It is difficult to evaluate the 
decision to “join” DSG as prior to 1979, “membership dues” and “research subscriber fees” were not 
separated.  Thus, members may have “joined” DSG solely for access to research. As DSG membership is a 
dichotomous variable, logistic regression analysis was employed. See Appendix 1 for a description, 
measurement, and data sources for each variable.   
28 The average non-DSG member has approximately twice the seniority (or about 13 years in office), and 
voted with the majority of their party against the majority of Republicans about 57% of the time.   
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variables at the mean.  I found no relationship between urban district demographics and DSG 
membership, which is surprising given liberals’ emphasis on issues that disproportionately 
impacted urban districts such as “slum clearance” and city-based rat extermination programs.  
And while the archival record documents DSG members’ belief that southern members 
were electorally safer than themselves, I found no association between group membership and 
district competitiveness.  These results should be interpreted with extreme caution, however, as 
most southern members were not only elected from non-competitive, one-party states (Polsby 
2004), but they represented “at-large” districts.  As a result, 71 Democrats – representing 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia – received 100% of the major party vote 
in their “district.”29  And elections indeed produced sharp swings in DSG’s membership rolls.  
Figure 3.1 traces the size of DSG’s membership relative to the full House Democratic Caucus 
from 1959 to 1976.30  In most years during this period, DSG comprised a minority (or bare 
majority) of the Democratic Caucus (though the group never dipped below a third of Democrats).  
DSG swelled to a majority of Democrats (nearly 55%) in the 89th Congress after the landslide 
Democratic election in 1964, and plummeted by 50 members after the disastrous 1966 midterm 
election.  Remarkably, despite this steep drop, the group’s membership rebounded, albeit 
unevenly, and never dropped below 45%.  This suggests that DSG’s recruitment tactics were 
                                                          
29 These data are collected from Congressional Quarterly, Voting & Elections Collection.  8 non-southern 
members were also elected to at-large seats in California (3 members) and Massachusetts (5 members). 
These states had both at-large and district representation.   
30 Unfortunately, I have been unable to identify valid membership lists in the archival record for subsequent 
years.  It is important to note that these figures, especially beginning in 1968 when Conlon became 
executive director, over-represent the number of members of Congress identifying as DSG members. 
Conlon’s greatly increased DSG’s research subscriber services. New research publications were developed, 
and the quantity and length of existing materials increased as well. DSG did not separate membership dues 
from research subscriber fees until 1979, and thus any member who subscribed to DSG’s research services 
was automatically made a member of the group. 
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successful in maintaining a significant floor level of support among members despite electoral 
forces outside of the group’s control.   
The broader differences observed above suggest that Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) 
could legitimately claim that DSG members were a coherent group within the Democratic Caucus 
that deserved consideration, if not a seat at the table.31  Rayburn would ultimately go on to 
provide liberals with some critical early resources (which will be described in the next section), 
and in return, liberals provided the Speaker with the necessary leverage to obtain the legislative 
outcomes he desired.  
 
Resource Cultivation 
Legislative resources are finite and often tied to formal leadership positions within parties 
and/or the committee system (Evans 2004; Wawro 2001), which traditionally disadvantages 
junior members without access to either leadership positions or the resources they often convey.32  
As junior members, the liberal Democrats who founded DSG recognized the considerable support 
they would need for their activities, and began strategically developing the logistical support and 
income necessary to empower themselves to undertake them.  These regular resources provided 
steady support for DSG activities and services across a variety of temporal and institutional 
factors, including party leaders unfriendly to the group, during times of divided government, or 
                                                          
31 Chapter 5 provides detailed comparisons of key differences between DSG leaders, and formal party and 
committee leaders in the House.  
32 Rep. Thomas Rees (D-CA) described the struggle liberal members faced in attempting to obtain 
legislative resources: “We tried to get some help, I mean secretarial help; we tried to get some secretarial 
pooling so we could get letters out. We tried to get an extra office so two or three members could pool an 
operation, but everything was given out by seniority. The senior members who didn’t need help, who all 
won by huge votes, that’s why they are senior members, because they have [a] set district….it was a lost 
cause. The senior guys had the staff; they had the secretarial backup; they had the space; they had the 
machinery, and we didn’t.” [Thomas M. Rees, Oral History Interview, Conducted 1987, UCLA Oral 
History Program, for the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program: 360-361].   
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election years when individual members participated less.   It ensured that the group remained 
empowered to act on behalf of collective liberal interests and foster member participation.   
Some of the earliest logistical resources cultivated by liberals for their efforts emanated 
from the leadership.  Speaker Rayburn gave liberals an office in the Longworth building in 1958, 
making DSG the first unofficial or informal group in the house to receive separate office space 
(Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist 1980).  Within a decade, DSG would grow to include the 
equivalent of four member’s offices on the fourth floor of Longworth, and their executive director 
would have an office equivalent to the personal office provided to each member.  If the 
distribution of precious office space and resources is one of the most important and valued 
“special favors” available to party leaders (Peabody 1967), then Rayburn’s decision sent a strong 
signal to the liberals that he appreciated the role they played in the party.  Lilly described the 
significance of Rayburn’s institutional support for DSG:  
“Probably the biggest thing that ever happened to DSG was either 1959 or 1960, Sam 
Rayburn’s office called Bill Phillips who was executive director at the time, and said we 
think you should have a telephone connected to the House system….that was how they 
knew they had arrived.”   
 
The importance of a telephone line of DSG’s own cannot be overstated.  When liberals first 
began organizing themselves in the late 1950s, they created a whip system – led by Thompson 
(D-NJ) and operated via telephone – to mobilize liberal members to come to the floor for key 
votes.33  This system made it possible for liberals to instantly receive communication from the 
leadership, but more importantly, to share that information with their fellow (liberal) Democrats.   
DSG began building up their staff capacity during this period.  William (Bill) Phillips, an 
aide to Rep. George Rhodes (D-PA) – one of DSG’s founding members – was hired as the 
                                                          
33 The development and function of the DSG whip system will be explored in detail in chapter five.  
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group’s staff director (and first full-time employee) in May 1960.34  Rhodes initially loaned 
Phillips temporarily to the group, but the group’s growing activities required full-time staff 
support.  Within ten years, DSG’s staff went from 1 full-time staffer to over 20 (reaching 26 by 
the early 1970s).35  The largest increase in staff occurred after the executive committee hired 
Richard (Dick) Conlon as executive director in 1968.36  Conlon, who was trained as a journalist 
before becoming press secretary for Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN), is widely credited with 
swiftly building up DSG’s staff capacity, especially the group’s research staff.  One former DSG 
staffer interviewed recalled Conlon’s expectations for potential new staff hires: “He [Conlon] 
would get people with varied backgrounds. He would get people with graduate degrees…He 
actually had in mind having people who already had substantive expertise in the area.”37  In this 
way, DSG’s staff paralleled the ideal committee staff with a range of substantive experts 
supporting the work of members of Congress. 
DSG’s policy of rotating executive committee leaders at the start of each Congress 
necessitated the development of a strong, prepared and self-directed staff.  Every staffer 
interviewed in the course of this project stressed that the new leadership each Congress ensured 
that DSG’s executive director, in particular, had significant prerogative to direct the day-to-day 
activities of the group. DSG’s executive director was considered such an important position that 
Conlon – DSG’s longest serving top staffer – was referred to in press reports as the “436th 
Member of the House.”  He was on a first name basis with nearly all members he interacted with, 
and had strong personal relationships with many executive committee members.  Conlon, his 
                                                          
34 Davidson, Roger H., David M. Kovenock, and Michael Kent O’Leary. 1966. Congress in Crisis: Politics 
and Congressional Reform. DSG papers, Part II, box 163, folder 6. 
35 By 1993, DSG had 18 full-time staffers.   
36 John Morgan replaced Bill Phillips in the mid-1960s. According to one former DSG staffer, Morgan was 
forced out by the DSG leadership because they believed he was ineffective.  The executive committee was 
responsible for interviewing and hiring the executive director, who then was charged with most DSG hiring 
decisions.   
37 September 21, 2015 in-person interview.   
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successor Scott Lilly, and the staff they developed were a significant resource for DSG, and as 
such, the office was effectively self-sustaining.  Regardless of various temporal factors – e.g. 
busy election years, or the chairman’s demanding committee work or district travel schedule – 
DSG’s staff ensured that the organization’s goals, activities and services continued to thrive.   
To support DSG’s growing staff, DSG developed a regular stream of clerk hire funds.  
House clerk hire funds are monies from a member’s personal office budget that are explicitly 
earmarked to pay for staff (“clerk”) salaries.  In the mid- to late-twentieth century, members 
could elect to jointly pool a portion of their clerk hire funds to pay for a single staffer.38  Clerk 
hire funds were contributions given by individual members to DSG over and above their 
membership dues and research subscription fees.  And indeed, members’ loyalty to DSG and their 
appreciation for the research services provided by the group was more than returned to them 
through the services provided by the group.  In an interview with DSG’s bookkeeper, she recalled 
how if DSG was ever short on payroll and needed clerk hire funds, she would call members’ 
offices and most members “were pretty willing [when asked to contribute] to do so. Some of 
them did it on a regular basis.”39  Members also sometimes contributed clerk-hire to DSG in 
gratitude for staff support or assistance on a member’s special project, such as a fundraising 
event.40  Moreover, as the leadership training and opportunities provided by the group 
strengthened, members desiring to run for leadership positions in DSG strategically participated 
                                                          
38 The staffer would work in the DSG offices and for DSG-specific activities, but would technically be paid 
for by several individual members’ office budgets.  This practice was extremely limited by legislative 
service organization regulations adopted on the eve of Republican take-over of the House in 1994.   
39 October 22, 2015 in-person interview.   
40 For example, in an October 23, 1985 letter from an aide to Rep. Bob Wise (D-WV) to Conlon, the aide 
noted that “Bob asked me to contact Roy [Dye] to inquire about making a modest Clerk Hire contribution 
to the DSG” as a thank you for Conlon’s help with Wise’s recent fundraiser and other things. DSG papers, 
Part II, 132, folder 6.  
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in these fundraising efforts to garner favor with other members.41  By the late 1970s, somewhere 
between 80 to 100 members contributed on average $3,600 in clerk-hire.42   
The rest of the DSG budget, including office equipment and other materials, were funded 
largely through research subscription fees and membership dues.  Despite the collective action 
problem posed by many large groups, DSG enjoyed considerable success at soliciting financial 
support from their members. By the end of the first session of the 87th Congress, over half of the 
121 solicited members of Congress contributed financially to the group (68 members total).43  
Services offered by DSG prompted much of this loyalty by DSG members who paid membership 
dues and subscription fees ranging from $100-$200 in the early 1960s, to $500 at the end of the 
1970s, to well over $2,000 at the beginning of the 1980s (and between $3,000-$4,000+ 
thereafter).44  DSG tracked contributing and non-contributing members, and dispatched executive 
committee members to lobby those members from their region who had not yet fulfilled their 
obligations to pay their bill in full.  Contested DSG elections also provided a strong impetus for 
members to renew their DSG membership so that they were eligible to vote.  There were four 
especially competitive DSG elections, in 1971, in 1975, in 1979, and in 1994 (before the start of 
                                                          
41 For example, in a February 27, 1975 letter, Rep. William Ford (D-MI) announced his (ultimately 
unsuccessful) candidacy for chairman of DSG.  In his bid for the position, he stressed his fundraising work 
during the past six years, which helped give him “valuable insight into how DSG can best function in 
meetings its goals and challenges.” DSG papers, Part I, box 4, folder 3.  
42 February 22, 1979 Dear DSG Colleague letter from Mikva, DSG papers, Part II, box 133, folder 5.  
43 It is important to note that not all of the Members of Congress solicited by DSG considered themselves 
“members” of DSG, nor were they necessarily actually members of the group.  “Democratic Study Group 
Members, 87th Congress, 1st Session, November 1, 1961,” DSG papers, Part I, box 58, folder 3.  
44 Beginning in 1979, membership dues were separated from research subscription fees. At the time, 
membership dues totaled $25 and research subscription fees $300.  The change was approved by the 
membership by a vote of 152 to 12. The distinction between “member” and “research subscriber” was 
primarily a difference between individuals with the right to vote in DSG elections at the start of each 
Congress, and individuals who did not have that right.  This was a pragmatic decision for DSG as a 
growing number of Republicans subscribed to the research services, as well as Democrats who did not want 
to be considered as DSG members, but wished to receive the group’s research.  February 15, 1978 memo 
from DSG chair Mikva re membership fees; December 6, 1979 memo from Obey to members re DSG 
financial problem, DSG papers, Part II, box 134, folder 1.  
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the 104th Congress).  Before each of these elections, numerous lapsed memberships were renewed 
so that members could cast a vote.     
To supplement the income provided by Democratic research subscribers, DSG began 
soliciting Republican research subscribers (apparently in response to the request of several 
Republicans to do so) in the early 1970s.  While the executive committee was concerned that they 
might unintentionally empower the opposition, this was a strategic move by the group to increase 
their operating budget without necessarily increasing their responsibilities or work.45  Former 
DSG executive director Lilly described this strategy:  
“We were a completely entrepreneurial, free enterprise organization within the federal 
government. We lived off of our subscriptions. We had some money donated, but by and 
large, our subscriptions were something that we needed.  I think during the time I was 
there [1988-1994], we went from 15 to 20 Republicans up to around 50.  [That was] 50 
times $5,000 a year – $250,000 – that we had to spend on improving our operation. And 
we did that in spite of the fact that both [Republican Minority Whip] Gingrich and 
[Republican Conference Chairman] Armey were not only discouraging Republicans from 
subscribing but threatening them – saying “we know who you are and we’re not going to 
do you any favors if you want to change committees or anything else.” Basically saying, 
“we’re not going to support you for any positions that you might seek if you continue to 
do that.”46    
In the late 1950s and much of the 1960s, interest groups contributed to DSG’s operating budget, 
providing “voluntary donations” for receipt of the research materials and contributions for the 
DSG Campaign Fund (earmarked for liberal candidates).  Ethics regulations passed by the House 
placed a moratorium on “voluntary donations” to the group.47  In order to continue receiving 
access to the research materials, interest groups, including labor unions, civil rights groups, and 
others, would pay a fee to receive the materials at-cost (postage, paper, and a small cost for the 
                                                          
45 It is important to note that this strategy often faced considerable challenges from the Republican 
leadership who were staunchly opposed to their members contributing to an officially partisan group.   
46 October 28, 2015 telephone interview. The archival record support Lilly’s characterization of the 
Republican leadership’s opposition to Republican research subscribers of DSG.  At the end of 1993, the 
Republican Conference Chair Dick Armey sent a letter to his fellow Republicans decrying the Republican 
members who provided the group with $158,900 in fiscal year 1993 alone.  He argued that this financial 
support was not a “harmless use of official funds,” but one that had “greater implications, as well as 
consequences, for all House Republicans.”  DSG papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5.  
47 However, contributions to the Campaign Fund continued as the financial accounts were separate.   
83 
 
copying equipment).  In the early 1970s, fees ranged between $25 and $75, but reached $300 by 
the end of the decade.48  These fees did not enhance DSG’s budget, but the relationship they 
symbolized was significant.  DSG provided legislative information to interest groups that would 
otherwise be difficult to obtain, and in turn, interest groups kept DSG abreast of their legislative 
activities.  If interest groups initially emerged as a critical contributor to DSG’s income, they later 
evolved into a pivotal link in DSG’s information network.49   
 
 
 
Strong Leadership to Advocate for Group Interests 
When DSG first met as a group on that September day in 1959, one of the first decisions 
they made concerned the group’s leadership structure.  The membership established a practice of 
electing their leaders with secret ballots, shared leadership power among a small group of 
members, and the elevation of leaders descriptively representative of the group.  These three 
tenets of DSG’s leadership structure guided the group throughout their tenure in the House – 
ensuring the group changed in response to new political environments and circumstances, and 
consistently empowered leaders with the legitimacy to speak authoritatively on behalf of liberal 
Democrats.  The effect on opportunities for ambitious members to participate in Congress was 
immediate.   
Rather than rely on the leadership of a single ambitious or charismatic member, DSG was 
consistently led by a group of members who served on what was called the “executive 
                                                          
48 DSG memo re “voluntary contributions” from non-DSG users, DSG papers, Part II, box 133, folder 2.   
49 This informational relationship is quite different from the informational exchange common to theoretical 
accounts of lobbying today (Hall and Deardorff 2004). During DSG’s tenure in the House, members 
collectively subsidized the cost of interest group participation and lobbying in Congress.  While interest 
groups undoubtedly played an informational role during this period, it was not the one-sided information 
exchange that scholars commonly assume to be the case in the contemporary U.S. Congress.  
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committee.”  The committee developed in 1960, and initially totaled 8 members.  Reps. Metcalf 
(D-MO), Thompson (D-NJ), and Roosevelt (D-CA), who were elected via secret ballot in 
September 1959 as chair, secretary-whip, and vice-chair of the group, respectively, were joined 
by Reps. John Blatnik (D-MN), Frank Coffin (D-ME), William J. Green, Jr. (D-PA), Abraham 
Multer (D-NY), and Sidney R. Yates (D-IL) in January 1960.  Over time, the executive 
committee was enlarged as group activities and responsibilities developed, but its leaders were 
always elected by the membership.50  From 1959 to 1971, the executive committee ranged 
between 8 and 15 members (and thereafter, between 15 and 38 members).  By the 1970s, the 
committee included several (at-large) vice-chairmen, a separate secretary and whip, and regional 
vice-chairmen.51  Elections were usually held over a 1-2-day period (especially in later years) in a 
designated room in one of the House office buildings (or sometimes in the Speaker’s Lobby in the 
Capitol).  Members were given ample notice ahead of the election, and could drop by to vote 
whenever they had a free period of time in their schedule.  In addition to the elected leaders, 1-2 
members were appointed by the chair each year, including the freshman representative.  Former 
chairmen were also guaranteed a seat on the executive committee as long as they served in the 
House.  This practice formalized the relationship between DSG allies after they moved into 
formal party and committee leadership positions later in their legislative career – ensuring that 
they were not only involved in DSG decision-making, but they were encouraged to contribute 
valuable leadership intelligence, as well as the resources provided by the leadership apparatus.  
                                                          
50 Sometime in the early 1960s, DSG began organizing an Elections Committee to make recommendations 
for leadership positions of the group.  The committee was appointed by the current DSG chair and headed 
by a former DSG chairman.  In general, there was only one candidate for chairman with the interest and 
credibility to win the seat, and the committee merely “nominated” that candidate.  When there were 
multiple candidates running for chairman, the Elections Committee nominated each of the candidates.  
There were four contested elections for chair in DSG’s history – in 1971, 1975, 1979, and 1994 (DSG’s last 
leadership election was moved from its typical March date at the start of the new congress in response to 
Democrats’ new minority status).   
51 Other leadership venues in DSG, including leadership in DSG’s task force system and leadership of the 
DSG Campaign Fund, were appointed by the chair (with input from the executive committee).   
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For example, if a DSG leader became a whip (as Reps. Thomas Foley (D-WA) or John Brademas 
(D-IN) did in the 1970s and 1980s), they could share information about where other members 
stood on a bill, and how that was likely to shape leadership strategy on the floor.   
The executive committee was designed to be representative of the full DSG membership, 
including seniority, regional composition, and electoral vulnerability.  Executive committee 
members averaged about 8.5 years in office or just over 4 terms, which made them slightly more 
experienced than the typical DSG member (who averaged about 3 terms in office), but 
significantly more junior than House leaders. Party leaders averaged 18 years (9 terms), 
committee chairs averaged 24 years (12 terms), and subcommittee chairs averaged 14 years (7 
terms).  The executive committee also represented a cross-section of liberal Democrats, although 
the overwhelming majority were from western and mid-western states.  The majority of DSG 
leaders were elected from mid-western (between 25-46%) and western states (between 21-38%) 
throughout the group’s tenure.  Over time, the committee evolved to include regional vice-
chairmen (and in the 1980s, a southern member) to ensure that it was descriptively representative 
of all Democrats.  It was considered critical to an organization like DSG where liberals were 
keenly aware of how geographic divisions could divide Democrats.  This broad geographic 
representation was especially important for anticipating potential regional problems or concerns, 
and crafting strategies to address them.  A long-time DSG staffer explained that “The executive 
committee would give insights into how people from those regions would think.”52   
And as liberals were disproportionately likely to be elected from competitive or marginal 
districts, so too were many executive committee members; this helped DSG understand the needs 
of rank and file members often ignored by electorally safe party and committee leaders.  Some 
executive committee members even represented districts where association with DSG could pose 
                                                          
52 August 6, 2015 in-person interview.   
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an electoral threat.  In an interview with political scientist Thomas Mann, who served as an APSA 
Congressional Fellow for Rep. James O’Hara – DSG’s Chairman in the 90th Congress (1967-
1968) – he recalled that O’Hara “represented a pretty conservative democratic 
constituency…where George Wallace did extraordinarily well.”53  Despite his chairmanship of 
DSG and his widely acknowledged parliamentary expertise, O’Hara’s constituency limited his 
capacity to serve as the public face of reform efforts in the House.  The electoral vulnerability of 
many executive committee members challenges a dominant line of research on the role of re-
election goals in shaping member behavior (Mayhew 1974), and helps explain why DSG limited 
much of its press activity in the group’s early days.  In a letter dated October 8, 1966, DSG 
executive director John Morgan noted that DSG averaged only 3 press releases a year on “strictly 
DSG business,” including non-controversial things like “major staff changes, our fund-raising 
event in the summer, a committee report and the like.”54  Though the press did cover DSG 
activities, the group’s leadership largely operated behind closed doors without press interaction or 
public knowledge.   
Executive committee members were expected to participate and contribute to the group.  
If DSG was running low on clerk-hire funds, for example, the executive committee was tasked 
with personally making up the difference, both from their own funds and by lobbying members to 
contribute.55  This emphasis on active participation was somewhat unique in the House.  As the 
congressional caucus system exploded during the 1970s and 1980s, members began organizing 
                                                          
53 November 17, 2015 telephone interview.  
54 October 8, 1966 letter from John Morgan to Blair Ewing. DSG papers, Part II, box 132, folder 9. Another 
explanation for the limited interaction with the press during this period is that John Morgan and Bill 
Phillips (Morgan’s predecessor) were not especially press savvy.  Richard (Dick) Conlon’s hiring in 1968 – 
and his own experience as a journalist – substantially changed how DSG interacted with and employed the 
press to their own advantage.   
55 Clerk-hire refers to the share of a member’s personal office budget that they can contribute to DSG to 
support the employment of full or part-time staffers.  The salary of a single DSG staffer, for example, may 
be funded through the clerk-hire contributions of several members’ offices (with each member contributing 
a few thousand dollars).  Clerk-hire contributions were separate from membership dues and research 
subscription fees, and were somewhat harder to solicit from individual DSG members than the other dues.   
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caucuses around single policy issues (nuclear proliferation), representatives of various 
demographic groups (Women’s Caucus, Congressional Black Caucus), and other ideological or 
factional groups (Republican Study Committee).  There were so many caucuses that many 
members belonged to numerous organizations, and their leadership board was more perfunctory 
and symbolic than substantive (Hammond 1989; 1991).  Scott Lilly, former DSG executive 
director and a longtime congressional staffer, described how DSG leaders differed from the 
leaders of other caucuses in the House:  
“We wanted the executive committee to not only help us think about what we were gonna 
do, but make our efforts resonate more broadly in the House once we did something…we 
did have a good deal of investment by a lot of the executive committee.  There were some 
people who belonged to 15 different LSOs, and didn’t participate in any of them. We 
tried to make sure that didn’t happen in DSG.”56   
The archival record supports Lilly’s account of member’s commitment to DSG.  Executive 
committee meetings were generally well-attended by DSG leaders, and they regularly participated 
in the discussions.     
The active demands placed on DSG leaders necessitated a sharing of responsibilities 
among members.  Beginning with Rep. Metcalf’s election to the Senate in 1960, DSG began an 
informal practice of rotating their leadership.  No single member occupied the same role in two 
consecutive congresses.57  During the March 1965 DSG leadership election, outgoing chairman 
Rep. John Blatnik (MN) said that “It has always been my strong feeling that there should be a 
rotation of officers and a broad sharing of responsibilities in DSG.”58  This practice was formally 
inscribed into the DSG bylaws at the request of outgoing chairman Donald Fraser (MN) in 1971. 
In a letter announcing nominations for the executive committee in 1973, the DSG nominating 
committee wrote, “In no small part, the past success of DSG in meeting such challenges has been 
                                                          
56 October 28, 2015 telephone interview.  
57 For example, a member could move up from the secretary or whip position to the chairmanship, but they 
could not stay as the secretary or whip for two consecutive congresses.   
58 Introductory Remarks, March 3, 1965 DSG meeting, DSG papers, Part II, box 3, folder 8.  
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due to the renewed energy and drive and the fresh ideas which successive new leaders have 
brought to our group.”59  These archival documents suggest that it was not only an organizational 
imperative that leadership responsibilities be shared in light of the multiple, competing demands 
on members’ time, but a strategic imperative as well.  Executive committee service was not just a 
responsibility, but an opportunity.  A rotating leadership was part of a deliberate strategy by DSG 
to help disseminate leadership training and experience to a larger group of members denied by 
seniority norms from receiving them elsewhere in the House.  This increased DSG’s chances of 
cultivating leaders competitive and ambitious enough for the highest echelons of congressional 
power.  Today, many member groups in the House follow this practice (Singh 1998), including 
the Congressional Black Caucus (which formally organized in 1971).  But it was DSG that 
originated this unique model of leadership training dissemination among group members.    
 
Resolving Group Conflict 
If the frequent death knell of factions is an inability to reconcile internal debates between 
dogmatic purity and pragmatism (Schwartz 2006; Weinstein 1967), then liberal leaders carefully 
structured decision-making processes in DSG to avoid this fate.  Decision-making mechanisms 
balanced member demands with the realities of the institutional environment and the group’s 
status as a minority faction in the majority party.  They also provided a guaranteed outlet for 
members to participate directly in the activities of the group.  DSG leaders and members were 
routinely responsible for making many important decisions, including what legislation or 
procedural reforms to support, where to devote resources, and what strategy to pursue to achieve 
specific agenda items. The bulk of DSG’s decisions were made in two primary ways – delegation 
                                                          
59 DSG papers, Part II, box 4, folder 1.  
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to the executive committee, and formal votes and/or polling of the group’s membership.  In either 
case, the majority always carried.  
The executive committee was tasked with making most decisions concerning internal 
DSG matters on behalf of the membership, especially on issues involving group resources and 
specific strategies.  The committee met more frequently than the full membership, averaging one 
meeting every two weeks, with some DSG chairs electing to call meetings slightly more 
(in)frequently depending on their personal preferences and the congressional and DSG agenda. 
Each meeting was organized around a specific agenda set by the chair and executive director, but 
members were encouraged to contribute.  Despite this collaborative atmosphere, executive 
committee meetings were not dominated by “aimless discussions and monologues or to be 
interrupted by Members who want to pursue their [personal] agendas.”60  The meetings were 
intended to be action-oriented – anchored around specific events or needs of the broader 
membership (upcoming legislation or policy proposals, leadership races, elections, etc.) When 
members disagreed over a course of action (about where to devote resources, a specific strategy, 
whether to endorse a bill or amendment, and so forth), the committee would cast a formal vote 
and the majority decision would carry.  DSG bylaws dictated that the executive committee may 
make however many “recommendations and statements regarding legislation and public policy as 
it considers appropriate,” but that they “shall represent the Executive Committee only and shall 
not be construed to represent the position of the DSG….unless said matter is approved by the 
membership.”61  DSG staff kept meticulous minutes of these meetings, and names and positions 
were recorded whenever a formal vote was taken.   
The archival record of executive committee meetings suggest that the meetings not only 
served as a forum for members to discuss DSG issues, but also their own legislative and policy 
                                                          
60 Undated memo from Conlon to Brodhead. DSG papers.  
61 DSG bylaws, DSG papers, Part II, box 100, folder 4.  
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priorities.  In an interview with a former DSG staffer who attended these meetings, he described 
this process in the early days of DSG:  
“The idea was the chair of DSG and maybe one or two other members…would contact 
[executive director] Dick and say go get the members together. It’s more like a sharing 
[forum]…it was a pretty large group, which was good – you’re lucky when you have a 
meeting and you’re lucky to get a dozen.  The idea was to have some give and take. Some 
issues on the take, they know they have to deal with legislatively in the weeks ahead. Just 
talk about it, how they wanted to handle it, how they want to [address it]” (emphasis 
added).62   
The size and diversity of the executive committee helped ensure that potential points of division 
were explicitly addressed and debated.  DSG also had internal, informal safeguards in place to 
ensure that decisions about strategy and use of resources represented the interests of the full 
membership – and not merely the prerogative of a single or small group of leaders.  Former DSG 
executive director Scott Lilly recalled how one of his most important responsibilities was to 
balance the prerogative of DSG leaders with the needs of the overall organization:  
If DSG leaders came in “with something that was parochial or something that did not 
reflect the broader viewpoint of the membership and tried to use the organization to 
promote something that the organization wasn’t interested in…that was the point where 
the executive director was expected by the other members and the chairman to say, “No, 
we’re not going to do that.” [Lilly’s predecessor] Dick did that at times, and I did that at 
times.”63 
 
The full membership played a direct role in group decisions as well, especially in the 1960s and 
1970s.  When the executive committee was sufficiently divided, or when membership polls 
would strengthen DSG’s hand in negotiations or party debates, decisions were forwarded to 
members.  DSG frequently conducted polls (or “questionnaires,” as referred to by members and 
staff) to determine which procedural reforms to advance in the Caucus, and occasionally polled 
members on specific policy proposals.  For example, when DSG advanced pivotal reforms on 
issues like votes on committee chairs, recorded teller votes, or an elected whip, it was with 
                                                          
62 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.   
63 October 28, 2015 telephone interview.  
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majority support in the membership.  And when poll results showed insufficient support for other 
proposals, such as term limits on committee chairs, televised coverage of the House floor, or 
Caucus procedures to instruct Democratic members of specific committee, the executive 
committee “declined to act.”64  Polls imbued DSG reform proposals and recommendations with 
significant legitimacy; the group routinely included poll numbers indicating support for each 
measure by the membership, and basic statistics on the representativeness of the responses 
(including respondents’ seniority and geographic distribution), alongside its formal 
recommendations.  DSG also occasionally commissioned polls of constituents in members’ 
districts before deciding on a collective group response, such as a 1985 poll of constituent opinion 
on President Ronald Reagan and various Democratic tax reform proposals.     
In contrast to the practices of several prominent factions today (such as the Blue Dogs 
Caucus and the Freedom Caucus), DSG never bound its members to vote a certain way on any 
issue.65  And indeed, many staffers interviewed in the course of this research were reticent to even 
acknowledge that DSG had a “policy agenda.”66  Policy and legislative endorsements were 
relatively rare and limited to “matters of fundamental importance where there is at least a chance 
that such a recommendation might be productive, and on matters, such as House procedures, 
                                                          
64 September 25, 1976 memo from Eckhardt to members re reform proposals. DSG papers, Part II, box 133, 
folder 4.  
65 When the group made a decision to support an item on the policy or procedural reform agenda, it was a 
recommendation that its members support the bill or resolution – not a requirement.   
66 Many staffers, especially those who worked on DSG’s various information and research publications, 
acknowledged that DSG had a procedural reform agenda, but were hesitant to say that DSG had a policy 
agenda.  Most of these staffers, especially those employed as DSG researchers, viewed DSG strictly as an 
information service.  However, as one staffer noted (September 22, 2016), “because DSG ultimately really 
was the members, it was almost [like DSG operated on] two separate tracks. Because even once they got all 
the reforms they got, they still….had an undercover operation” going on certain policy issues.  This 
suggests that not only was DSG so effectively organized that the group’s staff could self-sustain the most 
important of DSG’s services, but that this organizational capacity then empowered members and leaders of 
the group to focus on policy matters.  The executive committee, for example, did not need to worry about 
routine, everyday issues in the DSG office – they could focus their limited time and energies on developing 
and building up support for various liberal policy proposals.   
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where DSG is recognized as having a degree of institutional expertise.”67  The number of 
endorsements often reflected the congressional agenda; the group endorsed 17 bills in 1965, while 
endorsing only 1 bill in 1977.68   In an early example of membership polls shaping DSG agenda 
and strategy, DSG chairman Metcalf (D-WY) noted in a Dear Colleague letter to members in 
1960 that:  
“all DSG Members were polled as to their position on this measure [to lift the 4 ½ 
percent interest rate ceiling on long-term government bonds] so that a unified group 
position could be taken. The results of the poll show that 94 percent of the DSG Members 
replying to our questionnaires oppose H.R. 10590 in its present form. Accordingly, at the 
DSG meeting yesterday it was decided that a joint letter be addressed to the Speaker, 
informing him of the strong opposition of DSG Members to the bill and requesting a 
meeting with him to discuss the matter in detail before the bill is scheduled for floor 
action” (emphasis added).69  
 
The sequence of events and strategy outlined here by Metcalf underscores the importance of both 
membership polls and deliberation in DSG decision-making.  Metcalf and other DSG members 
ultimately succeeded in not only securing a meeting with the Speaker, but in delaying 
consideration of the bill until it was revised.   
Part of the reason why policy endorsements like the example described above were so 
rare is that DSG was often reluctant to commission membership polls, which could weaken their 
hand by providing tangible evidence that the majority did not necessarily support their position.  
In an interview with a longtime DSG staffer, he said that DSG would be “very wary of doing a 
poll because once you do it, now you’ve got this f---ing poll.”70  DSG’s long, and ultimately 
                                                          
67 August 14, 1981 letter from Brodhead to the editorial board of the Nation, DSG papers, Part II, box 132, 
folder 3. In response to criticism in the Nation that DSG did not advocate “a liberal position on every major 
bill that comes along,” DSG chairman Brodhead (D-MI) wrote that this is “because the liberals who have 
led DSG over the years know that most Members – liberals as well as moderates and conservatives – vote 
their districts on major legislation, and that, as a result, a DSG recommendation would have about as much 
impact on Members’ voting behavior as does the Democratic Party Platform.”   
68 “List of Issues DSG Took a Position On, 1960-1979.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 151, folder 6.  
69 February 26, 1960 Dear Colleague letter from DSG chairman Metcalf, DSG papers, Part I, box 71, folder 
9.  
70 August 5, 2015 in-person interview.   
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unsuccessful, pursuit of legislation establishing public financing for House elections in the late 
1970s provides a clear example of the negative consequences of polling members’ preferences.  
In 1979, after the House Administration committee failed to report the bill establishing public 
financing, H.R. 1, the leadership requested that DSG poll its members before taking a resolution 
to the Caucus that would have required the Rules Committee to report the legislation directly 
(bypassing House Administration).  The poll of Democrats revealed a lack of majority support for 
the bill.71  Staff memos during this period document the frustration within DSG that the poll 
undermined their bargaining position: “All that has been accomplished by the whip check ploy 
has been to put us in an untenable position and to lessen the chances for success.”72  The House 
never ultimately voted on public financing legislation for congressional elections.73  These 
dynamics also provide an alternative explanation for why Speaker Sam Rayburn chose not to use 
the Democratic whip system (Ripley 1964).  Rayburn’s negotiating position was arguably, if 
somewhat surprisingly, stronger without firm numbers about where members stood.  
The specific decision-making mechanisms outlined above significantly strengthened 
DSG’s capacity to negotiate with party leaders, and to engage in debates with other Democrats. 
But they also increased DSG’s capacity to resolve conflict and produce compromise prior to 
introducing important procedural and policy matters in the Democratic Caucus.  At a 1981 
Symposium on the U.S. Congress to honor Speaker Tip O’Neill, long-time DSG executive 
director Richard (“Dick”) P. Conlon said,  
“Each of the various reforms was subjected to prolonged and deliberate discussion and 
debate in the DSG Executive Committee and at DSG membership meetings before being 
offered in the caucus to make sure they would work as intended and that they would not 
                                                          
71 DSG’s efforts on public financing were bi-partisan and necessitated a not insignificant base of liberal and 
moderate Republican support. To many in DSG, a poll revealing a majority of Democrats opposing public 
financing legislation (in the form of H.R. 1) did not provide an accurate depiction of the current legislative 
environment because any bill passed on the floor would be passed with Republican support.   
72 June 6, 1979 memo from Conlon to Obey re H.R. 1. DSG papers, part II, box 133, folder 5.  
73 This policy proposal will be analyzed in more detail in chapter six. 
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have undesirable side effects. As a result, virtually all of the major DSG reforms were 
approved as initially offered” (1981, 241).   
 
If DSG struggled to unite their own members behind a specific proposal or course of action, they 
could hardly expect to unite all Democrats behind the same proposal.  This was an institutional 
and organizational imperative for a group that frequently constituted a minority of Democrats.  
Returning to Figure 3.1, it is notable that even during the height of reform at the start of the 94th 
Congress, the group did not comprise more than 45% of Democrats.  Given that liberals (and 
DSG members) were notorious members of the so-called Tuesday-to-Thursday Club (Sheppard 
1985), DSG found it difficult just to mobilize their strongest allies – let alone lead a campaign to 
mobilize and persuade non-members.74  The group’s minority status and the hurdles to 
mobilization elevated the importance of the decision-making mechanisms outlined above, 
promoting the internal group unity critical in order for the group to construct winning majority 
coalitions on the House and Caucus floor.     
Despite many members’ desire for faster and greater liberal policy gains, the mechanisms 
established by DSG fostered shrewd pragmatism in the group.  Adherence to an incremental 
strategy of change – though widely recognized as effective (Rohde 1991) – occasionally led to 
critiques that DSG was too slow-moving and not extreme enough in their activities.  
Nevertheless, the majority of active DSG members did not share this view – in a 1977 survey of 
the DSG membership, only 8 of 110 members reported that DSG was not “activist enough.”75  
These internal mechanisms were developed to resolve conflict between members, and – 
                                                          
74 The “Tuesday-to-Thursday” Club refers to those members who are routinely not available or present in 
Washington, D.C. and/or on Capitol Hill, except on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday when votes are 
usually scheduled and committee (and party) meetings are routinely held. These members usually spend the 
rest of their time home in their district (or engaged in other activities around the country).   
75 May 13, 1977 memo from Mikva to members re responses to DSG questionnaire. DSG papers, Part II, 
box 133, folder 4.  
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especially on important reform issues – these procedures usually succeeded in unifying members 
behind a specific course of action.     
 
 
 
Communication & Information Sharing Tools 
The formal structures of the House provide party and committee leaders with a set of 
tools, including agenda-setting power, and information and communications services (Kingdon 
1989; Evans 2004; Cox and McCubbins 2005), to pursue their policy goals.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, these tools were often used to suppress consideration of many of the policy goals 
prioritized by liberal members.   DSG strategically developed their own tools to challenge these 
biases and support the adoption of liberal policy goals.  Among them, liberals developed the DSG 
Campaign Fund to provide liberal candidates with funds, activities and services; a whip system to 
mobilize members to come to the floor for key votes; and information networks to provide their 
members with unbiased policy and legislation research.  These tools were effective instruments 
through which DSG distributed precious resources and services to their members and empowered 
them to collectively articulate liberal interests. But they also served as the central linkage between 
DSG’s organizational strengths and the group’s broader membership.  
Almost immediately after the group’s founding in 1959, DSG developed its whip system 
under the office of the secretary.  Shortly thereafter, liberals used the system to mobilize their 
allies in their “first floor engagement” on the 1959 Civil Rights Act – which is representative of 
the broader policy issues most commonly addressed by the whip system.76  Throughout the 
                                                          
76 Undated 1960 memo, DSG papers, part II, box 151, folder 6. “The coordinated DSG effort in support of 
the civil rights bill represents our first floor engagement. In many ways, it was an experimental pilot 
operation. Mistakes were made. Some techniques worked, some didn’t. All in all, we have obtained 
valuable experience which will help in the coming fights for other measures in our DSG legislative 
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1960s, liberals would use their whip system, which emphasized personal, member-to-member 
lobbying to mobilize members on behalf of a variety of policies, including the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.77  DSG organized their whips geographically, pioneering 
what was called the “buddy system” whereby whips would stay on the floor throughout the entire 
debate on amendments and notify a list of members when they needed to be present.  This was a 
considerable task as debates on amendments (especially on major legislation) frequently took 
several hours, but it was the only method through which whips could know exactly which votes 
liberal support was most needed, and the precise time when votes would occur.  After the 
introduction of recorded teller votes (and the further development of the Democratic whip 
system) in 1970, DSG refined their whip system as the primary tool through which membership 
polls and counts were conducted.  These polls and counts guided group decision-making, but they 
also empowered DSG leaders to advocate on behalf of the group.  For example, DSG’s emphasis 
on unbiased whip polls (weighted to account for liberal bias) often gave them leverage in 
negotiating with the leadership who relied on Democratic counts that were susceptible to 
conservative bias (and did not always weight results based on differing responses rates).78  From 
civil rights legislation in the 1960s, to procedural changes in the 1970s, to budget issues in the 
                                                          
program.”  This memo provides early evidence that DSG leaders always sought to reflect on their past 
efforts – successes and failures – and apply those lessons to future fights.   
77 See chapter seven for more information about the policy focus of DSG whips. The personal relationship 
between whips and their assigned members was so important that whenever a whip was assigned their list 
of members, they were instructed to review the names.  If their personal relationship with any member was 
weak (for any reason), the whip was to notify DSG staff who would reassign the member.    
78 For example, in budget negotiations with the leadership in 1983, DSG’s whip poll gave liberal leaders 
leverage in negotiating with the leadership to pressure Ways & Means to include alterative options to meet 
budget reconciliation goals (September 29, 1983 executive committee meeting minutes, DSG papers, Part 
II, box 7, folder 8).  DSG’s poll (which was weighted to eliminate liberal bias) surveyed more options than 
the leadership (which surveyed only 3), and was apparently deliberately non-specific in their poll so that 
Ways & Means “wouldn’t get pressured to include things in the tax package.” DSG’s whip poll would 
ultimately enable them to help craft a committee amendment known as the Pease-Gephardt-Moody-
McHugh amendment (McHugh was DSG chair at the time), which would have raised $32 billion over three 
years (White and Wildavsky 1990).  The amendment was ultimately not adopted (65 Democrats voted 
against the rule), but the consideration of the amendment itself is significant given Ways & Means 
Chairman Rostenkowski’s opposition to any amendments on his committee’s bills.     
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1980s, DSG’s whip system empowered liberal leaders to construct successful legislative 
coalitions on key issues of interest to their members.   
Ultimately however, the success of these coalitions and the whip system was dependent 
on efforts inside and outside of Congress to increase the number of liberals in the House.  DSG 
was keenly aware that liberals’ minority status limited the strategies available to them to achieve 
their policy goals.79  To increase the number their likeminded allies, they established the DSG 
Campaign Fund in the early 1960s to support liberal candidacies, especially in competitive 
districts.80  The Campaign Fund served as an apparatus through which DSG could distribute 
monies and services to fledging liberal campaigns.  In addition to draft speeches, opposition 
research and other information, the Campaign Fund also leveraged individual connections and 
subsidized the cost for members to capitalize on new media in their campaigns. For example, in 
1968, the DSG Radio-TV subcommittee led by Reps. Lester Wolff (D-PA) and Tom Rees (D-
CA) (whose California district contained Hollywood agencies) wrote to members offering their 
services to coordinate an effort to obtain movie stars, including Henry Fonda, Ralph Bellamy, and 
Gregory Peck, to record radio commercials for DSG members running for re-election.81  DSG 
also invited public relations experts and held seminars on topics like “How To Make the Most of 
Your Television Appearance,” which included instruction on make-up, posture, and lighting.82  
These were all critical services for liberal members from competitive districts that were not 
provided by the Democratic campaign committee at the time.   
                                                          
79 For example, shortly after organizing the group in 1959, liberals decided that absent the votes to pursue 
formal rules changes, they would focus for the time being on “working within the Rules of the House.” 
December 30, 1960 DSG meeting notes (2pm in the hearing room of the George Washington Inn), DSG 
papers, Part II, box 159, folder 2.  
80 I have not been able to establish an exact organizing date for the DSG Campaign Fund, however the 
group was first active in congressional elections in 1964.    
81 Undated 1968 memo from Les Wolff to DSG Members. DSG papers, Part I, box 90, folder 2.  
82 Campaign Work Strategy, 1968. DSG Papers, Part II, box 6, folder 3.  
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Over time, DSG evolved to meet members’ other campaign needs. DSG began a polling 
service which provided at-cost polling services to campaigns that would otherwise struggle to 
obtain the resources necessary to conduct polling.  Political scientist Thomas Mann spearheaded 
DSG’s polling efforts in the 1970s and recalled how they marshaled minimal resources to provide 
a significant service for candidates:  
“There was no budget – I came cheap back then. We used volunteer interviewers that we 
trained in districts. I hired a Catholic nun graduate student at Georgetown to do data 
processing for me and produce tables that I used to write up our reports. But what it 
allowed them to do was provide assistance to challengers who had modest budgets and 
couldn’t afford to hire and pay for polling…. They [Members] just look back on it, and 
they look back on it as a really important part of their election to Congress. It was really 
quite an extraordinary list of people because so many of them were successful…It was 
amazing because when you do it this cheaply, you’re drawing samples that wouldn’t be 
acceptable now, using telephone directories when lists of registered voters weren’t 
available…[we had] at least aspirations of rigor. We produced some useful materials for 
Members, and it was certainly better than ‘the seat of the pants’” operation campaigns 
were running.83 
 
In addition to the critical poll service, DSG also began a loan service to candidates whereby DSG 
raised a rotating pool of funds that made small loans to the campaigns of liberal Democrats.  The 
loans only had to be paid back if the candidate won the race (they were forgiven otherwise).  
While it would be difficult, if not arguably impossible, to isolate the effects of DSG campaign 
support on the likelihood of winning re-election from the 1960s-1980s, liberals clearly developed 
and employed the Campaign Fund to subsidize the cost of running for election to the House for 
their fellow liberals.  DSG’s support strengthened the candidacies of Democratic candidates and 
incumbent members alike.  The early development of these campaign resources and services – 
much earlier than similarly developed by party committees – suggests that many liberals’ 
campaigns would have been (all else equal) weaker without DSG’s support.   
                                                          
83 November 17, 2015 telephone interview. Mann worked as an APSA Congressional Fellow for Rep. 
James O’Hara (D-MI).   
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Arguably the most important and long-lasting tool developed by DSG was their 
innovative information and research services, which empowered liberals to intelligently articulate 
and represent their constituents’ interests.84  In the 1950s and 1960s, junior liberals were reliant 
on the largely unhelpful information provided by committees, the leadership, and the Library of 
Congress.  In contrast, DSG’s information was designed in line with what Kingdon (1973) 
described as the most “usable”: “predigested, explicitly evaluative information which takes into 
account the political as well as the policy implications of voting decisions” (227).  DSG 
developed a range of information services to enable liberals to participate in the legislative 
process, including a variety of policy and legislative research distributed to members on a daily, 
weekly and monthly basis, depending on the publication, the complexity of the issues involved, 
and the congressional schedule.   
Nearly all of DSG’s research was considered partisan until Dick Conlon was hired as 
executive director in 1968.85  Conlon’s background as a journalist, including stints with the 
Minneapolis Tribune and the Duluth Herald & News Tribune, shaped his approach to DSG’s 
research services.  He strived to provide a comprehensive representation of policy issues before 
the House.  Among the publications was the Legislative Report (which summarized all major 
legislation scheduled for House action in a given week), Fact Sheets (which provided in-depth 
analyses of major legislation scheduled for House action), Special Reports (which analyzed 
controversial issues and legislation from a Democratic perspective), and Staff Bulletin (which 
distributed draft constituent letters on major legislation/issues, and requests by members for new 
cosponsors to their legislation).  Of the four major publications listed above, only the Special 
Reports adopted an overt Democratic or liberal ideological approach.  
                                                          
84 DSG research services began in the early 1960s but did not fully develop until the late 1960s/early 1970s.   
85 The partisan nature of DSG’s research services in the 1960s explains why no Republicans became 
research subscribers until the early 1970s after Conlon spent a couple years developing DSG’s reputation 
for non-partisan research.  
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In an interview with a long-time DSG staffer who worked on the research publications, 
he said the purpose was “to gird them [members], not to influence them.” The goal was not 
necessarily to change how they voted, but to enable them to vote “as if he [she] were informed” 
(Kingdon 1973, 74).  He went on to describe the staff’s approach to DSG’s research services:  
We “started with the assumption that they [members] were going to be uninformed about 
the bill – the details, about why it is controversial. That the members came to the floor 
ignorant, and if they’re ignorant, they are either going to be puppets of the whip or do 
something stupid.  We say our job is to let them know ‘here is the problem,’” rather than 
to tell them how to fix it.86 
 
DSG’s research subsidized the cost for members (and their staff) to remain informed on issues, 
including simple, straightforward summaries of all legislation in which they cast votes, the 
position of relevant interest groups and the Administration on any given bill, a description of the 
parliamentary situation in which the bill would be debated, and a concise summary of the major 
points of controversy related to a bill.   
But more critically – as the quote above captures – the research services made it possible 
for liberal members to cast votes supported by verifiable information.  Informed of the real policy 
and electoral implications of casting a “yea” or “nay” vote, members were less susceptible to 
leadership or committee pressure (and arguably presidential pressure (Kernell 1997)).  And they 
could defend their votes to their constituents with concrete, demonstrable evidence, rather than 
party talking points – members cast knowledgeable, informed and defendable votes.       
 
From Organization to Action 
Liberal Democrats have a well-deserved place in recent history as a model for group-
driven institutional change in Congress.  But the role of the organization they developed to 
                                                          
86 August 5, 2015 in-person interview.   
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advocate on behalf of their shared interests remains poorly understood.  What role does group 
organization play in enabling policy, procedural, and leadership change in Congress?   
The next three chapters test the organization-action model of institutional change in three 
critical processes within Congress in the late twentieth century and beyond: leadership 
emergence, procedural reform, and legislative policymaking.  In each chapter, I argue that DSG’s 
organizational features enabled liberals to capitalize on their existing numerical strength, while 
providing the resources and tools necessary to compensate for liberals’ minority status within the 
party for much of the mid-twentieth century.  DSG’s successful pursuit of their procedural, 
policy, and leadership change agenda throughout the mid-twentieth century is due as much to 
their organizational strength as their increased size and internal ideological cohesiveness within 
the House Democratic Caucus.   
I begin with the role of DSG in expanding leadership pipelines to accommodate 
ambitious junior liberals.  
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4 | Informational Asymmetries in the Textbook Congress 
 
 
 
In most accounts of the textbook era Congress, the seniority system is the lynchpin of 
power differences between liberals and conservatives.  Liberals’ under-participation was a 
function of their seniority and seniority alone. But weak party organization and strong committee 
autonomy suppressed liberal participation at every turn, and in every level of congressional 
organization, from committees to the House floor and the Democratic Caucus.  Junior liberals had 
weak knowledge of the rules, procedure, and precedents that shaped their right to participate in 
legislative debate and party politics; they had limited information on the content and context of 
the legislative agenda; and they had weak information on the upcoming legislative schedule.  
These asymmetries made it difficult for liberals to protect their parliamentary rights to participate, 
to know the high stakes of their participation at any given moment, or to anticipate and plan for 
opportunities to meaningfully participate in legislative and party affairs. 
Organizational norms in Congress ostensibly promote the free flow of information 
between and among members of Congress and outside experts (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Krehbiel 1991; Adler and Lapinski 1997).  But party and committee leaders have a strong 
incentive to limit the availability of quality legislative information and political intelligence, 
especially in the House of Representatives.  In the 1950s-1970s, leaders often suppressed the flow 
of information when access by rank and file members posed a challenge to the party brand, or 
their own power or preferred policy outcomes.  In most cases, senior conservatives had access to 
greater – or simply higher quality – information than junior liberals.  In others, the lack of access 
to information by all members reinforced existing power asymmetries between members.  
Collectively, these informational asymmetries between liberals and conservatives posed just as 
much of a hurdle to better representation of liberal policy goals as the seniority system itself.   
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This chapter analyzes informational asymmetries between members in the textbook 
Congress, and how differential access to legislative information motivated successive generations 
of liberal Democrats to organize throughout the 1960s, 1970s and beyond.  I argue that 
informational asymmetries between party leaders, committees, and rank and file members, 
suppressed the participation – and representation – of liberal interests in the House.  Weak party 
organization and strong committee autonomy limited the flow of quality information and 
communication between members, committees and party leaders.  Liberals knew little about the 
content of legislation and proposed amendments, the position of relevant constituency and 
interest groups, the terms of legislative debate and consideration, and the legislative schedule.  
Their senior, conservative colleagues often not only had better information by sheer virtue of 
their committee leadership position, but they exercised their influence with the leadership to 
discourage the flow of information on controversial policy issues.1  Ultimately, I conclude that 
party leaders’ strict adherence to the “joint agreement” to protect the party brand (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005) drove liberals to break the agreement.  In the prior chapter, I explain how 
liberals developed specific organizational features in 1959 and beyond; here I explain why liberal 
members made the decision to devote resources to organization in each successive congress.  The 
suppression of information in nearly every aspect of congressional and party organization 
explains not only liberals’ decision to organize the Democratic Study Group (DSG), but also the 
depth, strength, and longevity of the organization cultivated by the group’s leaders.    
 
 
                                                          
1 In the rare cases where information availability was limited for all members, it tended to reinforce existing 
power differences between senior conservatives and junior liberals.   
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Parliamentary Precedent & The Right to Participate 
Congressional scholars widely note that junior members’ right to participate in committee 
work was often infringed upon in the textbook Congress (Polsby 2004; Hall 1998).  
Parliamentary procedure provides order for the often-chaotic legislative process, but it also 
protects individual members’ right to participate in legislative affairs.  In the textbook Congress, 
amateur organization and leader prerogative limited the rare guaranteed opportunities for junior 
members to participate in the legislative process and party affairs.  Junior members were unable 
to gain access to parliamentary resources, which would have empowered them to protect their 
individual rights to participate in legislative debate, and to develop legislative strategy on issues 
important to their constituents.  Senior members’ longer terms of service in the House simply 
gave them greater first-hand parliamentary experience.  And of course, junior members had 
almost no opportunity to participate in party business and agenda development in the textbook 
Congress; leaders relied on an informal network of advisers and friends to develop policy.  And 
even after regular meetings began, it took many years for the Democratic Caucus to develop rules 
and procedures governing party power and decision-making.    
Parliamentary Precedent.  Access to parliamentary precedent provided one of the most 
difficult, and least well known, barriers to liberal participation in the textbook Congress.  In 
theory, all members – regardless of their seniority or majority party status – can access House 
procedure, and consult with procedural experts in Congress (Kravtiz 1990).  The House adopts a 
set of rules at the beginning of every Congress, which each member can easily obtain.  But 
mastery of these rules and their application comprises one of the steepest learning curves for new 
and junior members of Congress.  They shape not only whether members can participate in 
legislative and party affairs, but also how they can participate.  The House Parliamentarian is 
responsible for ensuring that the legislative process and debate adheres to House rules. While the 
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Parliamentarian is a Speaker-appointed position, the position is independent and the holder is 
responsible for protecting all members’ rights and capacity to participate in the legislative process 
(Bolling 1966).  The office maintains an attorney-client relationship with members and their staff, 
and any member’s office can call the Parliamentarian’s office to receive help on the development 
of legislative strategy.2   
The democratic legislative ideal described above assumes that any member can 
compensate for their weaker first-hand experience with House procedure through study and 
consultation with experts.  In the textbook Congress however, this ideal was unattainable to most 
junior liberal members.  Rather, junior members lacked access up-to-date House precedents 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Bolling 1966).  And existing norms, including the Speaker’s 
control of the Parliamentarian’s office and the seniority system, made it very difficult for junior 
members to receive legislative strategy advice, or gain the firsthand experience necessary to 
protect their individual right to participate. 
The Parliamentarian is responsible for maintaining a formal record of how the rules have 
been enforced in prior legislative debates, but members in the 1960s only had access to the 
precedents as they existed in the New Deal era (Kravitz 1990, 381).3  House rules are nearly 
impossible to understand without the accompanying compilation of House precedents, or a 
historical record of how the rules have been interpreted and applied in specific legislative debates.  
These “precedents” explain what difficult to understand House rules mean in practice.  Until the 
publication of what was called Deschler’s Precedents in 1973, longtime House Parliamentarian 
                                                          
2 February 16, 2016 in-person interview with former House Parliamentarian, Charles Johnson.   
3 Cannon’s Precedents were published in 1936, however this volume included very little after 1933.  
Kravitz (1990, 381) recounted that the only updated precedent available to members was in “House 
Manual,” but “there only in the form of annotations that were often inadequate and sometimes terse to the 
point of incomprehension for anyone other than an expert.”  Today, statute directs the Parliamentarian (and 
provides for additional staff support) to update the precedents every five years.   
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Lewis Deschler kept the official record of parliamentary rulings of the Speaker on loose-leaf 
indexed material in his personal office.  There was no bound book of updated precedents – as 
there is today – for members and their staff to keep in their own offices and consult whenever 
they wanted to learn how a given rule would be interpreted and applied. 
All members, regardless of seniority, ideology, partisanship, or majority party status, 
were directly impacted by access to parliamentary precedent.  In 1969, Republican Rep. Paul 
Findlay (R-OH) argued that the availability of precedents handicapped members’ participation in 
a November 1969 press release:  
“The lack of an up-to-date compilation for use by individual Members greatly erodes our 
ability effectively to represent our constituents. In a very real sense, it strikes at the heart 
of our representative system of government. The absence of current published precedents 
means that the views of some duly elected Members of Congress will not be heard in this 
body because the precedents which protect their rights and require that they be given a 
fair hearing are not known by the Member who would use them” (emphasis added).4 
Despite the implications of precedent access for all members, senior conservatives – and party 
leaders – were the beneficiary of these institutional conditions.  Senior members simply had more 
personal experience participating directly in legislative debate.  The seniority system promoted 
not only their control over committee leadership offices, but gave them greater experience 
managing floor consideration of legislation under their committee’s purview.  Subcommittee and 
committee chairs always served as floor managers on the floor for legislation under their 
committee’s jurisdiction – arguably the single most useful experience available to members 
wanting to develop their parliamentary skills.5  Floor managers gained hours of first-hand 
experience absorbing how rules and procedures shape the content of legislation, and how 
members can successfully (or unsuccessfully) advocate for their interests and rights, on the floor.   
                                                          
4 November 20, 1969 Press Release, Rep. Paul Findlay, DSG papers, Part II, box 160, folder 13.   
5 February 16, 2016 Interview with Charles Johnson. This continues to be true today.   
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Limited precedent access was also a critical component of the Speaker’s agenda-setting 
power.  Rep. Thomas Rees (D-CA) recounted how liberal amendments opposed by the leadership 
were frequently ruled out of order in the 1960s because of the Speaker’s extraordinary access:  
“…the parliamentarian was always at the speaker’s side.”  “…you can’t win because he’s 
[the Speaker] got the law books and all the precedents.  The precedents weren’t printed 
up past 1938, so you had to go to the parliamentarian to find out what the latest precedent 
was and he knew damn well what you were trying to do.  He was advising the speaker.”6  
The Speaker also exerted at least some control over how much help the Parliamentarian provided 
to members.  On occasion, Speakers Sam Rayburn (D-TX) and John McCormack (D-MA), might 
direct the Parliamentarian and his deputies to be deliberately unhelpful to members and their 
staff.  In House Out of Order, Bolling recounted how if the Speaker disapproved of a member’s 
planned legislation, “Deschler was not helpful…faultlessly polite but totally uninformative and 
about as helpful as a deaf mute” (1966, 113).  In other cases, if a staffer called the 
Parliamentarian’s office to request help for a member’s bill or amendment that the Speaker would 
rather keep off the floor, the staffer might be told that their member needed to come down 
personally to receive help on that matter.7  This was not only a time intensive burden for busy 
members, but it was akin to showing “the opposition what our game plan was” ahead of time, as 
Rep. Rees (D-CA) said.  For the Speaker, these tactics provided an informal means through which 
the Speaker could protect the “party brand” and suppress legislation that might publicize 
divisions among party members (Cox and McCubbins 2005).   
The several decade-long delay in updating parliamentary precedent – and its far-reaching 
consequences for members – was not lost on either Congress or the Parliamentarian himself.  
Legislative appropriations bills began providing funds for the compilation of the precedents in the 
                                                          
6 Oral History Interview, California State Archives, State Government Oral History Program, December 
10-11, 1987.  
7 February 16, 2016 Interview with Charles Johnson.   
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mid-1960s, including $10,000 in 1965 (the equivalent of $77,100 in 2017) for additional 
resources and staff support.8 The project however, faced numerous delays and was not completed 
until 1973.  In the forward to what was known as Deschler’s Precedents, the Parliamentarian 
himself specifically noted the implications of the volume for junior members.  He wrote, “In the 
past, the older and more experienced members have held an obvious advantage over younger 
Members who had not yet mastered the necessary parliamentary skills” (1971, IX-X, emphasis 
added).  The new compilation was intended to subsidize the time and resources necessary for 
these “younger members” to develop parliamentary expertise.  While members’ understanding of 
precedent still proved difficult, the publication of Deschler’s precedents brought an end to the 
parliamentary information vacuum of the textbook Congress.   
Democratic Caucus Bylaws & Rules. The institution of regular monthly meetings of the 
Democratic Caucus while Congress is in session in 1969 was a watershed moment for Democrats.  
It created a new opportunity for rank and file members to participate in party business and the 
development of party policy that did not exist previously.  Almost immediately however, weak 
organization and informational asymmetries between members about the power of the Caucus to 
shape rules and policy outcomes weakened the capacity of the Caucus to fulfill its new 
responsibilities.9    
Democratic Caucus rules – just like House rules – govern the consideration of party 
business, and protect individual members’ right to participate.  Very few of these rules were 
                                                          
8 Of course, Deschler’s singular knowledge of House rules made it difficult for him to devote the time 
necessary to compiling and updating the precedents during the busy legislative schedule.  He had the dual 
responsibilities of assisting members on the floor, while also compiling and organizing some 30-40 years of 
congressional precedent.   
9 In theory, the Caucus was intended to allow facing the party both inside and outside of Congress, to allow 
for interaction between party leaders and rank and file members, and – for liberal reformers – the 
consideration of rule and procedural changes that would alter the balance of power and policy outcomes 
within the House.   
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formally etched into party bylaws – or implemented – during the Caucus’s transition from a 
procedural coalition to a true party organization (Schickler and Rich 1997; Rohde 1991).  This is 
an unsurprising byproduct of the absence of an official Caucus budget, office-space, or staff, until 
1975.10  Nevertheless, the lack of widespread agreement about rules governing Caucus business 
and decision-making significantly weakened the capacity of the Caucus to serve as a forum for 
members to engage with each other about party business, especially junior liberals.  And it was 
advantageous for senior conservatives who preferred strong committee autonomy; the 
disorganization of the Democratic Caucus weakened the party’s ability to check committee 
power.     
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Caucus met for about an hour once a Congress to elect party 
leaders, and then promptly adjourned; in part, of course, to protect against consideration of issues 
that might bring conflict between members to the fore.  Basic guidelines were established to 
govern these meetings, including the role of Caucus Chair as presiding officer and Secretary as 
official record keeper.  The introduction of regularly monthly meetings of the Democratic Caucus 
(while Congress is in session) in January 1969 brought about almost immediate chaos and 
confusion.  New questions emerged about the overlap between party and committee business that 
had not before.  Were committees allowed to schedule meetings during the Caucus?  And if not, 
would committee chairs (who held the power to set committee schedules) be punished if they 
called a meeting anyway?  Was a vote by the Caucus to instruct legislative committees binding on 
Democratic committee members?  
                                                          
10 Caucus meetings were held on the House floor (as they are today).  December 15, 1970 letter from 
Democratic Caucus Chair Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) to Democrats. DSG papers, Part II, box 136, folder 
11. Rostenkowski noted that “all expenses are carried by my own Congressional office.” During this same 
time period, the Republican Conference employed two full-time workers.  The Caucus began receiving 
legislative appropriations in 1975.   
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Democrats even struggled to figure out how to apply rules providing for a quorum for the 
conduct of party business.  At the May 14, 1970 meeting, only 97 members showed up, which fell 
short of the required “majority of Democrats” necessary for the consideration of the meeting’s 
agenda.  Members in attendance then spent a full 57 minutes – just shy of the normal hour 
reserved for regular meetings – debating whether the party could even entertain a motion to 
adjourn because they did not have a quorum.  Eventually, the Caucus adjourned under a voice 
vote.11   
As implemented, quorum rules significantly limited the role of the Caucus as a forum for 
rank and file members to engage with one and other, and their party leaders.  If a single member 
wanted to end a Caucus discussion or debate, all they had to do was raise a point of order that a 
quorum was not present.12  The Caucus delayed a decision to forbid committee chairs from 
scheduling committee meetings at the same time as Caucus meetings, but finally forbid the 
practice in 1972.  The restriction did not stop the practice, however and many members continued 
not to attend Caucus meetings in favor of committee meetings well into the 1980s.13  Liberal 
members who were more likely to support the role of the Caucus as a check on committees had to 
make a choice – participate in committee meetings or Caucus meetings.  Many members chose to 
participate in committees, which had a more direct bearing on their re-election (Mayhew 1974).   
                                                          
11 Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, May 14, 1970, House Democratic Caucus papers, box 2, folder 
23.  
12 This would spur a quorum call, which often ended the meeting before any party business was actually 
addressed.  And for the first three years of the Caucus, the party had no mechanism to inform and notify 
members that a Caucus quorum call was in progress (although the meeting itself was undoubtedly 
scheduled in advance). In July 1971, the Caucus settled on a telephone system that would notify all Caucus 
member offices, and give members 20 minutes to show up and be counted. Journal of the House 
Democratic Caucus, July 20, 1971, House Democratic Caucus papers, box 3, folder 15. 
13 September 17, 1984 letter from Caucus Chairman Gillis Long (D-LA) to Tip O’Neill (D-MA) re 
suggestions to improve Caucus meetings.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 140, folder 10.   
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Other Caucus rules were still developing as well.  The leadership was not required to 
notify members about items on the Caucus agenda in advance of meetings and members often 
remained uninformed.14  In a 1970 letter to Democrats at the end of his tenure as Caucus 
Chairman, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) suggested that the absence of a Caucus budget limited the 
distribution of the Caucus agenda.  The Caucus would not receive legislative appropriations until 
1976.  In addition, individual members were not originally empowered to place a resolution, or 
notice a topic for discussion, on the Caucus agenda either.15  While the rights of individual 
members to help shape the Caucus agenda was eventually written into the party bylaws, the 
Caucus chairman had considerable prerogative to decide the order of agenda items.  Though a 
member was guaranteed agenda space, they were not guaranteed agenda time – meetings were 
often adjourned before some members’ proposed items were even addressed.16   
Caucus Resolution Ending Funding for the Vietnam War.  A protracted 1971-1972 series 
of votes on several anti-war resolutions exemplifies the chaos of the Democratic Caucus’s early 
days.  Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY), a staunch critic of the Vietnam War, proposed several “end-the-
war resolutions” in the spring of 1971, including one that was eventually adopted on March 31, 
1971.  Abzug feared that the March resolution would lead to “a year-long prolongation of the 
conflict in Indochina [Vietnam],” and noticed a stronger resolution to be considered at the April 
Caucus (Oleszek 1973, 34).17  Many Democrats – wishing to avoid discussing and/or voting on an 
“end-the-war” resolution – simply failed to show up for the monthly meetings.  Committee 
                                                          
14 March 17, 1971 Memo from executive director Conlon to Chairman Phil Burton (D-CA) re complaints 
about lack of notice: “…The caucus agenda is also generally unavailable. We get many calls from 
Members about what is coming up in the caucus, but it has become almost impossible to get any solid 
advance information on the caucus agenda.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 26, folder 12.  
15 November 20, 1986 Special Report, “Reform in the House of Representatives,” Part II, box 135, folder 8.  
16 Unfortunately, the Caucus Journal does not document meeting agendas; only those items that were 
debated and voted on appear in the Journal.   
17 March 14, 1973. Walter J. Oleszek, “Party Caucuses in the United States House of Representatives,” 
Congressional Research Service, pg. 34.  DSG papers, Part II, box 137, folder 4.  
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chairmen repeatedly scheduled meetings during the Caucus to discourage liberals from 
participating (and thereby establishing an undesirable precedent for Caucus control over 
committees).   
After three months of “no quorum” meetings, Caucus Chairman Olin Teague (D-TX) 
called a “caucus on the Caucus,” which led to the adoption of several changes designed to address 
lingering organizational issues (Oleszek 1973).18  This package of reforms was adopted on July 
20, 1971, and included changes to empower the Caucus Chairman to set the “order of business” 
and cancel meetings with notice, as well as prohibiting chairmen from scheduling monthly 
meetings or hearings during the regular Caucus.  The party also wrote it into the bylaws that 
members, absent a quorum, could continue to meet “for purposes of discussion”; however, the 
only motion in order would be a “motion to adjourn.”  In other words, Democrats could debate 
the merits of Abzug’s end-the-war resolution, but they could neither vote on nor table the motion.   
In 1972, the Vietnam War remained one of the most important issues before the Congress 
and the Democratic Caucus.  In April, Democrats approved another resolution condemning the 
North Vietnamese for the invasion of South Vietnam, and directed the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee to write legislation within 30 days to terminate “all U.S. military involvement in and 
over Indochina.”19  A resolution to denounce the Nixon Administration was originally noticed for 
Caucus consideration by Rep. Robert Drinan (D-MA), who ran for Congress in 1970 on an anti-
war platform.  The resolution was ultimately sponsored by several members, and later branded 
the “O’Neill resolution” after the whip, Tip O’Neill (D-MA), spoke out in support.  
The text of the resolution was amended during the Caucus to reflect both opposition to 
Communism and opposition to the policies of President Richard Nixon, which helped garner 
                                                          
18 “Party Caucuses in the United States House of Representatives.”  DSG papers, Part II, box 137, folder 4.  
19 May 1, 1972 Dear Colleague letter from O’Neill, DSG papers, Part II, box 172, folder 11.  
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Speaker Carl Albert’s (D-OK) support.  Despite these changes, the content of the resolution was 
not nearly as contentious as the test it represented over how to interpret and apply Caucus Rule 
7.20  Rule 7 provided that if two-thirds of Democrats present (and constituting a quorum of the 
full Caucus) voted on a matter of “party policy” to instruct Democratic members of a legislative 
committee, the decision was binding on those members.  In other words, Democratic members of 
the committee were required to support the decision of the Caucus (and as the majority party, to 
ensure committee output reflected Democratic consensus).   
A clear majority of Democrats attended the April Caucus – the first component necessary 
for Rule 7.  The leadership even conducted a rare special lobbying effort for the vote, specifically 
requesting that committee and subcommittee chairmen not hold meetings that would preclude 
members from attending the Caucus.21  The lobbying effort was notable because the leadership 
frequently cancelled regular Caucus meetings in the 1970s to avoid discussing controversial 
issues that would divide the party (as the anti-war resolution was likely to do).  However, many 
committee chairs failed to show up for the vote, including Foreign Affairs Chairman Thomas E. 
Morgan (D-PA). 6 other Foreign Affairs members also failed to show up, including Rep. L.H. 
Fountain (D-NC), Cornelius E. Gallagher (D-NJ), Robert N.C. Nix (D-PA), John C. Culver (D-
IA), John W. Davis (D-GA), and Ronald Dellums (D-CA) (another four voted against the 
resolution).  Liberal supporters of the measure struggled to force a Caucus vote on the substantive 
merits of the resolution, but eventually succeeded.22  The vote was 144 to 58 in favor of the 
                                                          
20 The vote was also widely viewed as a vote to set party precedent of Caucus-dominance over legislative 
committees.   
21 April 18, 1972 memo from the House Democratic leadership (Reps. Carl Albert (D-OK), Tip O’Neill (D-
MA), Hale Boggs (D-LA), and Olin Teague (D-TX)) to all Committee Chairs. DSG Papers, Part II, box 
172, folder 11.   
22 DSG chairman and staunch anti-war liberal Phil Burton (D-CA), a cosponsor of the resolution, was 
active in the effort to secure a vote on the resolution.  In an April 21, 1972 letter from David Cohen, 
Director of Field Organization for Common Cause, to Burton, Cohen gave Burton credit for the successful 
vote: He wrote, “you were absolutely great in making sure that the O’Neill Amendment was voted on and 
the previous question finally put to a vote so that the Caucus Resolution would achieve final passage…In 
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resolution, with Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK) and Majority Leader Hale Boggs (D-LA) joining 
O’Neill to support it.   
Shortly after the vote, Caucus Chairman Teague sent a letter to all Democrats which 
suggested that the vote itself – a clear rebuke of the president’s foreign policy – was not in fact 
binding on Democratic Foreign Affairs committee members.  Many Democrats were furious.  
Rep. Drinan sent a letter to Speaker Albert criticizing Teague’s determination:   
“I must say that I cannot understand how the Chairman of the Caucus could conclude that 
the matter involved in the 144-58 vote did not involve “party policy.”…I am sure that 
you are aware of the deep determination and enormous amount of work carried out by 
many Members of the House of Representatives to bring about the result arrived at by the 
Democratic Caucus on April 20. I am not about to see all of this work eroded by the 
decision of the Chairman of the Caucus, -- a decision which in all candor is 
incomprehensible and totally unacceptable” (emphasis added).23   
In addition, Rep. O’Neill (D-MA) sent a Dear Colleague letter re-asserting that the intention 
behind the resolution was to “direct” the Foreign Affairs Committee “in order that the House 
might have an opportunity to vote directly on this vital matter.”24  In response to the confusion – 
and undoubtedly conservative opposition – Teague requested that the Library of Congress 
investigate whether the vote bound Democratic committee members.  Nearly a month after the 
vote, the American Law Division affirmed that the vote was binding because the 144 members 
who supported the resolution constituted more than two-thirds of those present and voting (or 135 
members).  Teague undoubtedly could have arrived at this conclusion absent the investigation of 
the Library of Congress.   
Party rules (just like House rules) have significant power and policy implications.  
Funding for the war in Vietnam was one of the most contentious and significant issues to come 
                                                          
our own briefings of the press, we told them about your critical role. We obviously had the votes, and you 
were tremendous in preventing the “bulls” from taking it away from us.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, 
folder 2. 
23 April 25, 1972 letter from Drinan to Speaker Albert, DSG Papers, Part II, box 172, folder 11.   
24 May 1, 1972 Dear Colleague letter from Tip O’Neill, Part II, box 172, folder 11.  
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before the Democratic Caucus in the 1970s, but the debate was arguably meaningless without 
members’ strong understanding of their own parliamentary rights.  While the Democratic Caucus 
chair may have been confused about how to apply a rule that had been on the books for years (or 
perhaps simply wanted to delay its enforcement), Drinan’s letter speaks to the importance of 
individual knowledge of rules and procedure.  As a freshman, Drinan was empowered to 
challenge Teague, as well as Foreign Affairs Chairman Morgan (D-PA), precisely because he 
knew that his – and other Democrats’ – right to participate were infringed upon by a 
misapplication of Rule 7.  
While scholars tend to view the Caucus’s adoption of new rules and procedures as 
singular, overnight changes, the Caucus’s early years were dominated by discussions over how to 
interpret and apply existing party rules.  The capacity of the Caucus to serve as an outlet for 
members’ participation (and a check on legislative committees) is a function of members’ 
knowledge of existing rules and procedure.  Struggles over the meaning of a quorum, or the 
relationship between committee and the Caucus, effectively eliminated a key outlet for members 
to participate in party affairs and the development of party policy.25  For junior liberals without 
the power to participate or set policy within committees, the weakness of the Caucus was even 
more damning.    
 
 
                                                          
25 Struggles over obtaining a quorum and the interaction between the Caucus and committees would 
continue throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, and did not go unnoticed by the press where coverage 
often lamented the failure of the Caucus to settle these differences (September 21, 1981, “Remember the 
Caucus,” National Journal, Michael J. Malbin, pg. 1642. DSG Papers, Part II, box 135, folder 5). In 1984, 
outgoing Caucus chairman Gillis W. Long (D-LA) suggested to Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) in a letter 
summarizing his observations as chairman that committee and caucus meetings were often simultaneously 
scheduled (September 17, 1984 letter from Long to O’Neill, DSG Papers, Part II, box 140, folder 10).   
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The Policy Stakes of Legislation 
 The U.S. Congress is designed to develop and marshal policy expertise to address 
national policy problems.  Committees serve as a reservoir of technical information about specific 
policy problems and programs, various legislative approaches, how legislative directives are 
applied and carried out at the state and local level (and by federal agencies), and the impact of 
various programs on specific constituency and interest groups.26  The sheer volume of 
information and expertise that is generated – and necessary for legislative decisions and member 
coordination – often renders information sharing and dissemination impossible (Kingdon 1973).  
In the textbook Congress, most members struggled to gain access to quality information about the 
content of legislation and its implications for key constituency groups.27  Liberals routinely voted 
blindly on legislation, which had significant and meaningful consequences for member 
participation.  Busy members with multiple, competing demands on their time need to be 
informed of the real-life consequences of their vote for their constituents, and their own power, 
policy, and electoral goals.  Members are usually aware of the real electoral stakes and policy 
implications of their individual participation in debates and votes on the most salient issues (e.g. 
segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, abortion rights and gay marriage today).  But it is simply 
impossible for members to remain informed about every piece of legislation or policy issue that 
they vote on, let alone all of those on the congressional agenda (Curry 2015).     
Legislative Information. For much of the 20th century, (Democratic) members were 
largely unaware of the content of legislation when they cast their votes, especially on legislation 
outside of their own committee assignment.  They were rarely aware of the impact of a given bill 
                                                          
26 Across a range of different, competing views of congressional organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Krehbiel 1991; Adler and Lapinski 1997), scholars agree that committees promote the cultivation of policy 
and legislative knowledge among a specific subset of members.   
27 This was especially true in the pre-internet, emerging technology era of the textbook Congress, it is also 
true today (Curry 2015; Ringe and Victor 2013).   
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on their constituents, or the position of interest groups on legislation.  The most readily available 
information – committee reports – often suppressed division between members on a bill under 
their jurisdiction.  Absent quality information, members may think it is more important to take a 
meeting with a lobbyist or group of constituents, or to spend time in their district, rather than 
participate in debate in the Committee of the Whole or in the caucus. 
Democrats did not develop an independent research operation within leadership offices 
until the loss of the majority in 1994.  The party likely did not see the need; majority status 
ensured that Democrats controlled most committee staff positions, and thus staff work-product.  
In contrast, the Republican Conference developed their own research services for members in the 
early 1960s.  As the minority party, Republicans did not enjoy the same advantages as 
Democrats, especially over committee resources.  And the party failed repeatedly throughout 
Democrats’ unbroken 40-year rule to obtain minimum guaranteed staffing levels in committee.  
In the meantime, the party built up its own internal information resources to assist members.  
House Republican Policy Committee staff “assisted the minority in the preparation of useful 
information.”28  After a decade of unbroken Democratic rule, the Republican Conference 
professionalized these services and established what was known as the Committee on Research 
and Planning (later the Committee on Research) in 1965.29  This Committee provided a single 
(leadership-controlled) resource to help Republican members understand the major legislative 
issues before the Congress, and cast knowledgeable votes.   
                                                          
28 George B. Galloway, Senior Specialist, American Government Division, Legislative Research Service. 
“How Congressmen Inform Themselves,” Circa 1963. DSG Papers, Part II, box 152, folder 2.  
29 Committee’s activities fell in two areas.  First, it organized a variety of activities, including “hearings, 
field trips, seminars, development of legislative alternatives, and publication of the results of studies and 
investigations.” And second, the Committee provided information, including fact sheets, charts, graphs, 
questionnaires, and roll call analyses on about 100 topics each Congress (in addition to ad hoc assistance 
available by member request). 93rd Congress Directory, Republican Conference, 1973. DSG papers, Part 
II, box 158, folder 11.    
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Meanwhile, the Democratic leadership relied almost exclusively on committee resources 
to inform and prepare members for legislative debates and votes.  The result was that junior 
liberal members in particular, “were overly dependent upon conservative senior committee and 
subcommittee leaders for their knowledge about legislation,” especially on policies outside of 
their own committee work (Stevens, Mulhollan, and Rundquist 1980, 10).  Conservatives, of 
course, had a strong incentive to suppress access to committee information that might hinder their 
preferred policy outcome.  Many chairs adopted a philosophy that “the less that’s known out 
there, the better.”30   As political scientist Norm Ornstein described it, “committee chairs and 
leaders held their control over information very close” (Klein 2011).   
The text of a bill or committee report, for example, was often not available until the day 
the House was to consider a given bill (Kravitz 1990).31 Reports summarize the committee’s 
actions on the bill, including hearings and mark-up activity.  Only the Appropriations Committee 
was required to provide advance notice of committee reports; all other committees could submit 
them immediately before a vote.32  Absent advance notice, members had little, if any, time to 
prepare amendments to shape the bill on the House floor (Kravitz 1990).  If members (or their 
staff) do not know what is actually in a bill, they can hardly expect to draft an amendment – and 
garner other members’ support – to change the underlying policy.    
And even if the documents were made available by the committee, the slow-emerging 
professionalization of House technology systems in the 1960s and 1970s usually impeded access 
as well.   Government resources simply struggled to keep pace with member demand and the 
ever-expanding congressional agenda.  Members frequently faced printing delays when trying to 
                                                          
30 September 23, 2015 interview with a former DSG staffer.   
31 June 24, 1970 DSG Special Report on Secrecy in the House of Representatives. DSG Papers, Part II, box 
128, folder 7. July 26, 1983 letter from DSG Chairman Matt McHugh (D-NY) to Appropriations Chairman 
Jamie Whitten (D-LA). Part II, box 102, folder 9.   
32 The 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act required all committees to submit to a three-day layover period.   
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gain access to the text of a bill or committee report.  In 1971, District Committee Chairman John 
McMillan (D-SC) lamented the “logjam” at the Government Printing Office, which caused 
“delays in printing which have, in some instances, resulted in reports not being delivered to the 
Committee or to the document room until the day of floor consideration.”33  House facilities were 
sometimes subject to these delays as well.  In 1977, a staffer for the whip’s office noted that the 
House “Document Room” was subject to overload by “‘rush’ requests from Members’ offices,” 
which made it difficult to obtain copies of bills ahead of time.34  When this occurred, members 
were often forced to vote on legislation without the benefit of even the committee report.  
Members and their staff simply do not have the time to read and digest the often-complex 
information provided in the reports – and certainly not the legislation itself – during busy 
legislative days.35   
Even if a committee report was made available by the chair, and the printing office or 
document room provided copies, and members had time to read it, members likely still lacked 
enough information to meaningfully participate on the floor.  Reports are supposed to reveal the 
range of dissent among committee members (Kingdon 1973) – codified in an addendum known 
as “minority views” or “alternative views.” But chairs sometimes used their position to suppress 
the views of (Democratic) committee members who disagreed with them.36  Members also could 
not trust that a committee report would provide them with the full range of dissenting views 
                                                          
33 February 1, 1971 Dear Colleague letter, DSG papers, Part II, box 142, folder 10.   
34 Testimony before a House Administration Task Force on Information of the House Commission on 
Administrative Review, Majority Whip staffer James Mooney.  DSG papers, Part II, box 123, folder 3. 
35 These printing delays underscore the importance of House rules providing for a three-day layover period 
between the availability of reports and the consideration of legislation (which were gradually strengthened 
over the next several decades). The 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act provided for a three-day layover 
period for conference reports prior to a vote.  However, legislation was sometimes exempted from these 
rules, and members frequently disputed what counted as a “day” (e.g. weekends and holidays) in the rule’s 
enforcement.   
36 For example, one DSG staffer {August 5, 2015 Interview) said, “Committee reports do a lot of things, 
but explaining a bill is not one of them…If there is controversy, the bill would explain it a little bit…[the] 
Committee would rather suppress the tension.”  
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among majority party members, or reveal issues that may emerge in their re-election campaigns.  
In addition, committee reports are often riddled with technical language, and are heavily legal in 
nature – neither of which is readily digestible by members.37  This made it difficult for members 
to use the content of the report as the basis for a speech on the House floor, to design an 
amendment targeting specific provisions of the bill, or to cast a vote with the assurance that the 
bill would help (or conversely, hurt) their constituents as expected.   
Most committees worked with the leadership to distribute basic legislative information 
via the whip’s office – known as “the leadership’s information outlet.”38  Each week, members 
received what was called the “whip pack,” which was an envelope including the texts of 
upcoming bills and resolutions, and associated committee reports.  They also received “whip 
advisories,” or one page descriptions of each bill or resolution that provided a “thumbnail picture 
of the major provisions of a bill.”  In theory, this information appears to be seemingly 
comprehensive – providing all the information necessary for members to cast a knowledgeable 
vote.  In practice, however, it was essentially useless in subsidizing the cost for members to 
participate in floor debate or cast a vote.  Whip-provided information neither subsidized the cost 
of participating in debate, nor did it serve as an easy heuristic for member voting decisions 
(Kingdon 1973).   
In testimony before a 1977 House Commission on Administrative Review, a whip staffer 
suggested that the whip’s office explicitly abdicated responsibility for providing this sort of 
political intelligence for members.  Whip resources did not “argue the merits or demerits of a 
                                                          
37 Interview with former DSG staffer, September 21, 2015; Interview with former DSG staffer, August 5, 
2015; Stevens, Arthur G., Daniel P. Mulhollan, and Paul S. Rundquist. 1980. “Congressional Structure and 
Representation: The Role of Informal Groups.” Paper prepared for delivery at the 1980 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association.   
38 Testimony before a House Administration Task Force on Information of the House Commission on 
Administrative Review, Majority Whip staffer James Mooney.  DSG papers, Part II, box 123, folder 3.  
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particular bill” and avoided “the use of language which might be construed as taking an advocacy 
position.”  Advisories “provide only a very brief summary of a bill’s major provisions, rarely list 
any amendments and never point out the points of controversy of the position of relevant interest 
groups on the bill.”39  At best, the leadership helped members gain access to the text of a bill, as 
well as the associated committee and/or conference report, prior to a scheduled vote.  Members 
remained reliant on their own staffs to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a bill, and the 
broader, real-world context of a given policy.40   
The Library of Congress is, of course, another resource available to members to learn 
about legislation on the congressional agenda.  In the textbook era, members had access to what 
was called the Legislative Reference Service (LRS), a division of the LOC.41  LRS provided in-
depth policy analysis for members, services roughly analogous to those provided by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) today.  But members had to anticipate ahead of time what 
their informational needs might be, and the staff size and budget limited the number of requests it 
could handle at any one time.  And of course, if a bill or committee report was not available to 
members, it was unlikely to be made available to researchers at the LRS either.  When Congress 
created CRS in 1970 in a bid to address some of these issues, it prioritized providing timely 
information to committees, not individual members – a striking oversight at a time of continued 
                                                          
39 April 1978 DSG staff memo from “Dan” to executive director Dick Conlon re Error in Legislative 
Report. Memo was in response to April 11, 1978 Dear Colleague letter from Adam Benjamin, Jr. (D-IN). 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 4. 
40 Of course, members could theoretically rely on interest groups to help provide this broader real-world 
context (Hall and Deardorff 2004). However, interest groups often confront the same resource limitations 
that members face, and are likely to focus on the most salient issues before the Congress (i.e. only those 
issues in which members are already well-informed).   
41 The Legislative Reference Service was expanded and renamed the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) as part of the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act.   
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conservative dominance over committees.42  And the basic informational exchange relationship in 
which individual members (and their staff) are responsible for requesting information remained.   
 
The Congressional Schedule 
The final participation hurdle confronting members was the unreliability of the legislative 
schedule, which made it difficult for liberals to ensure they were in town when critical issues 
were under consideration.  Liberals were notorious members of the so-called “Tuesday-to-
Thursday Club” – a distinction often attributed to their preference and/or need to spend more time 
in their home districts than conservatives.43  But junior liberals often simply had weaker 
information than conservatives about when committee meetings would be held, and when 
legislation would be considered on the floor.  The lack of advance notice about upcoming 
committee meetings and floor votes is a byproduct of both the seniority system and an over-
representation of conservative interests in the party whip system.  And of course, these dynamics 
were often reinforced by party leaders who used available resources, including their scheduling 
power, to suppress liberal turnout when a controversial policy emerged on the agenda.   
Committees. Committees are effectively mini legislatures; each with individual rules and 
procedures adopted at the start of the Congress by committee members.44  Conservative chairmen 
employed committee rules instead as a tool to limit the participation of junior liberals; indeed, 
                                                          
42 The law charged CRS with providing objective, non-partisan, in-depth policy analysis to all legislative 
committees.  It also addressed the “anticipation problem” by directing CRS to provide each committee with 
a list of policy areas “it might profitably pursue” at the beginning of each Congress (Kravitz 1990, 383).   
43 Liberals tended to be elected from marginal districts where members had a strong incentive to return 
home frequently.  Southerners were elected from safe seats where there was arguably less of a need to 
frequently travel back to the district.   
44 Some committees, of course, did not even have printed rules, including the powerful Appropriations 
Committee.  Absent printed rules, junior members could not levy a formal complaint against the chairman 
for violating autocratic leadership.   
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committee gatekeeping power is the power to control the committee rules and schedule.  Chairs 
could not control which legislation was referred to their committee; those decisions were made by 
the Parliamentarian and the Speaker (Bolling 1966).  But they could exercise their power over 
committee rules to control the path of bills under their jurisdiction and to shape the participation 
of members in their committee.   Prior to the introduction of party votes on committee chairs in 
1971, chairs were simply not accountable for how they managed committee rules or legislative 
work-product.       
If parliamentary rules are designed to protect individual members’ right to participate, 
then committee rules and norms were designed to protect the prerogative of chairmen.  Chairmen 
had the power to decide the number and basis upon which to establish subcommittees each 
Congress, which could be used to reward and punish mid-level seniority members.   If a fifth or 
sixth ranking member who might ordinarily be in line for a subcommittee chairmanship was 
considered too liberal, the chair could simply appoint fewer committees to ensure they would 
miss out on a chairmanship (CQ Almanac 1975, 26-40).  For example, John McMillan (D-SC) 
was notorious for appointing District Committee subcommittees by number, not by policy area or 
topic.45  This allowed him to refer bills to in an arbitrary manner.  High-ranking liberal committee 
member Charlie Diggs (D-MI), for example, was “allowed the empty honor of a subcommittee of 
his own.”  McMillan “regularly sent any matter of real significance to other subcommittees, 
headed by southern cronies like the dubious Rep. John Dowdy of Texas” (Alsop 1971).    
During committee hearings, junior members were often instructed by chairs that they 
were not allowed to participate in the proceedings.  Future Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), for 
example, often regaled freshmen at new member orientations with a story about his experiences 
                                                          
45 Notably, Judiciary Committee chairman Emanuel Celler (D-NY) also numbered his subcommittees to 
prevent conservative control over bills in his jurisdiction.   
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as a freshman on the Agriculture Committee.  Chairman W.R. Poage (D-TX) “wouldn’t even let 
you talk. He wouldn’t even want to allow the [committee] members to say anything as a 
freshman. He would say, ‘maybe if you are re-elected, then maybe you can say something…For 
all I know, you got elected by accident.  Maybe if you come back again, you can say 
something.”46  Many committees also did not give individual members “the prerogative to ask for 
a vote on certain measures.”47    
And of course, junior members also rarely knew the committee schedule ahead of time.  
Chairs themselves had significant prerogative to decide the timing and number of hearings or 
meetings that their committee held on any given bill or issue.  Chair organizing power was 
sometimes used to schedule meetings when the chair knew many members were back home in 
their districts, which suppressed the liberal vote bloc on committee votes.  When this occurred, 
liberals often voted via proxy, which was allowed in most committee rules.  While proxies are not 
as useful for shaping the content of a bill in committee, members can entrust their vote to another 
member if (and when) they missed a committee vote to report a bill.  In the 1960s, this included 
“blanket” proxies whereby a member could sign a single statement at the beginning of a Congress 
entrusting their vote to another committee member.  The committees that did not were among the 
smallest and largest – and the most powerful –, including the Rules and Appropriations 
                                                          
46 September 23, 2015 Interview with former DSG staffer. Other junior members during this era recounted 
similar stories, including Rep. Dave Obey’s (D-WI) recollections of being told to “sit down and shut up” by 
his own committee chair [September 16, 2015, Congressional Reform Symposium, Capital Visitor’s 
Center, Washington, D.C.].  
47 Rep. Stanley Tupper (R-ME) described the power of chairmen to control the committee schedule in a 
1962 Washington Post editorial: “There is marked variation in committee rules, which give to some 
chairmen nearly dictatorial powers over committee business and procedure. Many committees do not have 
printed rules. Committee members do not have the prerogative to ask for a vote on certain measures.  
Meetings can be scheduled at the whim of the chairman.  The chairman’s power to ignore a bill is often 
unchallenged.” 
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Committees.  While proxies did not contribute to necessary quorums for committee business, 
strong Republican attendance in committees generally made up for any necessary gaps.48   
At other times, chairs’ organizing power was used to severely limit the number of 
meetings held altogether.  Committees with printed rules usually provided for a coalition of 
(Democratic and Republican) members to call a meeting in the chair’s absence, but this rarely 
happened in practice.49  Conservatives were not the only chairs who exercised this power, but 
they were the most egregious offenders.  Rules Committee Chairman Howard “Judge” Smith (D-
VA), for example, was perhaps most notorious for abusing his position during the late 1950s and 
1960s period to sideline legislation with which he disagreed.  Smith often simply refused to call 
committee meetings – abandoning the Capitol for his Virginia farm.  He would also hold an 
excessive number of hearings on a given bill to delay its consideration, as well as to stir 
controversy and opposition among members.  The Rules Committee finally established regular 
hearings in 1967 when incoming chairman William Colmer (D-MS) struck a deal with Speaker 
John McCormack (D-MA) to avoid a challenge to his seniority (see chapter six for a detailed 
analysis of this shift).  
Congressional folklore has memorialized Smith’s use of these tactics better than others, 
but they were used by many chairs, including those whose ideological preferences aligned better 
with the broader Democratic Caucus.  Indeed, one of the primary complaints levied against 
Education & Labor Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell in 1965-1966 – amidst a bi-
partisan effort to unseat him for financial “misdeeds” – was that he only called meetings of the 
                                                          
48 May 9, 1974 Minutes of the Special Democratic Caucus on the Bolling motion, DSG Papers, Part II, box 
137, folder 7.  Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills spoke out against “doing away with proxies,” 
arguing that if Democrats eliminated all use of committee proxies, “we [Democrats] turn over the operation 
of the committee[s] to them.”  
49 This is in part because legislation supported by a bi-partisan committee majority was usually 
conservative in nature, and thus more likely to be supported by the committee chair himself.    
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committee when he was in town.  In the 2nd session of the 89th Congress, this constituted a sum 
total of one meeting.50  
Individual members and party leaders had some tools at their disposal to speed up the 
legislative process and overcome committee sluggishness; however, the few available did not 
allow for advance notice and planning.  A handful of rules and procedures empowered the 
leadership or individual (committee) members to bypass the committee of jurisdiction and bring 
legislation directly to the floor, but they were often difficult to use and/or not always in-effect. 
For example, the Calendar Wednesday procedure provided a means through which committee 
bills stymied in the Rules Committee (or in the original committee of jurisdiction) could be called 
up on the House floor for consideration.  But it was difficult to use on most legislation because 
the committees were called in alphabetical order.  Thus, a bill stuck in (or under the jurisdiction 
of) the District or Judiciary Committees would first have to wait through the call of the 
Agriculture, Armed Services, and Banking committees, among others. Chairs of one committee 
opposed to a bill in another committee used the procedure “as a limited version of the filibuster in 
the Senate” (Bolling 1966, 201).  Oftentimes, the clock simply ran out.51 
The House Floor.  Party leaders, of course, plan the legislative schedule on the floor – the 
specific day a bill will be brought up for consideration.  But in an era of committee rule, the floor 
schedule depended on the schedule within the original committee of jurisdiction (as well as the 
Rules Committee).  Timely progress in committees promoted progress on the floor; stagnation in 
committees promoted stagnation on the floor. The result, as a 1965 history directed by the 
                                                          
50 DSG Papers, Part II, box 158, folder 3.  
51 In theory, a committee chairman opposed to a bill in another committee could also strategically exercise 
his/her right to bring up a bill in their committee on the calendar, thereby delaying consideration of other 
committees’ legislation until a later Calendar Wednesday (if at all).  Today, the Calendar Wednesday 
procedure is rarely used (often dispensed of via unanimous consent).   
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Committee on House Administration concluded, is that “precise, long-range planning as to the 
exact day or week when a bill is to be voted upon in the House is hardly possible.”52   
Arguably the most valuable tool available to the leadership to plan the legislative 
schedule was the party whip system (Ripley 1964).  In addition to the informational role 
described above, appointed zone and geographic whips were also responsible for conducting a 
survey of members’ schedules and counting the number of supporters and opponents who would 
be present for the vote.  Whips would then share this information with the leadership, and the 
leadership could make an informed determination as to whether a given bill would succeed or 
fail.  However, the whip system as constituted in the textbook Congress suppressed liberal 
participation in three ways.  
First, party leaders were sometimes fearful that a simple poll on a controversial measure 
might arouse conservative opposition.  In 1964 and 1965, for example, whip Hale Boggs (D-LA), 
did not manage the whip operation on two of the most important bills to come before the 
Congress – the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts because he was afraid that he would provoke 
conservatives to organize against the bill.53  However, these weaknesses were not limited to civil 
rights.54  Many bills came to the floor without a nose count “to see where the Administration 
stood.”55   
                                                          
52 History of the House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st session, House Document No. 250. Printed 
under the supervision of the Committee on House Administration, Omar Burleson, Chairman.  DSG papers, 
Part II, box 129, folder 9.   
53 The Civil Rights Act. Congressional Quarterly. 1965. Part I, Box 70, folder 4. Rep. Richard Bolling 
described this aspect of the Democratic whip system as “an anomaly”: “…certain regional whips are 
responsible for getting out the vote for bills, such as civil rights and welfare measures, that they themselves 
are opposed to” (1966, 55).   
54 Boggs acted as whip and floor manager for the 1969 extension of the surcharge on personal and 
corporate income taxes, but succeeded in “rounding up only 56 Democrats (against 179 opposed)…He did 
not even attempt to use his whip system to collect Democratic support” (Evans and Novak 1969).   
55 “Democratic Current in the House: Worried Members are Dissatisfied with Leaders,” New York Times, 
1967. John Herbers. DSG papers, Part II, box 153, folder 3.   
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Second, southern geographic whips would sometimes simply refuse to carry out a poll for 
the leadership, or they might deliberately over- or under-inflate the support for a bill in their 
counts (Ripley 1964).  A southern whip for example, might misrepresent the position of liberal or 
conservative members in their zone.  Consequently, party leaders might schedule bills for 
consideration that would ultimately prove more controversial than expected, or alternatively, they 
might refuse to schedule a controversial bill that would likely have passed on the floor.  Kennedy 
Administration congressional liaison Charles U. Daly was critical of the leadership counts, noting 
that “under the liaison operation we had – on either the Senate or House side – I wouldn’t depend 
solely on [Senator] Bobby Baker or Jesus Christ to do any counting.”56 
And finally, House whip zones overrepresented rural, conservative areas of the country, 
while underrepresenting urban, liberal areas.  According to Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), in 
1965, “the whip zones in the South average out at about 8.5 million inhabitants, while zones in 
the West average about 12.6 million” (1966, 223-224).  In practice, this meant that conservative 
whips were responsible for coordinating fewer members than liberal whips. It was simply much 
harder for liberal whips to mobilize support for a bill; not only were they responsible for more 
members, but their whip assignments comprised an inherently more diverse constituency than did 
southern whips.        
Collectively, these dynamics ensured that the leadership rarely conducted polls of 
member opinion, and frequently told members only that a bill would be considered “in the near 
future.”57  Of course, the leadership also strategically used their scheduling authority to suppress 
participation to doom legislation they disagreed with, or was damaging for the party brand.  Votes 
                                                          
56 Baker, a senator from South Carolina, served as Secretary to the Majority Leader.  Charles U. Daly, 
recorded interview by Charles T. Morrissey, April 5, 1966 (29), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History 
Program.  
57 April 1978 DSG Staff Memo from Dan to Conlon. Part II, box 133, folder 4.   
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were sometimes scheduled when they knew many liberals would be out of town, ensuring that 
legislation would fail (Kingdon 1973).  And during critical votes on amendments in the 
Committee of the Whole, there is no evidence that the leadership activated the whip system 
whatsoever.  This was particularly important given that floor managers had considerable 
prerogative to cut off debate and call a vote.  As subcommittee and committee chairs 
disproportionately managed floor debate, they frequently used this power to suppress the 
participation of liberals.58  One longtime congressional staffer who spend time on the floor in the 
1960s recalled how “the people who were controlling the time would just not recognize” liberals 
to offer an amendment “until they knew that there were enough people of their own stripe around 
to vote it down.”59  Sometimes, party leaders used their scheduling power to limit conservative 
participation as well.   During the 1970 debate on recorded teller voting, Rep. Joe Waggonner (D-
LA) said that “Everybody knows that there have been times when the leadership urged people to 
take a walk during a critical teller vote to prevent an amendment from being adopted.”60  
Nevertheless, leadership pressure was more likely to negatively impact liberals who did not hold 
committee leadership positions.  
The archival record reveals some disagreement about whether it is the responsibility of 
individual members or the leadership (through the party whip system) to promote floor vote 
attendance and participation.  Early meetings of the House Democratic Caucus became the venue 
through which the party debated some of these issues, especially prior to the adoption of recorded 
                                                          
58 Liberals noted these dynamics in the text of whips calls during this era. For example, on August 11, 
1969, a call was issued to liberals requesting they stay on the floor, noting that “conservatives are delaying 
the votes on the Adams substitute hoping that liberals will leave the floor” [DSG Papers, Part II, box 102, 
folder 4].  
59 September 24, 2015 telephone interview.  
60 June 18, 1970 “Some in House Seek to End Old Practice of Nonrecord Voting,” Wall Street Journal. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 2. 
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teller votes on amendments in 1971.  Rep. Lenore Kretzer Sullivan (D-MO) argued that members 
themselves should be responsible for ensuring that their colleagues show up to vote:  
“We have a whip system – but we shouldn’t have to depend upon it, because by the time 
the call goes out and the members straggle over here, the teller vote has already been 
taken.  I think each of us should carry an assigned list of five members we keep tabs on – 
and know where they are when a bill is open for amendment under the five minute rule, 
and why they’re not on the Floor. If we did that, it would be pretty clear why some things 
don’t get done.”61   
Speaker John McCormack (D-MA) called for the Caucus to examine the problem of absenteeism 
on the House floor, and suggested it carried over to the problem of committee quorums as well.  
Sullivan and McCormack’s comments suggest a leadership vacuum on member participation and 
mobilization.  Arguably, what Sullivan is describing constitutes a whip system – a system in 
which a set of active and/or knowledgeable members mobilize and coordinate the participation of 
members who will support the bill (or oppose it as necessary).  The leadership has an interest in 
making sure their fellow partisans show up and participate – indeed, that is the only way they can 
assure victory on their own agenda items.  The fact that party leaders – and even some members – 
placed the responsibility squarely on members’ shoulders suggests they did not think the 
leadership had a significant role in promoting, or suppressing, members’ participation (in contrast 
to some theories (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005)).   
 Roll Call Vote Participation & the 1963 Foreign Aid Appropriations. The archival 
record, interview sources, and newspaper coverage suggest that party and committee leaders 
suppressed members’ participation throughout the textbook Congress.  Here I examine systematic 
differences in member participation, as well as an illustrative example that exemplifies the 
complex information-participation dynamics.    
                                                          
61 Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, March 18, 1970, House Democratic Caucus Papers, box 2, 
folder 21.  
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I begin by analyzing floor vote participation, or the percentage of roll call votes in which 
a member voted “yea” or “nay,” and therefore was present on the floor.62  Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to identify observable measures of liberal vote participation at the stage where you 
would most likely to see a potential relationship – on amendment votes in the Committee of the 
Whole, which were unrecorded until 1971.  Given the strong control exerted by conservatives at 
this stage, I would expect liberals to participate far less than other Democrats.  Nevertheless, on 
roll call votes, I expect liberal members to participate in fewer floor votes than other Democrats, 
while committee and subcommittee chairs should participate less than other Democrats.63   
                                                          
62 Roll call votes provide a proxy measure of member participation as other measures of floor participation 
are unavailable during this era.   
63 If liberals are more dependent on party leaders to understand their right to participate, the legislative 
schedule, and the policy implications of their participation, then I would expect liberals to participate less 
than other Democrats.  And as committee and subcommittee chairs are not accountable for their 
institutional position to either party leaders or rank and file members, I expect they will participate less than 
other members.   
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It is likely that other informal whip systems were active during this period, but prior 
scholarly research (Ripley 1964; Polsby 2004) and the archival record reveal only two formalized 
whip systems were active during the 1960s and 1970s – the Democratic leadership and the 
Democratic Study Group’s whip systems.  Thus, I operationalize “liberal” as “DSG Member,” or 
those members who paid regular dues to DSG and were targeted by DSG’s whip system.  This 
provides a stronger test of the hypotheses as these members were ‘whipped’ on the very votes 
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analyzed here, while conservatives were not.  All Democrats were the target of the Democratic 
leadership’s whip system.  Committee and subcommittee chair are operationalized as whether the 
member holds a chairmanship in that Congress.  Controls variables were included for district 
distance, seniority, race, gender, and party unity (See Appendix 2 for additional information on 
each explanatory variable).  The floor vote analyses begin in the 86th Congress, which reflects the 
advent of liberal organization.  The suppression of liberal mobilization did not begin in the 86th, 
but it marks a turning point in liberal frustration over their inability to participate.  As the 
dependent variable of interest here is continuous (percent of all votes the member participated in 
on the House floor or in committee), I employ ordinary least squares regression.64  Table 4.1 
presents ordinary least squares regression results on Democrat members’ attendance on roll call 
votes from the 86th – 95th Congress.  The results provide evidence that there were notable 
differences in floor vote participation between Democrats.   
As expected, both DSG members and leaders participated in fewer roll call votes than 
other Democrats.  On average, DSG members participated in on average 4.7 percent fewer, and 
leaders 1.6 percent fewer, roll call votes than non-DSG Democrats.65  This is a significant 
difference, and one with likely policy implications as well.  Members participate in a large 
number of roll call votes each Congress, and many winning and losing votes on legislation were 
close during this period.  As the leadership is responsible for alerting members, especially their 
                                                          
64 Data on the dependent variables were collected via Congressional Quarterly (floor votes) and the DSG 
archival papers (committee votes).  
65 I also ran the analyses by Congress to uncover potential differences by year; however, the results did not 
change.  Given that the archival record document liberal complaints on issues like “Rules Committee 
obstruction” and “high Democratic opposition to bills which come to the Floor [for] which no one has 
provided an early warning” in 1977, the consistencies observed are unsurprising [Discussion of Rules 
Committee, October 27, 1977 executive committee meeting minutes, DSG Papers, Part II, box 7, folder 3; 
Foley comments on the Democratic whip system, May 25, 1977 executive committee meeting minutes, Part 
II, box 7, folder 1].  Indeed, it suggests that scholarly conceptions of the textbook era as ending in the early 
1970s amidst the passage of reforms (Rohde, Stiglitz, and Weingast 2013) does not necessarily comport 
with the realities of the legislative environment.   
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fellow partisans, to the legislative schedule, members’ floor vote participation records are a 
reflection of the leadership’s effective communication and distribution of information.66    
While DSG members and leaders confronted many of the same informational 
asymmetries, an additional mechanism may be driving the leader results.  Many executive 
committee members served important leadership roles outside of Congress.  For example, 1965-
1966 DSG Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) served as the national head of voter registration for 
John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign (and notably advocated for registering more urban 
and African-American voters).  1969-1970 DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MC) co-chaired 
the Democratic National Committee’s committee on delegate selection reforms in the early 
1970s.  Others were active in social movement activities outside of Congress, such as Reps. 
Charlie Diggs (D-MI), Jonathan Bingham (D-NY), and Don Edwards (D-CA) who traveled to 
Selma, Alabama to observe civil rights demonstrations and reported their observations to the 
White House (advocating for stronger civil rights protections).67   
And as expected, committee chairs participated in, on average, 2.34 percent fewer roll 
call votes than other Democrats.  The model suggests that there is no relationship between 
subcommittee leadership and floor vote participation.  While subcommittee chairs were similarly 
not accountable for their position, they were the most likely of all members to serve as floor 
managers for legislation, which likely stemmed any incentive they may have had to risk not 
showing up for floor votes. 
                                                          
66 Of course, attendance records are also a reflection of members’ personal circumstances, including 
extended illness and family emergencies, as well as members who “come late” or “leave early” as a result 
of special election, retirement or other circumstances.  In order to control for these effects, members who 
reported personal circumstances or were not eligible for all votes in a given congress are excluded from this 
analysis.   
67 March 17, 1965 memo to members of the DSG Steering Committee, DSG Papers, Part II, box 38, folder 
3.  
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The seemingly odd set of findings in the model above are perhaps best understood 
through a December 1963 House vote on foreign aid funding.68  The high-profile vote illustrates 
many of the information-participation dynamics found in the archival and interview data, and 
regression analysis above, including the suppression of dissenting committee views, inability to 
access legislative information prior to a vote, lack of advance schedule notice, and the inability of 
the Democratic whip to round up votes.  
The House foreign aid bill is a relatively straightforward annual appropriations bill, and 
thus is representative of the difficulties liberals confronted in securing meaningful, substantive 
debate on a wide variety of policy areas.  It took on a unique significance in 1963 because it was 
one of the first bills to be passed under new President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Administration.  
Johnson viewed it as a chance to assert his power over not only the agenda and Democrats in 
Congress, but Republicans too.  It was, as the Washington Post described it, a “test of the 
President’s prestige.”69  And ultimately, it seems unlikely that the bill would have passed without 
his strong involvement.    
The bill was drafted by House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee 
chairman Rep. Otto E. Passman (D-LA) who was a staunch opponent of foreign aid and 
decreased the bill’s funding level by $800 million (the equivalent of $6.374 billion today).  The 
Democratic leadership did nothing to support attempts to increase the funding level by liberals 
                                                          
68 In addition, women and African-American members participated in, on average, 2.8 and 10.6 percent 
fewer roll call votes, respectively.  These results should be interpreted with extreme caution given the very 
small number of women and African-Americans in office during this time period.  However, the negative, 
significant relationship likely reflects the fact that both were a distinct minority within the Democratic 
Caucus and had weaker communication channels and legislative allies.  There is also, not surprisingly, a 
slight negative relationship between participation levels and the distance between a member’s district and 
Washington, D.C.  Members with home districts far away from the capitol are less likely to be able to 
quickly travel back to the House in time for a key vote, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.   
69 December 25, 1963, Washington Post, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Inside Report…Where were 
the Liberals?” DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 7.  
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and President Johnson before it was reported on December 14th.  However, Passman and 
Appropriations Chairman George Mahon (D-TX) ensured that the full committee report 
suppressed division among members about the bill (CQ Almanac 1963, 288).  The report did not 
include any dissenting views despite the fact that liberal Rep. Charles S. Joelson (D-NJ) – a 
second term member ranking at the bottom of the committee in seniority – submitted two 
paragraphs of “separate views” at the time of the bill’s approval.70  Joelson’s fellow liberals could 
not rely on the report to inform them about potential limitations in the committee-drafted bill; 
they had no pre-warning that their individual vote was important, nor could they craft 
amendments to increase funding.71  Nevertheless, the House adopted the bill 250-135 on 
December 16th.  
Disagreements between the funding levels provided in the House and Senate bills 
stymied conference negotiators, which made it difficult for members to anticipate the final roll 
call vote and plan to be in town for the vote.72  The leadership could offer no assurances about 
when it would come to the floor. The slow negotiations ensured that the Conference Report was 
not drafted until 10:15pm on December 20th, and the Rules Committee granted a rule for the 
report at 1:45am on December 21st.  Only 263 members of the House were present, but it was 
enough to constitute a quorum.  Of course, neither members nor their staff had time to read the 
Conference Report; at 5a.m., the House adopted a Republican motion to recommit instructing 
House conferees to disagree to a Senate amendment on Export-Import guarantees. 
                                                          
70 Joelson “charged the Committee with ‘heavy-handed censorship.’” CQ Almanac 1963, 288-97.   
71 Rep. Donald Fraser (D-MN), a Foreign Affairs committee member, offered an amendment on the House 
floor to restore $30 million in funding for international organizations. It was rejected however, 89 to 149.   
72 The House and Senate also disagreed over a provision barring the Export-Import Bank guarantees of 
private credits to Communist countries for purchase of U.S. commodities (in particular, wheat sales to the 
U.S.S.R.), which provoked opposition from Republicans in the House as well.  Republicans and some 
conservatives charged that the bill amounted to a congressional-sanctioned “financing” of the Russians.   
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The failure of the Conference Report set off a sprint among the leadership to bring 
enough Democrats back into town to support the bill.  Perhaps not surprising in an era of minimal 
leadership accountability, many high-profile committee chairmen, including Judiciary Chair 
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) and House Un-American Activities Chair Ed Willis (D-LA), were absent 
for the vote.  Several prominent Rules Committee members with leadership ambitions, including 
B.F. Sisk (D-CA) and Richard Bolling (D-MO), also refused to return.  All received phone calls 
from Democratic Whip Hale Boggs (D-CA), but none wanted to return for the vote.73  Sisk was 
eventually persuaded by a personal phone call from Johnson, while Bolling refused to return from 
his holiday in the Virgin Islands.74  Absent any accountability to the Democratic Caucus or the 
leadership for their position, none of these high-ranking members had any incentive to show up 
for the vote; their record would not be held against them.  Johnson had to direct the Democratic 
National Committee to charter – at the party’s expense – a plane to bring members back for the 
vote; Sisk was the only high-ranking member to return.75   
This highly publicized (and embarrassing) foreign aid vote exemplifies the informational 
asymmetries typical of the textbook Congress.  Liberal members were not guaranteed access to 
quality information about the content of the bill and debates between committee members; their 
participation was defined exclusively in terms of Johnson’s own prestige in Washington – not 
policy outcomes; and while party leaders were subject to Johnson’s own self-selected December 
deadline, they failed to anticipate the need for members’ participation on the vote on the first 
conference report, and inform members in advance.  On December 24th, Democrats eventually 
rounded up enough votes for the final roll call on the amended conference report to adopt it 189-
                                                          
73 Pearson, Drew. December 24, 1963. “Absentee Record on the Hill.” Washington Post.  Part II, box 129, 
folder 7.  
74 In its coverage of the events, the Washington Post noted that Bolling “who once aspired to be 
Speaker…was in the Virgin Islands with his new fiancée. He is a vital member of the Rules Committee but 
is getting a divorce and did not come back.”  
75 Five members were picked up in California alone.   
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158, but it was President Johnson’s involvement – not the leadership or Boggs – that 
disseminated information, promoted member participation, and ultimately, ensured the bill’s 
passage.   
A Way Forward for Liberals: The Democratic Study Group 
It is often assumed that member behavior is motivated by a relatively abstract incentive 
structure.  Abstract incentives simultaneously motivate the suppression of policy differences 
between party members (Cox and McCubbins 2005), as well as the adoption of institutional 
changes in Congress (Rohde 1991).  For liberal Democrats, the decision to establish and organize 
DSG was driven by their personal, first-hand experience with significant informational 
asymmetries between themselves, party leaders, and their more senior, conservative colleagues.  
These differences were replicated everywhere from the party campaign committee, to 
mobilization by the whip system, to access to congressional precedents.  Neither the Democratic 
Caucus nor their party leaders subsidized the cost for members to pursue their policy, electoral, or 
power goals within the House of Representatives.  Few, quality participation opportunities existed 
for liberal Democrats.   
Indeed, if the joint agreement to protect the “party brand” emanates from the utility 
individual members receive from the party itself (Aldrich 1995), liberal Democrats had little to 
lose by bringing internal Democratic divisions to light.  Majority party status did not provide 
them with additional benefits and many liberals felt they were held to a higher standard by their 
constituents precisely because they were in the majority.  Junior liberals had no power to pursue 
their policy goals or further their constituents’ interests, and little recourse to challenge the 
committee leaders who opposed them.  And the leadership failed to mobilize and inform their 
ranks, to support the movement of liberals to positions of power in the House (including on key 
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committees), and to fulfill the promise that legislation important to their constituents would be 
considered.   
For liberal Democrats, the Democratic Study Group would play this role.  The group did 
not immediately alleviate the stark informational and power differences in the House; these 
differences continued throughout much of the middle to late twentieth century.  And successive 
generations of liberals – (re)elected every two years – had to make the decision to invest their 
time and financial support to develop an organization to advocate on behalf of their interest.  But 
ultimately, DSG was more responsive to, and representative of, liberal interests than the 
Democratic Caucus or party leaders.  After the establishment of DSG in 1959, group leaders 
spent the next several decades developing an organization with the capacity to expand leadership 
pipelines (chapter 5), promote procedural reform (chapter 6), and the consideration of liberal 
policy goals (chapter 7).  In each of the following chapters, informational asymmetries constitute 
a significant institutional hurdle; at every turn, liberals carefully developed and employed DSG to 
overcome them.    
I now turn to an analysis of each of three facets of institutional change.    
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5 | Leadership Change in the House of Representatives 
 
 
 
 One of the prevailing truths about Congress is that members run for Congress by running 
against Congress – a phenomenon known by many as Fenno’s paradox.  This has proven to be a 
successful campaign strategy for countless candidates and incumbents alike.  But after a 
campaign built on a platform of bringing “change” to Congress, candidates inevitably learn the 
same lesson that all new members learn after being sworn in – if you want to accomplish 
anything in the House, positions of power matter. Policy agendas are decided by those with 
formal power, and reinforced by congressional rules and procedures that empower leaders to 
punish those partisans who don’t fall in line.  Absent exclusive committee assignments, 
committee chairmanships, or party leadership positions, rank and file members – even in the 
majority party – can expect a steep uphill battle to receiving votes on legislation they sponsored, 
garnering press attention, or obtaining a meeting with the Speaker.  Popular rhetoric aside, 
platforms of “change” will go nowhere if party leaders do not support them.  If members want to 
change how Congress works and the legislation produced, allies in the leadership are pivotal.   
 In the late 1950s, liberal Democrats learned a similar lesson.  Party leaders were reticent 
to recruit junior liberals for leadership positions, and seniority limited their access to committee 
leadership positions.  This chapter analyzes how junior liberals developed DSG as a separate site 
of leadership power and training in the House before the adoption of the 1970s reforms.  I argue 
that liberals strategically structured DSG to provide their likeminded partisans with the (1) policy 
expertise, (2) visibility and connections, (3) coalition building support, and (4) institutional 
prestige denied to them by their seniority status in the formal structures of the House.  These 
critical leadership development and training opportunities enabled their ambitious allies and 
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representatives to not only bypass the hurdles posed by the formal structures of the House, but to 
be competitive for elected and appointed leadership positions in the post-reform era. 
This chapter is structured in two parts. First, I analyze the process through which DSG 
promoted new liberal leaders (Part I).  And second, I evaluate the success of past and present 
DSG leaders at ascending the party and committee leadership hierarchy in the House (Part II).  
This chapter incorporates archival evidence, interview data, regression analyses, and several 
legislative and leadership race case studies, to identify, analyze, and evaluate the complex 
dynamics between DSG leadership training, and leadership emergence in the reform era and 
beyond.  I begin by introducing a theory of leadership change that expands upon the 
congressional literature’s typical emphasis on formal rules changes and ideological realignment.  
Then I examine the composition and function of DSG’s leadership.  The rest of the chapter is 
devoted to analyzing the process through which DSG promoted the leadership ambitions of junior 
liberals, and evaluating their success at achieving party and committee leadership positions.   
Collectively, my findings suggest that congressional scholars should reassess the dominant 
conclusion that junior liberals’ successful transition into formal leadership positions is solely due 
to formal rules changes and the “homogenizing” of the House Democratic Caucus.  This finding 
has important implications for processes of leadership change in the contemporary U.S. House of 
Representatives.   
 
Moving Beyond Ideology & Rules Reform:  
An Alternative Theory of Leadership Change in the Reform Era 
The congressional literature often conceives of leadership advancement through 
individual-level characteristics – self-starting personalities and recruitment by existing party 
leaders (Loomis 1984; Peabody 1967; Canon 1989).  The challenges confronting the leadership 
ambitions of party factions – and the strategies adopted by these groups to overcome them – are 
often overlooked.  And yet, access to leadership pipelines often constitutes the strongest 
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institutional barrier to representation of party factional interests in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  Formal leadership positions determine both symbolic representation (e.g. what 
policy issues receive a public hearing) and substantive representation (e.g. which legislation 
receives a vote on the House floor) (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Hall 1998). Seniority rules 
and norms, and the incentive within both parties to suppress the policy issues often prioritized by 
factions (Cox and McCubbins 2005), poses a significant barrier for new groups.  New factions 
usually comprise the most junior – and least powerful – members of the House, which severely 
limits their access to critical leadership positions (and thus their capacity to pursue their policy 
goals).  If the dominant patterns of leadership advancement are foreclosed, how do factions 
overcome the power asymmetries limiting their capacity to pursue their policy, prestige, and 
electoral goals (Fenno 1974)?  
The argument offered in this chapter is simple. If leadership advancement depends on 
either recruitment by current party leaders or the self-starting initiative of ambitious rank and file 
members, I argue that organized party factions can bridge the gap.  Well-organized factions 
provide an alternative leadership pipeline – simultaneously helping self-starters while grooming 
members unlikely to be recruited by party leaders.  Members denied leadership training in the 
formal structures of the House can instead receive this experience through factional organization, 
including (1) policy experience outside of their own committee assignment; (2) visibility and 
connections in the House with other members, the leadership, interest groups, and the media; (3) 
access to tools and resources for building legislative coalitions around important policy priorities 
in the House; and (4) almost instantaneous prestige and cachet that comes with being a part of a 
group with a known reputation in the House.   
The theory offered here provides an alternative view of leadership change in the House 
from the pre- to post-reform era.  The bulk of the congressional literature explains leadership 
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change through two specific mechanisms – formal rules changes expanding access to leadership 
positions, and ideological coalition changes that shift party incentives in leadership selection 
(Harris and Nelson 2008; Becker and Moscardelli 2008; Rohde 1991).  These two views of 
leadership change emphasize the role of groups (e.g. the emergence of new groups spurs the 
adoption of new rules and shifts dominant ideological coalitions in the party), but the 
organization of the group itself is largely irrelevant.  Instead, party and committee leaders change 
when the incentive structure within parties shift, either for individual members and/or for the 
party at-large.  I contribute a third mechanism of group-led leadership change – groups spur 
leadership change by preparing their natural ideological allies to be competitive for elected and 
appointed leadership positions in the House.  The theory offered here is not incompatible with 
other theories of party leaders that stress participation in party building activities, including 
supporting the election of their fellow partisans (Pearson 2015).  DSG helped socialize ambitious 
members into the responsibilities of leadership decision-making, and helped foster the 
connections (and relationships) between and with other members necessary for members to come 
out on top in a Caucus-wide election.  Where my theory of leadership emergence departs is in its 
understanding of leadership emergence through groups, rather than individuals.  Many political 
scientists view leadership emergence through individual level characteristics, including ambition, 
partisanship, ideology, fundraising activities, personality and leadership style, and so forth 
(Loomis 1984; Peabody 1967, 1976; Harris and Nelson 2008; Sinclair 1999; Becker and 
Moscardelli 2008).  To the extent that groups play a role in these theories, it is largely as an 
ideologically-driven voting bloc.  The theory offered here contributes to this literature by 
integrating the role of individual characteristics with the increased presence of factional 
representatives in formal party leadership posts.  Individual level characteristics are undoubtedly 
critical in explaining the movement of individual members to formal leadership positions in 
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Congress, but they are not as useful in explaining how a group of members might grow to 
monopolize leadership positions within the party.  
Conventional explanations of leadership change in the 1960s and 1970s often obscure the 
complex dynamics shaping power in the textbook Congress – and the strategies adopted by 
liberals to challenge their conservative colleagues.  Liberals faced considerable institutional 
hurdles to realizing their leadership ambitions – hurdles that went far beyond antagonistic 
committee chairs.  Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) was uninterested in recruiting allies of DSG for 
formal leadership posts – liberals’ relatively benign request to place a single “western” liberal 
member on the Rules Committee was outright denied.1  This was a strategic decision by Rayburn 
– the appointment of an additional liberal would have further publicized ideological divisions and 
conflict within the party, harming the party brand (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), and 
arguably, majority party status (Peabody 1967).  And despite Rayburn’s token recruitment of 
Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) into his inner circle – a relationship arguably built more on 
personality than ideological cohesion – the internal divisions within the Democratic Caucus 
hindered Bolling’s ability to move up the leadership ladder after Rayburn’s death.  And there 
were few other appointed or elected venues for liberal leadership ambitions.  Until the passage of 
the 1970s reforms, Caucus leadership positions were largely titles in name only with little 
compensatory power.  And the bottom rung of the automatic “escalator” to the leadership 
(Peabody 1976) – Democratic whip – was appointed by the Speaker and Majority Leader.  
Despite the fact that several whips went on to become Speaker, including Tip O’Neill (D-MA) 
                                                          
1 While congressional scholars typically divide Democrats between “Northerners” and “Southerners,” the 
most active liberal reformers self-identified as “westerners” and specifically advocated for improving the 
representation of “western” members and constituencies.  When liberals met with Speaker Sam Rayburn to 
discuss the possibility of placing a “westerner” on the Rules Committee in January 1959, the Speaker 
replied, “You boys can raise this in the next Caucus if you want to, but I think you better not” (Undated 
1959 meeting minutes between Speaker Sam Rayburn and John Blatnik. DSG papers, Part I, box 55, folder 
7).  This was a relatively minor request on the part of liberals because a single additional member on the 
Rules Committee would not have given liberals a majority over the southern Democratic-GOP coalition.   
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and Thomas Foley (D-WA), rank and file members had no say over who held the position until 
the rules change in 1986 to provide for a Caucus-wide vote.    
Conventional explanations of leadership change in the reform era focus on the two 
mechanisms of leadership advancement identified above.  As the liberal bloc grew, the urban, big 
machine-southern, conservative Democratic coalition “predictably” weakened (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). This provided an incentive for parties to elevate more ideologically extreme 
leaders (over ideological middlemen) (Harris and Nelson 2008; Peabody 1976), and to pass 
reforms centralizing power in the leadership (Rohde 1991).  Formal rules changes in the 
Democratic Caucus also expanded the total number of leadership positions available in the House 
by placing limitations on the total number of leadership positions any one member could hold, 
establishing some term limits, and creating new leadership positions in the House.  The increased 
potential for members to achieve leadership positions provided a strong incentive for rank and file 
members to support the passage of these rules changes (Schickler, Sides and McGhee 2003). 
Liberal Democrats undoubtedly pursued a dual strategy of supporting the election of 
more liberal members to the House, and campaigning for the adoption of rules changes expanding 
access to leadership positions.  But rather than simply bide their time and wait for more liberals to 
be elected, or for the adoption of formal rules changes to finally occur – both of which would not 
occur until the 1970s – liberals structured DSG as a separate power base in Congress.  Denied 
leadership experience in the formal structures of the House, ambitious liberals organized DSG to 
provide these opportunities.  Seniority limited the ability of junior liberal members to make a 
name for themselves, to develop policy expertise, to become coalition leaders, and to assume 
agenda-setting roles within their party.  Liberals organized DSG to challenge these power 
asymmetries – using the organization’s activities, services, and leadership platform to provide 
their allies and representatives with the skills, connections, resources and tools, necessary to be 
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competitive for elected and appointed leadership positions in the House. This training, I argue, 
created an alternative leadership pipeline, and enabled the movement of DSG allies into formal 
party and committee leadership positions – and ultimately, a liberal monopoly of Democratic 
leadership positions in the post-reform House.   
The “Executive Committee” 
When liberals established DSG in September 1959, the election of a leadership was the 
first group decision; leaders initially comprised of Reps. Lee Metcalf (D-WY) as chair, James 
Roosevelt (D-CA) as vice chair, and Frank Thompson (D-NJ) as secretary.2  These elected 
representatives would come to constitute the “Executive Committee,” which will be the primary 
focus of the analyses presented in this chapter.  From 1959 to 1995, the Executive Committee 
comprised between 8 and 38 of the most ambitious, active, and engaged liberals in the House.  It 
was the site of the majority of DSG’s leadership training, although the group provided a range of 
activities and services that cultivated leadership skills among the broader membership.  Initially 
headed by a small group of members, the committee would grow to include several (at-large) 
vice-chairmen, a separate secretary and whip, regional vice-chairmen, a freshman representative, 
1-2 appointed members, and all former chairmen of the organization, by the early 1970s.  Former 
chairmen were guaranteed a seat as long as they served in the House, which formalized the 
relationship between DSG allies after they moved into formal leadership positions – ensuring that 
they were not only involved in DSG decision-making, but they were encouraged to contribute 
valuable leadership intelligence, as well as resources provided by the leadership apparatus.3   
                                                          
2 September 9th, 1959 Meeting Minutes of the Policy Committee Meeting, House Judiciary Committee 
Room. DSG papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., part I, box 135, folder 10.  
3 For example, if a DSG leader became the whip (such as Rep. Thomas Foley (D-WA) or Rep. John 
Brademas (D-IN)), they could share information about where other members stood on a bill, and how that 
was likely to shape leadership strategy on the floor.   
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Figure 5.1: Seniority Differences Between DSG & Democratic Party Leaders
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Executive Committee members remained considerably more junior than formal leaders 
throughout the group’s tenure in the House.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 compare seniority differences 
between the DSG leadership and party and committee leaders, respectively, from the 86th – 103rd 
congresses.4  These differences were especially pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s.  While DSG 
leaders averaged about 8.5 years in office (or 4 terms), party leaders averaged 18 years (9 terms) 
of service in the House (Figure 5.1).  Similar trends can be observed in Figure 5.2, with DSG 
leaders consistently ranking significantly beneath the average seniority of both subcommittee and 
full committee chairs.  Committee chairs averaged 24 years (12 terms) of service and 
subcommittee chairs averaged 14 years (7 terms) of service.5   
The continuity in seniority status of the DSG leadership is remarkable.  Despite 
significant increases in the size of the liberal faction, and the adoption of reforms expanding 
junior members’ access to power (Rohde 1991; Schickler, Sides, and McGhee 2003), DSG 
remained a site in Congress where junior members dominated available leadership positions.  
This continuity reflects a culture among liberals that the responsibilities and opportunities 
associated with serving as a DSG leader should be spread among members, rather than 
concentrated among a small subset of them.  Beginning with original DSG chairman’s (Rep. Lee 
Metcalf (D-MT)) election to the Senate in 1960, DSG began an informal practice of rotating their 
leadership.  No single member occupied the same role in two consecutive congresses.6  During the 
March 1965 DSG leadership election, outgoing chairman Rep. John Blatnik (D-MN) said that “It 
has always been my strong feeling that there should be a rotation of officers and a broad sharing 
                                                          
4 DSG leaders are operationalized as members of the DSG executive committee, a group of 8-32 members 
elected by the membership to make decisions on the group’s behalf.  DSG leadership data was collected 
from the DSG papers at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and seniority data on all Democrats 
was collected from the Congressional Quarterly.   
5 These significant seniority differences also reflect the growth of careerism in the House, which worked 
against the ambitions of many junior members (Hibbing 1991).   
6 For example, a member could move up from the secretary or whip position to the chairmanship, but they 
could not stay as the secretary or whip for two consecutive congresses.   
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of responsibilities in DSG.”7  This practice was formally inscribed into the DSG bylaws at the 
request of outgoing chairman Donald Fraser (MN) in 1971. In a letter announcing nominations 
for the Executive Committee in 1973, the nominating committee wrote, “In no small part, the past 
success of DSG in meeting such challenges has been due to the renewed energy and drive and the 
fresh ideas which successive new leaders have brought to our group.”8  These archival documents 
suggest that Executive Committee service was not just a responsibility for members, but an 
opportunity as well.   
 Rotating membership of the Executive Committee ensured that DSG provided leadership 
opportunities and experience to a wider and more diverse group of members – in stark contrast to 
the committee system, which across numerous, conflicting theories of organization (Adler and 
Lapinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Krehbiel 1998; Hall 1998) favors and result in 
the leadership and participation of a smaller number of members.  Instead, DSG disseminated this 
training and experience, rather than concentrating it among a subset of members.  Rotating 
leaders also ensured that no single member could rely exclusively on DSG as a platform for their 
leadership ambitions.  This is especially important in ensuring that DSG remained a consistent 
mechanism of progressive change in the House.  If “Institutions, like people, tend to radicalism in 
youth and conservatism in old age” (Cannon 1971), then the forced leadership rotation helped 
DSG evolve as the House itself evolved.   While factions built on the foundation of a single 
charismatic leader are unlikely to prevail over the long-term, DSG’s organizational structure 
ensured that they consistently attracted and socialized a new group of ambitious, liberal members 
into the House leadership.9   
                                                          
7 Introductory Remarks, March 3, 1965 DSG meeting, DSG papers, Part II, box 3, folder 8.  
8 DSG papers, Part II, box 4, folder 1.  
9 One consequence of DSG’s rotating leadership was the elevation in responsibilities and importance of the 
DSG staff.  Every staffer interviewed in the course of this project stressed that the rotation of the leadership 
did not negatively impact DSG’s ability to develop long-term plans or strategy.  Rather, it elevated the 
significance and power of the DSG staff – which numbered between 20-25 by the 1970s – and in particular, 
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The Executive Committee constituted a cross section of liberal Democrats, but the 
overwhelming majority were from western and mid-western states.  Broad geographic 
representation helped ensure that the group anticipated potential regional problems or concerns, 
with members giving “insights into how people from those regions would think.”10  And as 
liberals were disproportionately likely to be elected from marginal districts, so too were many 
Executive Committee members – giving DSG unique insights into the needs of rank and file 
members often ignored by electorally safe party and committee leaders.  Some Executive 
Committee members even represented districts where association with DSG posed an electoral 
threat.  In an interview with political scientist Thomas Mann who worked for Rep. James O’Hara 
(DSG chairman from 1967-1968) – he recalled that O’Hara “represented a pretty conservative 
democratic constituency…where George Wallace did extraordinarily well.”11  Liberals in DSG’s 
early days were keenly aware of the electoral vulnerability posed by association with the “official 
organization of liberals” in the House.  The group was careful to recruit junior members with a 
promise of confidentiality, providing reassurance that their opponents in future elections could 
not use their membership against them.12  For example, in 1965, Rep. Thomas Foley’s (D-WA) 
conservative district provided a challenge to Rep. Mo Udall’s (D-AZ) recruitment efforts.  In a 
letter thanking him for a check for his membership dues, Udall wrote, “As I told you this 
morning, the DSG officers are keenly aware of the nature of your district and the special 
problems that you face. There are no DSG membership lists, but we are happy to provide you 
                                                          
the executive director.  The DSG executive director was considered such an important position that DSG’s 
longest serving top staffer, Richard “Dick” Conlon, was referred to in press reports as the “436 th Member of 
the House.”  Both Conlon and his successor, Scott Lilly, were on a first name basis with nearly all members 
they interacted with, and had strong personal relationships with many Executive Committee members.   
10 August 6, 2015 in-person interview.   
11 November 17, 2015 telephone interview. Mann served as an APSA fellow for O’Hara.  
12 Of course, the archival record strongly contradicts any claims made about this policy. DSG kept 
numerous, detailed records of its members and research subscribers each Congress, including records of 
member financial contributions.  The policy was, more accurately, a promise that DSG would not disclose 
membership lists to the press, the leadership, or anyone else – a promise that DSG strenuously upheld 
throughout their tenure in the House.  
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with the benefit of research and assistance of our group” (emphasis added).13  Udall’s letter 
suggests that Foley’s membership in DSG was conditional on its secrecy.  Obviously by 1975 
when Foley became DSG chairman, the benefits and power of public association with – even 
leadership of – DSG outweighed the potential negative electoral consequences.   
Executive Committee meetings, which occurred on average once every two weeks, 
socialized junior members into the responsibilities and compromise inherent to leadership 
decision-making.  Each meeting was organized around a specific agenda set by the chair and 
executive director, but individual members were encouraged to contribute.  Nevertheless, 
Executive Committee meetings were not dominated by “aimless discussions and monologues or 
to be interrupted by members who want to pursue their [personal] agendas.”14  Meetings were 
action-oriented – anchored around specific events or the membership’s needs (upcoming 
legislation, leadership races, elections).  When members disagreed over a course of action (about 
where to devote resources, strategy, whether to endorse a bill), the committee cast a formal vote 
and the majority decision carried.  If the committee was significantly divided, the decision was 
sometimes forwarded to the full membership to be voted on at the next membership meeting.15   
The archival record suggests that Committee meetings served as a forum for members to 
discuss their own legislative and policy priorities.  A former DSG staffer who regularly attended 
these meetings described this process in the late 1960s and 1970s:   
“The idea was the chair of DSG and maybe one or two other members…would contact 
[executive director] Dick and say go get the members together. It’s more like a sharing 
[forum]…it was a pretty large group, which was good – you’re lucky when you have a 
meeting and you’re lucky to get a dozen.  The idea was to have some give and take. Some 
                                                          
13 June 24, 1965 letter from Udall to Foley. DSG papers, Part II, box 132, folder 6.  
14 Undated memo from Conlon to Brodhead. DSG papers.  
15 DSG always strived to compromise and settle debates before taking procedural and policy matters before 
the Democratic Caucus. At a 1981 Symposium on the U.S. Congress honoring Tip O’Neill, Conlon said 
“Each of the various reforms was subjected to prolonged and deliberate discussion and debate in the DSG 
Executive Committee and at DSG membership meetings before being offered in the caucus to make sure 
they would work as intended and that they would not have undesirable side effects. As a result, virtually all 
of the major DSG reforms were approved as initially offered” (Hale 1983, 241).   
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issues on the take, they know they have to deal with legislatively in the weeks ahead. Just 
talk about it, how they wanted to handle it, how they want to [address it]” (emphasis 
added).16   
DSG was unique among groups in the House in its emphasis on active participation by members 
serving on the leadership.  And as the caucus system exploded during the 1970s and 1980s, many 
members belonged to numerous organizations, and their leadership board was more perfunctory 
and symbolic than substantive (Hammond 1989; 1991).  Scott Lilly, a longtime congressional 
staffer and former DSG executive director, described how DSG leaders differed from the leaders 
of other caucuses in the House:  
“We wanted the Executive Committee to not only help us think about what we were 
gonna do, but make our efforts resonate more broadly in the House once we did 
something…we did have a good deal of investment by a lot of the Executive Committee.  
There were some people who belonged to 15 different LSOs, and didn’t participate in any 
of them. We tried to make sure that didn’t happen in DSG.”17   
The archival record supports Lilly’s account of members’ commitment to DSG.  Executive 
Committee meetings were generally well-attended by DSG leaders, and they actively participated 
in the discussions.     
 
PART I:  
Expanding Leadership Pathways in the Textbook Congress & Beyond 
 Liberal Democrats were keenly aware of the importance of elevating their allies into 
formal leadership positions in order to secure rules changes and liberal policy outcomes on the 
floor.  But rather than bide their time until the passage of new rules – which eventually occurred 
in the 1970s – liberals organized DSG to provide members with the opportunity and capacity for 
leadership.  In this section, I analyze the process through which DSG prepared their strongest, 
most ambitious allies to be competitive for appointed and elected leadership positions by 
providing them with leadership training denied to them in the formal structures of the House.  
                                                          
16 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.  
17 October 28, 2015 telephone interview.  
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DSG’s training cultivated four key facets of leadership: 1) Policy Expertise; 2) Visibility and 
Connections; 3) Coalition Building Experience; and 4) Institutional Cachet and Prestige. My 
research of the archival record and interview data suggests that the dominant scholarly conclusion 
that the successful transition of junior liberals into formal leadership positions is solely due to 
formal rules changes and the “homogenizing” of the House Democratic Caucus should be 
reassessed.   
 
Policy Expertise 
DSG structured their services and activities to foster the development of policy expertise 
for their leaders (and members).  While political scientists often assume that the committee 
system promotes the development of policy specialization in Congress (Adler and Lapinski 1997; 
Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Krehbiel 1991), liberals confronted an institutional environment 
that limited their ability to cast knowledgeable votes, or to learn about policy issues outside of 
their committee work.  In order to advance the leadership hierarchy, DSG was designed to 
promote a broader base of policy knowledge.  
As I discussed in chapter four, members were exclusively dependent on committees to 
obtain legislative information from the mid-1950s through the 1990s.  The leadership provided 
very little information about legislation (and what it did provide was supplied through 
committees).  These biased information networks reinforced power and informational 
asymmetries between junior liberals and southern conservatives.  One former DSG staffer said 
that Dixiecrats viewed information sharing negatively, remarking that chairs believed “the less 
that’s known out there, the better.”18  DSG challenged these informational biases by “getting that 
                                                          
18 September 23rd, 2015 interview with a former DSG staffer.  
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information out and more broadly and from a less restrictive source.”19  DSG’s various 
publications outlined the legislative schedule, and provided critical procedural information (terms 
of consideration on the floor), policy information (bill content) and political intelligence (position 
of key groups, the leadership, the White House, and so forth on the bill; major arguments for and 
against; major points of contention).  Collectively, these research services subsidized the cost for 
members and their staff to become knowledgeable about any policy.20   
In addition to the research services, DSG challenged committee biases in policy 
information through their task force system.  During most congresses throughout their tenure in 
the House, DSG organized a series of task forces around specific policy areas to support the 
development of their member’s policy expertise and leadership (pre-dating many of the 
leadership-led efforts to replace committee action with party task forces on legislation) (Sinclair 
1985, 2011).  These policy areas reflected Democratic priorities, the interests of members 
themselves, and areas where the committee of jurisdiction (including the Rules Committee) 
provided a blockade to consideration of key policy problems.  Task forces were responsible for 
holding educational hearings on particular subjects, meeting with experts, arranging membership 
meetings of interest to members, monitoring committee activity on issues within the task force’s 
responsibilities, developing legislation or amendments where appropriate, and preparing reports 
and other materials to present the findings and recommendations of the task force.21  The task 
forces functioned like an alternative committee system, providing opportunities for members to 
assume policy leadership roles and become knowledgeable about policy areas outside of their 
committee work.   
                                                          
19 November 4th, 2015 interview with a former DSG staffer.  
20 See chapter 7 for a discussion of the policy implications of the research services.  
21 Guidelines for DSG Task Forces, 1983. DSG papers, Part II, box 6, folder 3. It should be noted that not 
every task force was as engaged and active, both in their own activities and in challenging committee 
decision-making (Mann, Stevens and Miller 1974).    
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In the 1960s and 1970s, the committee system limited the development of policy 
leadership roles for junior members in a few ways.  Seniority norms ensured that these members 
were unable to head subcommittees, or even to participate in the consideration of legislation and 
policy issues in committees.  Junior liberals, in particular, were frequently instructed by their 
conservative chairs to sit down and not speak during committee meetings and hearings.  One top 
DSG staffer interviewed recalled how Foley would always tell other members on the Agriculture 
Committee stories about his early experiences on the committee: Foley told them that “the 
committee chairmen wouldn’t even let you talk. He [former Agriculture Chairman Poage] 
wouldn’t even want to allow the members to say anything as a freshman. He would say, ‘maybe 
if you are re-elected, then maybe you can something….For all I know, you got elected by 
accident.  Maybe if you come back again, you can say something.’”22  Armed Services 
Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert’s (LA) infamous reference to the new members of the 
94th Congress as “boys and girls” was merely one in a long line of indignities hurled at junior 
liberals by their senior conservative colleagues (Yang 1992).   
Today, freshman members still participate less in committee proceedings than other 
members (Hall 1998), and opportunities to assume formal and informal policy leadership 
positions are rare (French 2016).  Emphasis on the committee system as the mechanism through 
which members specialize in policy limits the opportunities available to members to gain 
experience and influence legislation outside of their committee work.23  There are, of course, a 
limited number of majority party positions on any committee, and many junior members are 
dissatisfied with their initial committee assignment.  Junior members often receive assignments 
                                                          
22 Other junior members during this period have shared similar accounts, including Rep. Dave Obey’s (D-
WI) recollections of being told to “sit down and shut up” by chairmen. Remarks, September 16 th, 2015, 
Congressional Reform Symposium, Capital Visitor’s Center, Washington, D.C.  
23 In part, this is because committee work generally occurs on the same days and times each week (allowing 
for regular party meetings, district work time, and floor schedules).  Members with more than one 
committee assignment often find it difficult to participate equally across their committee assignments.   
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that reflect neither their personal background and skills, nor their constituent’s interests.  It is far 
more difficult for these members to pursue their policy or electoral goals in the House as a result 
(Fenno 1973; Kellerman and Shepsle 2009; Rohde and Shepsle 1973).   
 DSG’s task force system challenged these biases by providing opportunities for members 
to engage with policy areas outside of their committee.  Table 5.1 presents data on the 
membership make-up of DSG task forces in the 87th, 89th, and 91st Congresses.  Of the 22 task 
forces analyzed, only 5 drew a majority of their membership from members who served on the 
corresponding committee of jurisdiction.  In other words, the majority of liberal members served 
on DSG task forces with a different policy focus than their committee work.  Records of requests 
by members to serve on a specific committee are only available for the 91st Congress, but the 
same trends can be observed there as well.  The majority of members requested to serve on a task 
force with a different policy focus than their own committee assignment(s).  Only on the 
Economic & Tax Policy, Health & Welfare, and Education task forces did a majority of 
requesting members also serve on the corresponding committee of jurisdiction.   
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Rep. Shirley Chisholm.  Rep. Shirley Chisholm’s (D-NY) experiences as a freshman in 
1969 are representative of how DSG challenged the policy limitations posed by the committee 
system.  When Chisholm was first elected to the House to represent New York City’s 12th district 
in 1968, she was placed on the Agriculture Committee (and later Veteran’s Affairs)– an 
assignment she protested because it did not reflect either the urban issues in her district or her 
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background in education (and which some Democrats viewed as racially discriminatory).24  The 
formal structure of the House made it difficult for Chisholm to directly participate in policy 
debates related to her own and her constituent’s interests.  Moreover, her urban constituents were 
less likely to care about any policy achievements she secured through the Agriculture and 
Veteran’s Affairs committees.  Chisholm eventually secured a position on Education & Labor 
(viewed by many as a ‘carrot’ from Hale Boggs for her vote in his heavily contested majority 
leader race), but before she did, she gained experience serving on DSG’s Education task force.  It 
provided an outlet for her expertise in education, enabling her to remain informed and involved in 
education policy prior to her eventual assignment to Education & Labor, as well as providing 
some tangible evidence of her advocacy on behalf of her constituent’s interests in an important 
policy area. These are critical components of the credit claiming and position taking activities 
thought to be important for members’ electoral goals (Mayhew 1974), as well as their policy 
goals (Hammond 1989).     
 It is not possible to evaluate the counterfactual scenario, or to administer knowledge tests 
to members to determine whether their knowledge of a given policy area increased after service 
                                                          
24 In a February 2, 1971 DSG membership meeting, Rep. Herman Badillo (NY) invoked Rep. Chisholm’s 
experiences in his request for DSG’s support in protesting his committee assignments. His remarks 
illustrate both the electoral and representational challenges for individual members of relying exclusively 
on committee work to develop policy expertise: “Freshman Badillo outlined his case against his assignment 
to the Agriculture Committee. He argued that the committee ratios on his first three choices (Education & 
Labor, Banking & Currency, and Interstate and Foreign Commerce) were not correct, that he could be put 
on any of these without bumping another Democrat. His major contention was that that assignment to 
Agriculture could only be viewed as an insult to Puerto Ricans and New Yorkers in light of the same 
treatment that was given to Rep. Chisholm as a freshman. Rep. Gibbons spoke of the geographical 
imbalance of putting him on Education and Labor. Rep. Dellums said that geographic criteria should be 
irrelevant in making assignments, that a person’s ability and interests are more important. Rep. Burton 
moved that the DSG go on record to request the Caucus to add more seats to both Armed Services and 
Education & Labor to accommodate Rep. Abzug and Badillo respectively. During the debate on the 
motion, Rep. Udall announced that a deal could probably be arranged with Tino Roncalio who had been 
placed on Education & Labor and was not pleased with the assignment. Following this, Fraser suggested 
that Burton amend his motion to place the DSG on record to help get desirable assignment for those 
freshman who were unhappy. That was done” (emphasis added). DSG Meeting Minutes, DSG papers, Part 
II, box 6, folder 8.  
159 
 
on a DSG task force.  However, these data clearly illustrate that not only were members 
themselves interested in participating in policy development outside of their own committee, but 
DSG provided members with the opportunity to do so.  In short, DSG subsidized the cost of 
developing policy expertise on a wider array of policy issues – challenging the participation 
biases inherent to the formal structures of the House.   
 
Visibility & Connections 
If formal leadership positions in Congress inevitably imbue their holders with a certain 
amount of visibility and built-in connections with organized interests, DSG provided their leaders 
with an institutional platform that promoted their name recognition and cultivated relationships 
with key figures.  Unlike Senators, members are reliant on leadership positions to gain press 
attention and develop connections with individuals and groups inside and outside of Congress.  
Absent these institutional positions, it is difficult for members to achieve the same level of 
visibility or to cultivate the same relationships.  DSG leadership experience ensured that 
members’ fellow partisans, party and committee leaders, and outside interests not only knew who 
they were, but fostered relationships between them.   
 The breadth and diversity of DSG’s research services promoted a relationship arguably 
without parallel between the liberal faction and the Washington Press Corps, which fostered 
greater visibility for DSG leaders.  For many journalists assigned to Capitol Hill, the research 
services subsidized the cost of researching and writing on Congress (in contrast to dominant 
views of informational exchanges in Congress (Hall and Deardorff 2006)).  One DSG researcher 
recalled that “journalists really wanted our materials. I remember…journalists were always 
running over…[to get] the Daily Report, the Fact Sheet, whatever else we published that 
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night…when they opened the office the next morning.”25  DSG’s information made journalistic 
work easier – it was a readily available and trusted source of information on the legislative 
schedule, committee work, the positions of interest groups, the leadership and the White House.  
The usefulness of the research for journalists is not surprising.  Longtime executive director Dick 
Conlon was trained as a journalist prior to coming to DSG, and approached the majority of the 
research services through a journalistic lens with an emphasis on verifiable evidence.    
The close, regular relationship between DSG and the press helped foster a public 
platform for DSG leaders.26  When liberals were elected or appointed to leadership positions in 
DSG, the press routinely covered these stories – something that was not true of all other groups 
and factions in the House at the time.  When DSG had contested leadership races, they were not 
only the subject of news stories, but they were covered as significant Democratic leadership races 
indicative of larger intra-party battles.  The 1979 battle for DSG chair between Reps. Dave Obey 
(D-WI) and Richard Ottinger (D-NY) is a good example of this phenomenon.  In the Obey-
Ottinger race, which ultimately resulted in Obey winning 173-74, Mary Russell of the 
Washington Post noted that the leadership was keenly interested in the race, and Majority Whip 
(and former DSG Executive Committee member) John Brademas was working on behalf of 
Obey’s candidacy.27  The leadership’s interest in the race was suggestive of split liberal alliances 
in the Democratic Caucus.  DSG encouraged this coverage by routinely providing their leaders 
with press services. Whenever a DSG member was appointed to lead a task force, DSG 
announced the appointment in a press release that stressed the member’s qualifications and 
interests.  DSG also offered to prepare press releases for task force leaders and members to 
                                                          
25 September 21st, 2015 interview with former DSG staffer. 
26 This close relationship does not necessarily mean that the media always covered DSG in a positive light 
– it merely means that the press was aware of and followed DSG – their activities and leaders – more so 
than other groups.   
27 “Liberal House Democrat Contest: Loyalist vs. Independent,” February 26, 1979, Washington Post. DSG 
papers, Part II, box 4, folder 5.  
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announce their service on policy task forces to local media back home in their district.28 These 
services helped members foster a higher public profile for their work in Congress, enabling them 
to engage in position-taking and credit claiming (Mayhew 1974).   
In addition, DSG developed relationships between their leaders and organized interests 
through their campaign work.  The DSG Campaign Fund began in the early 1960s, and was led 
by a chairman and a small group of liberals – providing a liberal corollary to the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee.  DSG was often very critical of the DCCC because they 
believed the organization was structured to disproportionately help safe seat, southern members, 
rather than vulnerable liberal members in western states.  The Campaign Fund enabled liberal 
leaders to build strong alliances with outside interests, including groups like the National 
Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC), the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and 
various labor groups, including the AFL-CIO, UAW, and SEIU.  According to political scientist 
Thomas Mann who worked with the DSG Campaign Fund in the 1970s: “You could see the DSG 
Campaign Fund as a precursor to the modern day congressional campaign committees…where 
connections were made to the broader party network.”29  The archival record is filled with 
numerous letters between these groups and DSG staffers and leaders.  Groups routinely wrote to 
the Campaign Fund (or DSG) to share lists of “good liberal candidates,” and wrote checks for 
DSG to contribute to their campaigns.  The DSG Campaign Fund also served as a recruitment 
tool for DSG.  One longtime DSG staffer I interviewed recalled how “we were very much 
                                                          
28 For example, on September 18, 1965, Rep. Patsy Mink (D-HI) issued a press release announcing her 
membership of the newly formed DSG Full Employment Steering Committee: “Its purpose is to undertake 
a comprehensive study of the policies needed to meet the national goals of full employment…” DSG 
papers, box 148, folder 13.  In an example of the local newspaper coverage that often followed these press 
releases, the Oakland Post published a column on May 26, 1971 covering Rep. Ronald Dellums’ (D-CA) 
appointment as vice-chair of DSG’s Consumer Task Force.  The paper not only noted how unusual it was 
that Dellums, a freshman, had been appointed to a position normally reserved for “older Congressmen,” but 
it tied him to “The Group” that played a “key role in enactment of all major social legislation over the past 
decade” and “led efforts to reform and modernize Congress.”   
29 November 17, 2015 telephone interview.   
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involved, and…talking to other organizations like the NCEC that pay attention to candidates so 
we were able to identify really good people and really have an impact. They [members] would 
know that going in and…immediately join the DSG so they could get the [legislative research] 
reports.”30  DSG provided an institutional mechanism for groups and ambitious members to form 
connections with candidates, and for liberal leaders already in Congress to develop strong, 
reciprocal relationships with outside groups.   
 And when freshman Democratic members were first elected, DSG provided their initial 
introduction to Congress through their orientation sessions – simultaneously providing a critical 
service for freshman (and the party at-large) while also elevating the profile of the DSG leaders 
who were not only the public face of the orientation sessions, but were often the first 
congressional “leaders” new members officially met.  DSG was a pioneer in this regard.  Before 
the leadership developed their own comprehensive session for freshman, DSG provided one.31  
They even reimbursed members and their spouse for a separate trip to D.C. for the orientation, 
which was held in November after their election.32  These orientation sessions included a series of 
practical seminars built around topics like how to make effective use of the mail (and franking 
privilege), ethics, and where to live and send your children to school in D.C.  While the purpose 
of these orientations changed slightly over time, DSG Chairman Matt McHugh’s description of 
                                                          
30 September 23, 2015 interview with former staffer.  
31 A June 12, 1978 letter from Speaker Tip O’Neill to Majority Leader Jim Wright suggests that the 
leadership did not begin organizing orientation efforts until the 96th Congress and even when they did, they 
relied on former DSG leaders to lead the sessions: “As we discussed the other day, the orientation of new 
Members is a task of sufficient importance that it should be managed directly by the elected Leadership of 
the House. You are my designee from the Leadership to organize, coordinate, and supervise the program of 
orientation for newly-elected Members to the House when they convene here in Washington after the 
general election this fall. Please utilize such resources as are appropriately available to you. I particularly 
think it would be a good idea to draw liberally upon the experience of John Brademas and his staff since 
John did such a fine job in 1976. Likewise, Frank Thompson in the House Administration Committee 
should be a part of your plans.” Both Brademas and Thompson previously served on DSG’s leadership, and 
organized and led the group’s orientation sessions.  DSG papers, Part II, box 52, folder 1.  
32 November 30, 1982 DSG Reimbursement Form, DSG papers, Part II, box 99, folder 6.  At the time, the 
House officially reimbursed Members for a single trip to Washington, D.C. prior to their swearing-in in 
January at the start of the new Congress.   
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their purpose in a 1984 letter to new members underscores how critical these early seminars were 
for freshman:  
“DSG’s orientation is specifically designed to assist you with a number of extremely 
important decisions you will have to make before you are even sworn in as a Member of 
Congress – how to organize your Congressional operation, how many of your staff 
should be located in Washington and how many in your District offices, what kind of 
people do you need on your staff to meet your new responsibilities, what committee 
assignments can your realistically aspire to and how to go about seeking them, and a 
briefing on issues you will have to vote on in the organizing caucus in December.”33   
Speakers included current members of Congress, high level staffers, journalists and other notable 
figures.  And at the end of each orientation, DSG hosted a reception for members and their 
spouses that was sponsored by interest groups (especially labor groups) – providing yet another 
opportunity for freshman and DSG leaders alike to form and strengthen connections in the 
“Washington Community.”  From candidacy to election to office-holding, DSG fostered 
relationships between Democratic members and their fellow partisans, organized interests, leaders 
in Congress, the media, and other key figures.  These relationships are a critical foundation for 
leadership posts in Congress (Peabody 1967) – absent DSG, junior liberals would have been 
entirely reliant on their own individual efforts to develop them.   
DSG’s orientation sessions also served as the first formal introduction for freshman to 
new and emerging liberal leaders.  This provided the liberal leaders of DSG with a tremendous 
visibility advantage in the House – many freshmen met DSG leaders prior to meeting incumbent 
party leaders and committee chairs, or even the Dean of their state delegation.  As large freshman 
classes were elected into office, these initial introductions could provide a tremendous advantage 
for leadership candidates prior to the Caucus organizational meeting.  In 1974-75, as the 
Watergate babies were swept into office, DSG’s orientations took on a new significance as they 
became the site of freshman “interviews” of all incumbent committee chairs on the eve of the 
historic overthrow of 3 committee chairs in the 94th Congress.  These interviews set a precedent 
                                                          
33 November 8th, 1984 Letter from McHugh to New Members. DSG papers, Part II, box 100, folder 1.  
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that would be repeated by Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) at the start of the 104th Congress.  Rep. 
George Miller (D-CA) recalled how DSG arranged the interviews, noting “that the only reason 
freshman saw them is that DSG put the interviews on their orientation schedule.”34  The 
orientation session provided an opportunity for them to meet the large freshman class and present 
themselves as the liberal alternative.  Candidates for other critical leadership races, including the 
heavily contested 1976 race for majority leader, and the 1986 race for the first elected majority 
whip, also addressed freshman at the DSG orientation.  And by the 1980s, “[Speaker] Foley, he 
rigged the system so there wasn’t any question that DSG was the place to be….at the luncheon 
which we had for new members was the first chance [for freshman] to be face-to-face with the 
Speaker, which was a big deal.”35   
Phillip Burton’s Race for Caucus Chairman.  The 1974 race for Caucus chairman 
between DSG Chairman Phillip Burton (D-CA) and B.F. Sisk (D-CA) starkly illustrates how the 
visibility and connections fostered by DSG’s campaign work enhanced members’ leadership 
prospects.   
At the 1974 Democratic organizing meetings, the most competitive leadership race before 
Democrats was arguably the race for Caucus Chair.  The top three party leadership positions 
(Speaker, majority leader, and majority whip) would not change hands, and prior to the 
nominations of the Steering & Policy Committee, Democrats did not anticipate challenges to 
incumbent committee chairs.36  The position of Caucus Chair however, was considered among the 
                                                          
34 December 5, 1990 executive committee meeting minutes. DSG papers, Part II, box 8, folder 8.  
35 October 28, 2015 telephone interview with former DSG executive director Scott Lilly.   
36 In 1974, Democrats voted to empower the Steering & Policy Committee as the Committee on 
Committees – the Caucus body tasked with assigning members to committees and making 
recommendations for committee chairmen.  The Journal of the Democratic Caucus documents most 
Member’s shock and surprise at not only the committee chair nominations of Steering & Policy (S&P), but 
also Caucus votes overturning S&P nominations.  For example, when S&P nominated Henry Reuss over 
Wright Patman, Majority Leader Jim Wright spoke out denouncing the decision: “I know some of you 
won’t feel fulfilled unless you make an example of some committees here. Why in the name of sweet 
reason do you single out Wright Patman for this kind of treatment – denying him a day in court, denying 
him an opportunity to have his stewardship accounted for by us members, denying us the opportunity to 
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most important decisions to be made by the Caucus – symbolic of the future role of the Caucus 
for the party.  And as DSG’s strategy to make the Caucus into a mechanism of institutional 
change in the House and the major site of party decision-making succeeded – first through regular 
meetings, then through the consideration of its procedural and policy agenda – ambitious 
members were keenly aware of how important the position of Caucus Chair would become.  
Historically, the Caucus Chair was largely a symbolic position; it was not necessarily part of the 
automatic escalator to the Speaker (Peabody 1976). And prior to 1969, the Caucus only met once 
a Congress to vote on party leaders.  But December 1974, by the 94th Congress, the position of 
Chair was no longer symbolic.  National and regional news coverage of the race widely noted that 
the vote for Caucus chair was a proxy vote for the power of the Caucus.  National Journal 
declared that the “power of the Caucus was seen to be the major issue” (1974, 1890) for 
members.  The St. Paul Pioneer Press identified the race as a choice between “making the caucus 
the controlling body for House Democrats,” and leaving “the leadership of House Democrats in 
the hands of such leaders [Speaker Carl Albert].”37 
 Burton’s competitor, Rep. Sisk (D-CA), was a moderate member of the House Rules 
Committee.  At 63, Sisk was 15 years older than Burton.  Sisk reputation was built on his 
membership of the Rules committee, and his leadership of the United Democrats in Congress 
(UDC).  UDC was an organization of moderate Democrats in the House that was “not especially 
active on legislative issues. Its major group activity so far has been its support of Democratic 
Party “regulars” in their arguments with “reformers” over the Democratic Party’s new charter” 
(National Journal 1974, 1888).  Sisk’s name was placed in nomination by Rep. John Moss (D-
                                                          
pass upon his stewardship? Why Wright Patman?” Democratic Caucus papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C., Box 5, part 11.  
37 DSG papers, Part II, box 153, folder 2. Bailey, Gil. “Intraparty fight looms in House.” December 1, 1974.   
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CA), and seconded by Reps. Jim Wright (D-TX) and Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), who tried to 
argue for Sisk’s liberal credentials:  
“In 1961, when we changed the Rules Committee to make it a more responsive arm of 
the leadership, Congressman Sisk was elected a member of that enlarged committee. 
Throughout the period of the 60s, during the Administrations of Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, he took the heat for which every member of the Rules Committee has to take for 
the popular and unpopular workings which make it possible to achieve, under Democratic 
Presidents, major new Democratic voters.”38   
Wright and Rostenkowski also stressed Sisk’s role in drafting the 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act – a bill which emerged out of a Rules subcommittee chaired by Sisk, but was 
so dramatically altered by DSG, including Burton, during its consideration on the floor that most 
liberals would hesitate to give Sisk responsibility for its passage or its effects on the House.39 For 
Democratic “regulars” and “reformers” alike, there was no doubt that Sisk was the “conservative” 
candidate in the race.  
Burton was considerably more junior than Sisk, although as Rep. Yvonne Burke (D-CA) 
noted in placing his name in nomination, he had “established himself as a leader in this 
Congress….one of the moving forces in the growth of this Congress.”40  In the lead-up to the race 
and during the Caucus meeting, it was clear that Burton was the DSG candidate.  Burton’s 
nomination was seconded by incoming DSG Chairman Rep. Thomas Foley (D-WA) who said 
that he thought Burton would be “a very judicial chairman” (National Journal 1974, 1888) – a 
strategic framing of Burton’s leadership style to a room of more senior Democrats who were 
somewhat wary of Burton’s plans for the Caucus.  Despite the perceived competitiveness of the 
race, Burton defeated Sisk 162-111.  
The connections Burton formed with freshman through his leadership of DSG and the 
Campaign Fund was widely believed to be the critical factor in the race.  Roll Call noted that,  
                                                          
38Journal of the Democratic Caucus, Democratic Caucus papers, Box 4, folder 28.  
39 See chapter 6 for a longer discussion of the Legislative Reorganization Act and Sisk’s leadership and 
participation on behalf of the bill.   
40 Journal of the Democratic Caucus, Democratic Caucus papers, Box 4, folder 28.  
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“Many of the Insurgents knew Rep. Burton personally, or at least recognized his name. 
Before the election, he had helped them raise money for their campaigns. His signature 
also appeared on letters accompanying campaign contributions that DSG mailed to 100 
non-incumbent candidates because Burton chairs DSG’s campaign committee” (Lies 
1974, 9, emphasis added).  
In addition to the campaign contributions, Burton and DSG supplied the liberal candidates with 
opposition research, draft speeches, and other information critical for their campaigns.  National 
Journal stressed that “In the early organizing meetings, the freshmen knew few people except 
each other and the leaders of the DSG” (1974, 1890, emphasis added).  Burton himself attributed 
his win to the support of the freshman, telling “reporters he thought that 65 of the 75 freshmen 
voted for him.” This support was driven by his leadership of DSG, which provided him with the 
resources to make campaign contributions, a platform to build relationships with his fellow 
partisans, and the name recognition that enabled him to not only compete with a more senior 
member, but against stronger, entrenched support in the House.   
Burton’s strategy in his campaign for Caucus chair reverberates in leadership campaigns 
today.  Most ambitious members organize leadership PACs to foster relationships with new and 
incoming members prior to their election to Congress (with the hopes of attaining their votes in 
future leadership races).  This strategy has been adopted by many Democratic members, 
including the current holder of Burton’s California House seat, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
(Pearson 2015).  DSG subsidized the cost for ambitious members to pursue this strategy by 
providing their own campaign committee and services, and helping to develop these critical early 
relationships between liberal leaders and new members.   
 
Coalition Building Support 
Third, DSG nurtured junior liberals’ coalition building skills by providing them with the 
resources and tools necessary to build support for their legislative goals.  The group subsidized 
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the cost to pursue policy goals suppressed by the broader party.41  Policy leadership roles in the 
House are typically associated with committee and party leadership roles, which limits most 
junior members’ ability to influence the content of legislation.  These formal leadership roles 
provide their holders with the resources and tools necessary to build successful coalitions around 
legislation (Arnold 1990; Evans 2004; Wawro 2001).  Junior members’ limited access to the 
shared party resources and tools is arguably the ultimate impediment to their policy leadership 
development.  
                                                          
41 In chapter 7, I examine the policy implications of these coalition building tools. Here the focus is on the 
development of coalition building leadership experience.   
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From the 1960s through the 1980s, DSG challenged the biases in committee policy 
leadership by providing their leaders and allies with access to coalition building experience, 
including access to policy information and political intelligence (Hall and Deardorff 2006), and a 
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whip system to inform members and build and coordinate support for policy initiatives.  In the 
textbook Congress, the Democratic whip system was employed only sporadically by party leaders 
(Evans 2011b).  In contrast, DSG’s whip system was especially active during this period.42  A 
significant portion of these legislative coalition building activities occurred through the DSG’s 
task force system. Task force leaders were specifically selected to challenge biases in the House 
committee system in the 1960s and 1970s.  If task force membership provided opportunities for 
liberals to become knowledgeable on issues outside of their committee assignment, leadership 
positions provided an opportunity for members ranked low on their committee seniority to pursue 
policies within the bounds of their committee assignment.   
Table 5.2 analyzes the leadership of DSG task forces for the 87th, and 88th-91st 
Congresses relative to their committee service.  In each Congress, the majority of task force 
chairs served on the committee of jurisdiction – of the 28 task forces analyzed, only 7 or 25% did 
not serve on the relevant committee.43  And in two of these cases (in the 91st Congress – the only 
year for which these records exist), the task force vice chair did serve on the committee of 
jurisdiction even if the chair did not.  These members also disproportionately ranked either low or 
at mid-level seniority on the committee hierarchy.  In each of the five congresses represented in 
Table 5.2, many chairs ranked at the absolute bottom of their committee hierarchies, such as 
freshman representative James Scheuer (D-NY) who headed the Full Employment Task Force in 
the 89th and ranked 20 of 21 on Education & Labor, or Rep. Sidney Yates (D-IL) who headed the 
Appropriations Task Force in the 90th and ranked 28 of 30 on Appropriations.  In the 91st 
                                                          
42 The archival record is filled with letters from committee and subcommittee chairs, and junior members, 
alike requesting that DSG conduct a “whip check” on a bill important to that member.  For example, a 
Foley staffer sent a memo to executive director Conlon requesting that DSG run a whip check on H.J. Res 
934 “in order that we may have a sufficient basis to persuade the Speaker to allow this measure to appear 
on the next Suspension Calendar of the House” (DSG papers, Part I, box 53, folder 6).   
43 And of course, even if the task force chair did not serve on the committee of jurisdiction, these junior 
members still received leadership experience that they were denied by the formal structures of the House.   
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Congress, future Agriculture Committee (and DSG) Chairman and Speaker of the House Thomas 
Foley (D-WA) headed the DSG Agriculture task force.  At the time, he ranked 8th (of 19) on the 
committee hierarchy.  And even among the mid-level and higher-ranking members, only 3 
concurrently served as a subcommittee chair during their tenure as task force chair (and none 
chaired the relevant full committee).   
The evidence in Table 5.2 is not surprising given DSG’s long-standing emphasis on 
providing leadership opportunities for junior members.  DSG was not governed by the same 
seniority rules and norms as the formal structures of the House, and the group even explicitly 
identified the expansion of policy leadership opportunities in the establishment of task forces.  In 
a 1969 press release announcing a slate of task forces, chairman Donald Fraser said that one of 
the goals of the task forces was to “give younger Congressmen an opportunity to play a more 
active role in the development of Democratic issues and policies”44 Fraser, a 3-term member 
himself, personally appreciated the role of the task forces in providing policy leadership 
experience. As a first-term member in 1965, Fraser headed the Foreign Affairs task force – a 
position which coincided with his membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee, where he 
ranked 18th in seniority (of 24).  During this period, there was no other site within Congress 
where a first or second term member could assume a policy leadership role.   
D.C. Home Rule.  The 1965 DSG-led effort to force a floor vote on legislation 
establishing home rule for Washington, D.C. is a striking example of how DSG’s task forces 
challenged biases in committee leadership.  According to dominant theories of agenda-setting 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005) and coalition building (Arnold 1990; Evans 2004; Wawro 2001), 
DSG should not have been successful at forcing legislation out of the District Committee, or at 
achieving a floor vote on the controversial issue of home rule for D.C. And while DSG was 
                                                          
44 January 14, 1969 Press Release, Donald Fraser. DSG papers, Part II, box 3, folder 11.  
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unsuccessful at establishing home rule in 1965, their efforts were part of a successful, longer term 
“softening” strategy by which the House became acclimated to a restructuring of the relationship 
between Congress and Washington, D.C. (Kingdon 1995).   
Rep. Carlton Sickles, a two-term member from Maryland, was chair of the DSG task 
force on home rule.  He served on the District of Columbia committee (as Table 5.2 indicates, 
ranking near the bottom of committee seniority), where home rule had long been stymied by the 
leadership of Rep. John McMillan (D-SC).  McMillan, like many southern conservatives, 
including fellow committee member and Rules chairman Howard J. Smith (D-VA), was 
staunchly opposed to any legislation establishing home rule.  The archival record and interviews 
with members and congressional staffers reveal that McMillan was one of the most autocratic 
conservative chairs in the House during this period (liberals would later unsuccessfully attempt to 
depose him in 1971).  As a junior member on the District committee, Sickles had no power to 
decide the committee agenda. 
D.C. home rule was one of DSG’s earliest policy goals. In 1962, DSG helped to 
spearhead a discharge petition to “bring the question of Home Rule for the District of Columbia 
to the floor of the House.”  The Senate had passed home rule legislation several times, but the 
House had not because of committee opposition.  The bill (and discharge effort) was sponsored 
by Executive Committee member Abraham Multer (D-NY), and DSG circulated a Dear 
Colleague letter to encourage members to sign the petition as soon as it reached the clerk’s desk 
as “the sponsors will need a lot of signatures in a hurry to help generate enthusiasm for their 
Home Rule cause.”45  Though it garnered over 200 signatures, it fell short of the 218 necessary 
and the discharge effort failed (CQ, 1839-1840).46  Three years later (and after a landslide 
                                                          
45 June 27, 1962 Dear DSG Colleague letter, signed by Reps. Frank Thompson, Cohelan, Abraham Multer, 
Henry Reuss, Edith Green, Henry Gonzalez, and William Fitz Ryan. DSG papers, Part II, box 151 folder 6.  
46 Signatories to discharge petitions were not publicly released by Congress (as part of a rules change) until 
1993, but sometimes a member supportive of the effort would strategically release the list to the press to 
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Democratic election), Multer again introduced home rule legislation and DSG chairman Frank 
Thompson (D-NJ) appointed a task force on Home Rule.  In announcing the task force, 
Thompson said that not only was home rule one of the most important issues to come before the 
Congress, it was “pledged by our Democratic Platform and strongly recommended by President 
Johnson.”47   
Multer’s legislation calling for D.C. Home Rule, H.R. 4644, was introduced at the 
beginning of the 1965 session (and subsequently referred to the District Committee). By the 
summer (and after the Senate approved similar legislation on July 22nd), liberals concluded that 
“agreement to bring the bill to the floor through normal procedures is impossible.”  The discharge 
petition was not the first choice of action for liberals, but their experiences in the 87th Congress 
prepared them for the necessity of employing the procedure.  Moreover, with the 1966 midterm 
election looming – an election that would ultimately prove disastrous for liberals – DSG was 
concerned with passing the bill with enough time to ensure D.C. voting rights in the election.  A 
September 23, 1965 memo from DSG Chair Thompson and Task Force Chair Sickles to DSG 
members outlined the decision to pursue the discharge petition: 
“From the beginning of our current efforts to obtain favorable action on the Home Rule 
bill, it has been our objective to draft the best possible bipartisan measure that could pass 
the House this year. This has involved some six months of continuous effort, first in 
                                                          
pressure other members to sign on.  For example, signatories to the discharge petition on the 1963 Civil 
Rights Act (which would become the 1964 Civil Rights Act), were released to the press to pressure 
Republican members to sign on to the bill.  The 1960 Republican Party Platform supported civil rights 
legislation, and many supporters of the bill believed that the moderate and liberal Republicans who were 
reticent to sign-on would do so if the list were made public.  And indeed, once Democratic Rules 
Committee chairman Howard Smith (VA) realized the discharge effort would be successful, he reported a 
rule on the bill.  It is important to note however, that opposition to signing a discharge petition does not 
necessarily indicate a member’s opposition to the underlying bill, but rather the discharge procedure. Many 
members are opposed to usurping committee jurisdiction, and believe the discharge procedure harms 
committee autonomy.    
47 March 30, 1965 memo from Thompson to undisclosed list of members re DSG Steering Committee on 
Home Rule for the District of Columbia. DSG papers, box 151, folder 6.  
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attempting to obtain hearings in the D.C. Committee on a bipartisan bill.  When this 
failed, we had no choice but to resort to the difficult Discharge Petition route.”48  
Discharge petitions are extraordinarily difficult to execute successfully, and historically, few 
petitions have been successful (Schickler and Pearson 2009).  Many members of the Home Rule 
Task Force personally remembered the two prior failed efforts to discharge legislation 
establishing self-government for D.C.  Nevertheless, on August 11th, Multer filed a discharge 
petition to bring H.R. 4644 to the floor, and on September 3rd, 1965, the discharge petition on 
Rep. Multer’s bill establishing home rule for D.C. received its 218th signatures.  Though most 
newspaper coverage at the time attributed this success to President Johnson’s support for the bill 
(CQ Almanac 1965), the success of the discharge petition reflects months of task force meetings, 
parliamentary study, negotiations with the leadership and Republicans by the bill’s chief 
sponsors, Reps. Multer and Sickles, to amend the bill to make it more acceptable to a majority of 
the House, and numerous Dear Colleague letters and personal member-to-member lobbying.  
Johnson’s support for the bill was important, but it was merely one facet of the extensive 
coalition building efforts in the House.  And indeed, an examination of the signatories to the 
discharge petition reads like a DSG membership list, save the small group of Republican 
members who provided the support necessary to reach the required 218 signatures (CQ Almanac 
1965, 613-20).   
In response to the success of the discharge petition mobilization effort, McMillian’s 
District Committee attempted to cut-off support for the bill by reporting a modified “home rule” 
bill (H.R. 10115) substantially different from Multer’s Administration-backed bill on September 
3rd.  The bill – a combination of two bills sponsored by Reps. Sisk and Joel T. Broyhill’s (R-VA) 
– retained the federal government’s jurisdiction over the old Federal City (as it existed from 1791 
                                                          
48 September 23, 1965 memo from Thompson and Sickles to DSG members re New Bipartisan DC Home 
Rule Bill Introduced – House Floor Action, Monday September 27th. DSG papers, Part II, box 151, folder 
6.  
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to 1871), and gave the remaining area, including the majority of D.C.’s inhabitants, back to 
Maryland.  Under the Committee-backed bill, home rule would only be offered to these “new” 
D.C. residents if Maryland refused to accept the new area.  The bill also changed the automatic, 
annual federal payment schedule in Multer’s Administration-backed bill, which McMillian and 
others criticized as “unconstitutional.”  Concerned these criticisms might prove a death knell, 
Multer and Sickles modified the payment schedule.49   
On September 29th, the House finally considered home rule legislation.  The 
parliamentary situation required that the Committee substitute be defeated first, but after months 
of lobbying on both sides, the Committee substitute passed 283-117. The Committee bill 
complicated the careful DSG-led coalition, and 15 of the last 26 discharge petition signers – 
apparently upset with the Johnson Administration – ultimately voted for the Committee substitute 
in protest. Approval of the Committee bill foreclosed the passage of D.C. home rule in the 89th 
Congress.  The House was not going to pass the Senate bill, the Senate was not going to pass the 
House bill, and conference negotiators were faced with the impossible task of attempting to 
reconcile the two sharply divergent bills.   
The successful discharge petition and floor vote of this key policy issue served as a 
significant challenge to committee biases in the textbook Congress.  DSG’s efforts sent a signal to 
committee chairs and the leadership, that junior liberals could force consideration of important, 
but potentially divisive and controversial, policy issues.  And while Multer’s bill did not pass the 
House, DSG’s legislative campaign brought the cause of home rule for D.C. furthered than it had 
                                                          
49 Among these changes, Multer and Sickles amended the bill to provide for annual, rather than automatic 
congressional appropriations to the District, providing for a 4-year term for the proposed DC mayor and 
council members to be held in even, non-presidential years (meeting objections to possible Hatch Act 
encroachments), and giving the President the authority to call our federal troops or to take over the local 
police force when he deems it necessary to protect federal interest or to preserve order. These changes were 
intended to “meet the objections raised by the Republican Policy Committee [the Republican Conference’s 
policy arm] statement adopted on Tuesday and eliminate the basic objections raised by other Members.” 
DSG papers, Part II, box 151, folder 6.  
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ever been before.  The floor debate and on-the-record vote for home rule provided symbolic 
representation of D.C. interests in Congress – arguably impossible without the careful work of the 
task force.  More significantly, DSG’s campaign for home rule and their careful negotiations 
between key constituencies in the House laid the groundwork for a significant restructuring of 
Congress’s relationship to Washington, D.C. (see below).   
According to dominant congressional theories of agenda-setting and coalition building 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Evans 2004), neither Sickles nor Multer should have been able 
to force a vote on this issue, nor should they have assumed coalition leader roles in the 1965 
home rule effort.  Neither held formal positions of power in the House and they were not 
provided any formal resources or tools from the House to advance the legislation.  Seniority rules 
and norms limited their capacity to assume policy leadership roles through their committee work; 
rather, it was their affiliation with DSG, which provided them with the institutional apparatus and 
the support to pursue their policy goals.  And while Sickles and Multer would retire from the 
House to run for governor of Maryland and serve on the New York Supreme Court in New York, 
respectively, another member (and later chair) of the Home Rule Task Force – Rep. Charlie 
Diggs (D-MI) – would use his experiences to pass home rule legislation when he became 
chairman of the District Committee 8 years later.   
On December 24, 1973, President Richard Nixon signed the District of Columbia Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, after its passage by the House.  The bill was 
the result of over a decade of activism designed to acclimate members to a restructuring of the 
relationship between Congress and the District (Kingdon 2011).  D.C. home rule activists such as 
Walter Fauntroy worked tirelessly to keep the issue of self-government alive outside of Congress 
for many years, even leading the effort to mobilize the black vote in McMillian’s South Carolina 
district in a successful bid to defeat him in the Democratic primary. But inside the halls of the 
Capitol, it was DSG that provided liberal supporters of D.C. home rule that institutional support 
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necessary to keep the issue on the agenda year after year.  And there is no doubt that the lessons 
learned through the failed 1965 home rule effort strengthened Diggs’s leadership over home rule 
legislation.  The success of the 1973 bill reflected Chairman Diggs’s procedural knowledge, 
experience negotiating between conservative and liberal Democrats, Democrats and Republicans, 
and perhaps most critically, the House and Senate – all of which ensured that he could 
successfully craft a bill that would be acceptable and stable.   
If the 1965 legislation failed because the House would not approve the Senate-passed bill 
(and members were provided with an acceptable moderate alternative to the too-liberal Multer 
bill), Diggs’ strategy was to craft a compromise bill acceptable to a large majority.  In an effort to 
temper conservative opposition within the Democratic Caucus, Diggs and DSG strategically kept 
the issue out of the Steering & Policy Committee to avoid a split vote between liberals and 
conservatives.50  In an interview with National Public Radio, Nelson Rimensnyder, an aide to 
Diggs at the time, said that “Whip counts were done, and the [liberal] Senate version was not 
going to pass. Diggs and other Democrats worried that if it went down, it wouldn’t bode well for 
getting anything through that Congress” (Austermuhle 2013).  Thus, rather than attempt to pass 
the liberal Senate bill, Diggs crafted a moderate compromise.  The bill contained the basic outline 
of Multer and Sickle’s bill – an elected mayor and city council with a 4-year term – but thorny 
issues like congressional review of District appropriations were retained to attract the moderate 
and conservative support necessary for its passage.  Diggs and other coalition leaders succeeded, 
and the modified form of self-government for D.C. not only passed the House, but the system 
they established – however imperfect – has stood the test of time.51   
                                                          
50 October 2, 1973 meeting minutes, DSG papers, Part I, box 6, folder 8.   
51 Despite debates in the courts today about the legislative intent of the 1973 Home Rule legislation and 
how much autonomy D.C. should have to govern itself, the coalition crafted by Diggs and DSG was clearly 
never intended to provide the type of self-government sought today (despite their personal desire to provide 
the District with complete autonomy from Congress). In an October 8th, 1973, Dear Colleague letter 
distributed to Members, DSG stressed the bill’s “numerous protections of the federal interest – such as 
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The institutional support provided by DSG to junior Democrats like Reps. Multer, 
Sickles, and Diggs, empowered them to not only represent critical under-represented and 
suppressed policy issues, but to become stronger coalition leaders in the future.   
 
Institutional Cachet and Prestige 
Lastly, DSG increased their members’ competitiveness for leadership positions by 
imbuing their members of the Executive Committee with almost instantaneous institutional 
prestige in the House.  Most members of Congress develop a reputation over time – some are 
known for their expertise in a particular policy area, others are known for their brash personality, 
political savvy, or shrewd negotiating skills, and others are known for being procedural experts 
(Fenno 1976; Sinclair 1995).  Reputation is especially critical in legislative institutions because 
the perception of a member’s power is often quite different than the formal institutional power 
ascribed to them (Battista 2011).   
DSG leadership experience signaled to other members and party leaders that a member 
had a distinct set of policy, procedural, and political skills, as well as a network of supporters 
behind them. Service on DSG’s leadership immediately elevated junior members’ standing in 
Congress.  As former DSG executive director Scott Lilly summed up, ““…being a permanent 
person in DSG really added to the sense that you were a person to be reckoned with in the House. 
The organization was powerful. Its members stuck together, and if you were part of that crew, 
people didn’t wanna mess with you.”52 Moreover, their leaders had a reputation for pragmatism, 
which stood in contrast to other groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, for example, 
                                                          
OMB and congressional appropriations control over the federal payment, prohibitions on local interference 
with the courts, and reservations of the right of Congress to legislate for the District at any time on any 
subject” (emphasis added,  
October 8th, 1973 Dear Colleague letter. DSG papers, Part I, box 45, folder 3).   
52 October 28, 2015 telephone interview.    
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which was regarded as too activist and ideologically-driven by many liberal Democrats.53  In the 
1980s and 1990s, this was a considerable edge in leadership races for Democrats in a party that 
still had significant internal divisions.    
DSG leaders remained consistently junior throughout their tenure in the House, but their 
seniority did not hinder their ability to secure meetings with party and committee leaders, and 
other notable political figures.  By the 1980s, the Executive Committee was routinely briefed by 
committee chairs on the content of legislation and (potential) issues that might arise.  The 
participation of chairs with historically fraught relationships with DSG, including Reps. John 
Dingell (D-MI) and Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), suggest that conservative, moderate and liberal 
chairs alike knew they needed liberal vote support.54  These powerful chairmen did not personally 
brief every junior Democrat on legislation before their committee.  The reputation of DSG as the 
organization and voice of liberals in the House gave the junior members of the Executive 
                                                          
53 In an August 6, 2015 interview, a former DSG staffer recounted the divisions between DSG and the 
CBC.  This staffer noted how many in DSG were critical of the CBC’s efforts to put together a budget, 
remarking that “They didn’t have to deal with how you were going to pay for it.” The staffer went on to say 
that there was not much staff cooperation, “but we always dealt with them on their budget and wrote it up. 
You can’t vote against it, but he [executive director Conlon] thought it was naïve and not serious. All 
along, neither side wanted to alienate each other, but the CBC in some sense replaced the leadership as kind 
of the other power center that DSG needed to watch….a wariness that they are not coming from the same 
place, different constituencies and different priorities.” This staffer’s remarks are supported by the archival 
record, which includes numerous letters and press clippings documenting several CBC’s members’ 
critiques of DSG as not activist or insurgent enough. For example, Shirley Chisholm reflected upon her 
impressions of DSG: “One unexpected disappointment for me was a group that I expected to embody the 
best in the House, the “liberal bloc” organization called the Democratic Study Group…The DSG talks a 
good game, but it lacks conviction. It never seems to get together and do anything” (The Majority Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 11, pg. 17, DSG papers, Part II, box 122, folder 9).  Many CBC members were also wary of 
DSG’s attacks on the seniority system, which over time, stood to protect the committee leadership of 
African-American members. In February (22) 1994, for example, Rep. William L. Clay of Missouri 
circulated a memo criticizing “the cavalier manner” in which some younger black members, including 
Cynthia McKinney of Georgia and Albert Wynn of Maryland, broke with the seniority system in their 
committee chair votes, declaring “The willy-nilly excuses offered for promising to support a candidate in 
violation of the rule of seniority is not in the permanent interest of black legislators or the broader black 
community” (CQ Almanac 1994).  Nevertheless, by the 1980s, the DSG and the CBC leadership had 
worked out a relatively symbiotic working relationship with the chair of each organization invited to the 
executive committee meetings of the other group.     
54 May 17, 1990 executive committee meeting minutes, Dingell briefed members on the Clean Air Bill; 
August 17, 1982 meeting minutes, Rostenkowski briefed members on the tax bill.  DSG papers, Part II, box 
8, folder 8.  
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Committee access they would not have received otherwise.  And over time, as DSG allies and 
leaders moved into the formal leadership, this network expanded to include party leaders as well.  
For example, during Rep. Richard Gephardt’s (D-MO) tenure as majority leader, he regularly 
attended DSG meetings – with Speaker Thomas Foley’s (D-WA) support – to brief members on 
policy issues (including health care, the budget, taxation, campaign finance reform, infrastructure 
programs, and social programs), negotiations with the White House, and key vote counting efforts 
undertaken by the leadership.55  Former DSG chairman Foley also regularly attended Executive 
Committee meetings during his tenure as majority whip to share leadership intelligence.56   
DSG’s reputation as a serious and effective policy-minded group provided Executive 
Committee members with access to a variety of individuals, groups and partisans outside of 
Congress.  The archival record documents an expansive network between DSG and experts inside 
and outside of government, including civil rights groups (e.g. the NAACP, the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights), labor groups (e.g. AFL-CIO), countless political scientists, 
economics and other scholars from D.C. based think tanks and universities across the country, 
and representatives of executive agencies (e.g. HEW’s Office of Civil Rights, the State 
Department), among countless others.  Democrats outside of Congress also frequently met with 
DSG leaders, including DNC officials, elected officials from the states, Democratic pollsters, and 
others invited to speak about the electoral and state/local implications of policy decisions.  For 
example, on September 9th, 1989, then-Governor Bill Clinton met with the Executive Committee 
                                                          
55 DSG executive committee meeting minutes, DSG papers, Part II, box 8, folder 8.  
56 For example, at the February 26, 1981 executive committee meeting, “Foley reports that these 
[committee funding] resolutions will definitely be defeated because there are not enough votes to win on 
the Floor. He says that the Leadership will propose putting all of the committee funding resolutions into a 
package, bring it to the Floor with a closed rule and have some sort of fallback position. He noted then that 
the major vote will be on the Previous Question on the Rule.” Later in the meeting, Rep. Matt McHugh 
asked Foley “what the Leadership is doing about an alternative tax plan to the Reagan proposal. Foley 
responded that their strategy right now is to not appear as obstructionists but rather to say that they will 
work to meet the Administration goals. Foley notes however, that it is nearly impossible to get a 
Democratic consensus on what an alternative program should be.” DSG papers, part II, box 7, folder 6.  
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to discuss the Education Summit being held later that month at the University of Virginia (and 
which Clinton was asked to co-chair by President George H.W. Bush).  Clinton “discussed 
substantive issues before the conference and the political dimensions of the meeting and how that 
affects congressional action. [And] Members gave the governor their views on what the 
Democratic governors’ strategy should be at the conference and what kind of programs should be 
seriously considered at the summit and by the Congress.”57  During the 103rd Congress, nearly 
every Executive Committee meeting was attended by at least one key political actor from inside 
or outside of Congress, including Speaker Foley, Majority Leader Gephardt, President Clinton, 
then-First Lady Hillary Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore (a former Executive Committee member 
himself), numerous cabinet secretaries, and others.   
Remarkably, this respect and cachet carried over to DSG staffers. Every staffer I 
interviewed spoke with extreme pride about their association with DSG. One staffer recalled: 
“I was a young kid who didn’t know much about Congress. I had a few friends who 
worked in individual Member offices. When I would say to someone that I worked at 
DSG, they were like “Wow, you work at DSG?” It was just seen as an incredibly 
important place, and if you were there, you did – everyone who was there, felt like they 
had landed in a special opportunity.”58   
In the late 1970s and 1980s, this institutional reputation would provide a kind of power for 
staffers in the House.  A longtime DSG staffer recalled how it was always in the interests of other 
offices in Congress to “be cooperative and to be helpful [to DSG]. People always called you back. 
They always had time for you. It was like magic to call and say you were from the DSG.”59  This 
prestige was undoubtedly reflected upon DSG leaders.    
 Health Care Policy. DSG’s Health Care Task Force in 1989 illustrates how the 
institutional respect and cachet cultivated by organized factions in Congress can shape and alter 
leadership recruitment patterns.  The reforms of the 1970s centralized party leadership and 
                                                          
57 Executive committee meeting minutes, DSG papers, part II, box 8, folder 7.   
58 November 5, 2015 interview with a former DSG staffer. 
59 September 21, 2015 interview with a former DSG staffer. 
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increased the number of leadership positions available to junior members (Rohde 1991).  In part, 
these developments led to the proliferation of leadership task forces to supplant committee action 
– the site of many junior members’ new leadership positions (Loomis 1984).  As a result of these 
developments, the function and organization of DSG’s task force system changed too – there 
were fewer of them, and they had a longer-term focus.  In February 1989, DSG Chairman Martin 
Olav Sabo (D-MN) appointed task forces on Health and Family Income, which was intended to 
“enable DSG Members to take a longer-term look at where Democrats should be headed on these 
issues.”  In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s task forces, leadership opportunities for “younger 
members” was not an explicit part of the formation of these task forces.  Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-
OH) was selected to head the Health Task Force, which was intended to have a serious policy 
focus.  In a letter inviting the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to speak to the task 
force about the demographics of the uninsured, DSG executive director Scott Lilly described the 
purpose of the group:  
“Unlike most other “task forces” on the hill, the primary objective of this group is not to 
come up with a list of legislative options to be acted on in this Congress.  Rather, we 
hope to develop a deeper and broader understanding of exactly what problems we face, 
what is already known about these problems, and what additional information will be 
required to fashion realistic long-term solutions.”60   
Despite the fact that this period oversaw an explosion of task forces on Capitol Hill – and health 
care would soon come to dominate Washington, D.C. – DSG’s efforts on health care pre-dated 
those of Republicans and the leadership alike.61  While DSG’s Health Care Task Force was 
                                                          
60 March 23, 1989 letter from Scott Lilly to Janet Norwood. DSG papers, Part II, box 36, folder 9.  
61 Two years later, a major DSG Special Report on Health Care in the U.S. would still place DSG at the 
forefront of Democratic efforts on health care policy.  One former DSG staffer interviewed recalled 
working on this effort: “In 1991, I did a Special Report. As I remember, it was about 40 pages long. It 
wasn’t time sensitive so I worked on it on and off for like 6 months. It was about health care reform, and it 
compared our health care system to other countries. It was right before Bill and Hillary started talking 
about health care reform, and it was right before Hillary unveiled her proposal.  You know, health care and 
universal access was always something the Democratic Party talked about. We focused on the problem of 
spending higher but not getting better life expectancy. You know, I studied Germany…but that’s something 
we had the luxury of doing. We had such a big staff….DSG was in a way, a little tiny Democratic think 
tank….we had enough staff that I could take six months” to research a given topic (September 21, 2015 
Interview).   
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organized at the start of 1989, Republicans did not organize until 5 months later.  Shortly 
thereafter, the Democratic leadership finally organized their own health care task force.  In 
November 1989, DSG Chair Sabo wrote a letter to then-Rep. Ben Cardin (D-MD) (a member of 
DSG’s Health Care Task Force) announcing the merger of the DSG and leadership task forces:  
“Since [the DSG creation of a task force on health care] that time the House Democratic 
Caucus has organized a series of task forces including one on health care. I could see 
little purpose in House Democrats organizing into two separate task forces focusing on 
the same general issue area and asked Caucus Chair Steny Hoyer [(D-MD)] if we might 
combine efforts.  We have agreed that the number of co-chairs on the Caucus task force 
be expanded to four to include the chair [Marcy Kaptur] of our task force, and that the 
size of the task force be increased so as to include you and other members of the DSG 
task force who have been active participants.”  
 
Sabo was able to secure not only a leadership position for Kaptur in the Caucus task force but 
also positions for all active members of the DSG task force, including himself and Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi (D-CA) who would go on to lead Democratic efforts for health care legislation as Speaker 
in 2009 and 2010.  The reaction of the leadership reflects the significance of DSG’s early action 
on health care, Hoyer’s own 6 years of service on the Executive Committee, and the group’s 
reputation and legitimacy.62  DSG activities were not superficial attempts to gain media exposure 
or embarrass the leadership – a serious policy focus underscored everything they did.   
The experiences of the Health Care Task Force’s members illuminate how factions like 
DSG can increase their allies’ propensity to be recruited by party leaders for key positions.  Party 
leaders have a strong incentive to limit their recruitment of partisans representing potentially 
divisive ideas (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  While there was no Democratic consensus on 
health care reform in 1989, the DSG Task Force was likely to endorse a more liberal proposal 
                                                          
62 DSG strategically aimed to organize its task forces as early in the first session of a new Congress as 
possible.  For example, in a February 24, 1983 Executive Committee meeting, Rep. McHugh “stated that it 
is important to establish task forces early so that we can have some impact on a particular subject. He noted 
the problem we had last year on the tax bill because the task force effort came too late to be effective” 
(Meeting Minutes, DSG papers, Part II, box 7, folder 8).  
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than would ultimately be favored by the Caucus or the leadership.63  Nevertheless, DSG’s 
reputation in the Caucus empowered their leaders to leverage their positions in DSG to positions 
within the formal party leadership structure.  For junior and mid-level seniority members who 
have yet to make a name for themselves through the normal legislative process – an increasingly 
high hurdle given the decline of committee efficacy and power (Sinclair 2011) – alliances with 
strong party factions can instantly provide members with institutional credibility and a reputation 
of effective leadership. DSG provided this reputation for ambitious junior liberal Democrats.   
 
The Case of Rep. James Scheuer 
The leadership training and opportunities provided by DSG are analyzed separately 
above for clarity.  But most members took advantage of DSG’s range of services and activities to 
simultaneously cultivate policy and legislative experience, foster relationships, build support for 
their own legislative proposals, and develop a respectable reputation within the House.  The 
skills, resources, and connections fostered by these experiences are self-reinforcing.  Rep. James 
Scheuer’s (D-NY) experiences as a freshman member in the 89th Congress (1965-1966) 
succinctly illustrates the role DSG played in providing an alternative leadership pipeline for 
ambitious members limited by the committee system and their seniority status.64  Scheuer was a 
member of the Education & Labor Committee – an assignment that reflected his years of working 
as an economist at the U.S. Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Price 
Stabilization.  Yet his seniority ranked him 20 of 21 members, which gave him little opportunity 
                                                          
63 DSG had gone on record in support of national health insurance as early as 1975.   
64 Scheuer’s experiences provided a stronger test of the role of DSG’s alternative pipeline because not only 
was he – as a freshman – at the absolute bottom of the seniority hierarchy in the House, but he did not serve 
on the Executive Committee (many of the benefits of DSG’s services and activities were conferred 
exclusively on Executive Committee members). 
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to develop and pursue his own policy proposals.  DSG enabled him to overcome his seniority 
status and capitalize on his interest and experience in labor policy. 
Scheuer joined DSG upon his election to the House in 1964, and immediately began 
lobbying the Executive Committee to create a task force of “freshman members only” to study 
chronic unemployment and to “develop a legislative program to prevent unemployment, and 
[that] produces the Great Society.”65  Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) approved Scheuer’s 
request in August 1965, and appointed a Full Employment Steering Committee responsible for 
working towards its stated goal of “a full employment economy.”66  Scheuer was appointed 
chairman, and his membership request was granted; the committee was composed solely of 
freshman members who served on legislative committees with jurisdiction over job creation and 
labor policies.  And indeed, it functioned as a pseudo legislative committee.  Scheuer and 
colleagued formed a series of subcommittees to foster member participation, called upon experts 
to inform committee members, and drafted a report about the sources of chronic, long-term 
employment and potential legislative approaches. The Full Employment Steering Committee’s 
efforts culminated in the release of a report and a proposed legislative program, the Career 
Opportunity Act, in January 1966.   
The leadership opportunities provided to Scheuer through DSG are unimaginable for 
many members, but especially those with just a year of service under their belt.  In January alone, 
Scheuer presided over a press conference announcing the report and the accompanying legislation 
                                                          
65 June 21, 1965 memo from Rep. Scheuer to the DSG Executive Committee. DSG papers, Part II, box 148, 
folder 11. Scheuer initially suggested that any report developed by the Steering Committee might be turned 
over to a committee of “senior DSG members who would develop and guide the necessary legislative 
program and Administrative liaison.”  
66 August 30, 1965 memo from DSG chairman Thompson to undisclosed list of members re the 
appointment of DSG Full Employment Steering Committee.  DSG papers, Part II, box 148, folder 11. 
Thompson also served on the Education and Labor Committee, and chaired the Special Labor 
subcommittee (Scheuer served as a member as well).   
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(on the 6th), personally briefed Vice President Hubert Humphrey on the report (on the 5th), and his 
leadership of the Committee was specifically noted by a Washington Post editorial endorsing the 
legislative proposal (on the 8th).67  Soon thereafter, he introduced the Career Opportunity Act, 
H.R. 13159, which provided for a $1,360,000,000 program “to provide employment opportunities 
for unemployed, low-income persons in sub-professional service careers.”  Scheuer’s bill was not 
enacted, but he succeeded in adding a “Subprofessional Employment” amendment to another bill, 
the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1966. His amendment authorized a new program 
to prepare “unemployed or low income persons” to enter career jobs in public service, including 
education, welfare, health, and public safety, as nonprofessional personnel.  The program 
provided training to foster career advancement among these groups, as well as respond to the 
country’s growing need for more workers in certain fields.  Congress initially authorized $33 
million for what was called the “Scheuer Program” (CQ Almanac 1966), but was later known as 
the “New Careers Program” (Lind, Rankin and Harris 2016; Armour 2002).  It provided 
education and training for thousands of individuals, and significantly increased the representation 
of low-income and minorities in several professions, particularly in health care and social work 
(Gartner 1971).  
Scheuer’s experiences in the 89th Congress are remarkable – more akin to the experiences 
of a senator than a new member of the House.  As a freshman, he should not have been able to 
                                                          
67 At the press conference, Scheuer gave an overview of the history of the Committee, including its 
motivation and goals; explained where and how new jobs should be formed (and paid for); highlighted how 
unemployment disproportionately impacts African-Americans and young people, and civil rights 
implications of the “full employment campaign”; and outlined the Career Opportunity Act (H.R. 13159) 
(Scheuer Remarks at Press Conference, DSG Papers, Part II, box 148, folder 12).  Scheuer and other 
members of the Full Employment Steering Committee met with Vice President Humphrey at 10am on 
January 5, 1966 in the Executive Office Building (January 4, 1966 memo from Scheuer to DSG members 
re Presentation of Committee Report to Vice President Humphrey).  A January 8th, 1966 Washington Post 
editorial, “Training for Stability” (pg. E6), outlined DSG’s report and the group’s proposed “public 
employment training” program, which would provide long-term unemployed individuals with training “in 
the fields of health, education, and urban improvement.” The editorial specifically noted Scheuer’s “able 
chairmanship” of the Committee which produced the report. DSG papers, Part II, box 148, folder 11.  
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gain a leadership position, secure notable press attention or a personal meeting with the 
Administration – let alone the adoption of an amendment creating a significant program in his 
own name.  DSG helped him garner widespread respect for his policy expertise and legislative 
proposals, and gave him a platform to foster relationships and cultivate support with key actors, 
including the Johnson Administration which added his legislative proposal to their own package 
of proposed amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act (Nixon 1970).  While Scheuer was an 
ambitious, strategic member who likely would have had a successful legislative career regardless, 
DSG provided the institutional and organizational structure necessary for Scheuer to become a 
leader in Congress almost immediately after his election in 1964.  This was critical timing for a 
reformer like Scheuer – he was able to capitalize on a Democratic Administration (lost in 1968) 
and large majorities in the House (decimated in 1966) to ensure the adoption of legislation 
important to him and his constituents.  Absent DSG, it is highly unlikely that a freshman member 
like Scheuer would have been able to achieve similar success so quickly in the textbook 
Congress.   
PART II: 
Evaluating the Liberal Democratic Leadership Pathway 
 
 Leadership change is a critical facet of broader processes of institutional change.  And 
liberal Democrats were keenly aware of the need to improve their descriptive representation in 
formal leadership sites if they wanted to shape Democratic policy outcomes.  The archival record 
and interviews with former congressional staffers and members of Congress reveal that DSG 
simultaneously prioritized expanding access to leadership positions in the House through formal 
rules changes, and training their leaders to be competitive for them.68  This section examines the 
                                                          
68 The archival record often explicitly documents DSG’s strategic efforts to transition executive committee 
members to formal leadership posts.  For example, in a September 1979 memo, DSG staff analyzed the 
impact of Rep. Dave Obey’s (D-WI) leadership ambitions for DSG: “An Obey candidacy [for Caucus 
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“outcome” of these efforts.  In the contemporary House, liberal Democrats monopolize 
committee and party leadership positions (Harris and Nelson 2008; Becker and Moscardelli 
2008).  Prior research has examined the significant influence of formal rules and ideological 
changes in the Democratic Caucus on the leadership ambitions of junior, liberal Democrats.  I 
evaluate a third mechanism of leadership change: empowering DSG’s strongest liberal members 
to be competitive for appointed and elected leadership positions in the House.   
DSG’s emphasis on leadership training for their members motivates several expectations 
about the competitiveness of DSG allies and representatives for formal leadership positions.  If 
Executive Committee members gained leadership experience denied to the average Democrat, 
then members with prior DSG leadership experience should be more competitive for formal 
leadership positions in the House.69  If DSG leadership experience is significant, we would expect 
to see these effects in formal leadership positions that map on to the opportunities, services, and 
activities of the Executive Committee.  For example, DSG provided their leaders with coalition 
building experience, including whip experience – activities that closely align with the 
responsibilities of members of the Democratic whip system.  
In order to assess the relationship between DSG Executive Committee service and the 
assumption of formal leadership power in the House, I examine several sites of appointed and 
elected party and committee leadership.  I first examine participation in the Democratic whip 
                                                          
chairman] is important to DSG. It would enhance the position of DSG chairman in the same way that 
Burton and Foley did by running for the Caucus. Also, a friendly Caucus chairman is essential if DSG is to 
maintain its central role in the reform movement” (September 7, 1979 memo from Dan to Richard Conlon 
re Caucus Chairmanship, 97th Congress. DSG papers, Part II, box 133, folder 5. The memo was crafted in 
response to Rep. Obey’s desire to run for Budget chairmanship, while DSG preferred he run for Caucus 
chairman.).   
69 It is important to note that the archival record provides one reason why we may not observe any 
significant effects of DSG leadership experience (at least in terms of party leadership positions).  Many 
members saw the DSG Executive Committee as a leadership platform in its own right, and not as a step on 
the ladder to higher, or formal institutional, office. These members would have been less likely to seek out 
new leadership opportunities, or to run for elected posts in the party.  Indeed, several DSG chairs ran for 
the Senate while serving as chair, including Lee Metcalf (D-MT), John Culver (D-IA), and Mike Lowry 
(D-WA).  
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team, which simultaneously serves as an information distribution network and a leadership tool 
for member vote counting and persuasion (Meineke 2016).  This leadership site is appointed by 
top party leaders, as well as elected by the broader base of party members, and capitalizes on the 
type of member expertise and experience that DSG helped cultivate among their ambitious allies 
and representatives.   
I then examine committee leadership positions, including committee and subcommittee 
chairs.  Chairmanships were highly valued by DSG leaders and were key targets of reforms to 
expand access to junior members.  And, like the party leadership sites introduced above, 
committee and subcommittee chairmanships are House positions that leverage experience liberals 
would have gained through DSG.  As seniority still governs the selection of the majority of full 
committee chair positions – and effects of DSG leadership experience may not be discernible in a 
statistical model – I also examine committee seniority violations.  Committee seniority violations 
occur when the Democratic Steering and Policy (S&P) Committee nominates an individual other 
than the most senior member of any given legislative committee for the chairmanship, or when 
the Democratic Caucus votes down the S&P-nominated, most senior committee member.  
Committee leadership positions are appointed by S&P, but elected by the Caucus.   
And finally, I examine the top Democratic Caucus leadership positions, including the 
elected Speaker, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Caucus Chair, and Caucus Secretary/Vice 
Chair, and the appointed (by the whip in consultation with the Speaker and Majority Leader) 
Chief Deputy Whip, Whip Task Force Chairmen, and Assistant to the Minority Leader (in the 
1990s, post-majority party era).  Similar to committee chair posts, these party leadership positions 
were key targets of reforms in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and were highly valued positions 
sought by DSG leaders.   
Collectively, the process outlined in Part I suggest that DSG leaders should be more 
successful at achieving formal committee and party leadership positions than the average 
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Democrat without access to the same leadership experience.  As DSG strategically targeted some 
formal leadership positions more than others, I do not expect DSG leaders to be more competitive 
than the average Democrat equally across all leadership sites.  But the strategy of leadership 
change via capacity building as pursued by DSG motivates three primary hypotheses:    
H1: DSG Executive Committee members are more likely to be appointed to the  
Democratic whip  
system and campaign committee than other Democrats;  
H2: DSG Executive Committee members are more likely to be elected to and/or be 
appointed to committee and subcommittee chair positions than other Democrats; and  
H3: DSG Executive Committee members are more likely to be elected to serve as 
Democratic Caucus leaders than other Democrats.   
 
Data & Methods. Evaluation of the hypotheses outlined above require a mixed-method approach.  
The complexities through which new leaders emerge in Congress, and the vast array of appointed 
and elected positions in the House and the Democratic Caucus, necessitate the use of multiple 
sources of evidence and analytical methodologies.  To the extent possible, I employed both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence, as well as statistical and historical process tracing 
approaches.  The collective findings of the statistical analyses, archival records, and interviews 
increase confidence in the conclusions drawn below.   
The primary dependent variables addressed by the hypotheses above are dichotomous 
(coded 1 if the member served as a leader in each leadership site within the House, 0 otherwise).  
Data on each of the primary dependent variables (Democratic whip system, and committee and 
subcommittee chairmanships) were collected from CQ Almanac. Party leaders are de facto 
members of Democratic whip system, but they were removed from these analyses to avoid over-
inflating the influence of a small group of members.  DSG leader is a dichotomous variable 
measuring whether the member served on DSG’s Executive Committee in a prior Congress 
(coded 1 if the member served as a DSG leader in a prior Congress, 0 otherwise).  I also collected 
data on a variety of other important factors included in the models as control variables, including 
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seniority, demographic characteristics, ideology, party unity, legislative entrepreneurship, and 
district marginality.  Seniority (measured in years) and party unity scores (ranging from 0 to 100) 
for each Democratic member were collected from CQ Almanac.  I created a measure of 
legislative entrepreneurship by counting the number of bills introduced by members from 
Congress.gov (via the Library of Congress).  This is an interval variable that is lagged by one 
Congress.  Thus, a member who introduced 5 bills in the 96th Congress will receive a score of 5 
for the 97th Congress (all freshmen receive a score of 0 for this variable).  CQ Voting and 
Elections Collection provided the data on district marginality (measured as the percent of the 
majority party vote the member received in their most recent election to the House).  
Demographic information on individual members (sex and race) was coded based on 
Congressional Research Service Reports.  Ideology was measured using DW-NOMINATE scores 
from Poole and Rosenthal (2007).  See Appendix 3 for a complete list of variables, measurement, 
and data sources.   
  Both the party and committee leadership analyses begin in the 94th Congress, which 
reflects the first application of the formal rules change allowing up or down votes on committee 
chairs.  Committee seniority violations are analyzed from the 94th to the 103rd congresses, and the 
top party leadership positions are analyzed from the 94th to the 103rd congresses (post-reform era) 
and from the 104th to the 109th congresses (post-majority party era).  Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
evaluated using regression analyses.  The very small number of top Democratic Caucus leaders 
and committee seniority violations necessitates employing simple summary statistics to evaluate 
the third hypothesis.  As the primary dependent variables evaluated in hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
dichotomous, I estimated 4 sets of logistic regression models. 
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Results. The statistical analyses provide some mixed evidence for the success of DSG 
leaders in achieving party and committee leadership posts.70  In the 1970s, DSG leadership 
experience in a prior Congress was significantly associated with service as a Democratic, and 
with assuming subcommittee chairmanships in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but not with 
assuming full committee chairmanships.  The majority of committee seniority violations (5 out of 
9) benefited DSG leaders, and another 2 benefitted DSG members.  And beginning in the 94th 
Congress, DSG members and leaders occupied more than 50% and often over 80% of the top 
leadership posts.  DSG leaders held between 30-50% of the top leadership positions from 1985 to 
1994, and no less than 50% of the top party leadership positions from 1995 to 2006.  Collectively, 
the results suggest that pathways to formal party leadership positions vary depending on the type 
of position.  If factions want to successfully expand leadership pathways, they must pursue 
multiple, different strategies that align with the unique dynamics shaping each type of leadership 
position.  The findings ultimately suggest that DSG Executive Committee service played a pivotal 
role in enabling leadership development in the reform era, but DSG’s efforts to transition leaders 
into formal leadership positions were most successful in the areas that most closely aligned with 
Executive Committee service, as well as positions that were the most-frequent targets of formal 
rules changes.  Collectively, the results suggest that leadership training – in combination with 
formal rules changes expanding access to leadership positions – is the most successful strategy 
available to factions.  Below I will review the results for each type of leadership position 
addressed in the hypotheses.   
                                                          
70 In the interest of brevity and clarity, I do not report all null results in the tables below.  As noted in the 
text below, I estimated logistic regression models for all post-reform era, Democratic majority congresses 
(the 94th-103rd).   
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 Democratic Whip System. Table 5.3 presents regression analysis of the differential 
advancement of Democrats through the party whip system.  The Democratic whip system 
includes a combination of appointed and elected positions.  Zone whips are geographically 
organized, and are elected by a geographic region (or in the case of a large state, such as 
California or New York, by the full state delegation).  Assistant whips are appointed by the whip 
in consultation with the party leadership.  And whips are led by the whip task force chairmen 
(beginning in the 100th Congress), the chief deputy whip, and the (majority) Democratic whip.  
The earliest movement of DSG leaders into the formal structures of the House occurred through 
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the party whip system (see party leadership election and appointment section below).  I examined 
all whip teams beginning in the 94th Congress and found no relationship between DSG leadership 
experience and participation in the whip system in the 1970s and early 1980s.  Under Speaker Jim 
Wright (D-TX) and Majority Leader Thomas Foley (D-WA) however, DSG leadership 
experience took on a renewed importance.  Wright viewed DSG as a legislative partner (relying 
on the group to drum up liberal support his legislative agenda, including issues like Iran-Contra), 
and Foley was especially loyal to DSG through his past service as group chairman.  Under 
Speaker Wright, a DSG-Democrat has a probability of joining the whip team that is about .25 
greater than a non-DSG Democrat (holding all other variables at their mean).  These differences 
held when Foley assumed the Speakership in 1989 as well, with a DSG-Democrat having a 
probability of joining the whip team that is about .32 greater than non-DSG Democrats (holding 
all other variables at their mean).  Ultimately, the results suggest that DSG promoted the 
advancement of members into whip positions, but only when allies in the leadership were well 
positioned to help (Peabody 1967).  And as DSG leaders took over the Democratic whip system 
leadership (see below), they were more likely to appoint their liberal allies to positions within the 
whip system.  Thus if DSG challenged committee and whip system biases in the 1960s (Polsby 
2004), the group reinforced the growing liberalness of the party leadership in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Ringe and Victor 2013).   
 Committee Leadership. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 provides the results for the subcommittee and 
committee chair analyses for the 94th-103rd congresses.  The models reinforce the predominant 
role of seniority, even in the post-reform era, in deciding committee leadership positions.   
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DSG leadership is associated with the assumption of subcommittee leadership positions, 
but only during the 1970s at the height of DSG’s organizational development and institutional 
position; the relationship disappears in later congresses.  In the 94th Congress, a DSG-Democrat 
has a probability of becoming a subcommittee chair that is about .31 greater than a Democrat 
without this experience (holding all control variables at their mean). The relationship is slightly 
weaker in subsequent congresses, but still significant. A Democrat with DSG leadership 
experience in the 95th Congress has a probability of becoming a subcommittee chair that is about 
.21 great than a Democrat without this experience.  And in the 96th Congress, a DSG-Democrat 
has a probability of becoming a subcommittee chair that is about .27 greater than other Democrats 
(holding all control variables at their mean).  In addition to the strong institutional position of 
DSG in the 1970s, the magnitude of the relationship observed here also reflects DSG’s first-
mover advantage.  The proliferation of member groups in the House – and the alternative 
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leadership sites they provided – did not develop in earnest until the 1980s (Hammond 1991).  In 
the 1960s and 1970s, DSG provided leadership training to members that was simply not available 
elsewhere.  In the 1980s and beyond, the proliferation of member groups, and the return of 
institutional norms that continued to limit subcommittee leadership positions for junior members 
(Loomis 1984), eliminated the relationship between DSG and subcommittee leadership positions.   
 I did not identify any systematic evidence that DSG leaders were more likely than other 
Democrats to become committee chairs (although over 40% went on to lead full committees).  
Rather, seniority, and to a lesser extent, race and legislative entrepreneurship, play a significant 
role in committee leadership selection.71  Even in the post-reform era, seniority remains the most 
important – if not the sole – determining factor in the selection of full committee chairs.  While 
this may seem surprising considering the weight given to this singular rule change by 
congressional scholars (Rohde 1991), it reflects two poorly understood aspects of the committee 
leadership reforms.   
First, one of DSG’s primary reform goals was to induce behavioral changes in existing 
chairmen – not necessarily to depose problematic incumbent committee leaders.  In their early 
efforts to persuade members to support the rules change requiring committee chair votes, DSG 
leaders stressed that:  
“A Chairman who receives a large number of negative votes but retains his chairmanship 
would be put on notice that many of his colleagues disapprove of his performance in 
office. In all likelihood, that chairman would be more responsive to the Caucus in the 
next term as chairman” (emphasis added).72  
Formal Caucus votes were intended to provide a check on members’ ideological complacency, 
and remind chairs that their power was not absolute. Leadership power emanates directly from, 
                                                          
71 The statistically significant coefficient for race should be interpreted with caution as there were very few 
non-white (African-American, Asian-American, or Latino(a)) members of Congress during this period. 
However, the results provide evidence in support of the widespread belief on the part of black members 
that while the seniority system often had a negative impact on substantive representation of black interests, 
it had a net positive impact on the descriptive representation of black interests.   
72 Dear Colleague Letter, DSG papers, Part I, box 40, folder 5.  
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and therefore is accountable to, the Caucus.  Liberal leaders in DSG believed that rather than 
target the removal of specific members, leadership change was more effectively pursued through 
broad institutional changes.73  
And second, the seniority reforms ultimately passed by the Democratic Caucus were far 
more moderate than initially favored by DSG.  DSG originally proposed that the Caucus 
committee charged with studying potential reforms – known as the Hansen Committee for its 
chairwoman Julia Butler Hansen (D-OR)– adopt a more expansive study and evaluation of the 
committee system:  
DSG’s draft of the Caucus resolution read: The “Chairman of the Caucus be authorized 
and directed to appoint a committee of the Caucus to review, consider, and recommend 
ways in which the Caucus may assure itself that those it selects as chairmen of standing 
committees will, in such capacity, be responsive to the Caucus and to the Democratic 
leadership, and ways in which chairmen can be assured of working majorities on their 
committees who will support Democratic programs and policies” (emphasis added).74   
Nowhere did the initial resolution explicitly call for a study of the seniority system. DSG was 
more concerned with the support of potential chairmen for national party policy and their 
responsiveness to the Democratic Caucus.  But when Speaker Albert finally introduced a 
resolution calling for what would become the Hansen Committee, it charged the committee “to 
study and review the rules and practices of the House of Representatives, including the custom of 
seniority and to make such recommendations as it deems advisable.”  In limiting the Hansen 
Committee’s purview to the seniority system, the Democratic Caucus made it harder for the 
Caucus to challenge specific members.  Rep. Lloyd Meeds’s (D-WA) comments on the floor of 
the Caucus during the 1975 organizational meeting reflects this paradox: “Those who were here 
when these Rules were adopted will recall that they were adopted to make it more difficult to 
                                                          
73 DSG’s policy was to only target the removal of Democrats’ seniority if they actively campaigned for 
and/or endorsed the election of a candidate from the opposing (Republican) party – an action that was 
already expressly forbidden by the Caucus bylaws (and thus required rules enforcement, not the passage of 
new rules).    
74 Draft, Caucus Resolution calling for the creating of the Hansen Committee. DSG papers, Part II, box 
136, folder 11.  
199 
 
attack the seniority system, not less difficult” (emphasis added).  Caucus bylaws did not explicitly 
require members to consider Chair competency or efficiency, support for national party policy, or 
fairness and equitable treatment for other committee members.75  When the Caucus finally 
changed its bylaws and acknowledged the “custom of seniority,” it merely stipulated that the 
Committee on Committees “need not necessarily follow seniority” in making its 
recommendations for chairmanships.   
Table 5.6: DSG Leadership Experience & Democratic Committee Chair Seniority Violations, 
1974-1994 
 Committee 
Ranking 
DSG Leader DSG Member 
94th Congress (1975-1976) 
Agriculture Committee 
New Chair Thomas Foley 3rd  X  
Incumbent W.R. Poage 1st    
Senior W.R. Poage 1st    
S&P Nominee W.R. Poage 1st    
House Administration Committee 
New Chair N/A*    
Incumbent Wayne Hays 1st    
Senior Wayne Hays 1st     
S&P Nominee Frank 
Thompson 
2nd X  
Armed Services Committee 
New Chair Melvin Price 2nd   X 
Incumbent F. Edward 
Hebert 
1st    
Senior F. Edward 
Hebert 
1st    
S&P Nominee  F. Edward 
Hebert 
1st   X 
Banking & Currency Committee 
New Chair Henry Reuss 4th  X  
Incumbent Wright 
Patman 
1st    
                                                          
75 DSG was unsuccessful in amending the Committee Report to require consideration of “fitness, ability, 
length of service, past performance as chairman, support of Democratic programs and principles, 
cooperation with the leadership, and responsiveness to the will of the Caucus” (DSG Executive Committee 
Recommendations re Caucus meeting, DSG papers, Part I, box 40, folder 5). The continued problems 
posed by some chairmen drove DSG to organize another reform committee in 1992 to study potential 
changes in the selection of committee chairmen (see chapter 6 for more information about this reform 
effort).   
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Senior Wright 
Patman 
1st    
S&P Nominee Henry Reuss 4th X  
99th Congress (1985-1986) 
Armed Services Committee 
New Chair Les Aspin 7th  X  
Incumbent  Melvin Price 1st   X 
Senior Charles 
Bennett 
2nd    
S&P Nominee Les Aspin 7th  X  
102nd Congress (1991-1992) 
Public Works and Transportation Committee 
New Chair Robert Roe 2nd   X 
Incumbent  Glenn 
Anderson 
1st   X 
Senior Robert Roe 2nd   X 
S&P Nominee Glenn 
Anderson 
1st   X 
House Administration Committee 
New Chair Charlie Rose 3rd  X  
Incumbent  Frank 
Annunzio 
1st   X 
Senior Joseph 
Gaydos 
2nd   X 
S&P Nominee Frank 
Annunzio 
1st   X 
103rd Congress (1993-1994) 
Appropriations Committee  
New Chair David Obey 5th  X  
Incumbent N/A*    
Senior Neal Smith 
(IA) 
2nd   X 
S&P Nominee David Obey 5th  X  
Armed Services Committee 
New Chair Ronald 
Dellums 
  X 
Incumbent N/A*    
Senior Sonny 
Montgomery 
   
S&P Nominee Ronald 
Dellums 
  X 
Source: Committee seniority violations data for the 94th, 96th and 99th congresses was 
collected from the House Democratic Caucus papers at the Library of Congress. In the 102nd 
and 103rd congresses, this data was collected from Kathryn Pearson’s Party Discipline in the 
U.S. House of Representatives (2015).  Additional data on seniority violations was 
supplemented by analyses in CQ Almanac.       
Note: Only permanent committee seniority violations that include votes cast by Steering and 
Policy and/or the Caucus are included here (“acting” chairmen who replaced incumbents 
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because of illness of pending indictment for criminal charges are excluded as they were not 
voted on by Members).  S&P nominee refers to the first nomination issued by the Steering & 
Policy Committee in its capacity as the Committee on Committees.  
*In these cases, the potential committee seniority violation did not result in a new committee 
chair (the incumbent maintained their position), or it was an open committee seat where there 
was no incumbent chair.   
 
Committee Seniority Violations. The null findings in the committee chair model above, as 
well as archival evidence about the strategy and effect of seniority reforms, suggest that any 
evidence of a separate DSG effect would likely only be apparent in seniority violations.  
Committee seniority violations occur when Steering & Policy (S&P) nominates someone other 
than the most senior member on a given committee, or when Democrats vote down S&P 
recommendations for the most senior member.  S&P serves as the Democratic Committee-on-
Committees, and a member seeking a committee chairmanship (or a committee assignment) must 
by nominated by someone on S&P to be considered and approved by the Caucus.  S&P members 
are appointed by party leaders (who themselves serve as ex-officio S&P members).  Caucus 
bylaws provide that floor nominations are only in order after the S&P-nominated candidate has 
been voted down.  Table 5.6 presents data on committee seniority violations from 1975 to 1994.76  
As the limited number of cases in the table suggests, history has confirmed Rep. Meeds’s 
comments about the paradox of seniority reforms – seniority violations are rare.  Yet in most – 
though certainly not all – cases, DSG leaders (and members) benefitted, and advanced to 
chairmanship positions between 1974 and 1994.   
In 1974-1975, there were four committee seniority violations (only three were ultimately 
successful).77  Of these four violations, three benefitted former DSG leaders, including two 
                                                          
76 There were other cases of committee seniority violations, but they were not voted on by Steering & 
Policy or by the Democratic Caucus. In these instances, the chairman stepped aside because of illness or as 
a result of pending indictment for criminal charges.  These members serve as “acting” chairmen until their 
eventual election or defeat. 
77 Congressional Quarterly counts 5 total seniority violations, although a total of 4 committees were 
involved (the Caucus turned down the Steering and Policy recommendation of Rep. Reuss, before 
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former chairmen.  Although the reform requiring Caucus votes on committee chairs was passed in 
the prior Congress, the 94th Congress was the first opportunity members had to vote on potential 
seniority violations under the newly constituted and empowered S&P, which became the 
Committee-on-Committees charged with making recommendations for chairmanships.  Despite 
the significant attention on this critical reform and the huge influx of Watergate babies, the 
Caucus Journal documents incumbent Democrats’ seemingly-genuine surprise that the new rules 
might actually produce committee leadership change.  The shocking blow to Democrats’ 
traditionally rote committee selection process in part reflects DSG’s continued minority status 
within the Democratic Caucus.  In the 94th Congress, DSG members constituted about 45% of the 
Democratic Caucus – a sizable number (131) to be sure, but not nearly enough members to 
successfully defeat a unified opposition (especially given liberals’ “Tuesday-to-Thursday Club” 
status).   
The S&P Committee’s nomination for Banking & Currency chairman was the first 
indication that the 94th Congress would significantly change existing power dynamics in the 
House.  S&P nominated Rep. Henry Reuss (D-WI), a longtime DSG leader, to chair the 
committee over incumbent chairman Wright Patman (D-TX).  Fourth in committee seniority, 
Reuss was nominated by an S&P vote of 20-4. The announcement provoked immediate outcry 
from many Democrats, including Reps. Thomas Ashley (D-OH), Leonor Kretzel Sullivan (D-
MO), and Jim Wright (D-TX), all of whom spoke out in favor of Patman based on his long 
service in the House and his accomplishments for consumer protection as chairman.78  They also 
                                                          
eventually reversing itself and ultimately approving it – which CQ counts as two separate seniority 
violations).    
78 Wright’s surprise was likely genuine. Two years earlier, on January 17, 1973, he distributed a Dear 
Colleague letter endorsing a proposal to term limit committee chair positions because he believed the newly 
reformed system of Caucus votes on S&P nominees would only stir up “personal antagonism and some 
hurt feelings…In the end, practically every committee chairman undoubtedly will be confirmed by the 
members.” DSG Papers, Part II, folder 137, folder 2.  
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stressed his many years of significant fundraising for the DCCC.  Reuss was clearly the DSG 
candidate, and several DSG allies and leaders supported his candidacy, including Rep. Moorhead 
who announced that he rose “in support of the candidate of reform…one of the ablest economists 
in this Congress, our good friend from Wisconsin, Mr. Henry Reuss” (emphasis added).79  The 
ensuing debate so divided Democrats that Reuss withdrew his name from nomination “for the 
betterment of the Caucus.” And when the Caucus met again on January 22nd, Steering and Policy 
nominated Patman. But Reuss was nominated again, as was Rep. Robert G. Stephens Jr. of 
Georgia.  After a prolonged vote, Reuss ultimately prevailed over both Patman and Stephens, and 
Patman was added to the Interior & Insular Affairs Committee as a consolation.  At 81, Patman’s 
competency to lead a substantive legislative committee at “this time very important economic 
time in our history” (552) was the deciding factor against Patman for many members.  But S&P 
and the Caucus’s (ultimate) decision were not just a condemnation of Patman’s capacity for 
leadership – they were an endorsement of Reuss’s.  The policy credentials and strong 
relationships Reuss cultivated with other members through DSG (several of whom placed his 
name in nomination again after his withdrawal) secured his win.   
As the Caucus debated parliamentary rules that would govern debate over Reuss’s 
nomination, new chairman Burton announced that Poage’s nomination as Agriculture chairman 
had been rejected 144-141.  Despite the relatively close vote, Poage’s loss did not garner the same 
level of personal animosity as Patman’s loss.  The following day, S&P nominated third ranking 
Thomas Foley (D-WA) as chairman, which was supported by the Caucus when it met again on 
January 22nd by a vote of 257-9.  As the current DSG chairman, Foley presided over the group’s 
orientation at the start of the Congress (where freshmen interviewed committee chairman), and 
had the support of stalwart liberals and new members alike.   
                                                          
79 Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, Democratic Caucus papers, box 5, folder 11, page 552.  
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 The third seniority violation in 1975 was the Steering & Policy nomination of former 
DSG chair Frank Thompson (D-NJ) for chairmanship of the House Administration Committee 
over incumbent Wayne Hays (D-OH). House Administration was by no means considered an 
important committee – its jurisdiction over matters like technology and office space lacked the 
policy substance of other committees, and Thompson himself valued his second ranking position 
on Education & Labor more. However, in addition to arguably parochial matters, House 
Administration also had jurisdiction over campaign finance reform – an issue which would grow 
to dominate DSG’s policy agenda over the next decade.80  DSG strongly favored the placement of 
a strong supporter of campaign finance reform as chairman.   
 Thompson’s DSG credentials were so prominent during the ensuing debate that it likely 
played a role in his nomination by S&P (by a vote of 15 to 9) – a committee in which he himself 
served.81 Yet the Caucus initially rejected Thompson’s bid by a vote of 176 to 109. Many 
members apparently voted against Thompson on procedure rather than substance (believing – as 
with Reuss’s nomination – that Democrats should have a chance to vote against the incumbent 
before voting for the alternative).  When the Caucus met again, S&P nominated Hays, but 
                                                          
80 I analyze DSG efforts on campaign finance reform in chapter seven.  Hays was a strong supporter of 
many Caucus-passed reforms in the 1970s, but his sometimes-tepid support for campaign finance reform in 
the early 1970s and his personality (and penchant for hyperbole) limited his liberal supporters.  He often 
personally went after many of his liberal critics. He ripped into John Gardner, the chairman of Common 
Cause on the floor of the House, stating that “It was Common Cause and some of their henchman who tore 
up the election reform bill that we had and substituted their version, which made it possible for Watergate 
to happen. Common Cause exists, as far as I can find out, only to promote the presidential aspirations of 
John Gardner, which is probably the most ridiculous promotion since P.T. Barnum tried to promote his 
midget for that office” (Gruenstein, Peter. December 9, 1973, “He’s Nasty…and Powerful, Too.” 
Washington Star, DSG Papers, Part II, box 149, folder 10).   
81 Unfortunately, archival accounts of Steering & Policy committee meetings do not exist. In the Caucus, 
Rep. Mo Udall (D-AZ) spoke on behalf of Thompson and stressed his position as a founder of DSG and “a 
beacon of courage and good sense in this House for 20 long years.” Rep. O’Hara also supported Thompson, 
remarking “I remember when Frank Thompson took the initiative in organizing the Democratic Study 
Group back in 1959 when things were very tough for the kind of program that most of us believed in. I can 
recall when Frank Thompson was the Chairman of the Democratic Study Group during the years 1965-
1966, the 89th Congress, the Congress that wrote more social and economic legislation than any other until 
this one.” Democratic Caucus papers, box 5, folder 14.  
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Thompson’s name was again placed in nomination by his liberal colleagues.  Hays’ leadership of 
the DCCC was viewed by many as the significant factor in the race.  Despite allegations that 
Hays removed all other member’s names from the DCCC stationary – purportedly to give the 
impression that the party campaign funds were only from him – most of the freshmen supported 
Hays.  The Class of the 94th even wrote a letter to Time magazine disputing its coverage of the 
DCCC stationary story.82  Rep. Elliott Levitas (D-GA), a first term member, spoke out in favor of 
Hays to the other freshmen, arguing that “many of us owe our presence here today [to Hays]” and 
that the man responsible for “one of the greatest victories in history” should not be rewarded by 
being “summarily thrown out of office of his chairmanship.”83  Levitas’s testimonial is 
representative of the strange coalition of conservatives and liberals, and senior and junior 
members who supported Hays.   
On the second vote, Thompson lost to Hays 111-161.  Hays’ response to his win initially 
suggested that DSG’s strategy of placing chairmen “on notice” after a contested leadership race 
might prove successful: Hays said, “Obviously from everything that has been said in the 
newspapers and quite a few things have been said in the corridors and a few things said publicly, 
I am a miserable S.O.B. I will try to be a nicer S.O.B.”84  The Thompson/Hays race suggests that 
while DSG enabled their leaders to be competitive against other Democrats who also lacked 
formal leadership positions (such as Burton’s defeat of Sisk for Caucus chairman), they still 
struggled to defeat members who held formal positions of power (such as Hays’ DCCC 
chairmanship).  Nevertheless, Thompson’s initial nomination by Steering & Policy underscores 
                                                          
82 January 29, 1975 Meeting Minutes of the “Class of the 94th” Congress, DSG papers, Part II, box 149, 
folder 9.   
83 Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, Democratic Caucus Papers, Box 5, folder 14.  
84 Hays’ supporters suggested his brash reputation was one of the strengths of his leadership.  Rep. John 
Stanton, Hays’s fellow Ohio colleague, said “Wayne Hays is a son of a bitch but he is our son of a bitch. I 
don’t use vulgarity on the House Floor for any other reason than to point out to the Members of this House 
that in some cases you need strength and in some areas strength has a connotation of harshness, or 
toughness.” 
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how DSG’s success placing their allies on the committee – and the relationships and connections 
he cultivated in DSG – enabled him to be competitive with Hays.  Less than two years later, 
Thompson would ultimately become House Administration chair as Hays succumbed to 
allegations he inappropriately placed his “mistress” on the payroll to compensate her “solely for 
sexual services.”85   
 The third committee chair deposed in 1975 was F. Edward Hebert (D-LA), the longtime 
Armed Services chairman.  Hebert was nominated by S&P, but the Caucus voted 141-144 to 
remove him as chairman.  In retrospect, any potential debate among Democrats over Hebert’s fate 
was considered settled after his infamous welcome to the Watergate Class, in which he addressed 
them with the statement: “All right, boys and girls, let me tell you what it’s really like here” 
(Yang 1992).  In his place, Melvin Price (D-IL) was elected to assume the chairmanship by a vote 
of 251-7. While Price did not serve on DSG’s leadership, he was a dues-paying member who also 
served on the International Affairs & Defense Policy Task Force. 86  Price had the support of most 
Democrats, including liberals and freshman. He served as chair until he himself was deposed in 
1985 at the start of the 99th Congress in favor of Les Aspin (D-WI), who ranked 7th in committee 
seniority. Aspin served on the DSG Executive Committee in the 98th Congress (immediately 
preceding his election) – a strategic move for a relatively moderate member, especially on 
defense matters, like himself.  The relationships Aspin cultivated during his service on the 
Executive Committee helps explain his successful leapfrog over not only Price, but other more 
popular and more liberal (senior) members of the committee, including Reps. Charles Bennett (D-
FL), Marvin Leath (D-TX), and Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA) (who was most representative of 
                                                          
85 “The Congress: What Liz Ray Has Wrought.” Time Magazine. June 21, 1976. Thompson himself would 
lose his chairmanship and leave office when he was indicted as part of the Abscam Scandal in 1980. He 
would have the distinction of being the highest ranking and longest-serving politician indicted during the 
investigation.  
86 DSG Task Force Membership list, DSG papers, Part II, box 36, folder 13.  
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the Caucus position on defense issues).87  While the archival record does not document DSG 
activities on behalf of Aspin in 1985, DSG leaders strongly mobilized in support of Aspin in 1987 
when Leath challenged his chairmanship (Aspin ultimately retained his post).88 
 Aspin’s successful bid for Armed Services Chairman in the 99th Congress represents a 
turning point in the committee system’s representation of DSG’s liberal policy goals.  Figure 5.3 
traces ideological differences (using DW-NOMINATE scores) of committee and subcommittee 
leaders relative to DSG leaders from 1959 to 1994. Not surprisingly, early in DSG’s tenure, there 
were significant ideological differences between committee leaders and the faction of liberals in 
the House.  But beginning in 1985, committee chairs were generally as liberal (if not slightly 
more so) than DSG leaders.  These changes reflect both the addition of token representatives of 
the more southern and moderate wings of the party to the DSG leadership (explaining the slight 
uptick in their average NOMINATE SCORE), and the documented changes in the selection of 
committee chairmen.  Subcommittee chairs, on the other hand, remained ideologically stable 
from the 93rd to the 103rd Congresses. While notably more liberal than in the late 1960s, 
subcommittee chairs remained more conservative than full committee chairs.  As these changes 
took root in both the committee system and DSG’s leadership, a strategic ambitious member like 
Aspin could secure a position on the DSG Executive Committee to make him/herself more 
competitive for committee chairmanships where liberal support was critical.    
                                                          
87 “Congressional Leadership Tested." In CQ Almanac 1990, 46th ed., 8-12. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1991 
88 On January 14, 1987, Reps. James Oberstar (D-MN), Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN), Dave Obey (D-WI), 
and others sent a Dear Colleague letter on behalf of Aspin who apparently provided “active representation 
during Armed Services Committee deliberations” of midwestern interests (DSG Papers, Part II, box 102, 
folder 11).  On January 19, 1987, DSG leaders Matt McHugh (D-NY) and Don Edwards, circulated a Dear 
Colleague letter advocating against Leath despite his “pleasing personality, [and] cooperative attitude.” The 
letter enclosed Leath’s voting record, which apparently demonstrated he was opposed to “virtually 
everything else of importance to our party” (Part II, box 102, folder 12).   
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 In the 102nd and 103rd Congresses, there were four seniority violations – two benefitted 
DSG leaders (Reps. Charlie Rose (D-NC) and Dave Obey (D-WI)), and one benefitted a DSG 
member (Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA)).89  In 1991, Rep. Charlie Rose leapfrogged over both 
incumbent chairman Rep. Frank Annunzio (D-IL) (who was narrowly rejected by the Caucus) 
and Joseph Gaydos (D-PA) (CQ Almanac 1991, 8-12).  Rep. Rose, a moderate to conservative 
Democrat, had served on DSG’s Executive Committee for two terms as a regional (southern) 
representative.  Like Aspin, this was a strategic move that enhanced his vote support among 
liberals – critical for a moderate like Rose.  Two other committee seniority violations in 1993-
1994 benefitted members with prior relationships with DSG.  Dellums was elected chairman of 
Armed Services by a vote of 198-10, and Obey was elected chairman of Appropriations by a vote 
of 152-106.  Dellums had a strong liberal record, and was personally close with several DSG 
                                                          
89 Rep. Robert Roe’s defeat of incumbent chairman Glenn Anderson, did not involve any DSG leader or 
member.   
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leaders, including chairman (and fellow Californian) Burton who helped secure his position on 
Armed Services in 1973 – historic as the first African-American member of the committee.90  Of 
the two races, Obey’s was by far the more contentious.  Obey’s chief rival for the position was 
Rep. Neal Smith of Iowa, who was next in line for chairmanship.  S&P nominated Obey by a 
margin of 18-7 (after which the committee stopped voting because Obey had won a majority) 
(CQ Almanac 1995, 3-13).  After his election, Obey’s reputation as a DSG Democrat was 
solidified when he promptly hired DSG executive director, Scott Lilly, to be his chief of staff on 
Appropriations.   
 The cases of committee seniority violations analyzed here suggest that the leadership 
experience provided through DSG enabled ambitious liberals to compete with some of their more 
senior colleagues to chair House committees.  DSG leaders (and members) were remarkably 
successful at obtaining contested chairmanship positions.  This account of committee leadership 
change is not incompatible with other accounts of committee seniority violations in the 
congressional literature (Pearson 2015).  Service on the DSG Executive Committee helped 
socialize members into leadership positions, giving them a sense of the needs of other members 
(and the party) and how best to support them, as well as the tradeoffs and compromise inherent to 
leadership decision-making.  DSG leaders “were really focused on how does a legislature work 
and how should it work and what’s wrong with how it works…those were good things for people 
to think about if they wanted to rise in the institution and be effective.”91  And of course, DSG 
leaders were already among the most liberal with the strongest party support scores in the 
Democratic Caucus – executive committee service was a successful way to brandish their liberal 
credentials while developing the skills and experience necessary to be competitive in the Caucus.     
                                                          
90 “The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums Oral History Interview,” Office of the Historian, U.S. House of 
Representatives, [April 19, 2012]. 
91 October 28, 2015 telephone interview with Scott Lilly.  
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 Party Leadership Hierarchy.  The centralization of power in party leaders during and 
after the passage of rules changes in the 1970s elevated the importance of the top party leadership 
posts for rules enforcement and policy outcomes. If DSG wanted to ensure that their policy and 
procedural reform agenda was maintained, they needed to ascend the leadership ladder as well.  
The analyses of the party leadership hierarchy below suggest that DSG was incredibly successful 
at developing a strong monopoly over the top Democratic leadership positions – a dominance that 
continues in the House today long after the group itself dissolved.  DSG leaders’ overwhelming 
dominance suggests that we should reassess conclusions that attribute the liberal monopoly over 
leadership positions solely to formal rules changes and changing ideological cleavages in the 
Democratic Caucus (Harris and Nelson 2008; Rohde 1991).   
 About 10 years after DSG’s founding, their allies and leaders began making their initial 
forays into the top party leadership posts.  Indeed, when Thomas (Tip) O’Neill was selected as 
Assistant Majority Leader (i.e. Majority Whip) by Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK) and Majority 
Leader Hale Boggs (D-LA) in 1971, he declared “I haven’t found any members of the 
Democratic Study Group who don’t feel they now have a voice in the leadership. I know that 
when the leadership meets, the views of the liberals will be expressed” (CQ Almanac 1972).  
While not a formal member of the executive committee, O’Neill had worked closely with DSG 
for many years.  DSG selected him as their representative in the fight to introduce recorded teller 
voting in the House as part of an amendment to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, and he 
served as one of the group’s whips in the 1960s.92  After his appointment, O’Neill and John 
                                                          
92 In remarks at a Symposium honoring O’Neill in 1981, DSG executive director Richard P. Conlon said 
“This [recorded teller vote] reform was the subject of a major effort by the Democratic Study Group, and 
Representative O’Neill agreed to be the main sponsor, thereby making the proposal more acceptable to the 
so-called regulars in the House.”  Conlon went on to recall how this relationship continued after he entered 
the leadership when “O’Neill played a similar role as the Democratic whip two years later when he offered 
a DSG resolution in the Democratic Caucus, instructing the Democratic members of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee to report legislation terminating United States involvement in the Vietnam War within a 
certain time” (Hale 1983, 239).  
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McFall recruited DSG Vice Chairman John Brademas (D-IN) as Chief Deputy Whip.  Brademas 
was next in line for DSG chairman at the time (to succeed outgoing chairman Fraser) and was 
viewed as a representative of DSG to the leadership (Sarro 1971, A2).  In both these cases, 
O’Neill and Brademas’s relationship with and experiences in DSG made them more competitive 
than other members to be appointed to these leadership positions.  Within a few short years, DSG 
leadership experience would make liberals competitive for even more Caucus-wide elected 
positions.     
 
 
Table 5.7: DSG Representation in Majority Party Leadership Posts, 1973-1994 
 Name 
DSG  
Leader 
DSG 
Member 
No DSG 
Affiliation  
93rd Congress (1973-1974) 
Speaker Carl Albert   X 
Majority Leader Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Whip John McFall  X  
Caucus Chair Olin Teague   X 
Caucus Secretary Leonor Sullivan   X 
Chief Deputy Whip John Brademas X   
Percent of Leadership  16.6% 33.3% 50.0% 
94th Congress (1975-1976) 
Speaker Carl Albert   X 
Majority Leader Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Whip John McFall   X  
Caucus Chair Phillip Burton X   
Caucus Secretary Patsy Mink X   
Chief Deputy Whip John Brademas X   
Percent of Leadership  50.0% 33.3% 16.6% 
95th Congress (1977-1978) 
Speaker Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Leader Jim Wright  X  
Majority Whip John Brademas X   
Caucus Chair Thomas Foley X   
Caucus Secretary Shirley Chisholm   X  
Chief Deputy Whip Dan Rostenkowski   X 
Percent of Leadership  33.3% 50% 16.6% 
96th Congress (1979-1980) 
Speaker Thomas O’Neill  X  
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Majority Leader Jim Wright  X  
Majority Whip John Brademas X   
Caucus Chair Thomas Foley X   
Caucus Secretary Shirley Chisholm  X  
Chief Deputy Whip Dan Rostenkowski   X 
Percent of Leadership  33.3% 50% 16.6% 
97th Congress (1981-1982) 
Speaker Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Leader Jim Wright  X  
Majority Whip Thomas Foley X   
Caucus Chair Gillis Long   X 
Caucus Secretary Geraldine Ferraro   X 
Chief Deputy Whip Bill Alexander  X  
  16.6% 50% 16.6% 
98th Congress (1983-1984) 
Speaker Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Leader Jim Wright  X  
Majority Whip Thomas Foley X   
Caucus Chair Gillis Long   X 
Caucus Secretary Geraldine Ferraro   X 
Chief Deputy Whip Bill Alexander  X  
Percent of Leadership  16.6% 50% 16.6% 
99th Congress (1985-1986) 
Speaker Thomas O’Neill  X  
Majority Leader Jim Wright  X  
Majority Whip Thomas Foley X   
Caucus Chair Richard Gephardt  X  
Caucus Secretary Mary Rose Oakar X   
Chief Deputy Whip Bill Alexander  X  
Percent of Leadership  33.3% 66.7% - 
100th Congress (1987-1988) 
Speaker Jim Wright  X  
Majority Leader Thomas Foley X   
Majority Whip Tony Coelho    X 
Caucus Chair Richard Gephardt  X  
Caucus Vice Chair Mary Rose Oakar X   
Chief Deputy Whip David Bonior X   
Whip Task Force 
Chairmen 
Martin Frost 
Bart Gordon 
David Obey 
Leon Panetta 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
Percent of Leadership  40% 30% 30% 
101st Congress (1989-1990) 
Speaker Thomas Foley X   
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt  X  
Majority Whip William Gray   X 
Caucus Chair Steny Hoyer X   
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Caucus Vice-Chair David Bonior X   
Chief Deputy Whip Gary Ackerman  X  
Whip Task Force 
Chairmen 
Bart Gordon 
David Obey 
Leon Panetta 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
Percent of Leadership  44% 33% 22% 
102nd Congress (1991-1992) 
Speaker Thomas Foley X   
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt  X  
Majority Whip David Bonior X   
Caucus Chair Steny Hoyer X   
Caucus Vice Chair Vic Fazio X   
Chief Deputy Whip Butler Derrick 
Barbara Kennelly 
John Lewis 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Whip Task Force 
Chairmen 
Bart Gordon 
David Obey 
Leon Panetta 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
Percent of Leadership  55% 27% 18% 
103rd Congress (1993-1994) 
Speaker Thomas Foley X   
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt  X  
Majority Whip David Bonior X   
Caucus Chair Steny Hoyer X   
Caucus Vice Chair Vic Fazio X   
Chief Deputy Whip Butler Derrick 
Barbara Kennelly 
John Lewis 
Bill Richardson 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
Whip Task Force 
Chairmen 
Bart Gordon 
David Obey 
 
X 
 X 
Percent of Leadership  55% 27% 18% 
Source: Data on party leadership positions are collected from CQ Almanac.  Data on DSG 
leadership and membership are based on documents in the DSG papers at the Library of 
Congress.    
 
Table 5.7 details DSG’s representation in top elected and appointed party leadership 
posts from the 93rd -103rd Congresses.  Beginning in the 94th, DSG members and leaders 
collectively occupied more than 50% of the top party leadership posts, and often over 80% of the 
top leadership posts.  By the 100th Congress, DSG leaders, as defined by their service on the 
executive committee, achieved a significant plurality or majority of Democratic leadership 
positions.  Ten years after O’Neill and Brademas’s appointments, DSG’s steady monopolization 
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of the Democratic whip operation continued when Wright and O’Neill recruited Foley to serve as 
the last appointed whip in 1981.  In 1987, Wright recruited two-term DSG leader David Bonior 
(D-WI) to serve as chief deputy whip.  Bonior stood out from other members through his 
leadership of a Speaker’s task force on the issue of aid to Nicaragua’s contra rebels – Wright’s 
personal passion, which DSG supported through their partisan research publication (Special 
Reports).93  He was strategically selected by Wright as a “bridge” to liberals and Mid-westerners 
(CQ 1991).  During the 1970s and early 1980s, DSG’s representation in the top leadership posts 
constituted a minority of top leaders.  But by the late 1980s and early 1990s – especially once 
former DSG chairman Foley became Speaker of the House – the relationship between DSG and 
the party leadership had shifted.  DSG leaders began a long-term monopoly of the Democratic 
leadership, while non-DSG Democrats assumed largely token positions.      
 
                                                          
93 Wright relied on DSG to help “drum up” opposition to Reagan throughout the Iran-Contras Affair 
(Interview with former DSG staffer, August 6, 2015).   
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Foley especially valued his strong connection to DSG and ensured that the leadership 
reflected DSG both symbolically and substantively.  DSG’s executive director Scott Lilly recalled 
how Foley’s election changed the relationship between DSG and the party leadership:  
Foley called Lilly into his office and said “’[Former DSG executive director] Dick 
Conlon always wanted floor privileges. He was never able to get them [under prior 
Speakers] – you will always have them’ under my leadership.” Lilly said “Foley wanted 
me to know that he had come out of DSG. DSG was his anchor in the House and he 
wanted to continue to be considered as part of that. Foley said, ‘There may be times 
where you will think I am out of line, but I want to make sure that DSG does well under 
my speakership’” (emphasis added).94 
If the group’s success under Foley is measured based on their representation in the party 
leadership, DSG did very well.95  In the 101st-103rd congresses, the Caucus chair and vice-chair, 
and the top whip officers (majority whip, chief deputy whip, and whip task force chairmen) were 
comprised of a strong cohort of members who emerged from the DSG leadership pipeline.  Foley 
                                                          
94 October 28, 2015 telephone interview.   
95 And of course, as the statistical analyses above suggest, Foley was also loyal in appointing DSG leaders 
into whip team positions as well.   
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also fostered and encouraged a strong relationship between Majority whip (and later Leader) 
Gephardt.  Like former Speaker O’Neill, Gephardt was a close ally (and member) of DSG who 
never served on the Executive Committee.  But unlike O’Neill, Gephardt regularly attended 
Executive Committee meetings to share leadership intelligence and hear from the emerging group 
of liberal leaders. In the 103rd congress, he attended nearly every Executive Committee meeting. 
He was a DSG ally and leader both in name and substance – a relationship which would become 
even more important when the 1994 elections ushered in a Republican majority (see chapter 8).   
Figure 5.4 traces the average ideological differences between the top Democratic party 
leaders and the DSG Executive Committee from 1959 to 1994.  While not as ideologically 
distinct as committee leaders, the trends in the graph clearly align with the slow monopolization 
of party leader positions by DSG.  Party leaders remained slightly more conservative than DSG 
leaders from 1959 to 1974; beginning in 1975, as three DSG leaders (Reps. Burton (D-CA), Mink 
(D-HI) and Brademas (D-IN)) move into party leadership positions, these differences are largely 
eliminated.  Despite a brief conservative resurgence in the 1980s which brought a new class of 
more conservative Democrats (and emboldened some incumbent conservatives), the leadership 
grows to resemble the organized faction of liberal Democrats in the House.   
Post-Majority Party Era. The bulk of the analyses presented in this chapter end in 1994 
when new Speaker Newt Gingrich abolished legislative service organizations (in a move 
purportedly targeting DSG – see chapter 8 for more details). Democrats elected after 1992 did not 
have an opportunity to serve on the DSG leadership, hindering the validity of any systematic 
comparisons between DSG and non-DSG leaders.  However, there is no reason to expect that the 
impact of DSG leadership experience would have ended after 1994.  Party leaders are more senior 
than the average rank and file member, and most DSG leaders continued to serve in the House.  
And indeed, several continued their accession up the leadership ladder.  
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The closely contested DSG leadership election on December 14th, 1994 suggests that 
Democrats, at least initially, viewed the post as more important in a post-majority party era under 
Republican rule. The election – scheduled prior to the devastating loss in November – resulted in 
arguably the most competitive race in DSG’s history.  186 Democrats filed into the Speaker’s 
Lobby to vote for Executive Committee members David Skaggs (D-CO) and Rosa DeLauro (D-
CT).  The high-level of participation, including incoming Minority Leader Gephardt – despite 
norms against the highest-ranking party leader participating in leadership races, especially of 
intra-party groups – underscores how much DSG was viewed initially as the voice of the liberal 
opposition to the new Republican majority.96   
 
Table 5.8: DSG Representation in Minority Party Leadership Posts, 1995-2006 
 Name 
DSG  
Leader 
DSG 
Member 
No DSG 
Affiliation  
104th Congress (1995-1996) 
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt  X  
Minority Whip David E. Bonior  X   
Caucus Chair Vic Fazio  X   
Caucus Vice Chair Barbara B. Kennelly  X  
Chief Deputy Whip Rosa DeLauro 
John Lewis 
Bill Richardson 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Percent of Leadership   57% 43%  
105th Congress (1997-1998) 
Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt   X  
Minority Whip David E. Bonior  X   
Caucus Chair Vic Fazio  X   
Caucus Vice Chair Barbara B. Kennelly   X  
Chief Deputy Whip Rosa DeLauro 
Chet Edwards 
John Lewis 
Robert Menendez 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
                                                          
96 On December 4, 1994, 150 Democrats including new Minority Leader Gephardt, sent a letter to Speaker-
elect Gingrich to protest the decision to abolish LSOs.  The letter read: “We can only view it as an effort to 
censor opposing views, and to deny the primary source of information to the Minority party as we embark 
upon a furious legislative schedule…Given that DSG helps Members to maximize the use of House 
resources, eliminating DSG must be seen as an effort to stifle debate and criticism of legislation that the 
new Republican Majority produces” (DSG papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5).   
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Percent of Leadership  63% 37%  
106th Congress (1999-2000) 
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt   X  
Minority Whip David Bonior X   
Caucus Chair Martin Frost  X  
Caucus Vice Chair Robert Menendez  X  
Chief Deputy Whip Chet Edwards 
John Lewis 
Ed Pastor 
Maxine Waters 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Percent of Leadership  50% 50%  
107th Congress (2001-2002) 
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt  X  
Minority Whip David Bonior  
(2001-2002) 
Nancy Pelosi  
(2002-2003) 
X 
X 
  
Caucus Chair Martin Frost  X  
Caucus Vice Chair Robert Menendez  X  
Chief Deputy Whip Chet Edwards 
John Lewis 
Ed Pastor 
Maxine Waters 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Assistant to Minority 
Leader 
Rosa DeLauro X   
Percent of Leadership  60% 40%  
108th Congress (2003-2004) 
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi X   
Minority Whip Steny Hoyer X   
Caucus Chair Robert Menendez  X  
Caucus Vice Chair James Clyburn  X  
Senior Chief Deputy 
Whip 
John Lewis X   
Assistant to Minority 
Leader 
John Spratt X   
Percent of Leadership  67% 33%  
109th Congress (2005-2006) 
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi X   
Minority Whip Steny Hoyer X   
Caucus Chair Robert Menendez 
(2005) 
James Clyburn 
(2006) 
 X 
X 
 
Caucus Vice Chair John Larson   X* 
Senior Chief Deputy 
Whip 
John Lewis X   
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Assistant to Minority 
Leader 
John Spratt X   
Percent of Leadership  67% 17% 17% 
DSG membership in column 4 reflects membership during the 103rd Congress. It is coded 
based on whether the Member participated in the DSG election in December 1994 (only dues-
paying members could participate in the election). 22 Democrats did not participate in the DSG 
elections, including a small number of formal members (note: including these members does 
not change the data presented in the table).  
*Larson was elected after LSOs were abolished from the House. 
 
The race resulted in a 93-93 tie between Skaggs and DeLauro.  After the first ballot, 
DeLauro announced she was withdrawing from the race and Skaggs automatically became chair 
with the promise “to preserve and strengthen DSG.”97  Shortly thereafter, DeLauro was given a 
chief deputy whip position by Gephardt.98  And while Skaggs would not be able to keep this 
promise, DSG’s dominance over party leadership posts was preserved and strengthened, even in 
the post-majority era.  Indeed, the loss of the Democratic majority arguably sped up DSG’s 
eventual monopolization of party leadership posts as many of the Democrats who lost their seats 
in the 1994 election were more moderate than the average DSG leader; the election ultimately 
made the Caucus more liberal than before.    
Table 5.8 analyzes DSG representation in minority party leadership posts from 104th – 
109th Congresses (during which Democrats served under a Republican majority).  Nearly all party 
leaders during this period, except for Rep. John Larson (D-CT) in the 109th (elected after the 
abolition of LSOs), served as a leader or member of DSG.  And in each Congress, over 50% of 
the top party leaders served on DSG’s Executive Committee, including more moderate members 
such as Rep. John Spratt of North Carolina.  Even in the 108th Democratic leadership election, 
which was notable for advancing a completely new slate of party leaders –  4 of the 6 newly 
elected (and appointed) leaders had DSG leadership experience.  3 of them had significant service 
                                                          
97 December 14, 1994 DSG Press Release, DSG Papers, Part II, box 4, folder 13.  
98 It is unclear if DeLauro knew about the potential whip appointment before she withdrew from the race.      
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– Reps. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Steny Hoyer (D-MD) had served 3 terms (or 6 years), and Rep. 
Spratt served 4 terms (or 8 years), on the executive committee.     
 
Conclusion 
 
In the pre- and post-reform eras, liberal Democrats significantly shaped leadership 
pathways in the House of Representatives.  Absent access to official leadership pathways in the 
House, DSG provided liberals with the skills, connections, resources and tools, necessary to be 
competitive for elected and appointed leadership positions in the House.  The evidence provided 
above suggests that leadership change is not simply the result of rules changes or ideological 
changes within the majority party.  It reveals that the organization of liberal Democrats group did 
not merely succeed in empowering liberal Democrats to monopolize Democratic leadership 
positions (Becker and Moscardelli 2008; Harris and Nelson 2008), they succeeded in empowering 
DSG leaders to monopolize Democratic leadership positions.  These members were undoubtedly 
among the most ambitious in the House and nearly all had other notable leadership experiences 
outside of DSG.  Rep. John Lewis (D-GA), for example, is a civil rights icon, and helped found 
and previously served as chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.  Their ambition (Peabody 
1976; Loomis 1984) made them more likely to seek out alternative leadership opportunities in the 
House – and to successfully leverage these experiences in their leadership races.  DSG served as a 
bridging mechanism between individual member ambition and broader coalition changes during 
the mid- to late twentieth century House.   
The strategy of leadership change adopted by ambitious liberals in DSG has important 
implications for our understanding of leadership emergence and leadership power in the 
contemporary U.S. Congress.     
The individual characteristics cultivated by DSG are widely acknowledged by 
congressional scholars as a key component of leadership emergence in Congress (Loomis 1984; 
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Peabody 1967, 1976; Sinclair 1999; Pearson 2015). This chapter integrates these skills with the 
observed movement of party faction representatives to formal party and committee leadership 
positions in Congress (Becker and Moscardelli 2008; Harris and Nelson 2008).  Group 
organization provides an alternative leadership pipeline, socializing ambitious members into the 
responsibilities of leadership decision-making, and cultivating the individual-level characteristics 
that help a candidate stand out in a crowded race.  DSG enabled liberal Democrats denied access 
to leadership positions in the formal structures of the House to develop policy expertise, to build 
relationships with other members and key allies, to gain coalition building experience, as well as 
the development of a formidable reputation in the House.  Ultimately, the interaction of these 
individual-level characteristics and group organization enabled a liberal monopoly of Democratic 
leadership positions that continues today.   
The significance of DSG leader ambitions is easy to overlook, but their advancement 
fundamentally transformed leadership power.  The relative “liberalness” of policy outcomes may 
not have necessarily changed if other liberal members who did not come up through the DSG 
pipeline became the party’s whips, leaders, and Speakers.  But the lasting impact of procedural 
reform likely would have been considerably different.  DSG leaders were socialized into a culture 
where the preservation of the 1960s and 1970s reforms was prioritized, and they had a stake in 
preserving the institutional reforms championed by the group that other (liberal) Democrats did 
not.  Twenty-one years after DSG moved out of their Longworth offices, their organizational 
imprint on the House remains – with important implications for the role and power of party 
leaders.  DSG helped pioneer the modern whip system, which is now an agent of party discipline 
in the House.  Indeed, it is not surprising that the earliest movement of DSG allies and leaders 
into formal leadership posts occurred through the Democratic whip system. Tip O’Neill’s (D-
MA) appointment as majority whip and John Brademas’s (D-IN) as chief deputy in 1971 reflects 
DSG’s critical mobilization efforts throughout the 1960s.  In every succeeding Congress after 
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their appointments, the DSG Executive Committee was represented in the top leadership of the 
whip system. The significant increase in activity and effectiveness of the Democratic whip system 
beginning in the early 1970s has its roots in the leadership experiences of liberals in DSG, and 
was upheld through successive generations of DSG-Democratic leaders (Evans 2011).  In 
addition, DSG leaders were also uniquely positioned to learn about the role of information access 
in policymaking power and the development of party unity.  Richard Gephardt’s (D-MO) 
decision (at the suggestion of Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI)) in 1995 to hire DSG’s top staffers to 
develop an informational and research office within the Democratic leadership strengthened the 
role of party leaders in shaping party messaging on policy issues (Harris 2005).  This office 
today, while lacking the breadth and diversity of DSG’s research services, reflects the transition 
of DSG’s leaders and allies into the Democratic leadership. The loyalty and responsibility these 
members felt towards upholding the organizational role provided by DSG was not shared by rank 
and file liberal Democrats.99   
Of course, the leadership monopoly fostered by DSG would not have been possible 
without the adoption of many of the 1970s-era reforms.  Thus, I now turn to the second facet of 
institutional change – procedural change.  
                                                          
99 One DSG staffer (August 6, 2015) referred to Democrats immediately after the election as “chickens 
running around with their heads cut off.” This staffer (whose sentiments were reflected in other interviews) 
expressed disappointment that Democrats did not do more to protect DSG, and fight back against Gingrich.     
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6 | Procedural Change in the House of Representatives 
 
 
 
Legislative rules and procedures are a constant source of consternation for new members 
of Congress.  After a long campaign built on a platform of bringing “change” to Congress, most 
new members learn that the promises they made to their constituents are stymied by rules that 
limit their capacity to participate in Congress.  They control nearly every aspect of the U.S. 
Congress – from how party and committee leaders are selected, the involvement of the public and 
interest groups in shaping legislation, the power of the minority to oppose the majority, the level 
of media access, the quantity and quality of member debate, to the legislation ultimately adopted 
by Congress.  In the House, rules and procedures are employed to centralize nearly all legislative 
power in the majority party leadership or the committee system – but nearly always to the 
detriment of rank and file members.  Absent rules changes, it is very difficult for junior members 
to gain access to the leadership pipeline or to participate in the legislative process.  Indeed, the 
House Freedom Caucus’s chorus of pleas for a “return to regular order” in 2015 is a testament to 
the frustration junior members face in pursuing their goals, even in the majority party.1  Later that 
year, they leveraged their support for Rep. Paul Ryan’s (D-WI) Speaker bid in exchange for his 
promise that he would consider changes to rules and procedure that would empower rank and file 
Republicans.  The party’s failure to adopt any major reforms over the past 18 months reflects the 
limitations of piecemeal negotiations with party leaders during leadership elections.  If members 
want to change how Congress works and the legislation it produces, they need to develop a 
longer-term strategy. 
                                                          
1 “Regular order” is an idealized version of the legislative process that emphasizes member participation at 
every stage of the process.   
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As the previous chapters detail, junior liberals in the 1950s learned a similar lesson.  It 
was not sufficient for liberals to simply lobby party leaders or leverage their votes in leadership 
races; successful procedural reform efforts require overcoming a series of institutional hurdles.  
This chapter focuses on this stage, or the preceding activities necessary for successful procedural 
change before any votes are cast by members.  I argue that procedural reform is a member-driven 
process with multiple stages, and analyze how DSG empowered liberal leaders to advocate for a 
series of reforms designed to redistribute power between rank and file members, party leaders, 
and committee chairs.  DSG enabled liberal reformers to engage in a series of agenda-setting and 
coalition building activities; these activities include (1) researching House procedure to identify 
hurdles to their policy and power goals; (2) informing their fellow likeminded partisans about the 
need to reform House procedure; (3) developing consensus between members about the best way 
to reform the rules; and (4) mobilizing members to participate when their reforms came to a vote.  
Each of these activities enabled liberals to successfully overcome the bias towards the status quo 
in the formal structures of the House, and to enact a series of reforms that created the foundation 
of the contemporary U.S. House.  Although many scholars suggest that congressional reform is 
an inevitable byproduct of compositional changes within political parties (Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Wright 2000; Zelizer 2004), procedural reform is a uniquely member-driven process.   
Like the previous chapter, the analyses that follow are divided in two parts – process 
(Part I) and outcome (Part II).  Part I examines processes of procedural change in the House from 
the late 1950s to the mid-1970s.2  I analyze the role of organization in promoting each stage in the 
proposed process, and evaluate a series of procedural reforms against the proposed process.  Part 
II evaluates the success of each of liberal Democrats’ procedural reform proposals from 1959 -
                                                          
2 This period roughly aligns with what we might call the “reform era.”  Chapter 8 addresses the 
consideration and adoption of rules reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.   
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1976.  As the outcome of DSG’s procedural reform campaign has received extensive analysis in 
the literature, the bulk of the chapter focuses on processes of procedural change in the House 
Democratic Caucus in the 1950s-1970s.  In both sections, I weave several in-depth case study 
analyses, including the 21-day rule, recorded teller votes on amendments, the transformation of 
the Democratic whip from an appointed to an elected position, the 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act, and the creation of the Democratic Steering & Policy Committee.  
“Successful” and “failed” cases are included throughout the chapter.  Collectively, the analyses in 
Part I and II suggest that reform is not an automatic or passive event that occurs upon the election 
of a sizable number of likeminded members, but a longer-term process with a series of distinct 
stages.   
I begin by briefly examining the institutional environment that confronted junior liberals, 
and why a piecemeal reform process of study, information dissemination, consensus building, and 
mobilization is necessary for groups to successfully spur procedural change.   
Lessons Learned – Challenges to Procedural Change in the Textbook Congress 
In the 1950s, reform-oriented liberal Democrats confronted significant institutional 
hurdles to receiving consideration –  let alone adoption – of their procedural reform agenda.3  
There was little historical precedent for liberals to rely on to successfully guide their efforts.  
Other likeminded Democrats were uninterested and unengaged on issues of House procedure, 
which was not a salient issue for their constituents or in their electoral campaigns.  Party leaders 
                                                          
3 See chapter 4 for a longer discussion of procedural informational asymmetries, which ensure that 
members not only have little motivation to change legislative procedures (in contrast to most spatial 
accounts of institutional change), but they also have no understanding about how to change procedures.  
See chapter 3 for a discussion of the reticence expressed by party leaders to support liberal reform goals. 
Party leaders’ fear of a loss of power and/or their own leadership position underscores the ineffectiveness 
of piecemeal lobbying efforts in promoting long-term institutional change.    
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were wary of supporting any changes that might limit their own power, or risk their leadership 
position.   
And while existing theories of procedural reform largely assume that an increase in a 
faction’s ranks will help promote their cause, liberals in the 1950s and 1960s could not make the 
same calculation.  There simply was no established mechanism within the Democratic Caucus or 
the House for liberals to press their case and force a vote.  The result was that the group’s 
capacity to affect procedural change was based more on chance – whether they could receive a 
meeting with the Speaker, and whether they could convince the Speaker to support their 
proposal(s).  This was not a strategy for long-term success. 
In 1965, Congress finally established a (temporary) joint committee to examine 
organizational changes.  As amended by liberals, the resolution creating the committee provided 
for no restrictions on the scope of the committee’s responsibilities.4  In theory, this meant that the 
committee had the prerogative to address any change necessary to improve the function of the 
legislative branch.  In practice, it helped delay any sort of consensus between the parties about 
what type of forum was appropriate to consider changes to the seniority system and other 
procedural issues.  Indeed, while liberals were keenly aware of the need for a permanent body 
within Congress to consider changes to the legislature, neither party had yet agreed that party 
caucuses should function as the primary site of procedural reform within the House.5  Members 
                                                          
4 March 10, 1965 Dear Colleague letter from DSG executive committee, Part II, box 38, folder 3. April 8, 
1965 Dear Colleague letter from Reps. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Henry Reuss (D-MI), and Frank Thompson 
(D-NJ).  DSG papers, Part II, box 132, folder 7.   
5 The Report of the 1946 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress called for changes to internal 
party organization and a mechanism to “bring about more party accountability for policies and pledges.”  
The Report read “…if party accountability for policies and pledges is to be achieved, stronger and more 
formal mechanisms are necessary. The present steering committees, an informal and little-used device, 
seldom meet and never steer.” It recommended that the majority policy committee “hold frequent meetings 
to consider its role in expediting consideration and passage of matters pledged to the people by their party. 
[Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Congress (2nd session), March 4, 
1946, DSG papers, Part II, box 127, folder 5.] DSG’s executive committee called for a permanent joint 
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repeatedly testified across the Joint Committee’s hearings to express their opposition to, and 
support of, the seniority system.  And many offered their own diverse proposals to replace or 
augment the role of seniority in committee leadership selection.6  Members’ varied approaches to 
reforming the seniority system underscore not only the lack of consensus about potential reforms, 
but also where potential reforms should be addressed within Congress.  The Joint Committee 
ultimately decided against making seniority reforms an issue for the House floor: seniority “is a 
custom of both parties and can be disregarded when there is sufficient sentiment in either party to 
do so…Seniority is, therefore, a party matter” (emphasis added).7   
 The “sufficient sentiment” described above is in keeping with the dominant views in the 
congressional literature.  Most scholars argue that liberals successfully challenged existing 
legislative byways and the conservative monopoly on the committee system through their 
growing numbers in the House.  The election of a large number of junior members in the 1970s 
(which reached a crescendo with the election of the Watergate Babies in 1974) provided a new 
majority vote bloc without a stake in the existing institutional system (Schickler, McGhee and 
Sides 2003).  The liberal homogenization of the Democratic Caucus incentivized centralizing 
                                                          
House-Senate committee on congressional reorganization (similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy).  The proposal went nowhere, but it documents liberals’ early belief that Congress needed a 
permanent mechanism and body to continually consider changes to the internal organization and operation 
of Congress.  December 9, 1964. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “House Liberal Leaders Agree Tentatively on 
Eight Changes to Curb Conservatives’ Power,” James Deakin.  DSG papers, Part II, box 129, folder 9.   
6 Rep. Mo Udall (D-AZ) argued against the evils of seniority, and proposed electing chairmen by secret 
ballot by the three senior majority party members of the committee (May 12, 1965, Statement of Mo 
Udall).  Rep. D.R. Billy Matthews (D-FL) spoke on behalf of the seniority system, noting that it produced 
well-informed chairmen (May 13, 1965 Summary of Hearings).  Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA) testified in 
support of a system of rotating committee chairs among majority party members (May 17, 1965 Testimony 
of Chet Holifield).  Rep. John Rhodes (R-AZ) – who became minority leader in 1973 – said he “saw some 
merit in caucus election of committee chairmen.” (May 18, 1965 Summary of Hearings).  Rep. John 
Lindsay (R-NY) testified in support of chairmen election by the committee’s majority members (May 26, 
1965, Statement of John Lindsay).  And Rep. James O’Hara (D-MI) spoke in support of allowing party 
caucuses to not only nominate, but vote on each nominated chairman by secret ballot (with the most senior 
member receiving the initial nomination) (June 3, 1965 Summary of Hearings).  DSG papers, Part II, box 
128, folder 1.   
7 Final Report of the Joint Committee, Pursuant to S.Con.Res.2, July 28, 1966.  DSG papers, Part II, box 
128, folder 2.  
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power in party leaders who could effectively advocate on behalf of their interests (Rohde 1991).  
The result was the dissipation of the coalition of urban big machine Democrats and southern 
conservatives that Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) fought so hard to protect (Polsby 2004).   
While these accounts rightly connect compositional changes within the party to concrete 
changes in House and party rules, they obscure the critical – and necessary – intervening stages 
prior to the adoption of the historic reforms of the 1970s.  How did members decide which 
procedural reforms to support?  How did junior liberals overcome the stark participation 
problems confronting their cohort?  And absent a forum or venue to even discuss procedural 
reform, how did liberals successfully develop one?  This chapter focuses on these intervening 
processes.   
If neither Democratic leaders nor official congressional channels would provide a venue 
to consider changes to the seniority system and other areas of congressional organization, liberals 
created their own forum through DSG.  I argue that DSG provided a platform and forum for 
members to learn about and study existing legislative procedure, to draft and debate potential 
reforms, and to build relationships with allies inside and outside of Congress.  If group-led 
procedural change in Congress is predicated on the emergence of a large group of likeminded 
members (Rohde 1991; Schickler, McGhee and Sides 2003), then DSG made it possible for 
liberals to capitalize on rising “sentiment” as soon as their ranks increased in the 1970s.  More 
specifically, the organization of DSG enabled liberal reformers to engage in a four-stage process 
of procedural change; these stages include 1) researching the linkage between existing rules and 
procedures and their policy goals; 2) informing members about the need to reform the rules; 3) 
developing a consensus between members about the best way to reform the rules to enable their 
policy goals; and 4) mobilizing members to participate when specific rules proposals were 
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debated and voted on.8  Each of these stages overcomes significant power, informational, and 
participation asymmetries that exist between members, including differences between liberals and 
conservatives, and junior and senior members, in the textbook era.      
The theory of procedural change offered here is not incompatible with existing theories 
of institutional change that stress the emergence of a large group of likeminded members in 
spurring de(centralizing) adjustments to existing rules and procedures (Rohde 1991; Schickler, 
Sides and McGhee 2003).  DSG enabled liberal reformers to engage in the critical agenda-setting 
and coalition-building work necessary for the successful adoption of reform in the historic 
Democratic organizing meetings in 1972 and 1974.  Where my theory of procedural change 
departs is in its understanding of procedural reform as an active process more akin to the normal 
legislative process, rather than a static event where members play a passive role.  Many scholars 
view procedural reform as a mere byproduct of the emergence of a large group of likeminded 
members – incentives within the party change; the rules change to compensate.  In the theory 
offered here, members themselves comprise the pressure group necessary to force a static 
institution like the House to adopt major reform (in contrast to interest group-driven models 
(Wright 2000; Zelizer 2004)).   
Moreover, the intervening stages that occur in-between often remain an unexplained 
black-box in most spatial, and even many group-driven, accounts.  The theory offered here 
contributes to this literature by identifying and explaining the critical intervening stages necessary 
to link the emergence of new interests in Congress to concrete changes in House and party rules 
and byways.  Procedural change requires just as much careful research, negotiation, lobbying, and 
mobilization, as policy change under the normal legislative process.  Existing theories provide 
                                                          
8 Some of these stages may occur simultaneously, rather than sequentially. But all are necessary 
preconditions for the adoption of group-driven procedural change in Congress.   
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excellent accounts of when procedural change is likely to occur in Congress, but they are not as 
useful in explaining how and why the resulting changes look like they do.  Why did the 1970s 
reforms simultaneously empower both the rank and file and the leadership?  Why were specific 
reforms to the Rules Committee adopted and not others?     
I now turn to an analysis of how DSG leaders strategically employed the organization’s 
resources and tools to develop and advocate for a series of procedural reforms to further liberal 
policy goals.   
PART I: 
Processes of Procedural Change in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 Liberal Democrats learned quickly that piecemeal lobbying of the leadership and 
singularly extracted promises are not an effective strategy for long-term, mass institutional 
change.  Indeed, as reform leaders wrote in a letter to their fellow Democrats in November 1958, 
“there is a tremendous amount of research, drafting, organizational work, and personal contact to 
be done among our colleagues if we are to succeed.”9  In this section, I analyze the process 
through which DSG enabled liberal leaders to effectively advocate for the adoption of procedural 
reform by providing them with the organizational support necessary to develop a reform agenda 
and build a coalition of supporters inside and outside of Congress.  My research of the archival 
record and interview data suggest that liberals’ successful pursuit of procedural reform in the 
1960s and 1970s is not solely due to the size of their vote bloc.  Rather, liberals effectively 
capitalized on their increased ranks because they successfully undertook a series of preliminary 
stages long before the reforms even came to a vote.    
 
                                                          
9 November 12, 1958 letter from Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ), George Rhodes (D-MI), Henry Reuss (D-
MI), and Lee Metcalf (D-WY) to John E. Moss (D-CA). DSG Papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1.  
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Preliminary Research 
Research on congressional organization, and the relationship between House and party 
procedure and policy outcomes, constitutes the first stage of the process of procedural change.  
This information-collecting stage is usually noted by scholars of institutional change (Rohde 
1991; Schickler 2001) as a component of the reform-drafting process, although its inherent 
difficulties are often overlooked.  In most accounts of congressional reform, members are 
overloaded with information from “lengthy hearings, symposia, surveys, public appeals, 
academic consultations, roundtables, and so forth” (Deering and Smith 1996, 47).  But in both the 
historical and contemporary U.S. Congress, members struggle to even develop parliamentary 
expertise, let alone learn about the connection between specific rules and policy goals.  Simply 
put, reformers cannot “reform” legislative procedure if they do not even know what aspects need 
“reforming.”   
From the late 1950s through the 1990s, DSG developed a reservoir of institutional 
knowledge and staff resources on the rules of the House of Representatives and the Democratic 
Caucus.  Absent a compendium of current congressional precedent, or the vote records of 
committee chairmen, DSG developed its own.  The group carefully researched why specific rules 
disproportionately limited specific policy goals (such as an omnibus housing bill), and the 
implications of specific reforms for broader issues (such as majority party and leadership power, 
and transparency).  The information provided immediately digestible and usable evidence to 
persuade members and leaders to support DSG’s reform agenda.  These informational resources 
enabled the group to develop a dynamic procedural reform agenda – one attuned to the policy and 
political demands of a specific point in time.      
 As chapter three details, it took several years after DSG’s founding for the group to 
develop a steady financial resource stream and staff support.  In the interim years, liberals relied 
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extensively on the Library of Congress to conduct research on House procedure.  In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the Legislative Reference Service (the precursor to the Congressional 
Research Service) conducted several studies on DSG’s behalf.  Among them include a history of 
the Rules Committee and its relationship to majority party and leadership power, and a summary 
of common arguments made by members on the House floor against reforms to specific 
legislative rules and procedures.  These studies gave liberal leaders a historical and pragmatic 
foundation to understand the role of the Rules Committee and other legislative features in the 
House, including the 21-day rule and the Calendar Wednesday procedure.   
 Shortly thereafter, DSG began one of its most significant – and almost entirely unknown 
– research efforts known as “Project Saltmine.”10  In the 1950s and 1960s, liberals lacked access 
to an updated compendium of House procedure and precedent.  While this asymmetry between 
members undoubtedly made it difficult for junior members to protect their individual 
parliamentary rights to participate (see chapter four), it also made procedural reform more 
difficult.  Liberal reformers can hardly expect to change the rules if they do not even know the 
status of existing rules and procedures.  Thus in 1961, DSG chairman Chet Holifield (D-CA) 
instructed executive director William “Bill” Phillips to begin putting together a current 
compilation of congressional precedents.  The project was to be jointly managed by Phillips and 
Frederick “Fred” Sontag, a staffer for Republican Tom Curtis (R-MO).11   
The aim of the project was to compile a complete set of rulings of the Chair in points of 
order, parliamentary inquires with the force of rulings, rules changes, and construction of House 
                                                          
10 I asked former House Parliamentarian Charles Johnson who was an apprentice to Parliamentarian Lewis 
Deschler in the 1960s, about “Project Saltmine” and he had never heard of the effort.  “Saltmine” was an 
independent effort by members and their staff alone.  August 22, 1966 letter from Yale University 
Professor Andrew Walker to John Morgan. DSG papers, Part II, box 159, folder 4.   
11 Holifield and Curtis were close allies on the effort as access to congressional precedent was one of the 
few major issues during this time period that equally (and significantly) affected majority and minority 
party members, and junior members alike.   
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rules.  If the “Parliamentarian can find a precedent both for and against a proposed legislative 
action” (Bolling 1966, 113), liberals wanted to make sure they too had access to whatever 
precedent existed in their favor.12  The project required considerable resources.  Phillips and 
Sontag approached several foundations to fund the effort, including the Carnegie Foundation, the 
Taconic Foundation, and the William Volker Fund, and Congressional Quarterly offered their 
assistance as well.13  By 1964, a total of 5 staffers (including Phillips, Sontag, and some outside 
academics) worked part-time to complete the painstaking research.  The name “Project Saltmine” 
is indicative of the meticulous, all-consuming attention required of the research.  Staffers read 
paper copies of the Congressional Record line by line, and recorded every relevant motion and 
ruling, from the New Deal era to the 1960s.14   
The archival record does not reveal whether the compendium was ever completed 
(records continue until 1969).  Nevertheless, the significant reservoir of information it represented 
occasionally enabled liberals to challenge rulings on the floor – the ultimate goal of the project.15  
For example, liberals used the precedent research to ensure a package amendment adding 
education funding to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill in July 1969 was allowed to proceed to a 
vote.16  If each of the amendments had been voted on separately, they likely would have failed; 
                                                          
12 Many did not trust the Parliamentarian to provide this resource (see chapter four).   
13 It is unclear if any of these foundations ultimately funded Saltmine, however the Carnegie Foundation 
provided the American Political Science Association with a grant to study congressional organization. CQ 
executive editor and vice president, Thomas N. Schroth, wrote to the group to offer CQ’s assistance in 
completing the project, which likely reflects CQ’s own interest in having an updated compilation of House 
precedent in order to effectively cover debate on the House floor.  October 9, 1967 letter from Thomas N. 
Schroth to Tom Curtis. DSG Papers, Box 133, folder 1.    
14 Archival records of the final product are incomplete, but “Saltmine” was clearly a hands-on, extensive 
effort.  Most pages in the compendium are a series of small sections of the Congressional Record, which 
have been cut and pasted on to sheets of paper.   
15 August 22, 1966 letter from Yale University professor, Andrew Walker, to John Morgan, DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 159, folder 4. Walker wrote, “We had all hoped that in compiling a new set of precedents some 
of the power now resting in the Speaker and the Parliamentarian [to rule “the way they wish”] would be 
taken away.”  
16 July 29, 1969, 4:35pm, DSG Whip Call: “This is a DSG whip call. It is essential that members go to the 
floor and stay there. A vote on the Joelson amendment is expected shortly.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 102, 
folder 4.  
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the precedent forced the parliamentarian to rule that the package was in order, and it ultimately 
passed 242 to 106.17  One lobbyist active on the bill acknowledged the key role of the group’s 
research, we “had to concede that these liberals had done their homework for a change and had 
looked up some precedents and stuff” (Kingdon 1973, 119, emphasis added).   
 The emphasis on research often left the group open to criticism from more activist 
members, but it ensured that the group’s procedural reform agenda was responsive to current 
needs, rather than a static slate of changes.18  When the group’s research indicated a reform was 
no longer necessary, its leaders stopped pursuing it.   
 21-Day Rule. Liberal Democrats’ pursuit of the 21-day rule exemplifies the critical role 
of preliminary research in carefully crafting rules based on existing precedent, policy 
implications, and the current legislative environment.  The 21-day rule provides a mechanism for 
the House to bypass the committee with jurisdiction over legislation if it has not been reported by 
the committee within 21 or more days.  The 21-day rule is often viewed as a check on the Rules 
Committee because it provides a way for legislation that has not been granted a rule by the 
committee to be heard on the floor.  Or as a 1962 Washington Post editorial declared, 
“Unquestionably, the House needs the Rules Committee as a traffic regulator, but the 21-day 
safety switch is needed to prevent the light from being permanently stuck on red.”19 While 
ultimately only in effect from 1965-1966, this period coincided with the adoption of many of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs.   
                                                          
17 July 30, 1969 DSG Whip Call: “This is a DSG whip call. The vote on the Joelson amendment will occur 
at 4:15pm. Passed 242-106; r.c. 293-120.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 102, folder 4.  
18 For example, Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) wrote to DSG Chairman Donald Fraser on March 16, 1970: 
“Whenever we don’t want to get to the “guts” of an issue which has been discussed and debated for a long 
time, we [DSG] immediately establish another commission to do another study! We are already sinking 
under the weight of studies and analyses which have been done on poverty, education, reorganization of 
Congress and whatever. I would suggest that the Congress cease talking and begin to act immediately” 
(emphasis added). DSG Papers, Part II, box 122, folder 8.  
19 July 30, 1962. “Modernizing Congress: II,” pg. A12, Washington Post. DSG Papers, box 129, folder 6.  
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In November 1958, as reformers prepared for an influx of junior liberals, the nascent 
DSG leadership began conducting research on the historical precedent for adoption of the 21-day 
rule, which suggested that it served as an effective Rules Committee check.20  When it was in 
effect during the 81st Congress, legislation providing for Hawaiian and Alaskan statehood, a 
Rivers and Harbors bill, the National Science Foundation bill, an anti-poll tax bill, a veterans’ 
hospital bill, and a joint resolution providing for U.S. participation in international organizations, 
was brought to the floor.21  This historical precedent suggested that the twin failures of the 
Omnibus Housing and Area Redevelopment bills at the end of the 85th Congress (1958) would 
not have occurred had the 21-day rule been in effect.   
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA) included the reinstatement of the 21-day rule among the 
three procedural reforms he brought to Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) in January 1959.  Although 
Rayburn did not support its reinstatement, liberals did not abandon the reform goal and continued 
their research into its efficacy.22  And in December 1964, on the eve of a large influx of junior 
members, DSG again placed the reinstatement of the 21-day rule at the top of its reform agenda.23  
The group was careful however, to learn from historical precedent and their own experiences with 
Speaker Rayburn in 1959.  The group’s research revealed two primary limitations of the rule 
drafted in 1949 – 1) it was temporary – valid only for a single congress; and 2) it required action 
by the chairman of the standing legislative committee that had originally reported the bill.   
                                                          
20 Confidential “Proposed Master Plan and Timetable for Efforts to Liberalize House Rules,” 1958.  DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1.  
21 According to the group’s research, the rule also forced the Rules Committee to report other legislation, 
including minimum wage, social security, and public housing legislation.  “Background Information – 
Proposed Changes in House Rules,” 1958. DSG Papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1. 
22 October 26, 1960 Legal Research Memorandum, “Analysis of Proposals to Overcome Legislative 
Obstruction by the Rules Committee.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 136, folder 10.   
23 The reinstatement of the 21-day rule was the first of 8 procedural reform proposals endorsed by DSG’s 
executive committee in December 1964. “House Liberal Leaders Agree Tentatively on Eight Changes to 
Curb Conservatives’ Power,” James Deakin, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 9, 1964, DSG Papers, Part 
II, box 129, folder 9.   
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The newly drafted rule was strategically crafted to address these issues, and garner 
Speaker John McCormack’s (D-MA) support.  It provided for a permanent change in House rules, 
and empowered the Speaker to permit committees to call up a rule for adoption by majority vote 
on the floor if the Rules Committee refused to act.  As one DSG leader told the Wall Street 
Journal, “Precedent, which is pretty important around here, was all on the side of giving the 
power to the chairmen of the committee which had written the legislation. But we figured we’d 
get along a lot better with the Speaker if we could show we were interested in helping him” 
(emphasis added).24  Whereas the 1949 drafted rule mandated that the Speaker recognize the 
committee chairman to call up a rule, the 1965 drafted rule gave the Speaker discretion to 
recognize any (supporting) majority party committee member to call up a bill.25  Liberals’ plan 
succeeded.  McCormack not only supported it, but he spoke out personally on the House floor in 
support of the provision, including its permanent change in the rules.  The 21-day rule was 
adopted with a six-vote margin (224-202).   
This permanent change in House rules only lasted for the 89th Congress.  The 21-day rule 
was abolished at the start of the 90th – unsurprising given the narrow margin of the 1965 vote, the 
steep drop in liberal membership after the 1966 election, and the fact that liberals did not even 
mount an effort to keep it.  However, it was used six times during the 89th Congress, and was 
widely attributed as a critical factor in the success of President Johnson’s agenda.26  While the 
                                                          
24 “The House Liberals,” Wall Street Journal, pg. 14. Joseph W. Sullivan, February 16, 1965, DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 129, folder 9.   
25 1966. "House Rules Changes Enhance Majority Rule." CQ Almanac 1965(21): 585-90. Washington, DC.  
26 Among the six applications of the rule was a key policy goal of DSG and its chairman at the time, Rep. 
Frank Thompson (D-NJ) – House repeal of section 14(b) of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, otherwise known as 
the “right to work” provision.  Thompson chaired the Special Labor Subcommittee and introduced H.R. 77, 
which would have barred states from adopting “right to work” laws.  Thompson’s bill was stuck in the 
Rules Committee and only received a floor vote because of the 21-day rule, which Education & Labor 
Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) triggered in July 1965.  The bill ultimately died in the 
Senate, but its approval in the House underscores the significance of not only this singular procedural 
reform, but DSG’s strategic pursuit of reforms to enable their policy goals. July 22, 1965 memo from 
Thompson to Members re 1965 Supplement to Fact Sheet 8 – H.R. 77 (H. Rept. 540) Repeal of Section 
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rule was in effect, not a single Great Society program was buried in the Rules Committee.  In the 
years to follow – and with the eventual ascension of moderate Rep. Ray J. Madden (D-IN) to the 
Rules chairmanship in 1973 – liberals’ research suggested that the 21-day rule was no longer a 
necessary or effective procedural reform goal.27   
Information Dissemination 
The second stage in the adoption of procedural reform (and enforcement) is simply 
informing members about the relationship between specific rules and procedures, and power and 
policy outcomes in Congress.  Theories of institutional change generally assume that frustrated 
members of Congress are already aware of the necessity and high stakes involved in the 
enactment of procedural reform, but this is rarely the case.  Instead, members often must be 
explicitly informed – a thorny task rife with the potential to stir up conflict between party 
members and leaders.  DSG’s information campaign aimed to persuade members that the rules 
were malleable based on members’ support or opposition, and that rules (and norms treated as 
rules) had significant power and policy implications.   
 It seems somewhat obvious to political scientists, especially in the 1950s, that the 
seniority system has enumerable effects on policy and leadership in the House (1950 APSA 
Report).  But it was not apparent to most members.  At the time, members received little to no 
                                                          
14(b) of Taft-Hartley Act, DSG Papers, Part II, box 151, folder 6. “Right to Work’ Repeal Defeated by 
Filibuster.” in CQ Almanac 1965(21): 818-31.  
27 After Rules Chairman Howard Smith’s (D-VA) electoral defeat, liberals leveraged their promise not to 
oppose 2nd ranking Rep. William Colmer (D-MS) to negotiate regular meetings of the Rules Committee (in 
1967), and regular meetings of the Democratic Caucus (in 1969).  In 1972, the 21-day rule was officially 
abandoned as unnecessary given Madden’s impending take over as chairman [July 31, 1972 Minutes of the 
Committee for Congressional Reform: “The 21-day rule was also considered for our attention. It was 
decided that there was not a great need for changing this rule particularly in view of the likelihood of Rep. 
Ray Madden becoming Chairman of the Rules Committee in the near future.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 
154, folder 7].  
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formal orientation to the House.28  And in a static legislative institution, members are naturally 
predisposed to simply assume that the rules themselves are largely unchangeable.  Before 
convincing members about the need to even change the rules, DSG first had to undertake what 
executive director Dick Conlon called an “educational job”:   
“We sit here and talk to one another and we know about the power relationships in the 
House and how they work. The average member doesn’t know about that. This is the 
most eye-opening thing I ever did to call and ask on this.  There were members who 
thought that the seniority system and the way we did things was in the House Rules or in 
the law and I even encountered one guy who thought it was in the Constitution. And 
those that do have a sense of the relationship and so forth feel that [the seniority system] 
it’s the best of all possible systems…So we’ve clearly got to educate before we can make 
changes.”29  
This “educational job” posed a direct challenge to both party leaders and the party brand.  
Speakers Sam Rayburn (D-TX) and John McCormack (D-MA) had a strong incentive to suppress 
information that would pit one faction against another – their leadership position depended on 
their ability to cultivate and promote their fellow partisans’ shared interests.30  DSG’s distribution 
of information on the implications of the seniority system for liberals, or the 
                                                          
28 The Democratic leadership began officially orienting new members to the House in 1976.  In the interim, 
members were left to other, informal means of learning about legislative byways.  On April 10th, 1959, 
Rep. Charles O. Porter (D-OR) described his orientation to Congress on the House floor as follows: 
“Shortly after the election a Representative-elect receives a 13-page booklet from the Clerk of the House. It 
tells him about his pay, staff salaries, office equipment, allowances for travel, stamps, telephone, and 
telegraph. The Congressional Secretaries Club publishes an “Official Congressional handbook” with tested 
suggestions for office procedures, but there is no handbook for a freshman Congressman. When I arrived 
on the Hill in December 1956 I asked the Library of Congress to provide me with anything it might have in 
the way of advice from veteran lawmakers on “how to be a Congressman.” The librarians reported they 
could find nothing of the sort. Finally they sent over Jerry Voorhis’ “Confessions of a Congressman” – a 
worthwhile book for a freshman to read, by the way, but not what I had in mind.” DSG papers, Part II, box 
123, folder 6.   
29 Chronology of Caucus and House Reforms, 1969-1975.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 127, folder 4.  
30 Majority leader Carl Albert’s (D-OK) comments on the floor of the Caucus on September 15, 1971 
provides a nice illustration of the leadership’s attitudes towards consensus and dissension within the party: 
The Democratic Caucus’s “legitimate role is most decidedly not to provide an arena where ideological, 
geographic or ethnic Democrats of a certain stripe or coloration may win points or games against equally 
genuine Democrats of somewhat different backgrounds. Neither, may I add, do I feel the proper role of our 
Party Caucus to be some type of medieval star chamber or Communist Politburo charged with the 
responsibility of applying a litmus test for political orthodoxy… There is no doubt in my mind, however, 
that, for the Democratic Party, and this includes all who choose to stand under its broad umbrella, such a 
public display of crying and gnashing of teeth, is obviously counter productive.”  
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(un)representativeness of committee chairs of the broader Caucus, would undoubtedly provoke 
controversy and dissension within the party (and cause significant headaches for party leaders).  
And of course, liberals were somewhat concerned about the possibility of provoking party 
switchers if they publicized member voting records.31    
Nevertheless, liberals began distributing reports that summarized DSG’s research 
findings on the role of legislative and party rules on members’ power and policy goals almost 
immediately.  In 1959, three months after the establishment of DSG, the group distributed a 
memorandum on “The Republican-Southern Democratic Coalition” that traced its impact on a 
wide range of policy areas from the New Deal era.  The report argued that legislation on issues 
like education, civil rights, public works, taxation and others were continually stymied by the 
coalition, and analyzed several potential causal factors.32    
In subsequent years, DSG conducted piecemeal analyses of chairmen’s voting records, 
and leadership reputations and style in the House, including those of District Chairman John 
McMillian (D-SC), and Rules Chairmen Howard Smith (D-VA) and William Colmer (D-MS).33  
This research was particularly important for junior members who had little to no contact with 
their own committee’s chairman, let alone those of other committees.  These efforts were 
                                                          
31 March 3, 1969 memo from Conlon to Fraser re proposed DSG voting study strategy. Part II, box 136, 
folder 11.  
32 These factors included not only procedural roadblocks and the seniority system, but also the one-party 
system in the south, a lack of communication and unity of purpose within the Democratic party, 
“antiquated” apportionment formulas which over-represent rural interests, and the need to realign the party 
system.  December 1959 Staff Memorandum, Part II, box 120, folder 7.  
33 For example, a December 1966 Background Paper on the Rules Committee analyzed Rep. William 
Colmer’s (D-MS) voting record in anticipation of his ascension to the chairmanship.  It noted that he voted 
against the “Democratic Party’s program an average of 54% in the period 1961-66 inclusive. He voted in 
support of the Party position 18.16% in the same period.”  DSG Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 1. 
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eventually copied and modeled by liberal interest groups outside of Congress, including Common 
Cause, but DSG was the first to develop and disseminate these analyses.34   
In 1969, DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) and new executive director Dick 
Conlon oversaw a significant expansion of research services for members, especially on 
procedural reform.  Both were committed to developing quality, in-depth information services for 
members.  As a former journalist, Conlon also strengthened DSG’s relationships with local 
editorial boards, including the Washington Post.35  Though Fraser was careful to avoid personal 
attacks against committee chairmen, the studies of the seniority system and committee chair 
voting records published during his tenure as chairman are arguably the most well-known and 
cited of the group’s “educational job” (Rohde 1991; Schickler 2001).   
Fraser initiated a two-part study of voting in the 89th, 90th, and other congresses, that 
categorized members’ voting along four dimensions: Liberal-Conservative orientation, 
Administration support, support of Democratic Party Principles, and Party Unity.  The report was 
damning in its assessment of committee chairmen’s representation of their own districts, as well 
as the national Democratic Party.  The worst-supporting chairmen not only represented 
constituents with the lowest level of income and education (and thus most in need of the 
legislation supported by liberals), but on the most important floor votes:  
Chairmen “not only voted against the Democratic Administration, Democratic Party 
principles, and the majority of Democratic congressmen who gave them their coveted 
chairmanships, but were also directly responsible for the defeat of many Democratic 
programs and policies” (emphasis added).36  
                                                          
34 Common Cause Report on House Committee Chairmen, DSG Papers, Part II, box 122, folder 3.  
Although this study is undated, the earliest it could have been prepared and distributed is 1970 as Common 
Cause was not established until that year.     
35 In the 1970s, these papers regularly received DSG’s research on congressional reform, and wrote opinion 
pieces emphasizing the linkage between procedure and policy.   
36 1968 “Voting in the House” DSG Report. Part II, box 173, folder 1.   
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The study was strategically released to the press in order to garner additional attention for the 
relationship between the seniority system and the success of Democratic policies in Congress.37  
Liberal reformer and Rules Committee member Richard Bolling (D-MO) declared the study the 
“definitive illustration for the thesis that Southern Democrats in their capacity as committee 
chairmen and sub-committee chairmen, are not National Democrats.”38   
In addition to “bad voting” on the floor, DSG provided members with information on 
members’ voting in committee and on veto over-ride attempts, as well as their collective interest 
group ratings.  All were published as Special Reports, which was DSG’s primary outlet for 
distributing “partisan” or “ideologically” driven information.  Many full committee and 
subcommittee chairmen voted to sustain Republican vetoes from 1956 to 1975, directly against 
the expressed preferences of the majority of the House.39  “DSG Democrats” were significantly 
more supportive of groups representing education, labor, senior citizens, rural/farm, and women’s 
interests than non-DSG Democrats.40  
Of course, liberal reformers were keenly aware that vote records arguably amounted to an 
ideological litmus test, which most members were opposed to instituting.41  Thus DSG distributed 
information not only on member voting records, but the implications of the seniority system and 
southern conservatives’ monopoly for the leadership opportunities available to junior members.  
                                                          
37 March 3, 1969 memo from executive director Conlon to Fraser re proposed DSG voting study strategy.  
Part II, box 136, folder 11.  
38 It is important to note that while Bolling was sporadically aligned with DSG in the early to mid-1960s, he 
never served on DSG’s leadership and was not involved in the development of the vote study.  March 11, 
1969 letter from Bolling to the Editorial Page Editor of the St. Louis Dispatch. DSG Papers, Part II, 175, 
folder 7.  
39 The study also explicitly linked procedure and policy: “As a result, Democratic performance on the Farm 
Bill was the worst in two decades while party performance on Strip Mining was second worst.” June 23, 
1975 Special Report (No. 94-7), “Veto Override Votes, 1956-1975,” DSG Papers, Part II, box 172, folder 
4.   
40 July 25, 1975 Special Report No. 94-9 “Interest group Ratings and House Voting blocs”. 151:3.  
41 Footnote to Party Support Findings, Report on Committee Chairmen. DSG Papers, Part II, box 173, 
folder 6.   
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In February 1971, DSG produced a report on House committee chairmen that explicitly linked 
junior members’ own power goals to the adoption of seniority reforms.  The report, entitled “Age 
and Tenure of House Committee Chairmen,” provided concrete evidence that the seniority system 
produced chairmen who were not only unrepresentative ideologically of the Democratic Caucus, 
but also disproportionately far older than other members.42   
And on the eve of the historic Democratic Caucus organizing meeting in December 1974, 
DSG distributed a report categorizing chairmen based on their competence, misuse of power, and 
non-compliance with Caucus rules and bylaws.  The report provided members with an easy 
heuristic with which to evaluate committee chairmen.  Of the six chairmen targeted by DSG that 
year, four received direct challenges by the Democratic Caucus (three of which were ultimately 
successful).43   
 The group disseminated information on the role of legislative and party rules for 
members’ policy and power goals in other ways too.  In the 1960s, executive committee members 
conducted radio and television interviews that linked the passage of specific policy goals to the 
structure of the Rules Committee – often to the ire of Rules Committee Chairman Howard 
Smith.44   And DSG regularly held seminars for both members and their staff on parliamentary 
procedure. The policy and power implications of procedure were apparent in these sessions.  
                                                          
42 February 1, 1971 “Age and Tenure of House Committee Chairmen.” DSG Papers, Part I, box 7, folder 4.   
43 DSG critiqued the competence of Patman and Madden; the misuse of power of Hebert, Hays, and 
Madden; the non-compliance with Caucus rules of Hebert, Hays, Teague and Mahon; and the voting record 
of Poage, Hebert and Teague.  
44 For example, after a 1960 radio appearance by DSG leaders, Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ) and Lee 
Metcalf (D-WY) [1960 Congressional Radio Program Text Address re Changes in the House Rules, Part I, 
box 54, folder 10], Smith publicly denounced the comments [Draft resolution denouncing criticism of 
Howard Smith, Chairman of the Rules Committee, for criticizing the radio address of member of DSG for 
discussion of rules reform, Part I, box 49, folder 5]. DSG also distributed sample responses that members 
could use during weekly radio program appearances.  In 1959, for example executive director Bill Phillips 
sent a memo to members that encouraged members to link their own capacity to provide “major legislation 
for the benefit of your district” to their success making “more democratic the processes of the Rules 
Committee.”  February 27, 1959 memo from Phillips to Democrats re weekly radio programs, Part II, box 
37, folder 1.   
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They included not only basic information on House rules, but also how legislative sponsors can 
overcome obstruction by relevant committee chairs and the Rules Committee, as well as how 
factions can petition the Rules Committee to receive different rules.45   
Record Teller Vote Challenges. Liberals’ concerted effort to protect recorded teller votes 
on amendments underscores the critical role information plays in reducing uncertainty around the 
effects of specific procedural reforms, overcoming committee and leadership opposition, and 
persuading likely supporters.  Though conservatives never mounted a significant, coordinated 
effort to overturn the procedural reforms adopted in the 1960s and 1970s, individual challenges 
such as these emerged every few years.46   
In 1970, liberals secured adoption of recorded teller votes on amendments in the 
Committee of the Whole.  Historically, amendment votes were anonymous; the reform provided 
for recorded votes on demand of 20 members (or one-fifth of a quorum in the Committee of the 
Whole).  It went into effect in 1971, and over the next several years, conservatives repeatedly 
criticized the procedure as over-used.  In response, Fraser requested that DSG conduct a study to 
respond to these complaints:  
“When I was on the floor the other day while we were having some teller votes, I 
overheard some comments suggesting that teller votes were too easy to get and were 
being used too much. This reaffirms my conviction that we need to do some studying of 
the teller program itself… Wouldn’t an increase in the number required to secure a teller 
vote simply result in more quorum calls?”47 
DSG took Fraser’s suggestion and released a report, “The First Year of Record Voting,” that 
analyzed the usage and effectiveness of recorded tellers.48  The report responded to the “fears” of 
                                                          
45 October 15, 1969 memo from executive director Conlon to Administrative and Legislative Assistants of 
DSG Members.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 1.   
46 The initial adoption of this reform will be discussed extensively in Part II of this chapter 
47 December 10, 1971 memo from Fraser to Conlon re recorded teller votes. Part II, box 131, folder 2. 
48 January 27, 1972 “The First Year of Record Teller Voting,” Part II, box 81, folder 1.  
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members that recorded tellers might evolve into a tool of obstruction similar to the Senate 
filibuster, and linked the adoption of the reform to members’ policy goals.  The report found that 
conservatives “won” about half of the 103 record teller votes, while a quarter represented liberal 
“wins”; the rest were mixed or neither.  According to the report, the fact that a single “liberal 
amendment of any substance” succeeded in 1971 was a testament to the success of the procedure.  
And it provided ammunition for Fraser to defend the current procedure when the Caucus met a 
month later.49  He succeeded and the 20-member threshold was maintained as the level of support 
necessary for a recorded teller vote.   
Complaints of teller overuse continued through the summer of 1973.  Speaker Carl Albert 
(D-OK), Rules Committee Chairman Ray J. Madden (D-IN), and conservatives proposed 
increasing the number of members necessary for a recorded teller to 44, or one-fifth of a quorum 
of the full House.50  In response, DSG again sought to respond to the criticisms through the 
release of another Special Report entitled “Record Teller Votes in the 93rd Congress.”51  The 
report provided further evidence that an increase in recorded tellers is not due to overuse of the 
procedure, but rather a significant increase in legislative activity during the same period.  It again 
argued that an increase in the number of members required for a recorded teller would simply 
lead to more quorum calls.   
The reports released by DSG proved critical when the issue came to the House floor on 
April 9, 1974.  In its coverage of the debate, Congressional Quarterly recounted how DSG 
provided “figures showing that the increase in votes in 1973 was due mostly to demands for 
recorded votes on final passage of bills, not on amendments.”  Fraser testified before the Rules 
                                                          
49 January 4, 1972 from Fraser to Teague. Part II, box 131, folder 4.  
50 Some proposed an even larger number, as high as 88.     
51 July 10, 1973 Special Report. July 16, 1973 Supplement to DSG Special Report – Record Teller Votes in 
the 93rd Congress. DSG Papers, Part II, box 81, folder 1.  
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Committee, which held hearings on the issue, and provided additional evidence demonstrating 
that the recorded votes on amendments were “rather close,” and thus justifiable.  Conservative 
Republican Del Clawson (R-CA) subsequently requested several copies of DSG’s reports, which 
he then shared with other Republicans.52  Though the Special Reports were geared towards a 
liberal audience, Clawson found DSG’s arguments and evidence about the underlying cause of 
increased recorded teller votes persuasive.  The odd resulting coalition of conservative 
Republicans and staunch liberals elected to keep the 20-member level by a vote of 252-147.  
DSG’s information campaign overcame leadership and committee opposition, and brokered the 
Republican support necessary to succeed on the House floor.   
 
Consensus Building 
The third stage in group-driven procedural change in the House is the development of a 
consensus between members about the most appropriate, effective way to amend existing rules to 
achieve a given policy or power goal.  Scholarly agreement that the emergence of new groups in 
Congress will precipitate (de)centralizing changes to the distribution of power (Rohde 1991) 
often obscures the fact that there are many varied ways that House and party rules can be 
adjusted.  Ideological congruity does not necessarily translate into procedural congruity.  The 
benefit of historical perspective renders the reforms adopted by the Democratic Caucus in the 
1970s seemingly obvious; of course the party would adopt rules centralizing power as Democrats 
became more ideologically homogenous.   
                                                          
52 April 13, 1974, “Bipartisan Efforts to Retain House Voting Procedure Approved,” Congressional 
Quarterly. DSG Papers, Part II, box, 137, folder 7.   
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But there was no pre-established unity about the best way to alter leadership and 
committee power, or opportunities for member participation.  Rather, liberals developed 
mechanisms through DSG to enable consensus building, including repeated debates and meetings 
of the group’s members and leaders, and the dissemination of carefully worded questionnaires 
inquiring about member preferences.  Membership meetings were timed to occur immediately 
prior to a Caucus meeting so that consensus did not dissipate, and liberals pushed for the party’s 
organizing meeting to be permanently moved from January to November and December 
following the most recent election.  The eventual consensus ensured that by the time a resolution 
came before the Democratic Caucus, liberals were already in agreement.53  This was particularly 
important in the 1960s and 1970s for reasons both temporal and pragmatic.   
Until 1974, the organizing meeting of the Democratic Caucus was held in January 
immediately prior to the opening of the new Congress (usually the day or two before the start of 
the session).  Very little can be accomplished during a 1-2 hour meeting scheduled immediately 
prior to the appointment of committee members and leaders, or the day before members are 
expected to vote on a rules package on the House floor.54  If party debate over a specific 
procedural reform is protracted, or if several resolutions are under consideration, the clock may 
simply run out.  Prior to the establishment of regular party meetings in 1969, the one day 
organizing meeting was the only opportunity members had to debate and vote on specific 
procedural resolutions.   
                                                          
53 At a 1981 Symposium on the U.S. Congress held in honor of former Speaker Tip O’Neill at Boston 
College, DSG executive director Conlon described the importance of the meetings for promoting the 
successful passage of the reforms: “Each of the various reforms was subjected to prolonged and deliberate 
discussion and debate in the DSG Executive Committee and at DSG membership meetings before being 
offered in the caucus to make sure they would work as intended and that they would not have undesirable 
side effects.  As a result, virtually all of the major DSG reforms were approved as initially offered.” DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 140, folder 10.   
54 The Journal of the House Democratic Caucus in the early 1960s documents the brevity of the meeting, 
as well as the strenuous avoidance of conflict.   
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And even if a House rules change was approved in the Caucus, liberals usually only had 
one day to ensure majority support when it came to the floor.55  A resolution adopted with a 
simple majority of support in the Caucus does not constitute majority support on the House floor.   
And once organizing meetings were pushed back to December (and later November) after the 
election in 1974, liberals confronted a new problem – dissipation of support for reform in-
between Caucus and House votes.  A December 2nd, 1976 executive committee discussion about 
whether DSG should attempt to postpone Caucus consideration of the House rules package until 
January nicely illustrates the struggles reformers faced in maintaining their coalition once it was 
developed:  
“[Rep. William] Brodhead [D-WI] proposes that S&P [Steering & Policy] report back to 
a caucus that meets on Sunday, January 4th…on the grounds that the rules being proposed 
– Appropriations riders and amendments and discharge petition – will provoke a great 
deal of controversy and competition from the Republicans and single issue groups.  There 
is fear that with nearly a month to get organized, if the rules are adopted now, a great 
amount of pressure will be brought to bear on conservative Democrats thus placing 
adoption of the House rules on January 5th in great jeopardy. There is unanimous 
agreement that nothing could be more disastrous than if the rules adopted by the Caucus 
are not adopted by the House” (emphasis added).56   
The more time between Caucus and House votes on the rules package, the more time the 
opposition had to work to depress support for rules reform.   
 In the 1960s and 1970s, executive committee and membership meetings provided a 
crucial consensus-building forum for liberals.  Prior to the introduction of regular party meetings, 
it was the only forum available to members and leaders to debate the relationship between 
existing rules and policy outcomes, as well as the intent and likely effects of various rules change 
proposals.  For example, at a February 22, 1972 DSG membership meeting, members discussed 
their frustration over the Rules Committee’s “usurpation of the authority of legislative 
                                                          
55 Party rules changes were not subject to an additional vote of approval on the House floor.   
56 December 2, 1976 executive committee meeting minutes. DSG Papers, Part II, box 24, folder 3.  
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committees…in the recent instance of dock strike legislation.”  The members in attendance 
discussed several proposals to curb Rules’ power at the beginning of the 93rd Congress, including 
permitting the Speaker to initiate (with Caucus approval) rules to bypass the legislative 
committees altogether, and a suggestion that the Speaker nominate a new Rules Committee “each 
time around.”57  
Meetings also served as an opportunity to weigh broader strategic considerations against 
desired policy and power outcomes.  For example, various proposals to reconstitute the 
Democratic Steering & Policy Committee with leadership appointees or Caucus-elected members 
were routinely evaluated based on whether they would “spread the action around” or “strengthen 
the leadership.”58  It was often decided that the leadership had to be strengthened before proposals 
to ‘spread the action around’ could (or should) be adopted.  
 Executive committee and membership meetings were strategically timed to occur 
immediately prior to the Caucus organizing meetings to ensure that support did not dissipate 
because of counter-lobbying by the leadership, committee chairs, outside interests, or simply 
other members.  For example, on December 3, 1964, the DSG executive committee met for two 
hours in Chairman John Blatnik’s (D-MN) office and discussed 20 caucus and House rule 
changes.  It produced unanimous agreement on eight proposals, which were sent in a letter to all 
                                                          
57 Of course, this rule – empowering the Speaker to nominate members of the Rules Committee – would 
eventually be passed in 1974 – over Speaker Carl Albert’s (D-OK) express objections.  Feb 22, 1972 
Meeting Minutes, DSG Papers, Part II, box 6, folder 6. 
58 January 31, 1973 Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, DSG Papers, Part II, box 24, folder 2: 
Executive committee members debated whether to support one of two proposals to reconstitute the 
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee.  Each proposal was categorized according to whether it would 
“spread the action around” or “strengthen the leadership.” The committee eventually voted not for the 
individual proposals, but for whether S&P should be used as a tool of the leadership or as a tool of member 
participation. Similarly, DSG debated chairman Chet Holifield’s (D-CA) proposal to reconstitute S&P in 
1963. While the goal of Holifield’s proposal was to “spread the action around,” the effort had to overcome 
incoming Speaker John McCormack’s (D-MA) concern that it “might be interpreted as a dilution of the 
authority of the Speaker and other party leaders.” March 16, 1962, “Background Article,” Congressional 
Quarterly, pg. 451, DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 6.   
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DSG members and Democratic Members-Elect.  On January 2nd, the “newly enlarged DSG” 
(strengthened by the 1964 election) met in the Longworth House Office Building to consider the 
slate of 8 reforms, including the critical 21-day rule:   
“So many members poured in that a number were forced to stand throughout the 1 ½ 
hour session.  More than 150 were present – enough to control that afternoon’s 
Democratic Caucus…One by one the proposals were agreed to” (Davidson and O’Leary 
1966, 129).   
The strategy of scheduling DSG meetings immediately prior to organizing meetings was so 
successful in cultivating unity that DSG began timing membership meetings to coincide with 
monthly Caucus meetings as well.  When DSG Chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) announced in 
1969 that DSG would begin meeting on the Tuesday of the week preceding the monthly Caucus 
meeting, he noted that this practice would “allow DSG to prepare” for Caucus meetings.59  One 
year later, Fraser employed a regular DSG membership meeting to prepare his Democratic 
Caucus resolution calling for a study of the seniority system – the study eventually became the 
Hansen Committee.  The meeting helped Fraser to identify the best time to offer the resolution, as 
well as to amend the resolution text based on likely criticism.  It was revised to remove language 
that could be interpreted as a condemnation of conservative committee chairs, and Fraser received 
support from members to offer it in March of 1970.60  Both helped broker support for the 
resolution when it eventually came to a vote at the March 17th Caucus meeting.61   
                                                          
59 January 14, 1969 meeting minutes, election meeting. Part II, box 6, folder 6.  
60 Fraser received support to offer the resolution despite concern that support would be suppressed by 
another resolution scheduled for the same day – Rep. Jerome Waldie’s (D-NY) vote of no confidence in 
Speaker John McCormack (D-MA).  It was feared by some, including Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), that 
opposition to Waldie’s resolution would suppress support for the Caucus study by members wishing to 
make a strong show of support for the leadership.  The revised resolution garnered additional co-sponsors 
and the support the leadership, including Majority Leader Carl Albert (D-OK), who eventually co-
sponsored it.  [“House Liberals Plan Strategy for Seniority Challenge,” CQ, 1970, February 27: 642-643. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 3]. See the section on committee leadership selection in chapter five 
for a longer discussion of the various drafts of the resolution.   
61 Albert offered the resolution that was eventually adopted by the Caucus.   
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 And of course, beginning in the mid-1960s, DSG also fought to extend, and later move 
up, Caucus deliberations.  In 1964, as the DSG reform agenda – and the Democratic majority – 
expanded, the executive committee requested Speaker John McCormack (D-MA) hold a second 
party caucus to review committee assignments.  McCormack agreed, and it set a new precedent 
for the length of the organizing Caucus (Davidson and O’Leary 1966).  In 1970, DSG pushed 
Speaker McCormack to move up the organizing meeting to provide members with more time to 
address a lengthy agenda:  
DSG Chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) told new members-elect at the time: “We’re 
trying to persuade the leadership, I think they’re agreeable, that we ought to have the first 
Caucus two days ahead of the time the House actually meets and organizes, so that in 
case we need more than one Caucus we can have it in order to organize. We’ve got to 
fight on Majority Leadership, we’ve got to fight on other questions. Rather than try to 
compress all those decisions into one afternoon and one morning, we’d like to have two 
or three days in which to perhaps spread these decisions out.”62 
These efforts were initially unsuccessful.  And at the 93rd organizing meeting, the Caucus simply 
ran out of time to consider the full package of rules reform proposals on the agenda.63  But in 
1974, DSG succeeded in pushing the organizing meeting from January to December.  The extra 
time would prove to be critical as the Caucus deliberated for hours on challenges to four 
committee leadership nominations, and new rules realigning committee and leadership power.    
 In addition to the forums provided by in-person meetings, DSG developed and distributed 
“questionnaires” which polled members on their preferences and priorities on a wide range of 
potential procedural reforms in the House and the Caucus.  The goal of the questionnaires was to 
identify those proposals that would garner a majority of support among “national” Democrats, 
                                                          
62 Transcript, 1970 DSG-Sponsored Seminar for Members-Elect, DSG Papers, Part II, box 28, folder 36. 
63 “The caucus did not have time to take up another important element in the reform package, proposals to 
limit committee secrecy, open up more bills to floor amendment and revive the moribund Democratic 
Steering Committee. Those ideas were expected to come up at the next caucus Feb. 1.” January 1973, 
“Seniority Rule: Change in Procedure, Not in Practice,” Congressional Quarterly, DSG Papers, Part II, box 
163, folder 3.  
251 
 
and those that would not.64  The content of questionnaires was often driven by debate in 
membership meetings.  For example, at a January 14, 1969 DSG meeting, members discussed 
whether to challenge the seniority of Rep. John Rarick (D-LA) who endorsed George Wallace for 
president.  The members present at the meeting supported the effort, and thus a “whip check” was 
employed to assess whether the effort had “a reasonable prospect of success.”65  Shortly 
thereafter, DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) introduced a resolution in the Caucus to 
strip Rarick of his seniority.66  It was initially defeated by a narrow margin, but a month later, the 
Caucus voted 101-73 to deny Rarick his committee seniority.   
Executive committee reform recommendations were also “guided by Members’ 
responses” to these surveys, imbuing them with legitimacy.  DSG was careful to weigh poll 
numbers (which never captured the entire membership or Caucus) based on members’ region and 
seniority, and often distributed these results alongside its recommendations.67  Surveys also 
helped DSG anticipate the lack of a consensus before proposals even came to a vote.  For 
example, as members were strongly opposed to term limits on committee chairs, DSG never 
endorsed the proposal.68  And while a 1977 survey revealed widespread consensus about the need 
                                                          
64 The questionnaires were often structured so as to inform members as well.  Questions might begin with a 
long lead-in describing a specific hurdle to liberal policy goals or leadership advancement, and then offer a 
series of proposals designed to address the problem.     
65 Meeting Minutes. DSG Papers, Part II, box 6, folder 6.  
66 As Rarick was only in his second term, he was not in line for a subcommittee or committee 
chairmanship.  Fraser’s resolution was intended as a symbolic move to again put members on notice that 
they could not actively campaign for a member of another party.    
67 This was highly unusual at the time and helps explain why DSG proposals were more successful than 
other groups.  For example, a December 1972 Common Cause survey of members concluded that members 
favored the Republican proposal of selecting committee chairs via automatic, secret ballot from among the 
three most senior committee members [DSG Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 3].  The Democratic Caucus 
never seriously considered this proposal and members never voted on it.  For examples of DSG reform 
agenda, see: September 23, 1980 Memo from DSG Chairman Dave Obey (D-WI) to Members Re Reform 
Survey, Part II, box 139, folder 1. September 25, 1976 memo from DSG Chairman Bob Eckhardt (D-TX) 
to Members Re Reform Proposals. Part II, box 133, folder 4. July 26, 1984 Memo from DSG Chairman 
Matt McHugh (D-NY) to Members Re 99th Congress Rules Changes, Part II, box 139, folder 2.  
68 October 3, 1978 Memo from DSG Chairman Abner Mikva (D-IL) to DSG Members re Proposed Rules 
and Procedural Changes. DSG Papers, Part II, box 131, folder 4. 
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for advance notice of amendments considered on the floor, support for specific proposals broke 
down.69  Liberals did not endorse a proposal until they brokered consensus around a specific plan.  
Questionnaires also strengthened DSG’s hand in negotiating with the leadership as well; liberal 
leaders could point to specific support levels for a given rules change to help garner leadership 
support.  
Challenging Rep. William Colmer’s (D-MS) Seniority. Liberals’ challenge against Rep. 
William Colmer’s (D-MS) accession as chairman of the Rules Committee in 1967 provides a nice 
illustration of how the consensus building activities conducted by DSG shaped group decision-
making and strategy, and ultimately enabled the adoption of a specific (and largely overlooked) 
procedural reform – regular meetings of the Rules Committee.   
 In 1967, liberals saw Rules Committee Chairman Howard Smith’s (D-VA) retirement 
from the House as an opportunity to check the committee’s conservative tilt.70  The expansion of 
the committee from 12 to 15 members had given liberals a slim, one-seat majority, which did not 
conclusively prevent conservative obstructionism.  Moreover, the 1966 election had decimated 
DSG’s ranks and reformers were concerned about prospects for liberal legislation in the 90th 
Congress.71   
In December 1966, DSG distributed a report entitled, “The House Rules Committee – Its 
History and a Creative Proposal for the Future” to members.  The report analyzed the impact of 
the “conservative coalition” on “legislation aimed at the problems of America in the mid-20th 
                                                          
69 June 15, 1977 Memo from DSG Chairman Abner Mikva (D-IL) to DSG Members re Survey Regarding 
Possible New Rule on Advance Notice of Floor Amendments. DSG Papers, Part II, box 151, folder 4. July 
11, 1977 Dear Colleague letter from Mikva. Part II, box 50, folder 3.  
70 Smith was defeated in the Democratic primary by a liberal challenger, who ultimately lost to a 
Republican opponent.   
71 Of the 47 Democrats who lost their seats in the 1966 election, at least 35 of them were DSG members.  
Farmer, John J. 1966. “Bid to Republicans,” Newark News. December 1. DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, 
folder 9.   
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century,” and recommended bypassing top-ranking William Colmer for second-ranking Ray J. 
Madden (who was more supportive of liberals’ policy goals).  The report informed members 
about the need to rein in the Rules Committee, and both Colmer and Madden’s voting records.    
Shortly thereafter, DSG conducted a survey of members’ opinions on three separate 
courses of action: 1) a motion directing the Committee-on-Committees to name the majority 
leader to the Rules Committee and designate him as chairman; 2) a motion directing the 
Committee-on-Committees to designate Ray Madden rather than Bill Colmer as chairman; or 3) 
action to assure the appointment of 2 “progressive Democrats” to the Rules vacancies.72  70 
members responded to the survey.73  Members were asked their preferences on all three 
proposals: 51 favored designating the majority leader as the Rules Committee chairman; 28 
favored bypassing Colmer’s seniority and designating Madden as chairman; and 59 were in favor 
of ensuring that two progressive Democrats were appointed to fill the vacancies on the 
committee.74    
The survey responses drove the executive committee to shift its position.  On December 
11th, DSG Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) proposed that the majority and minority leaders 
(Democrat and Republican) be named to fill the top two posts on the Rules Committee.  The 
majority leader – Rep. Carl Albert (D-OK) – would serve as committee chairman.  The proposal, 
which would have given the GOP another seat on the Rules Committee, was structured to garner 
Minority Leader Gerald Ford’s (D-MI) support.  When Ford rejected the proposal out of hand, 
DSG initially returned to its proposal to designate Madden as chairman.75   
                                                          
72 Questionnaire on Rules Committee. DSG Papers, Part II, box 28, folder 9.   
73 20 members responded anonymously; the rest included their name with their responses.  
74 A plurality of members (42) favored designating the majority leader as Rules Committee chairman if 
forced to choose between following only one course of action.   
75 Former DSG Chairman Chet Holifield (D-CA) planned to introduce a resolution in the Caucus to 
designate Ray Madden (D-IN) rather than William Colmer (D-MS) as Rules Committee Chairman.  Walsh, 
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 At a subsequent DSG membership meeting, a motion to bypass Colmer and designate 
Madden passed 42 to 25 – well short of the support necessary to be successful on the Caucus 
floor.76  Rather than force a failed vote on the Caucus floor, DSG again adjusted their strategy.  
The group’s questionnaire and meeting results provided the leverage necessary for Speaker John 
McCormack (D-MA) to negotiate with Colmer to extract greater control over the Rules 
Committee.  Although liberals may have been split on how best to reform the Rules Committee, 
the survey provided tangible evidence that all liberals favored a more liberal and/or leadership-
driven committee.   
In exchange for McCormack’s (D-MA) support for his chairmanship, Colmer promised 
to introduce regular meetings of the Rules Committee.77  This was a significant win for liberals 
(although it was covered in the press as a failure).78  Howard Smith (D-VA) used his position as 
chairman to simply refuse to call a meeting of the Rules Committee.  Absent committee meetings, 
Smith could not report a rule.  He was also known to call a meeting when he knew a liberal 
committee member was out of town and unavailable for the vote.79  As the Rules Committee does 
not allow proxy voting, this tactic helped eliminate liberals’ slim one-seat majority.  The 
institution of regular meetings of the Rules Committee ensured that a bill would not fail simply 
                                                          
Robert K. 1967. “Disciplining Drive Focuses on Powell’s Chairmanship.” Sunday Star. January 8.  DSG 
Papers, Part II, 129, folder 9.   
76 Lyons, Richard L. 1967. “Rep. Powell flies back for fight.” Washington Post. January 9. DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 129, folder 9.  1967. “Powell is Ousted as Committee Chairman; Move seen today to block 
seating in House.” Wall Street Journal. January 10. Part II, box 158, folder 3.  
77 Lardner Jr., George. 1967, “McCormack for Seating Rep. Powell,” Washington Post, January 5. Part II, 
box 129, folder 9.   
78 At the same time as the Colmer fight, liberals organized to deprive Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) 
of his chairmanship of the Education & Labor Committee as a result of accusations that he mismanaged 
committee funds.  Both press attention and liberal energies were divided between the two efforts.  Powell 
was indeed forced to give up his chairmanship, and second-ranking Rep. Carl Perkins (D-KY) assumed the 
post.   
79 The absence of regular meetings made it difficult for members to plan their schedules to ensure they were 
present for committee votes.   
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because the chairman claimed his presence was needed elsewhere, and encouraged the 
participation of all committee members in Rules deliberations.80   
Two years later, the group again leveraged its opposition to Colmer to achieve the 
institution of regular party meetings when Congress is in session – another historic innovation 
(Rohde 1991).  Speaker McCormack agreed in exchange for liberals’ promise that they would not 
challenge Colmer’s seniority on the Caucus floor.   
While it is difficult to evaluate the counterfactual, it seems unlikely that McCormack 
would have been able to broker the concession from Colmer on his own.  As the Wall Street 
Journal noted in its coverage of the impasse in 1967, “the liberal forces, headed by [DSG 
Chairman] Reps. Thompson (D., N.J.) and O’Hara (D., Mich.), appear much better organized 
than the Speaker’s camp” (emphasis added).81  Their success is especially remarkable given the 
declining bargaining position liberals found themselves in after the 1966 election.  Despite their 
shrunken vote bloc, DSG provided reform leaders with the resources and tools necessary to 
mount a successful procedural fight against conservatives.82   
 
Mobilize Allies to Participate 
 The assumption underlying most theories of congressional reform is that ideological vote 
blocs will actually show up and vote in favor of (de)centralizing changes to rules and procedures 
                                                          
80 Smith, for example, often claimed he was needed back home on his Virginia farm.  In 1957, he claimed a 
barn fire on his farm required his attention during consideration of a civil rights bill.  Speaker Sam 
Rayburn’s (D-TX) response to this “excuse” has been memorialized in congressional folklore: “I knew 
Howard Smith would do most anything to block a civil rights bill, but I never knew he would resort to 
arson”  (Whalen Jr. 1984). 
81 Jan 9, 1967, Wall Street Journal, “Liberal House Democrats Will Push Today to Depose Powell and 
Colmer as Chairman.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 158, folder 3.  
82 It is important to note here that the decline in DSG’s membership (as a result of the election) was a 
significant factor in the loss of the 21-day rule in 1967.   
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(Rohde 1991; Schickler 2001; Schickler, Sides and McGhee 2003).  Thus, it may seem somewhat 
nonsensical to explicitly specify that a necessary component of the adoption of procedural reform 
is the actual participation of members in the vote.  Of course members have to participate in order 
for any legislative or procedural reforms to be adopted.  However, the low salience of legislative 
procedure for members and their constituents renders this stage a significant hurdle for groups.  
Member attendance in party organizing meetings is not required (and drops off propitiously after 
leadership races are dispensed), their votes are not publicized, and their participation (or lack 
thereof) will never become a campaign issue in their re-election.83   
   Mobilizing busy members with multiple, competing demands on their time to show up to 
seemingly arcane party and House floor debates over parliamentary rules and procedure is not an 
easy task.  It was arguably the most significant hurdle faced by liberals in the 1960s and 1970s.  
In many, though certainly not all, cases, participation in rules debates often meant rank and file 
members were forced to take a very public stand against committee, and even party, leaders.  This 
was especially risky for one or two-term members unsure of the outcome or the potential 
ramifications of a failed vote.   Liberals in DSG mobilized their natural ideological allies to show 
up and participate by ‘activating’ groups outside of Congress to pressure members, holding 
orientation sessions to foster the participation of incoming freshmen, and triggering the group’s 
whip system to alert members when their presence was needed on the floor.   
 In the 1960s and 1970s, DSG regularly reached out to the press, interest groups, and even 
members’ own constituents, about the need for congressional reform.  The goal was to activate 
these groups to exert pressure on members to show up and participate when these issues came to 
a vote. For example, executive committee members might sit for a radio interview and argue that 
                                                          
83 Many rules reforms considered on the House floor also remained relatively low in salience, particularly 
at the crucial amending stage in the 1960s.   
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Democrats needed to band together and challenge the Rules Committee’s “usurpation” of power 
“not given to them under their statutory jurisdictional provisions.”84  Interest group and labor 
unions were regularly invited to DSG executive committee or task force meetings when a reform 
vote was on the horizon, and the groups’ newsletters regularly published exerts from DSG’s 
research publications, as well as the group’s reform agenda.85  These newsletters often 
encouraged their members to support these efforts by pressuring their member of Congress to 
support the effort.  DSG gained access to the mailing lists of several liberal groups in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and employed them to solicit campaign donations as well as support for the group’s 
reform effort in Congress.  These groups include the Anti-Moral Majority, the National 
Committee for an Effective Congress, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Americans for 
Democratic Action, as well as several smaller groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists 
and Progressive Prospects.86   
 In addition, DSG strategically reached out to non-incumbent Democratic candidates who 
had yet to participate in a debate or vote on legislative or party rules.  Once they were elected to 
the House, the freshmen were invited to a new member orientation where they were encouraged 
to be present and active in the Democratic Caucus.  Given that the Democratic leadership did not 
begin offering their own orientation session until December 1976, this gave liberals a crucial 
mobilizing advantage.87  DSG briefed the incoming freshmen on the anticipated timing of key 
                                                          
84 February 10, 1963 Radio Interview with DSG Chairman Chet Holifield (D-CA) on WMCA New York 
City.  Part II, box 124, folder 13.   
85 1960 National Committee for an Effective Congress newsletter.  Part II, box 124, folder 11; June 29, 
1970 Steelworkers Legislative Newsletter, Part II, box 129, folder.  This newsletter encloses several DSG 
reports in totem. These efforts continued in the 1980s as well: a June 21, 1985 United Auto Workers 
newsletter printed a photo of the front cover of DSG’s report on tax reform.   
86 “List of Groups,” DSG Papers, Part II, box 16, folder 5.   
87 In an August 5, 1976 letter from DCCC Chairman James Corman (D-CA) to Dick Conlon re the 
upcoming Democratic party orientation sessions, he wrote “This will be the first effort by the Democratic 
Party orientation in the House to organize comprehensive briefing sessions for new Members, and I know 
that you share with me, the Speaker and the Majority Leader the desire that our program be well considered 
and as complete and useful as possible” (DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 4).     
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votes, and the importance of their attendance on the floor.88  At key intervals, DSG’s orientation 
session also served as a rules enforcement tool.  For example, in 1974, the orientation provided a 
forum for freshmen to interview committee chairs on the eve of a historic overthrow of three 
chairmen.89   
 And of course, when a vote on the House floor or within the Democratic Caucus was 
imminent, DSG often activated the group’s whip system to promote members’ attendance.  This 
was especially important in the Democratic Caucus where the party struggled to obtain a quorum 
to even consider reforms throughout the 1970s.90  During the first year of party meetings, the 
average member attended fewer than half of the Caucus meetings (41%).91  In 1961, the whip 
system was used to help build a coalition in support of the expansion of the Rules Committee – a 
close vote that passed 217-212.  Whip calls were used to mobilize members to participate in DSG 
membership meetings when liberals wanted to prepare for a Caucus meeting. 92  In the Caucus’s 
early days, DSG whips were also used to mobilize members to participate in votes as they came 
up.  For example, during the January and February 1971 organizing meetings, DSG initiated whip 
calls to mobilize members for votes on the 21-day rule, for nominations on Ways & Means 
vacancies, and a challenge to District Chairman John McMillan (D-SC).93 
                                                          
88 Transcript, December 1970, DSG Papers, Part II, box 96, folder 13.  While DSG held their orientation 
session every 2 years, unfortunately only one transcript of the sessions appears to have survived in the 
archival record.   
89 As Rep. George Miller (D-CA), a freshman in the 94th Congress, recounted, “the only reason freshman 
saw them is that DSG put the interviews on their orientation schedule.”  December 5, 1990 executive 
committee meeting minutes. DSG Papers, Part II, box 8, folder 8.   
90 Caucus quorums were especially problematic under Caucus Chairmen Phil Burton (D-CA) and Thomas 
Foley (D-WA).  Malbin, Michael J. 1981. “Remember the Caucus.” National Journal. September 21: 1642. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 135, folder 5.  
91 December 16, 1970 letter from Caucus Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) to Democrats. Part II, box 
136, folder 11.  
92 For example, a December 28, 1970 whip call notified members that a membership meeting was planned 
for the next day at 4pm “to discuss January’s Democratic Caucus.” Again, (on January 15) in 1971, DSG 
mobilized members to attend the “pre-caucus DSG membership meeting [that day] at 3pm.” Part I, box 71, 
folder 2. 
93 DSG Papers, Part II, box 71, folder 3.   
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Election of the Democratic Whip. The repeated failure of liberals’ proposal to transform 
the Democratic whip from an appointed to an elected position from the early 1970s through 1986 
underscores the importance and difficulty of the mobilization stage.  Party leaders control the 
Democratic Caucus agenda and the timing of party votes.  Leaders opposed to reform can 
indirectly stymie group efforts simply by scheduling consideration of a measure when they know 
large numbers of members will be absent (Kingdon 1973).  During party organizing meetings, 
attendance was often lowest in the afternoon.  Groups may successfully lay the groundwork for 
adoption of procedural reform, but if members do not show up when they come to a vote, they 
will still fail.   
The archival record on the election of the Democratic whip is comparatively sparse.94  
Nevertheless, it reveals not only repeated, unsuccessful attempts by liberals to elect the whip, as 
well as staunch opposition from party leaders.  Caucus votes to democratize access to the whip 
position were either very close (separated by 5-10 members), or extremely lop-sided. And on key 
votes in January 1973 and December 1974, less than 60% of Democrats even participated in votes 
to democratize access to the lowest rung of the “leadership ladder.”  Liberals repeatedly failed to 
mobilize their natural ideological allies – and even their unnatural allies (see 1973 Udall motion 
below) – to show up and participate when “elect the whip” resolutions were on the agenda.   
                                                          
94 Miscellaneous typed and handwritten note in the DSG papers however, reveal that liberals conducted 
research on the history of the whip position and developed arguments in favor of making the position 
elected [Proposal to Elect the Whip,” DSG Papers, Part II, box 162, folder 1]. Among the evidence argued 
in support of an elected whip: Republicans themselves had an elected whip; the Democratic whip is the 
only major House position that is unelected (even the Doorkeeper and Sargent at Arms is elected); and it 
harms the legitimacy of future Speakers.  And of course, like the seniority system, Democratic Caucus 
bylaws were silent on the selection of a party whip – the rules did not specify that the position should be 
appointed or elected.  Indeed, party bylaws also did not specify how the Democratic candidate for Speaker 
or majority leader was to be chosen either.   
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DSG made their first resolution to elect the whip at the January 19th, 1971 Caucus 
organizing meeting.95  However, the debate did not focus on the merits of the proposal, but rather 
accusations that majority leader-elect Hale Boggs (D-LA) – nominated in a heated 4-man race 
held the day prior – had made a “deal” with Wayne Hays (D-OH) that he would be appointed 
whip in exchange for his support in the majority leader race.96  Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) moved 
that the amendment be tabled, which was agreed to by voice vote.97   
Liberals tried again at the January 1973 organizing meeting, but the leadership remained 
staunchly opposed and used their agenda control to push off consideration of the ‘elect the whip’ 
resolution to limit member participation.  When the executive committee met with Speaker Albert 
to inform him of their “reform plans” in November immediately following the election, he said he 
would prefer to “put [them] over to [a] special caucus to be held within 1 or 2 weeks” after the 
organizing meeting.98  They faced continual delays over the next several weeks.  The leadership 
cancelled the January 10th caucus without explanation, refused to allow consideration of DSG’s 
reform proposals at the January 22-23 caucus (despite adherence to the advance notice 
requirements in party bylaws), and then adjourned the February 1st caucus meeting for lack of a 
quorum.   
Finally, on February 21st, at the regular monthly caucus meeting, DSG executive 
committee member Mo Udall (D-AZ) received agenda space for his proposal to term limit, 
                                                          
95 January 19, 1971 Meeting Transcript. A Caucus of the Democratic Member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Part II, box 136, folder 3.  
96 Hays had run for majority leader and withdrawn after the first ballot; he subsequently endorsed Boggs. 
He defended himself and said, “by no means would I accept it if it was appointive.” Speaker Carl Albert 
(D-OK) said, “The matter or the amendment have never been discussed with me. I know of no deals.” 
Boggs said, “In closing, I want to emphasize what the Speaker-elect said—there have been no deals.”  
97 Conyers likely offered this motion in an attempt to speed up Caucus consideration of his resolution to 
oppose the seating of the Mississippi delegation (see Part II).   
98 Timeline of leadership-DSG interactions at the beginning of the 93rd Congress, DSG Papers, Part II, box 
137, folder 3.  
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though not elect, the whip position.  Given the leadership’s strong opposition, liberals knew they 
needed conservative support and carefully crafted their arguments to appeal to their interests as 
well.  Udall said that southerners had “a special stake in this resolution” because “outside 
[interest] groups don’t want [southerners] in key positions.”99  If the position was term limited, it 
would help southerners gain access to the leadership ladder.   
But liberals failed to mobilize enough members to participate in the vote, and the 
leadership’s strategy of delaying consideration of the resolution succeeded.  Udall’s measure 
failed 102 to 38 – only 58% of Democrats participated in the vote (just 19 members above a 
quorum).     
In November 1974, DSG’s executive committee again endorsed a resolution providing 
that the whip be elected at the start of the 95th Congress, and restricting the length of service to 
two consecutive terms.100 And on January 4th, 1975, Rep. Ben Rosenthal (D-NY) offered both of 
DSG’s proposals in the Caucus.  Almost immediately, Tip O’Neill’s (D-MA) opposition 
dominated the discussion.  He likened an elected whip to “cutting off his arms” as majority 
leader:    
“The issue of electing a Whip never came up until I was elected Majority Leader two 
years ago….They have never tried to cut the arms off anybody else the 20 years I have 
been here…I think it is wrong if you saddle the Majority Leader or the Speaker with a 
Whip who does not believe in the philosophy or policy of the top two men in this House. 
In my opinion, the Whip’s job as an arm of the leadership, appointed by the Majority 
Leader with the approval of the Speaker. He does the bidding of the leadership, he is a 
means by which I communicate with you people….Let me direct my comments to the 
new Members of Congress…I appreciate the fact you want to do a good job. I say do not 
cut my arms off; do not give me a man who may not agree with my policies. I ask you to 
vote down both amendments.”   
                                                          
99 February 22, 1973, Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, Democratic Caucus, Part II, box 3, folder 
34.  
100 November 26, 1974 memo from DSG Chairman Thomas Foley (D-WA) to Members re Caucus 
Proposals. DSG Papers, Part II, box 137, folder 8.  
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When the resolution came to a vote, 38 voted in favor of Rosenthal’s motion, 132 against – the 
same level of support liberals garnered for Udall’s proposal in 1973.  Given O’Neill’s staunch 
opposition, the result itself is less striking than the fact that – once again – only 58% of the 
Democratic Caucus participated in the vote.  121 members were absent.  As they had in 1973, 
liberals failed to mobilize members to participate, and the leadership succeeded in delaying the 
vote until the end of the day.101   
As all Caucus votes are unrecorded, it is not possible to examine whether incoming 
freshmen or liberals were less likely to show up and participate than other members.  
Nevertheless, the under-participation of Democrats during the vote reveals a significant 
mobilization problem unexplained by existing theories of institutional change.  The 94th Congress 
was a high point for liberals, and the Watergate Babies were eager to make congressional leaders 
more accountable to rank and file members.  Procedural reform was arguably never more salient, 
both temporally and institutionally.102  The transition to an elected whip position was a natural 
extension of DSG’s efforts to increase the power of the Democratic Caucus.  And member 
surveys during the era demonstrate overwhelming support for the transition to an elected whip, 
and it should have garnered staunch support among Watergate Babies keen to check leadership 
power.103   
The sparse archival record on the early whip resolutions makes it difficult to conclude 
whether liberals tried and failed to mobilize members, or whether they simply did not consider 
                                                          
101 Unfortunately, the Journal does not document the time the vote was taken.  
102 Party organizing caucuses are a natural point of rules reflection, and newspapers, interest groups, and 
the public emphasized congressional and government reform in the 1974 campaign perhaps more than any 
other issue.   
103 I have not located the survey results from 1974, however a 1978 survey of members found that 64% of 
Democrats approved of electing the whip (October 3, 1978 memo from DSG Chairman Abner Mikva (D-
IL) to Members re Proposed Rules Changes, Part II, box 133, folder 4).   
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the necessity of making sure members showed up.104   But DSG’s repeated failures to 
democratize access to the lowest rung on the leadership ladder underscore the importance of 
mobilization over and above group size and ideological strength.  Liberals did not fail because 
there were not enough of their natural allies in Congress, nor did they fail because a majority of 
members were opposed to an elected whip.  They failed because DSG did not mobilize rank and 
file members to show up to the vote.  The proposal to elect the whip would ultimately not be 
adopted until 1984 upon Speaker Tip O’Neill’s (D-MA) retirement from the House (O’Neill 
remained opposed, but did not contest it).  It went into effect the following Congress.   
No amount of careful study or strong leadership can replace a successful record of 
accomplishment.  Ultimately, group-driven processes of agenda-setting and coalition building are 
only meaningful if they lead to procedural change in Congress.  I now turn to an evaluation of 
DSG’s procedural reform agenda.   
Part II:  
Evaluating the Liberal Procedural Reform Agenda 
 The archival record and interviews with former and current congressional staffers reveal 
that liberal reformers carefully employed the organization of DSG to help develop and pursue a 
series of procedural reforms in the 1960s and 1970s.  This section examines the “outcome” of 
these efforts, or the “success” or “failure” of the specific procedural reforms proposed by the 
group.  Prior research has examined the considerable influence of the homogenization of the 
House Democratic Caucus (Rohde 1991), strategic coalitions between multiple interests 
(Schickler 2001), outside interests (Wright 2000; Zelizer 2004) and members’ own ambition and 
                                                          
104 It seems unlikely that DSG leaders were unaware of liberals’ attendance problem given the group’s 
careful cultivation of a whip system.  The archival record also does not reveal outreach to, or interest by, 
the press or interest groups in the resolution.   
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self-interest (Schickler, Sides and McGhee 2003) in driving the adoption of the 1970s reforms.  
Here I evaluate a third mechanism of procedural change – group organization.   
Data & Methods. In order to assess the relationship between group organization and 
agenda, I evaluated the adoption of each of DSG’s rule and procedural reform proposals from 
1959 to 1976 (the “reform era”).  As it is difficult to assess the success or failure of proposals that 
were not subject to a formal vote, I analyze only those procedural reforms and enforcements that 
were subject to a formal vote in the House Democratic Caucus, or on the House floor.105  While 
this does pose a selection bias problem, the effect is to magnify the influence of group size.106  
Moreover, given that the leadership strategically timed – but did not prevent – votes on many 
DSG-authored reforms, a vote on the proposal does not pre-determine support for the proposal 
itself (and thus the likelihood of passage).   
DSG’s procedural reform agenda was identified via Dear Colleague letters and memos 
distributed by the DSG Chairman at the start of each Congress, and confirmed via the record of 
debate and votes documented in the Journal of the House Democratic Caucus.  Both the DSG and 
House Democratic Caucus papers are stored at the Library of Congress.  I evaluated the success 
or failure of each proposal (the outcome of interest) through Congressional Quarterly’s coverage 
of rules debates at the beginning of each Congress, and through record votes recorded in the 
Journal of the House Democratic Caucus (available at the Library of Congress).    
One could write an entire dissertation tracing the consideration and adoption of each and 
every reform adopted by Democrats in the 1960s and 1970s.  In the interest of brevity, I analyze 
                                                          
105 For example, DSG’s procedural reform agenda in 1971 included an item reading “declare all Speaker 
appointed positions vacant.”  Unfortunately, as this reform was not subject to a formal vote, it is impossible 
to determine whether it was “adopted” or “not adopted.”  Technically, all Speaker appointed positions are 
vacant at the start of each congress and constituted anew.   
106 The success of a vote is ultimately based on numerical support or opposition to a proposal.   
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two illustrative case studies – the reforms proposed by DSG’s 1969-1970 and 1992-1993 task 
forces on congressional reform.   Here I selected on the dependent variable: the 1969-1970 task 
force was successful in its major goal (co-opting the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act as a 
reform vehicle), while the 1992-1993 effort failed in its primary goal (the creation of an agenda-
setting body within the Democratic Caucus).  If the same organizational features and process 
stages are identified in both cases, then it seems unlikely that organization empowers groups to 
pursue procedural reform as outlined here (Jarl, Andersson and Blossing 2017). 
If organization promotes action as proposed here, then I expect liberal reform leaders to 
be incredibly successful at forcing adoption of DSG’s procedural reform agenda.  If group size 
(rather than group organization) promotes action as suggested in existing theories, then I expect 
DSG to be successful when the group constitutes a majority of the Democratic Caucus (or during 
the 89th, 91st and 92nd Congresses, see Figure 3.1).     
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 The DSG Procedural Agenda.  DSG leaders proposed two types of procedural reforms in 
Congress – (1) reforms addressing floor procedure, committee structure, and the legislative 
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schedule in the House, and (2) reforms shaping the power and role of the House Democratic 
Caucus.  Table 6.1 presents data on the first set of reform proposals; Table 6.2 presents data on 
the second set.107  When available from the archival record, I have included the name of the 
member who offered the proposal in the Democratic Caucus. 
 The DSG executive committee developed and endorsed 16 proposals targeting House 
floor procedures, committee structure, and the legislative schedule.  14 of the proposals were 
adopted, nearly all shortly after DSG publicly announced the group’s agenda.  Most of these 
proposals, including the expansion of the Rules and Ways & Means Committees, party ratio 
guarantees, and restrictions on closed committee hearings were designed to increase liberal 
participation in, and representation on, committees.  They represent some of the most important 
changes in the House in the twentieth century, and nearly all had a significant impact on policy-
making, member participation, and legislative transparency.   
The executive committee developed and endorsed 25 proposals targeting the power and 
function of the House Democratic Caucus.  Again, nearly all of the proposals were adopted.  
Some of these proposals, including the various iterations of the Steering & Policy Committee, 
were adopted but not necessarily implemented as intended.  However, these proposals remain 
some of the most important reforms to emerge from the Democratic Caucus in the reform era, 
including the institution of regular party meetings, and automatic votes (without demand) on 
committee chairmen.  Opportunities for member participation in party business and leadership 
selection increased significantly as a result.   
The small sample size renders robust statistical analyses problematic, but I did not 
identify any relationship between group size and agenda adoption.  Indeed, some of the most 
                                                          
107 Unfortunately, the Journal of the House Democratic Caucus is often deliberately vague in its record of 
debates, resolutions offered, and votes cast.   
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important agenda items were adopted when DSG constituted less than a majority of Democrats 
(including in the 94th Congress).  Collectively, the data suggest that group size affected agenda 
scope, rather than agenda adoption (as some theories suggest).  As the number of liberals in 
Congress and DSG’s membership increased, liberal reformers grew more confident and offered a 
larger number of proposals designed to alter power and policymaking processes in Congress.  
While it is unsurprising that reform proposals reached their peak in the 94th Congress, the group’s 
agenda increased in the 89th, 91st, and 92nd congresses when DSG’s membership represented a 
majority (however slim) of Democrats.108   
 
Agenda-setting Beyond DSG. Any assessment of DSG agenda-setting on House 
procedure in the Democratic Caucus should provide a denominator, or place the number and 
effectiveness of the group’s proposals within the context of efforts by other members.  DSG may 
have been successful at spurring adoption of their procedural reforms, but if other Democrats – or 
groups of other Democrats – were just as successful as liberals in DSG, then group organization 
likely holds less weight.  And indeed, the magnitude of DSG’s agenda success in the 1960s and 
                                                          
108 DSG comprised 55, 52, and 54 percent of the Democratic Caucus during the 89th, 91st, and 92nd 
Congresses.   
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early 1970s belies an interesting, but significant fact – from 1959 to 1973, the Journal of the 
House Democratic Caucus reveals that other Democrats offered a sum total of 3 procedural 
reform proposals.   
In the 88th Congress, the Caucus voted to approve a relatively insignificant resolution to 
curb congressional junkets, or member trips abroad.  And in the 92nd Congress, Rep. Chet 
Holifield (D-CA) offered a resolution neither endorsed nor opposed by DSG to delete a provision 
of the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act guaranteeing the minority one-third of committee 
staff.109  Many Democrats charged that this was akin to public financing of partisan, political 
“hacks.”  Neither of these proposals had any notable influence on opportunities for (majority 
party) member participation in the legislative process or party business.  In 1971, a package of 
reforms was offered by the Hansen Committee.  However, these were not the proposals of any 
one individual or group, and the panel itself was leadership appointed, which included three DSG 
chairmen.110    
The failure of other Democrats outside of the Hansen Committee to develop and offer 
major reform proposals in the 1960s is not surprising given that no other group of Democrats 
organized until 1971 (with the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus or CBC).  If 
organization promotes action, then other Democrats should have been poorly equipped to develop 
and offer procedural reforms on the Democratic Caucus floor.  Indeed, if other Democrats had 
                                                          
109 This vote is notable because it bound Democrats to vote on the House floor.   
110 Of course, several of these proposals were actually drafted by DSG (not surprising given that Rep. 
Hansen was not granted any staff support for the project and was forced to rely on the part-time assistance 
provided by a staffer in her personal office). And indeed, the Hansen Committee proposals provide support 
for the reform process outlined here.  The archival record documents at least three of the four stages 
proposed here, including research, information dissemination, and consensus development.  [Various 1970 
Dear Democratic Colleague letters from Julia Butler Hansen (D-CO), DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 
5].      
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initiated (and succeeded) in spurring reform in the Democratic Caucus, then it would challenge 
the theory proposed here.   
In 1974, at the historic organizing meeting for the 94th Congress, these dynamics finally 
shifted.  8 other Democrats offered reforms in the Caucus.111  Many were proposals rejected by 
DSG for a lack of support among members.  Rep. Thomas Rees (D-CA) for example, offered a 
resolution to enact an age limit on committee chairmen, which was rejected.  Rep. Charles 
Bennett (D-FL) offered a resolution to term limit committee chairmen, which was also rejected.  
DSG questionnaires polled members on these proposals and repeatedly found that most 
Democrats did not want to make decisions that limited the choices available to members in future 
congresses.   
Rules Enforcement Against Other Members.  It is one thing to for groups to force 
adoption of new rules and procedures, it is quite another to force the Caucus to enforce new and 
existing rules.  Thus, I also analyze the effectiveness of DSG’s efforts to enforce Caucus rules 
sanctioning individual Democrats for violations of Caucus rules.  These efforts are difficult to 
wage because they are often charged, personal fights with single targets, rather than broad debates 
about general principles of leadership accountability.   
Between 1965-1973, DSG led efforts to sanction 7 members of Congress in the 
Democratic Caucus (Table 6.3).  Nearly all, save the resolution to prevent the seating of the 
Mississippi Delegation (see below), were preceded by considerable study of existing party 
precedent, repeated Dear Colleague letters, memos, and insertions into the Congressional Record, 
                                                          
111 Other proposals include one by Rep. Robert Leggett (D-CA) to allow staff aid members on the House 
floor, and a proposal by Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI) to require that committee meetings be printed in the 
Congressional Record ahead of time. Unfortunately, it is not clear based on the archival record if these 
proposals were all brought to a formal vote. December 1, 1974 DSG Special Report, 94th Congress Reform 
Proposals. Part II, box 125, folder 7.  
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numerous membership meetings where the proposed sanctions were subject to debate, and careful 
negotiations with the leadership.   
The two challenges in 1965 against Reps. John Bell Williams (D-MS) and Albert Watson 
(D-SC) were preceded by research into existing precedent on party sanctioning of members for 
endorsing a candidate of the opposing party, and the advice of late Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) 
about the need to “warn” members prior to sanctioning them; the insertion of a “Statement on 
Democratic Party Unity” into the Congressional Record to inform members about the 
responsibilities of party membership; a series of Dear Colleague letters encouraging members to 
“sign” the statement; and careful negotiations with the leadership.112 
The vote on John McMillan’s District chairmanship provided the first application of the 
new Caucus rule providing for Caucus approval of committee chairmen.  It was led by DSG 
Chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) who observed McMillan’s leadership firsthand as a District 
Committee member.113  Among other activities, the vote was preceded by a series of informal 
discussions between joint DSG-District committee members; a review of the committee agenda 
and meeting schedule under McMillan; Dear Colleague letters to other members informing them 
about his autocratic leadership; and consultation with interest groups about how best to mobilize 
freshman support; and mobilization of enough members (10) to publicly demand a vote in the 
Caucus.114  While ultimately unsuccessful, it established a new precedent whereby committee 
chairs were subject to Caucus approval.   
                                                          
112 October 3, 1964 Dear Colleague letter, Part II, box 88, folder 7.  December 24, 1964, “Inside Report: 
House Liberals Woo Boggs,” Washington Post, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 163, folder 6.  
113 His leadership of the challenge opened himself up to punishment by McMillan, including McMillan’s 
efforts to decrease the number of District subcommittees to prevent Fraser from a chairmanship position 
(even though his seniority would normally provide for it).   
114 June 3, 1970 letter from Leon Shull of Americans for Democratic Action to DSG Chairman Fraser. Part 
II, box 133, folder 2.  
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The archival record suggests that the joint DSG-Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) proposal to 
prevent the seating of the Mississippi delegation (on charges of voter suppression) failed because 
the group failed to develop a consensus or mobilize members.  Liberals from New York and other 
states with independent or liberal parties were concerned about the precedent the resolution 
would set.115  In other words, the uncertainty surrounding the effect of the reform was too high for 
many members.  And DSG and Conyers both failed to ensure members actually showed up for 
the vote – 100 fewer members participated in the vote on Conyers’ resolution than participated in 
the leadership election earlier the same day.  It was defeated 55 to 111.116  
I did not identify any seniority challenges offered by other members on the Caucus floor 
during this period.  After the failure of the McMillan challenge in the caucus, Rep. Jerome 
Waldie (D-NY) offered a resolution on the House floor to strip John McMillan (D-SC) of his 
chairmanship in January 1971. DSG organized an effort to oppose Waldie on the floor out of 
concern about the precedent it would set for future seniority reforms.  Republicans were also 
opposed and Waldie’s resolution failed.  One year later, McMillan lost his primary and Rep. 
Charlie Diggs (D-MI), a former DSG leader, assumed the chairmanship.  Later that year, the 
long-stymied home rule legislation for the District of Columbia was finally adopted by the House.   
A Tale of Two Reforms: 
The Role of Organization in Group-Driven Reform 
 The brief analysis of DSG’s procedural reform agenda above provides strong support for 
the capacity of liberal leaders to affect procedural outcomes in the Democratic Caucus.  It is not 
possible however, to isolate and evaluate the specific effects of organization across all 41 reforms 
                                                          
115 These members wanted to reserve the option to run on a third-party ticket (if they lost their primary) and 
continue to caucus as a Democrat.   
116 Smith, Frank. The New Democrat, “How Democrats Screwed Mississippi Liberals.” March 1971: 14-15. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 152, folder 10.   
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proposed above within a single chapter.  Thus, I selected two cases to evaluate the theory of 
organization proposed here: 1969-1970 DSG Congressional Reform Task Force, and a 1992 DSG 
Congressional Reform Task Force.  The earlier effort constitutes a “successful” case, while the 
later effort constitutes a “failed” case.  This approach allows me to isolate the potential impact of 
organization on the capacity of groups to pursue their goals.  If liberals developed and marshalled 
the same organizational features and characteristics in the 1990s as they did in the 1960s-1970s, 
then it challenges the theory outlined here.  If, however, liberals in the 1960s-1970s leveraged 
stronger organizational capacity in support of their goals than liberals did in the 1990s, then it 
provides support for the theory as outlined.   
1969-1970 DSG Task Force on Congressional Reform. The 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act represents a significant shift in transparency and member accountability in 
the U.S. Congress, and provides the foundation for how the public, the media, and interest groups 
interact with and view the modern Congress today (Schudson 2015; Kravitz 1990).117  But it also 
provides tougher case of the theory of procedural change outlined here.  The LRA was not 
originally drafted by liberal Democrats.  It was an expansive package of reforms, rather than the 
piecemeal reforms typical of both the 1970s and procedural change in the U.S. Congress (Rohde 
1991; Schickler 2001).  And of course, the LRA was considered on the House floor where liberals 
constituted a smaller proportion of members than they did on the Caucus floor.  In other words, 
the LRA is highly likely to follow a different process of adoption than other procedural reforms 
drafted by DSG, adopted in the 1970s, or instituted by Congress.    
And yet, Liberal Democrats were successful in their monumental task of co-opting the 
LRA as a reform vehicle on the House floor because they had the organizational capacity to 
                                                          
117 The 1970 bill is one of three reorganization bills to be adopted by the House in the twentieth century.   
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undertake the effort.  My analysis of the archival record on the passage of the LRA provides 
strong evidence in support of the theory of procedural change as a process with multiple stages, 
including (1) research, (2) information dissemination, (3) consensus building, and (4) 
mobilization of support.  Liberals’ organization enabled them to successfully overcome the 
hurdles to group-driven procedural change in the House.   
The Legislative Reorganization Act was ostensibly the product of a special Rules 
subcommittee appointed by Rules Chairman William M. Colmer (D-MS) on April 22, 1969, and 
chaired by California Democrat B.F. Sisk.  The committee, including Reps. Richard Bolling (D-
MO), H. Allen Smith (R-CA), Delbert L. Latta (R-OH), and John Young (D-TX), was charged 
with studying the (re)organization of Congress and drafting a bill to be considered by the 
committee.  The subcommittee was a long overdue congressional reaction to the failure of the 
House to produce a bill incorporating the recommendations of the 1965-1966 Joint Committee on 
the Organization of Congress.   
While liberals were excited about the opportunity the subcommittee represented for the 
House to finally adopt necessary structural changes, DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) 
was concerned about the type of bill that Sisk would draft.  Sisk was a DSG member from the 
group’s founding in 1959, but often opposed many of DSG’s policy goals.118  In the spring of 
1969, Fraser established a DSG Task Force on Congressional Reform and appointed Rep. Sam 
Gibbons (D-FL) to chair the committee.119  The task force was responsible for not only studying 
the organization of the House, but monitoring the activities of Sisk’s subcommittee.  Gibbons, 
                                                          
118 For example, Sisk played a significant role in the failure of DSG’s home rule legislation in 1965 (see 
chapter five).   
119 Gibbons had a long legislative history in support of congressional reform, and even testified before the 
1965-1966 Joint Committee.  But his leadership of the task force reflects not only his personal interest in 
the organization of the House, but his own leadership ambitions.  Gibbons ran for majority leader against 
Rep. Tip O’Neill in 1973. December 12, 1972 Dear Fellow Democrats letter from Gibbons. DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 133, folder 2.    
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Fraser and other DSG leaders, spent several months researching institutional procedure and 
structures in the House, including the seniority system, the Appropriations process, and voting 
procedures and participation on the floor and in committee.  The goal was to systematically 
investigate the relationship between existing rules and procedure, and liberal policy outcomes and 
participation – but it also helped shape liberals’ agenda and strategy going forward.   
The task force’s work highlighted the importance of pursuing reform to committee 
leadership selection through the Democratic Caucus.120  Existing precedent and strategic 
considerations (e.g. liberal strength was stronger in the Caucus) suggested that liberals would be 
more successful within the Caucus than on the House floor.  Moreover, the task force’s research 
spurred DSG to temporarily delay seniority reforms in favor of the other institutional barriers to 
participation and policymaking identified.  Gibbons described this decision at a 1970 DSG-
sponsored Seminar for Members-Elect:  
“We purposely did not tackle [the] seniority system because it would knock something if 
we had gotten involved with it at that time, at least it [would have] killed all the other 
reforms we tried to take on. And we also felt that reform primarily was a problem of the 
Democratic Party as far as seniority was concerned.”121   
But the upcoming reorganization bill provided the ideal time to address the variety of other 
structural issues identified by the task force as suppressing liberal participation in the legislative 
process.  Seniority – a poison pill for these issues – would wait.122   
                                                          
120 Anecdotal efforts of course would ultimately be made by individual activist members on the House floor 
(most notably Rep. Jerome Waldie (D-NY), but no DSG resources would be devoted to reforming the 
seniority system on the floor.   
121 Transcript, 1970 DSG-Sponsored Seminar for Members-Elect, DSG Papers, Part II, box 28, folder 36. 
122 As DSG chairman, Fraser had considerable leeway to decide the timing of DSG’s pursuit of seniority 
reforms.  Indeed, while Fraser favored holding off on seniority reforms in 1969, he introduced a resolution 
in the Democratic Caucus in March 1970 calling for a study of reform within the party despite opposition 
from several liberals, including Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO).  Introduced at the same time as Waldie’s 
move to challenge Speaker McCormack – “Bolling, who opposed the Waldie resolution as ill-timed, spoke 
out at DSG meetings against introducing resolutions simultaneously. Fraser, the DSG chairman, disagreed. 
His view prevailed.”  
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Sisk’s subcommittee held 16 executive sessions in the summer and fall of 1969, and 
began the first of several hearings in October.  In November, as the planned hearings were 
winding down, Fraser and Gibbons launched an expansive campaign to inform rank and file 
members about the need for reforms beyond the parameters set by the committee.123  Per Caucus 
bylaws, Fraser wrote to Caucus Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) on November 10th to “notice 
for discussion and possible action on resolution relating to congressional reorganization and 
reform legislation.”124  On the 19th, Gibbons wrote a Dear Colleague letter to members informing 
them about DSG’s “in-depth analysis of the proposed Congressional Reorganization bill,” which 
he inserted into the Congressional Record under Extension of Remarks.125  Fraser and Sisk’s goal 
was to use official House and Caucus institutions to pressure Sisk to hold more hearings, thereby 
creating more opportunities for rank and file members to participate in the process.  They also, of 
course, hoped to change the underlying bill to address liberal concerns before it was reported.  
Both efforts failed.   
When the Rules Committee finally reported a bill on May 12th, 1970, the proposed 
reforms touched on a wide range of committee procedures, including codifying the rights of the 
minority party to participate in committee proceedings and staff hiring, as well as restrictions on 
proxy voting.126  But these “modest changes” were insufficient in addressing the fundamental 
                                                          
123 This era overlaps with a simultaneous effort to spur the Democratic 
124 Fraser also noticed an intention to raise the issue of the pay and working conditions of House cafeteria 
and restaurant employees, which was a personal interest of his and a minor scandal in the House at the 
time.  November 10, 1969 letter from Fraser to Rostenkowski.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 136, folder 11.  
125 This letter also provides additional evidence of the mobilization step: Gibbons informed members about 
the hearings underway in Sisk’s subcommittee and encouraged members to participate through testimony 
and statements submitted for the record.  Ultimately, 44 people testified and another 44 submitted 
statements for the record.   
126 The bill also called for the creation of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and provided for 
stronger coordination in congressional adoption of new technologies.  Schneider, Judy. 2003. 
Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts. CRS Report for Congress: 
October 20.   
278 
 
issues identified by DSG’s task force.127  Liberals felt that existing legislative structures would 
continue to suppress liberal participation and policy outcomes in Congress.128  More specifically, 
it did not alleviate the pressure liberal members felt to vote according to the position of their 
conservative committee chair (and potentially against their constituents’ interests), or simply not 
participate altogether.129  DSG thought that if the group opened up the process, they would make 
liberal policy outcomes in committee and on the House floor more likely.130   
After two months of hearings, Rules Committee members had little patience for these 
criticisms and repeatedly warned liberals on the House floor against attempting to fundamentally 
alter the bill.  Chairman William Colmer (D-MS) said “Those who have been crying the loudest 
for reorganization and reform, if they want it, I would to them they stay pretty well within the 
lines of reason and not try to just revamp the whole Congress and the character of the legislative 
procedures now in existence.” Sisk said “I am just old fashioned. I just do not believe that 
everything should be changed, that matters that have stood the test of time in this legislative body, 
                                                          
127 It is also important to note that liberals had mixed reactions to restrictions on proxy voting.  Liberals 
were more likely than conservatives to use proxies, and thus restrictions on proxy voting were more likely 
to negatively impact liberal interests than conservative interests.   
128 March 1973 Special Report, “Reform in the House.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 137, folder 4. 
129 While liberals were notorious members of the Tuesday-to-Thursday club in Congress, their vote 
participation on the floor and in committee was shaped by conservative leadership dominance.  If the only 
person who knows how you voted on the floor or in committee is your conservative committee chair that 
might punish you if you vote against their preferred position, members have a strong incentive to vote their 
way (and potentially against their own constituents) or not show up to the vote whatsoever.  “Unrecorded” 
votes opened liberals up to punishment if they voted the wrong way, and largely foreclosed any possibility 
of reward by their constituents or in the media.   
130 It is important to note here that many Dixiecrats ultimately supported the recorded teller vote provision, 
and even the opening of committee hearings (in keeping with Schickler (2001).  However, their interests 
did not align with DSG so much as each faction believed that this specific reform would better serve their 
own individual policy goals.  Liberals believed greater legislative transparency would make it easier for 
their likeminded colleagues to vote on controversial measures, while conservatives thought that additional 
legislative transparency would actually make it harder to do so.  And indeed, the recording of amendment 
votes is widely noted by scholars as an example of unintended consequences in congressional reform – 
amendment votes are liable to be a political minefield that may come back to haunt members in their next 
election.  But the archival record suggests that liberal reformers in DSG were well aware of the potential 
consequences and simply thought it was worth the potential risks and tradeoffs.   
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as well as in other areas, should be changed because somebody wants a change.”131  Both Colmer 
and Sisk did not see the need for radical change within the House, but they were also concerned 
about the fate of the bill Rules had spent over a year preparing.   
Their concerns were not unfounded; the LRA was to be considered on the floor under an 
open rule (allowing all amendments except for those addressing committee jurisdictional changes, 
which Rep. Bolling’s (D-MO) Select Committee would ultimately address a few years later).  The 
Rules Committee had little control over the full slate of amendments to be offered, which 
provided a strategic opening for DSG.  The LRA’s open rule enabled DSG leaders to force 
consideration of many of the committee and voting procedural changes identified by the task 
force.  The group developed a 14-point plan to amend the bill when it came to the House floor 
during the summer of 1970 that required marshalling every aspect of DSG’s organization.132   
Fraser and Gibbons decided to focus on a handful of amendments to the bill, including a 
proposal to record teller voting, a proposal to open committee hearings to the public, and a 
proposal to record and distribute committee votes.  In support of these amendments, DSG 
produced several additional reports for members that specifically linked the group’s amendments 
to members’ policy, electoral, and even leadership goals.  The group’s June 24th Special Report 
on Secrecy in the House of Representatives, for example, argued that non-record votes suppress 
not only members’ participation, but members’ ability to get support for their own amendments 
“regardless of their merit.”  And closed committee sessions and the limited availability of 
                                                          
131 July 13, 1970, Congressional Record, H6597.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 4.   
132 “Proposed Plan of Action on Congressional Reform.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 114, folder 8. See 
Appendix 4 for full text of document.     
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committee reports make members vulnerable to interest group interests, and potential attacks in 
their re-election campaigns.133   
DSG brokered unity in support of their slate of amendments strategically through surveys 
of member opinion, as well as symbolically by recruiting allies to serve as the public face of the 
reforms.   
In June, the group distributed a questionnaire to poll members about their schedule during 
the summer, as well as their preferences and support for all amendments likely to be considered 
on the floor (not only those drafted by DSG).134 The survey was a couple dozen pages long; each 
amendment was described in detail and included a summary of the rationale behind the proposal.  
It was designed to provide DSG with not only a base level of member support prior to the group’s 
lobbying efforts, but to enable the group to draft proposals that would be supported by a majority 
of members.  Members may agree on the principle of recording teller votes, but how many 
members should be required to demand teller votes?  And how should votes be recorded?    
After DSG chairman Fraser drafted the initial recorded teller vote proposal, Rep. Tip 
O’Neill was asked to serve as the lead Democratic sponsor of the recorded teller vote 
amendment.135 This was a symbolic move designed “in hopes of enlisting broader support.”136  
O’Neill was a DSG member, but was not traditionally associated with the group and served as a 
                                                          
133 June 24, 1970 DSG Special Report on Secrecy in the House of Representatives. DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 128, folder 7.   
134 June 3rd, 1970 DSG Congressional Reform Questionnaire.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 1.   
135 Of course, several members offered their own version of the recorded teller vote amendment, including 
Rep. Wayne Hays (D-OH) and Charles Gubser (R-CA), who ultimately served as the lead co-sponsor of the 
amendment.   DSG also recruited lobbyists to help develop consensus between the sponsors, and circulated 
papers refuting the arguments offered by the members in support of their proposals.  One page description 
of the “Ad Hoc Committee to End House Secrecy.”  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 1.   
136 Fraser drafted the amendment in July and then sent it to Legislative Counsel for revision.  DSG rejected 
Legislative Counsel’s revisions, and returned to a version of the amendment jointly drafted by Fraser, 
James O’Hara (D-MI), and DSG staffer Linda Kamm.  “Legislative Reorganization Chronology.” 
“Legislative reform effort builds new alliances among House Members,” Congressional Quarterly, Andrew 
J. Glass, 1970.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 2.  
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bridge between different factions in the party and the leadership.  O’Neill himself anticipated an 
appointment as majority whip at the start of the following Congress when then-Majority Leader 
Carl Albert (D-OK) assumed the Speakership.137   
On July 7, DSG circulated another Special Report, “The Proposal for Recording Teller 
Votes,” in response to the “overwhelmingly favorable response to it [the recorded teller vote 
amendment] in returns from the Democratic Study Group Congressional Reform Questionnaire.”  
While earlier reports were designed to inform members about the necessity of adopting 
procedural changes (and the real policy and power implications of doing so), the July 7th report 
was designed to promote member participation on the House floor in support of the changes.  It 
gave members simple arguments they could offer in speeches on the floor, as well as 
straightforward refutations of some of the common criticisms offered in opposition to the 
amendment.138   
Liberals were keenly aware of the need to promote member participation in the floor 
debate and votes; the fate of DSG’s amendments depended on liberal participation.  It was the 
summer of an election year; junior members from competitive districts would likely spend 
considerable time back home in their districts.  And of course, all of DSG’s amendments were to 
be considered on the House floor in the Committee of the Whole where liberals constituted a 
smaller share of members and none of the votes would be recorded (including, ironically, the 
                                                          
137 Indeed, when O’Neill joined the leadership, he proclaimed “I haven’t found any members of the 
Democratic Study Group who don’t feel they now have a voice in the leadership. I know that when the 
leadership meetgs, the views of the liberals will be expressed” (CQ 1972).   
138 For example, the report refuted criticisms that recording teller votes would require members’ constant 
attendance on the floor; it was a delaying tactic designed to slow the legislative process; that it would make 
it more difficult for members to vote for “interests of the nation, rather than regional interests”; and that it 
would “increase the possibility of demagogic amendments designed to embarrass members.” July 7, 1970 
DSG Special Report, “The Proposal for Recording Teller Votes,” DSG Papers, Part II, box 131, folder 2.   
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amendment to record teller votes).139  The open rule was likely to foster long days of debate, and 
liberals could not predict the exact timing of any one single vote.140  Indeed, they could not even 
predict how long the bill would ultimately be considered on the floor – the June questionnaire 
specifically asked members about whether they anticipated being in D.C. and “on or near the 
floor” during the amending stage, “which may take as long as a week.”  The amending stage of 
the 1970 LRA would ultimately take 3 months. 
On the first day of the bill’s consideration, the typical floor dynamics of the textbook era 
(see chapters three and four) were present.  Rep. H.R. Gross (R-IO) used his floor time to 
highlight liberals’ absentee problem: “Mr. Speaker…I arise to point out that some of the most 
vocal of the reformers are conspicuous by their absence at this time. I suppose that when this 
debate began those who felt so badly in need of a change in the rules of conduct of the House 
would be available and ready to get into action.”141  While Gross’s comments are typical of his 
own reputation as a “curmudgeon” (Schweider and Schweider 2006), they reflect a very real 
absentee problem for liberals.  DSG developed a two-pronged approach to promote liberal 
participation on the House floor.  First, the group recruited allies outside of Congress to pressure 
members to be in D.C. during the bill’s long period of consideration.  And second, they 
established a joint DSG-lobbyist whip system to monitor the floor to ensure members actually 
showed up and voted.   
                                                          
139 The Committee of the Whole (short for the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union) 
refers to a different set of rules employed during the consideration of legislation, and specifically on 
amendments to legislation.  It does not refer to a legislative committee (and all members of Congress are 
“members” of the Committee of the Whole), but rather the House in a different form intended to make the 
consideration of legislation easier (for example, by greatly reducing the number of members necessary to 
constitute a quorum).    
140 Conservative dominance of committees meant that conservatives often served as floor managers for 
bills, and thus controlled legislative debate.  The floor manager had significant prerogative to call up votes 
at will; if they surveyed the floor and decided that support for their preferred position was highest (and 
opponents their lowest), they could call up the vote at their will.  
141 Congressional Record 13 July 1970 H6597.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 4.  
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DSG’s executive director Dick Conlon was a former journalist himself and the architect 
of the press strategy.  Conlon knew that framing “unrecorded votes” and “closed meetings” as 
“secrecy” in the House would be a “magic button that turned a shower of things on,” even though 
many of the proposals had nothing to do with secrecy.142  On June 30, Fraser sent a letter to 
newspaper editors across the country informing them about DSG’s effort to “abolish secrecy,” 
and enclosed DSG’s Special Reports on the seniority system, secrecy in the House, and secrecy in 
the Appropriations process.  Three days later, Fraser orchestrated another letter signed by 10 
Democrats and 10 Republicans, including himself.143  Both letters specifically requested the 
press’s help in raising the public visibility of the proposed reforms.  If newspapers wrote 
editorials in members’ home districts on “secrecy,” it would spur constituents to pressure their 
member to end the practice – and ultimately, support DSG’s amendments.   
 Shortly thereafter, editorials started appearing in newspapers across the country.  Though 
the coverage appeared to be organic – a natural journalistic response to the congressional agenda 
– many of the editorials and stories explicitly cited DSG’s Special Reports and/or the group’s 
amendments to the bill.  The editorial boards of the Charleston Gazette in West Virginia, the 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin in Hawaii, the Standard-Times in Massachusetts, the Providence Evening 
Bulletin of Rhode Island, the Los Angeles Times in California, and the St. Louis Dispatch in 
Missouri all covered the effort.  And of course, national publications like the Wall Street Journal, 
the Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor, and D.C.’s own Evening Star and The 
Washington Daily News, published editorials as well.   
Sisk was unprepared for the media assault.  He told the press that charges of secrecy in 
the House “are basically a figment of the imagination of the news media. Maybe some of them are 
                                                          
142 July 12, 1979 letter from Conlon to Frank Eleazer. DSG Papers, Part II, box 162, folder 5.  
143 June 30, 1970 Dear newspaper editor letter from Fraser. July 2, 1970 Dear Newspaper Editor letter from 
20 members of Congress. DSG Papers, Part II, box 128, folder 4.  
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getting a bit lazy and like to have everything written out and submitted to them” (emphasis 
added).144  Sisk’s comments brought renewed attention to DSG’s Special Reports on secrecy, 
reinforcing the group’s effort to inform members about the necessity of the group’s proposed 
reforms.  Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY), a DSG member, inserted the group’s report into the 
record 8 days later. He said “Secrecy is not a figment of anyone’s imagination; it is an undeniable 
fact of life in the House. It is also a well-documented fact of life as a result of an excellent report 
by the Democratic Study Group” (emphasis added).   
Of course, pressure from the media and their constituents to show up to key amendment 
votes did not guarantee members would know when a key vote was scheduled to occur during the 
long days of debate.  Thus, DSG recruited lobbyists and activated a network of allied rank and 
file members to whip votes on the floor to promote member vote participation.   
In July, DSG invited a group of lobbyists to a briefing about the bill and the anticipated 
slate of amendments.145  The goal was to recruit the groups to join what DSG called the “Ad Hoc 
Committee to End House Secrecy,” and participate in the “gallery-spotting effort.”146  While 
interest groups comprise a key pressure group in some theories of procedural change (Wright 
2000; Zelizer 2004), many had to be convinced to participate.  The legislative counsel for the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Argyle Campbell, told National Journal that “We regard this (bill) 
as strictly an ‘in-house’ matter. It would be much better for them to handle it themselves.  
                                                          
144 Sisk’s comments also suggest he was unaware that DSG was the source of the press’s coverage of the 
bill. [1970. “Changes Sought for Committees: House Rejects Open Meetings.” Minneapolis Tribune. July 
15. DSG Papers, Part II, box129, folder 2.] 
145 Among the groups invited were the AFL-CIO, the National League of Cities, the National Wildlife 
Federation, the Sierra Club; the National Taxpayer’s Union; the Urban Coalition; Americans for 
Democratic Action; National Rural Housing Coalition; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights; the League 
of Women Voters; Ralph Nader; the Children’s Foundation; and the Wilderness Society.   
146 One page description of the “Ad Hoc Committee to End House Secrecy.”  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, 
folder 1.   
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Members should decide how they will conduct their legislative affairs and not outside pressure 
groups.”147   
“Gallery spotting” was a hallmark of DSG’s whip system throughout the 1960s; on 
unrecorded teller votes, it was simply the most effective way to keep track of whether a member 
actually voted.148  In 1970, lobbyists made for natural allies for the on-the-floor whip system.  
House rules limiting the materials anyone could take with them to the chamber as well as the 
quick pace of the voting process meant that gallery spotters had to know what members looked 
like by sight alone.  Lobbyists were the rare individual who could immediately recognize 
members of Congress by their appearance.   
The network of lobbyists was supplemented by an on-the-floor whip system known as the 
“buddy system.”  DSG chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) developed the system when he was a 
freshman in 1963 in place of the regular Democratic whip system.149  Fraser and Gibbons, as well 
as executive committee members John Brademas (D-NY) and Jim Corman (D-CA), coordinated a 
23-member team.150  The whip teams were organized by amendment, with each whip responsible 
for assuring the floor participation of 5 members with whom they shared strong, personal 
relationships (their “buddies” in Congress).151  Whips were required to stay on the floor, notify 
their assigned list of members when a vote was about to occur (and their support was needed), 
                                                          
147 Campbell went on to say that he attended DSG’s meeting “just out of curiosity.”  1970. “Legislative 
Reform Effort Builds New Alliance Among House Members.” National Journal. Glass, Andrew J. DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 125, folder 2.  
148 Usually, it was a practice that involved sending a DSG staffer who knew what (almost) every member of 
the House looked like to the floor to keep track of whether (and not how) a member voted.  It enabled DSG 
whips on the floor to effectively target those members who had not yet voted.   
149 It was first used on a December 1963 vote on foreign aid appropriations, but was also a critical feature 
of debate on many important bills in the 1960s, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act (see chapter seven).   
150 In keeping with the findings of chapter five, both Corman and Brademas would go on to serve in 
leadership positions within the official party whip system – both as chief deputy whips, and Brademas as 
majority whip.   
151 Whenever whip assignments were distributed to members, DSG whips were always asked to review the 
list and confirm they got along well with the assigned members. If not, they were to notify DSG who would 
have the member target reassigned to another whip who shared a stronger, personal relationship.   
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and informing Fraser and colleagues when and if they observed any problematic absences.152   
The goal was to ensure that DSG did not lose any amendment simply because a member was 
working in their office and did not know their support was needed on the floor.   
DSG ultimately proposed 11 amendments to the bill, but among the most important were 
3 “anti-secrecy” amendments providing for recorded teller voting (to provide for the recording of 
amendment votes); open committee meetings, and record votes in committee.  9 were approved 
during the House’s extensive consideration of the bill throughout the summer of 1970.  These 
include major provisions like the recording of teller votes (adopted by voice vote) and record 
votes in committees, but also provisions empowering committee members to call committee 
meetings, and strengthening the guaranteed layover period for conference and committee reports 
prior to a vote.  The open committee sessions amendment failed after several committee chairmen 
– led by Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Celler (D-NY) – mounted a coordinated effort to defeat it.  
However, DSG succeeded in forcing its adoption in the Democratic Caucus the following 
Congress.153   
The LRA was passed in the House by a vote of 325 to 19, and signed into law on October 
26, 1970 by President Richard M. Nixon.154 
The LRA provides considerable support for the theory of procedural reform outlined here.  
Liberals studied the institutional conditions limiting representation of liberal interests in the 
House for over a year; they produced numerous reports to inform members about the need to 
address the issues identified by the group; they polled members and held meetings to identify the 
                                                          
152 On the day of the vote on O’Neill-Gubser, three whips (Brown, Alexander, Symington) were absent and 
their members were reassigned.  Memo from Conlon to Reps. Fraser, Brademas, Corman and Gibbons re 
Special Whip System for Congressional Reform Bill.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 5.   
153 The rule was subsequently strengthened over the next couple years as well.   
154 91 members did not vote, including most committee chair(wo)men.   
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best way to address them and the proposals that would receive majority support; and they 
mobilized their allies to come to the floor when they came to a vote.  At every stage of the 
process, they marshalled the organizational resources and tools provided through DSG to 
overcome committee opposition, leadership apathy, and the under-participation of members, the 
press, and interest groups.  Absent DSG, it is highly unlikely liberals would have been able to 
mount these achievements. 
Of course, the LRA is merely one package of reforms.  Do the findings shown here about the 
relationship between organization and procedural agenda-setting hold in other cases of reform?  I 
now turn to a “failed” liberal-led reform to address this question.   
1992 DSG Task Force on Congressional Reform. In the early 1990s, liberal Democrats 
returned to one of DSG’s first reform goals – the creation of a new policy agenda-setting body 
within the Democratic Caucus under the auspices of a new task force on congressional reform.  
The goal was to create a robust Steering & Policy Committee within the party responsible for 
developing and setting Democratic party policy.  And in theory, according to many conventional 
explanations of group-driven change and power in Congress, liberals should have been successful 
in achieving its adoption.  The 1992 task force formed at a time when liberals constituted a 
significant portion of the Democratic Caucus and held many key committee and party leadership 
positions (see chapter five).  Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), Majority Whip David Bonior (D-
MI), and Caucus Chairman Steny Hoyer (D-MD), along with several other leaders, served on 
DSG’s executive committee and maintained close relationships with the group.155  And of course, 
like the LRA, the 1992 task force was established concurrent to an official House and Democratic 
                                                          
155 In total, 55% of the top party leadership positions (or 6 of 11), were held by members with prior 
executive committee service. See chapter five.   
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Caucus study of congressional organization.156  In short, there is every reason to expect liberals to 
have been successful in pursuing their goal to create an agenda-setting body within the 
Democratic Caucus.   
And yet, the archival record reveals that liberals never moved beyond the “research” stage of 
the process.  Task force members failed to draw a linkage between the proposed reform and 
members’ policy and power goals (“inform”); to build unity between rank and file members, 
committee chairs, or party leaders around a specific proposal (“develop a consensus”); or to 
marshal support among group allies, the public, or the media to support the effort when it came to 
a vote (“mobilize allies”).  Ultimately, the failure of the 1992 task force is not surprising given 
that many of the key organizational strengths developed by liberals in DSG had ceased to exist by 
the early 1990s.   
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, liberal Democrats undertook piecemeal efforts 
to create, or alter the composition and power of the Democratic Steering & Policy Committee.  
Each and every proposal was adopted by the Democratic Caucus, including proposals adopted in 
the 87th, 88th, 89th, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, and 95th congresses.  None ultimately functioned as a broad 
agenda-setting body, although certain iterations of the committee succeeded in developing party 
policy on specific issues.157  Indeed, Democrats arguably did not require such a policy mechanism 
– in the 1960s, liberals did not lack for a coherent policy agenda; existing rules and procedures 
simply made it impossible to carry out.  Members of Congress wrote the Democratic party 
platform adopted every four years, and many prized liberal policy goals were enshrined in the 
platform despite considerable controversy from within Congress.  Liberals could point to 
                                                          
156 The 1969-1970 DSG Task Force on Congressional Reform was established alongside a 1969-1970 
Rules subcommittee investigation into congressional organization, and the 1992-1994 DSG Reform Task 
Force was established alongside the 1993-1994 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.   
157 As Nathanson (1974) details, former DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) not only developed a 
resolution providing for the creation of a Policy and Steering Committee, but he “was instrumental in 
getting the Steering Committee to develop an economic program for the caucus” (9).   
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platform planks on civil rights, voting rights, home rule for the District of Columbia, even 
congressional reform itself, to justify their policy goals and procedural reform efforts inside of 
Congress.158   
 In the 1990s, liberals confronted a very different institution, which necessitated a 
different approach.  If reformers in the 1960s and 1970s focused on developing rules to enable the 
party to carry out a pre-established liberal agenda (as codified in the Democratic Party Platform), 
then liberals in the 1990s were focused on how the party could develop an agenda that could be 
carried out within the complex set of contradictory institutional rules produced through the 1970s 
reforms.   
In the spring of 1992, DSG Chairman Bob Wise (D-OK) appointed a Reform Task Force 
to address these new institutional dynamics.  Its members included former DSG chairmen Dave 
Obey (D-WI), Matt McHugh (D-NY), Martin Sabo (D-MN), James Oberstar (D-MN), and Reps. 
Tom Sawyer (D-OH), David Skaggs (D-CO), Peter Hoagland (D-NE), Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), 
Glen Browder (D-AL), and Nita Lowey (D-NY).159 After a month, the membership was expanded 
to include the entire 34-member executive committee.   
                                                          
158 For example, in DSG’s long pursuit of D.C. home rule, liberals frequently linked the adoption of a bill 
to a long-promised platform plank.  On the eve of House consideration of the 1973 Home Rule bill, DSG 
chairman John C. Culver (D-IA) wrote a Dear DSG Colleague letter noting that the issue had long been 
settled among “national” Democrats: “Every Democratic Party Platform since 1940 has contained such a 
commitment [for self-government for the District of Columbia.” October 8, 1973 letter, DSG Papers, Part 
II, box 151, folder 6. In a September 4, 1969, DSG executive committee members Rep. John Bingham (D-
NY), Sam Gibbons (D-FL), John Culver (D-IA), and Claude Pepper (D-FL) wrote to Caucus Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) noticing a resolution that provided for Caucus recommendation to committee 
chairs and committee majorities “that they review those sections of the 1968 Democratic Party Platform 
within their respective jurisdictions with a view to developing a systematic program for bringing to the 
Floor of the House legislation to give effect to the Democratic Party Platform” (emphasis added) [DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 136, folder 11]. In July 1984, DSG staff were asked by Walter Mondale to review and 
comment on the Democratic Party Platform (July 10, 1984 letter from Mondale to executive director Dick 
Conlon, DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 10).   
159 September 24, 1992 Dear DSG Member from Chairman Bob Wise (D-WV). DSG Papers, Part II, box 
126, folder 3. Meeting minutes suggest that Obey managed the task force meetings, although Wise 
appointed the membership.   
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The timing of the task force was both pragmatic and strategic.  The success of the 1970s 
reforms had created a set of contradictory institutional arrangements (Schickler, Sides and 
McGhee 2003).  The 1990s was an era in which rank and file members and party leaders were 
simultaneously empowered at a time when committee chairs themselves remained powerful.  The 
decentralization of power “led to fragmentation and overlap in the legislative process, which 
impedes the ability of the institution to address the nation’s complex and interrelated 
problems.”160   
The task force coincided with two other official studies of congressional organization in 
the House.  In July 1992, Congress established a Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, which was charged with conducting a “full and complete” study of congressional 
organization and operation.161  When meetings began in early 1993, the Joint Committee was 
dominated by members with DSG leadership experience – a significant shift from the 1965-1966 
Joint Committee and the 1969 Rules subcommittee on organization.  Four of the five House 
Democratic members of the Joint Committee (excluding the two co-chairmen, Reps. Lee 
Hamilton (D-IN) and Willis Gradison (D-OH)) had served on DSG’s executive committee or 
policy task force: Reps. Dave Obey (D-WI), Al Swift (D-WA), and John M. Spratt (D-SC), and 
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC).162  And in the spring of 1992, the Democratic Caucus 
appointed a Committee on Organization, Study, and Review chaired by Rep. Louise Slaughter 
(D-NY).   
                                                          
160 December 11, 1992 Special Report Democratic Caucus Strengthens Leadership, Streamlines House. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 4.  
161 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, January 6, 1993, Organizational Meeting, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
162 Obey was a former DSG chair; Swift was a member of DSG’s 1980s-era election reform task force 
(likely in conjunction with his House Administration chairmanship); and Spratt and Norton were both 
executive committee members.   
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The research stage began even before the task force held its first meeting.  Wise 
requested that DSG’s 501(c)3, the Democratic Study Center, consult with the Brookings Institute, 
the American Enterprise Institute, the Congressional Research Service, and other experts, to 
identify “the principal areas of concern in the organization and operations of the House of 
Representatives.”163  On May 20, 1992, Wise outlined three areas for the task force to address 
based on that research: 1. To develop a reform package that strengthened the capacity of the 
Caucus to serve as an instrument of party policy; 2. To improve the operations and procedures of 
House committees; and 3. To strengthen the tools of the leadership to develop and implement a 
policy agenda.164  In Obey’s words, the task force was responsible for “completing the job of the 
mid-70’s reforms.”  
The reform task force met weekly throughout the summer of 1992 to discuss the 
problems facing the House and the Democratic Caucus, and the development of proposals 
designed to address them.  Research projects were occasionally undertaken in response to 
member suggestions, such as a proposal to eliminate budget resolutions.165  At the June 3rd 
meeting, the task force agreed to focus on reconstituting the party’s Steering & Policy Committee 
as an agenda-setting body.  But they struggled to come to any agreement about how best to 
challenge committee chair prerogative or to strengthen S&P, or whether an agenda-setting body 
was even ideal given the party’s needs and the function of the legislative branch.166  A clear 
                                                          
163 May 14, 1992 Memo from Bob Wise to Members of the DSG Reform Task Force.  DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 126, folder 3.  
164 May 20, 1992 meeting minutes of the DSG Reform Task Force. part ii, box 126, folder 3.  
165For example, Louis Fisher, a specialist on the separation of powers at the Library of Congress, wrote an 
August 4, 1992 memo for members on the “political, institutional, and procedural consequences of 
eliminating budget resolutions.”  DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 3.  
166 At the June 3rd meeting alone, the task force debated 7 different proposals.  Members raised a number of 
issues, including when such an agenda should be developed (i.e. before committee chairs are selected?), 
whether it needs to be constantly re-evaluated every session, or whether chairs should be a part of the 
development of a party agenda.  Others were concerned about the consequences of a party agenda-setting 
mechanism for the legislative branch.  For example, at the June 10th meeting, former DSG Chairman Martin 
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division emerged between a reconstituted S&P that provided for some committee chair 
involvement (and membership), one that emphasized broader Caucus involvement, and one that 
had absolutely no committee involvement whatsoever. 
The extensive-months long research effort obscures a seeming failure on the part of the 
1990s-era executive committee to learn from the strategy adopted by liberals in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Indeed, despite counting nearly every Democrat as a member, none of DSG’s proposals 
would ultimately be adopted by the Caucus.  Committee chairs revolted and forced adoption of a 
compromise rules package.  At the time, a disappointed Wise told the press that the compromise 
ensured that “No matter what, the chairs will be heard.”167  The new body was called the 
“Speaker’s Working Group on Policy Development,” and was to be jointly compromised of 
committee chairs and S&P members.  Shortly after the December organizing meeting, the 
compromise proposal was suspended by the leadership after the large class of incoming freshmen 
complained that they were left out of the process.168   
The archival record suggests that DSG’s task force proposals failed because liberals in 
the 1990s did not have a strong group organization at their disposal.  While the group’s research 
services remained strong in the early 1990s, almost none of the other organizational features 
developed and marshalled by liberals in the 1960s and 1970s remained.  Archival evidence of 
regular membership meetings, orientation sessions for freshmen, non-labor interest group 
relationships, and whip or questionnaire activity in the 1990s is sparse (and seemingly non-
existent).  The executive committee continued to meet regularly, but there was little outreach to 
                                                          
Sabo (D-MN) said that Congress’s strength was “its ability to work on policy solutions over time…Don’t 
throw away our strength as a legislative body by trying to be like the President.”   
167 Foerstel, Karen. 1992. “Chairmen Win Compromises as Rules Package Finished.” Roll Call. October 8: 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 1, folder 16.  
168 Feb 4, 1993, “Synar is Elected to Chair Democratic Study Group: Says Congressional Reform Will be 
Main Focus,” Roll Call, Karen Foerstel. Page 9. Box 126, folder 5.  
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the broader membership.  And while DSG had a strong ally in Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), a 
former DSG chairman, he faced many of the same leadership constraints as earlier Speakers 
(Pearson 2015).  Liberals in the 1990s appear to have forgotten the key role of organization in 
enabling agenda-setting and coalition-building in the 1960s and 1970s.  The strategic information 
dissemination, consensus building, and mobilization so crucial to the adoption of reforms on the 
House and Caucus floor during that era were largely ignored by liberals in the 1990s.  They 
simply were not organized enough to capitalize on the large numbers of liberals in the 
Democratic Caucus, or their close allies in the leadership.  DSG leaders were aware of the need to 
surmount each of the same stages faced by liberals in the 1970s, but not the key role of group 
organization.      
The Failure to Inform.  DSG knew that they needed to educate members about the role of 
existing rules – and the consequences of the amending them – on members’ policy and power 
goals.  At the task force’s first meeting, they discussed the need to “respond to some of the myths 
about those [1970s] reforms, such as the criticism that they spawned more subcommittees.”  It is 
unclear if DSG had the staff support to develop informational resources on these issues for 
members; only 1 staffer, executive director Scott Lilly appeared to work on the project.  Given 
that there is no evidence that DSG distributed any of the research the group conducted, or 
evidence or arguments in support of further reform, it seems unlikely.  I identified only one 
Special Report on the topic, which was published on December 11, 1992 – after the party had 
already met, debated, and voted on several reform proposals.  And even that report provided only 
a review of the already-adopted proposals; it did not serve to persuade members ahead of time 
that party bylaws needed to be adjusted to create an agenda-setting mechanism.169 
                                                          
169 December 11, 1992, Special Report: Democratic Caucus Strengthens Leadership, Streamlines House. 
DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 4.   
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The archival record also provides no evidence that membership meetings were held to 
bring the rank and file into the process – or indeed, that they were held whatsoever at the time –, 
or provide an opportunity to discuss and debate the need for party reform.  In contrast to the 
earlier efforts, it is unclear if DSG or Wise even publicly announced the appointment or 
membership of a reform task force, which suggests a lack of press contacts as a group resource.170  
During several months of task force meetings, neither rank and file members nor party and 
committee leaders, were invited to attend.  Wise defended the discretion of the meetings, telling 
the press, “We worked five months on the product with a minimum of rumors.”  While he was 
defending the group’s decision to keep chairmen specifically out of the process, his statement 
suggests another decision on the party of DSG’s leadership – to keep the membership in the dark 
as well.  Indeed, by the early 1990s, DSG “members” defined their membership almost 
exclusively in terms of the group’s research services.   
The Failure to Develop a Consensus. The secrecy of the task force’s meetings belies 
another weakness of DSG’s strategy in 1992 – the failure to broker consensus with two key 
stakeholders: committee chairs and incoming freshmen.  This failure is an artifact of the absence 
of many key coalition-building mechanisms, including regular membership meetings, 
questionnaires of member opinion, or campaign activities and support for members (which 
appeared to end in the mid-1980s).   
The lack of initial committee chair outreach is not surprising.  Many of the task force 
members (save the former DSG chairmen) could not anticipate chairing a full committee 
                                                          
170 A June 1992 Congressional Quarterly article indicated that DSG was one of several groups considering 
reform, along with the Mainstream Forum (a group of moderate to conservative Democrats), OSR, and the 
House Republican Conference.  However, the article did not explicitly mention the task force or its 
membership.  “Extensive Reform Proposals Cook on the Front Burner,” June 6, 1992. By Janet hook, page 
1579-1585. DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 3.  
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themselves soon (or of course, the impending loss of majority control).171  They had a stronger 
interest in furthering the power and role of rank and file members.  Task force meeting minutes 
suggest that many viewed chairs as the opposition – not as eventual partners in a broader effort to 
strengthen the Democratic party in Congress.  For example, in an early summer meeting, the task 
force made plans to “develop a bill of particulars on some chairs,” which they believed would 
give DSG a “white hat” to wear during rules debates.172  Nevertheless, any proposal developed by 
the group would eventually require the support of the chairs, especially given Speaker Thomas 
Foley’s (D-WA) reputation for appeasing chairmen.  Thus, when congressional newspapers 
began reporting on the substance of DSG’s proposals, it prompted considerable ire from 
prominent chairmen who were learning about them for the first time.173   
Ways & Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) said of the proposals: “we’re 
[chairmen] the ones who are going to have to work under the effects of what these proposals are 
going to be. Those of us who are committee men ought to be able to give those people [the DSG] 
the benefit of our experience.”  Science, Space, and Technology Chairman George Brown (D-
CA) said “They [chairmen] do not want some other group’s agenda forced upon them.”  Energy 
& Commerce Chairman John Dingell (D-MI), a DSG member since the group’s founding in 
1959, levied arguably the most damning criticism, however.  In a September 25, 1992 letter to 
Wise, Dingell borrowed liberals’ language from the 1970 LRA debate to criticize the task force’s 
process:   
“As best as I have been able to determine, these recommendations were concocted by a 
single DSG staff member working together with a small group of former DSG Chairmen 
and other Members. If I am wrong about that, it is only because the secrecy cloaking your 
process made it difficult to get accurate information about exactly what was going on…I 
                                                          
171 Obey would become chair of Appropriations in 1994.  
172 Comments of Rep. David Skaggs (D-CO), June 3, 1992 DSG Reform Task Force Meeting, DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 126, folder 3.  
173 Foerstel, Karen. 1992. “Chairmen Worry Changes in Rules Will Erode Power.” Roll Call. September 
17: 14. DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 3.  
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subsequently learned that in fact these Members had been meeting secretly on a regular 
basis for several months and that all staff save the DSG’s Executive Director were barred 
from those meetings” (emphasis added).    
Dingell went on to critique the merits of DSG’s proposals:  
“…the Task Force’s process and recommendations seem designed at once to centralize 
and decentralize authority, to require accountability without ensuring discipline, to give 
everyone in the House a greater say in what the House should be doing except for those 
Members who actually have to do it.”  
The letter was eventually reported in the press, and Wise responded both publicly and privately.  
In his reply to Dingell, Wise stressed that members had every right to meet (secret or not), and 
likened the task force’s effort to DSG’s campaign against chairmen in the 1970s.174  He told 
National Journal that DSG did not want to “air every proposal” until the executive committee 
“reached a consensus.”   
Wise’s public and private comments indicate that the task force had no intention of ever 
soliciting the support of committee chairmen.  Absent their support, DSG would require broader 
support from the rank and file in order to constitute a majority on the Caucus floor.  The archival 
record reveals no effort to broker consensus with the broader membership during the summer of 
1992 – no questionnaires or polls to gauge member support and preferences; no membership 
meetings to debate the merits of specific proposals.  Given that DSG no longer had these 
resources and tools ready at their disposal, it is not surprising that consensus proved fleeting for 
liberals.   
 Moreover, rather than reaching out to non-incumbent Democratic candidates to persuade 
them to support their reforms early, DSG sought to pre-empt them ahead of time.  CQ coverage 
of the task force suggested that these efforts were an attempt by members to avoid being 
                                                          
174 “What I hope is not being questioned is whether ordinary Members of the House should dare to meet, to 
discuss and to propose changing the rules of the Caucus or the House – even if these changes might 
impinge on the power or prerogatives of those entrusted with positions of authority.  This is a question 
which most of us within DSG believe was resolved a generation ago.” 
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“blindsided by the big class of freshman” or “the object of a freshman revolt.”  And task force 
members wavered between anticipating the incoming members with optimism and fear.  Synar, 
for example, suggested that the new members represent “an opportunity now to change the 
behavioral standard in Congress.”  But Obey stressed the need for “a firm agenda to control the 
new Members coming in who are out campaigning against Congress and pledging to shake things 
up.”  Obey’s comments highlight a critical difference in strategy between the 1970s and the 
1990s.   
New members in the 1970s were elected after running similar campaigns against the 
legislative branch (a phenomenon known more commonly as Fenno’s Paradox), but their view of 
how best to “shake things up” was heavily mediated through DSG.  Indeed, DSG repeatedly 
reached out to non-incumbent Democratic candidates to provide research materials designed to 
educate them about the rules (and shortcomings) of the House and various proposals to address 
them.  When the class of the 94th arrived on Capitol Hill, they “[the freshmen] knew few people 
except each other and the leaders of the DSG” (National Journal 1974, 1890).  In contrast, 
liberals made almost no outreach to the class of 103rd.  Of course, neither did the leadership.   
At the December organizing meeting, the huge class of freshmen were so frustrated by 
the development of reforms in their absence that Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) was forced to 
give them 90 days to report their own rules package to the Caucus.175  When the freshmen-
developed proposals were eventually unveiled, it was clear they were far more concerned with 
ethics regulations and scheduling provisions that would create a “family-friendly atmosphere” 
than strengthening party organization and institutions.176  In the 1970s, DSG enabled liberals to 
leverage freshmen vote blocs as an asset in their pursuit of pre-developed procedural goals.  In 
                                                          
175 OSR also failed to consult with the freshmen.  
176 Feb 4, 1993, “Synar is Elected to Chair Democratic Study Group: Says Congressional Reform Will be 
Main Focus,” Roll Call, Karen Foerstel. Page 9] box 126, folder 5.   
298 
 
the 1990s, DSG no longer had the capacity to enable that same leverage over freshmen; instead, 
freshmen leveraged their own vote bloc to direct the rules adoption process.   
The Failure to Mobilize Allies.  The archival record provides no evidence that DSG 
reached out to the press, constituents, relevant interest groups, or even the broader membership, 
to help mobilize support for reform inside of Congress.  In short, the established lines of 
communication between DSG leaders and the membership had frayed considerably.  Once again, 
key organizational features that would have helped the task force mobilize support for their 
proposals were absent.  In the early 1990s, DSG did have a whip system, hold orientation 
sessions for freshmen or pre-Caucus membership meetings, or possess strong relationships with 
powerful interest groups.   
Task force members were aware of the need to develop reforms that would motivate 
public and press interest, which the S&P proposal was unlikely to do.  During one task force 
meeting, Synar said “we need other reforms that [the] public responds to.”  Obey noted a two-
track focus: the “public will focus on personnel [committee] changes,” while the press will “pay 
attention to what we do on power and substance.”  While the secrecy of the meetings likely 
undercut any efforts to mobilize the press, I did not identify any archival evidence that outside 
interests were invited to attend task force meetings, or to comment on the group’s proposals (let 
alone to help mobilize member support).  I also found no evidence that DSG distributed any 
research conducted by the group, or their specific proposals, to the press.  Indeed, the bulk of the 
task force’s interaction with the press appears to have occurred in response to Dingell’s 
September 25th letter to DSG chairman Wise, which was obtained by National Journal and 
others. 
DSG did not possess the same capacity for mobilization that liberals had in 1970.  While 
the archival record documents strong relationships with editorial boards in the 1960s and 1970s, 
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those same relationships did not exist in the 1990s.  Moreover, liberals failed to develop new 
interest group partners after the reform era.  Notably, most of DSG’s strongest interest group 
partners in the 1960s and 1970s had lost considerable power amidst the proliferation of interest 
groups.  Americans for Democratic Action and the National Committee for an Effective Congress 
could not offer DSG leaders the same level of support from outside of Congress.  And of course, 
labor regulations had significantly undercut the power of many unions, which were arguably 
DSG’s strongest allies throughout the group’s tenure.177  And while Wise consulted with scholars 
at think tanks, including Brookings and AEI where former staffers for DSG chairmen Thomas 
Mann and Norm Ornstein were based, they also served as consultants for the Joint Committee and 
OSR’s efforts.  These scholars were not an advantage exclusively enjoyed by DSG, as many had 
been in the 1960s and 1970s.       
As a consequence of these dynamics, members of Congress felt little to no pressure to 
strengthen party organization.  At a time when Republicans were swiftly shaping public attitudes 
towards Congress, liberals acquiesced the reform narrative to freshmen more concerned with 
ethics and lobbying regulations.178  Interest groups frustrated by the slow pace of divided 
government or the continued prominence of conservative chairmen were never persuaded that 
their policy agenda would be better served over the long-term by stronger party agenda-setting.  
And absent press outreach, reporters framed the story based on the revolt from committee 
chairmen and the “secrecy” of the task force’s meetings – and not how the proposed S&P would 
strength party accountability, or Congress’s capacity to pass a legislative program.   
                                                          
177 For example, a DSG staffer personally hand-delivered research materials to AFL-CIO every week, and 
the group was instrumental in temporarily funding DSG’s research activities after the abolition of 
legislative service organizations (see chapter eight).   
178 Of course, Republican attitudes towards Congress were disproportionately more negative than 
Democratic attitudes towards Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) – in part a reflection of the 
party’s long era in the minority. 
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The archival record reveals that while DSG remained a critical part of the House in the 
early 1990s, its capacity to develop and pursue a procedural reform agenda had weakened 
considerably.  Indeed, while many existing theories of institutional change suggest that liberal 
reformers in DSG should have been successful, the findings above are in keeping with the theory 
of group organization, as well as the process of procedural reform, proposed here.179  The 
organizational characteristics and process stages identified in the 1970 LRA debate were simply 
not present in the 1992 S&P effort.  The group no longer held regular membership meetings; its 
legislative research staff was segregated entirely from the leadership’s goals; all whip activity had 
ceased amidst the growth of the leadership whip system; and the power of the group’s individual 
interest group allies outside of Congress had weakened amidst the proliferation of interest groups.  
Absent these critical mechanisms for informing, unifying, and mobilizing members around the 
group’s agenda, it is not surprising the 1992 task force effort failed.    
Conclusion 
Nearly every single one of the procedural reforms proposed by liberal leaders in the 
Democratic Study Group was adopted by the Democratic Caucus or members on the House floor.  
As the analyses presented above illuminate, DSG was not simply the author of the 1970s reforms 
(Rohde 1991; Schickler 2001).  Rather, DSG provided the organizational apparatus through 
which members learned about existing procedure, developed preferences for how best to change 
them, and mobilized around specific proposals.  Liberals were successful in spurring the adoption 
of reforms in the 1960s, 1970s, and even into the 1980s, because they never lost sight of the 
critical role of organizational resources, tools, and mechanisms in enabling them to work 
together, and promote their agenda.  Indeed, the decision by groups in Congress to organize is not 
                                                          
179 It is important to note that Wright (2000) and Zelizer’s (2003) theories of congressional reform would 
have predicted DSG failure here. Absent interest group pressure – which was not present here – members 
would have not had any incentive to support the reforms proposed by liberals in DSG.   
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a one-time, static decision that permanently empowers groups with the capacity to pursue their 
goals through successive congresses as they please.  Liberals in 1959 made the decision to form 
DSG and begin developing key organizational features, but liberals in each subsequent congress 
had to make the same calculated decision.  Their efforts to promote institutional change only 
failed when liberals failed to maintain and adapt the group’s organization to the political and 
institutional environment, such as in 1992.   
It is easy to overlook the importance of the strategy adopted by liberal Democrats in DSG 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  If the adoption of reform is an “inevitable” consequence of the growing 
homogenization of the Democratic Caucus and/or the emergence of new groups inside and 
outside of Congress, then the specific role of individual members matters little.  And indeed, 
some “liberalizing” changes to House rules – especially some type of up or down vote, or term 
limits, on committee chairs – likely would have been adopted by the Democratic Caucus in the 
1970s and 1980s regardless of DSG.  But the process, content, scope, timing, and longevity of 
adopted reforms would likely have looked very different.  Procedural reform in Congress in the 
mid- to late twentieth century would have been led by interest groups rather than members 
themselves; individual proposals would have required active leadership support rather than mere 
apathy or neutrality; the adoption of key reforms would not have begun in 1961 but rather with 
the election of the Watergate Babies in 1974; and member uncertainty surrounding the effects of 
specific reforms would have been very high.   
Absent DSG, interest groups such as Common Cause (formed in 1970), would likely have 
played a much greater role in driving procedural change.  The result would likely have been more 
personally motivated and personality-driven (just as in electoral campaigns), with reforms 
developed to target the removal – and advancement – of specific members of Congress from 
leadership positions.  And some reforms would likely not have been proposed or adopted 
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whatsoever.  Interest groups – by virtue of their position outside of Congress – do not observe the 
unofficial meetings and byways that define much of the legislative process or leadership power, 
nor do they have access to a parliamentarian or other legislative resources to learn about 
legislative procedure.  Reforms providing for regular meetings of the Democratic Caucus, the 
creation of a Steering & Policy Committee, or even the creation of the Hansen Committee do not 
have a direct linkage to interest group policy agendas or to broad principles of legislative 
transparency, accountability, or responsiveness.  It is highly unlikely that groups would have 
proposed these reforms on their own.  
Absent DSG, party leadership apathy or opposition to specific reforms would have been 
impossible to overcome and any adopted reforms would have required the active, outright support 
of the Speaker and majority leader.  Apathy towards change, as Speakers Sam Rayburn (D-TX), 
John McCormack (D-MA) and even sometimes Carl Albert (D-OK) expressed, would likely have 
delayed the adoption of reform until a new generation of liberals such as Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-
MA) were elected.  Rather than the contradictory set of institutional arrangements ultimately 
produced by the 1970s reforms (Schickler, Sides and McGhee 2003), procedural reforms would 
likely have solely empowered party leaders with a minimal role for rank and file members and the 
Democratic Caucus.  Reform would have looked much like the swift centralization of power 
under new Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich (D-GA) in 1994-1995 (Strahan and Palazzolo 
2004; Aldrich and Rohde 1997).  And of course, DSG-instigated punishments against 
conservatives for violating Caucus rules (see Table 6.3) may have been much weaker, or may not 
have been levied whatsoever (especially in the 1960s).180   
                                                          
180 For example, a May 20, 1965 article in Reporter Magazine suggested that “DSG took all the risks” in 
challenging Reps. Williams (D-MS) and Watkins (D-SC) as President Lyndon B. Johnson and Speaker 
John M. McCormack (D-MA) suggested they would not personally push for punishing either member.  
Both remained largely “behind the lines in case the whole venture misfired.” [“The ‘Group’ That Runs the 
House,” Paul Duke and Arnold B. Sawsilak, pg. 29, DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 9.  
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Absent DSG, the formal adoption of reforms, which began in 1961, likely would have 
been delayed for many years.  Democratic leaders would have been forced to rely on watershed 
elections such as 1964 and 1974 to legitimize the liberal interests in their negotiations with 
conservatives, and the adoption of reforms would have been timed to coincide with these 
elections.  This would have made the adoption of the reforms themselves more tenuous, and 
given freshmen far greater leeway to drive the content of the reforms adopted.  The abolition of 
the 21-day rule in 1967 demonstrates the risk posed by relying on freshmen votes alone; if 
freshmen constitute the winning margin of a coalition, their subsequent electoral loss can shorten 
or end the tenure of the reform itself.  Moreover, freshmen – rather than seasoned members with 
first-hand knowledge about how Congress works (and doesn’t work) – would have driven the 
narrative, just as they did in 1992.  This likely would have promoted only those reforms that are 
easily explained to constituents, such as ethics and interest group regulations; broader party-
building reforms would have been largely ignored.   
And absent DSG, uncertainty around the adoption of reforms would likely have been 
very high.  If informational asymmetries between members on House procedure and precedent is 
perennially high, then asymmetries around procedural reform are often even higher.  Members 
would have been forced to rely on assurances from party leaders alone that a vote in favor of rules 
changes in the Democratic Caucus or on the rules package at the beginning of each Congress 
would have the intended impact.  Junior members who have inherently weaker procedural 
expertise than their more senior colleagues would likely not have known whether a specific 
procedural reform would enable, hinder, or have no effect on, their policy and power goals.  
Member uncertainty about the effects of reform doomed Rep. Richard Bolling’s (D-MO) 
proposals to realign committee jurisdictions in 1973-1974, Rep. John Conyer’s (D-MI) proposal 
to oppose the seating of the Mississippi Delegation in 1971, among others.  If this uncertainty 
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existed on all procedural changes, then member vote participation rates would be even higher 
than observed in the historical record, vote margins almost uniformly narrow, and the House 
would have confronted frequent, often successful, attempts to overturn specific reforms.   
Instead, DSG enabled liberals to begin the piecemeal process of reform as early as 1961 
with the expansion of the Rules Committee, to overcome leadership opposition to certain reforms 
(such as empowering the Speaker to appoint majority party members of the Rules Committee) 
and attempts to overturn or weaken specific reforms (such as the recorded teller vote procedure).  
But perhaps most important, DSG strengthened the lasting impact of the 1970s reform era.  The 
imprint of DSG’s procedural reform agenda remains on the Democratic Caucus and the House 
today precisely because the group’s leaders committed to the hard work necessary before the 
reforms even came to a vote.  The group’s reforms have stood the test of time because they were 
rooted in party and House precedent, as well as members’ personal experience, and they brokered 
the active participation of the natural stakeholders of reform (members, the public, interest 
groups, and the media) at every step of the way.  Members were not forced to vote for each 
reform, rather they were persuaded that their own and their constituents’ interests, as well as the 
principles of majority party power, and democratic representation and accountability, were better 
served by the adoption of DSG’s reform proposals.   
This strategy of procedural change has significant implications for our understanding of 
broader processes of institutional change and group power in the contemporary U.S. Congress.   
It is far more difficult today for junior members of either party to band together to force 
their party leaders to consider changes to rules and procedures that may decrease their own 
power.  The abolition of legislative service organizations made it harder for junior members to 
band together, and develop and share internal tools and resources to promote an agenda that may 
be at odds with the leadership.  Their capacity to affect a coherent agenda matters far less than the 
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bloc of votes they represent in leadership races.  The emergence of the Freedom Caucus in the 
Republican Conference was notable precisely because of the threat the disgruntled group of 
junior members posed to Speaker John Boehner (R-OH).  And the 60 or so Democrats who voted 
for Rep. Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) challenger Rep. Tim Ryan (D-OH) reflected junior members’ 
frustration with the inaccessibility of the leadership pipeline, but did not spur the development of 
an ancillary group within the party or significant changes in the Democratic leadership (Taylor 
2016).   
In this institutional environment, party factions appear to have no other option than 
piecemeal promises extracted during leadership races every two years.  Liberal Democrats’ 
successful strategy of developing a site and forum through which members could learn about and 
participate in the development of legislative rules provides a model for how members today can 
challenge power and informational asymmetries that limit their ability to meaningfully participate 
in the legislative process and party business.  Rather than bide their time and wait for mass 
ideological movements within the party – or the next leadership race – factions can develop their 
own forum to enable the hard, iterative work necessary for procedural change in Congress.   
I now turn to the final – and most difficult – facet of institutional change: policy change.    
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7 | Policymaking Change in the House of Representatives 
 
 
 
Arguably the most important goal of all party groups and individual members is to affect 
policy debate and outcomes in the U.S. Congress.  All other goals – re-election by your 
constituents, the accumulation of power and leadership positions, majority party status, and the 
adoption of new rules and procedures – only matter to the extent that they enable individuals and 
groups to pursue their own and their constituents’ policy goals.1  And yet, the power to influence 
policy in the House of Representatives is centralized in a small number of committee and party 
leaders.  Unlike in the Senate, rank and file members are largely left out of the legislative process 
until the final roll call vote in the House.  Leaders are imbued with not only the formal power to 
set the legislative schedule, but also a range of informal sources of power that enable agenda-
setting and coalition-building among their fellow partisans.  Leadership offices convey their 
holders with the resources to study policy issues, a platform to engage with interests and experts 
outside of Congress, and pre-established communication networks to rally support for (or 
opposition to) specific policy proposals.  These informal sources of power make it incredibly 
difficult for junior members without leadership offices of their own to contribute to agenda-
setting and coalition-building processes in Congress.  If groups of members united by some 
                                                          
1 The primacy of each of these goals has been heavily debated by scholars.  While Fenno (1973) argues that 
members simultaneously pursue re-election, power, and policy, others argue that some goals are inherently 
foremost for individual members and the party at-large.  Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), for example, 
argue that majority party status is the primary goal for individual members and the party at-large; all other 
goals are not only secondary, but they are mediated through the pursuit of majority party status.  Mayhew 
(1974) focuses on individual level goals, and argues that members pursue re-election first and foremost; 
members cannot pursue good policy or power without first being elected to Congress.  Here I argue that 
policy is not necessarily the most immediate, but it is ultimately the most important. The accumulation of 
power only gains meaning through the enhanced capacity to shape policy outcomes; few members use 
House leadership positions as a platform to pursue presidential, gubernatorial, or Senate office, and of 
course, the position only pays moderately more. Re-election provides a steady source of income for 
members, a public platform, and the potential for additional power, but ultimately, election to public 
service positions is distinct from other positions precisely because of the capacity to shape policy outcomes 
in government.  
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common interest want to participate in the legislative process or promote new policy issues, they 
need to develop the same resources and tools enjoyed by leaders within the formal structures of 
the House.  Rules changes alone are not enough. 
 Junior liberals in the 1950s confronted an institution designed to limit their participation 
in policymaking and the legislative process.  They had no power to write legislation, build 
coalitions around policies reflecting their policy goals, or even the information necessary to give 
a speech on the House floor or cast a knowledgeable vote.  This chapter analyzes how liberals 
pursued their policy goals in the textbook Congress and beyond.  Although most congressional 
scholars suggest that policy change in the post-textbook era is due to liberals’ pursuit of formal 
rules changes (see previous chapter), as well as ideological shifts within the Democratic Caucus, I 
identify a third mechanism of policy change – the cultivation of legislative resources and tools 
that empowered liberals to engage in the policymaking process.  This chapter analyzes the 
development and function of DSG as a separate site of agenda-setting and coalition-building 
power, and its impact on the legislative process in the House.  I argue that liberals strategically 
structured DSG to provide their likeminded partisans with (1) comprehensive policy and 
legislative research; (2) a platform to engage with key interests inside and outside of Congress; 
and (3) communications networks to mobilize support for legislation.  These critical agenda-
setting and coalition building opportunities enabled liberals to bypass the hurdles posed by the 
formal structures of the House, and directly participate in the legislative process in the pre- and 
post-reform eras.   
This chapter – as in the previous two – is structured in two parts.  First, I analyze the 
process through which DSG promoted policy participation in Congress (Part I).  And second, I 
evaluate the success of DSG at advocating for their policy goals in three key areas – civil rights 
and civil liberties, defense, and campaign finance (Part II).  I begin by introducing a theory of 
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policy change that expands upon the congressional literature’s typical emphasis on formal rules 
changes and ideological alignment.  The rest of the chapter is devoted to analyzing the process 
through which DSG promoted the policy participation of junior liberals, and evaluating their 
success at inserting oftentimes controversial issues onto the agenda and brokering support among 
their likeminded allies.  This chapter builds on the analyses presented in the prior two chapters, 
but here the outcome of interest is policy outcomes (rather than leadership emergence or 
procedural reform).  My findings suggest a re-evaluation of the conclusion that the growing 
liberal policy output of the Democratic Caucus is solely due to formal rules changes and the 
homogenization of party members.  This finding has important implications for processes of 
policy change in the contemporary U.S. House of Representatives.   
Beyond Ideology & Rules Reform: 
An Alternative Theory of Policymaking Change in the Reform Era 
Opportunities for member participation in policymaking is not limited to the final roll call 
vote, nor are obstacles to legislation limited to singular veto points in committees or with party 
leaders.   Members play a key role in concentrating attention on specific issues, specifying 
legislative alternatives, and shaping how their colleagues, constituents, the media, organized 
interests, and the broader public view policy issues.  Most of these activities take place in 
congressional committees where members have ample opportunities to participate (Hall 1998).  
Yet congressional scholars widely agree that policymaking power is wielded by a small number 
of formally elected and appointed party and/or committee leaders (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  
The centralization of power inhibits the capacity of groups or individual members to force 
Congress to hold an up or down vote on legislation they sponsored, especially on issues that may 
divide party members.  But it also limits the capacity of members to strategically frame issues, to 
specify legislative alternatives, or to meaningfully participate in debate on policy problems and 
solutions – facets of policymaking power that are often obscured in theories of institutional 
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change.  Ultimately, the power of party and committee leaders to set the legislative schedule is 
only one aspect of their policymaking power.  Formal leadership positions imbue their holders 
with a wide range of informal legislative resources and tools that enable agenda-setting and 
coalition-building in Congress.  These leaders hold disproportionate sway over the legislative 
process because they have access to policy information and political intelligence (Hall and 
Deardorff 2004; Kingdon 1984; Sinclair 1989, 2011; Curry 2015; Meinke 2016) that rank and file 
members do not.  If power asymmetries limit the ability of rank and file members to participate in 
policymaking, how do members and groups develop the capacity to pursue their policy goals?   
The argument offered in this chapter is simple.  While formal party and committee 
leadership offices limit rank and file member participation in agenda-setting and coalition-
building, I argue that organized party factions can subsidize policymaking by disseminating 
legislative resources and tools to individual members.  Well-organized factions provide an 
alternative policy development site and forum – simultaneously contributing to the advancement 
of issues already on the agenda and promoting new issues that may divide their fellow partisans 
and party leaders.  Members denied the opportunity to participate in policymaking in the formal 
structures of the House can instead do so through group organization, which provides them with 
access to (1) policy and legislative research, (2) a network of policy allies inside and outside of 
Congress, and (3) tools to mobilize support for legislation.    
The theory offered here provides an alternative, albeit not incompatible, view of policy 
change in the House from the pre- to post-reform era.  The bulk of the congressional literature 
explains policy change as a byproduct of two specific mechanisms – formal rules changes that 
shift the responsibility for policymaking between committees and party leaders, and new 
ideological coalitions that shift leadership support for (and opposition to) certain policies (Rohde 
1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005).  Party policy and policymaking shifts when the incentive 
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structure shifts, either for individual members and/or for the party at-large.  To this literature, I 
contribute a third mechanism of group-led policy change – groups spur policymaking change by 
subsidizing the cost for members to participate in the development of policy, and for leaders to 
advance politically risky policy issues.  The theory offered here is not incompatible with accounts 
of policymaking power that stress access to policy and political information, and resources to 
sway votes (Wawro 2001; Evans 2004; Kingdon 1984; Hall and Deardorff 2004).  DSG helped 
disseminate these resources and tools to a wider range of members, and fostered the development 
of policy expertise necessary for members to emerge as coalition leaders.  
Where my theory of policy change departs is in its understanding of these legislative 
resources and tools as emanating from member groups, rather than the formal structures of the 
House or outside interests.2   Political parties are widely assumed to provide this subsidy 
themselves, which in turn motivates political actors to join and participate (Aldrich 1995; Cox 
and McCubbins 2005).  The theory offered here argues that member groups do not merely 
incentivize policy change; they are active players in the development of policy and the 
policymaking process.  I contribute to the literature by reconciling the often-divergent 
policymaking theories that suggest groups are agents of change who simultaneously delegate 
                                                          
2 This view is different than dominant theories of parties and institutional change, but it comports with most 
research on the congressional caucus system (Hammond 1991; 2005).  Congressional caucuses overlap, but 
do not align, with party factions as analyzed here.  Recent work by Victor and Ringe (2009) provides an 
alternative view – caucuses do not challenge structural biases in formal party and committee structures so 
much as replicate and reinforce them.  Nevertheless, Victor and Ringe agree that caucuses serve as a 
reservoir of legislative resources and tools; they simply serve a different purpose than suggested by the rest 
of the congressional caucus literature.  I discuss changes in the congressional caucus system in chapter 8, 
but these divergent findings are likely a byproduct of the abolition of legislative service organizations in 
1995 and the steep rise in centralized party power.  Leaders exert far more power over member groups than 
they did in the past, which in turn shapes group strategy and behavior.  Groups are more likely to be 
successful when they work positively with party leaders, rather than aggressively challenge them; in turn, 
party leaders use rewards and punishments available to them to shape group activity.  The theory offered 
here emphasizes that partisan group organizations (which overlap, but do not align, with the congressional 
caucus system), empower group members and leaders to challenge biases in the formal structures of the 
House; group members and leaders have the agency and responsibility to decide how to allocate group 
resources and tools between party leadership priorities and group interests.   
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policy power to party and committee leaders to advocate on their behalf.  While these two sets of 
theories are especially useful in explaining both the slow pace and timing of policymaking 
change, they are not as useful in explaining why politically risky issues advance during periods of 
party realignment.  
The fate of liberal legislation in the House changed significantly from the 1950s to the 
1980s, but rules and ideological changes alone do not explain the adoption of liberal policies in 
the intervening decades.  Moreover, the hurdles to achieving liberal policy goals went far beyond 
the authority of formal rules changes, or pre-established policy congruence.  Leaders were 
reticent to use – or develop – party resources and tools delegated to them by their fellow 
partisans.  Democratic whip Hale Boggs (D-LA) barely used the whip system he was charged 
with managing because of a (real or perceived) fear that doing so would mobilize opposition – 
rather than support – for legislation (see chapter four).  For Boggs, Speakers Sam Rayburn (D-
TX) and John McCormack (D-MA), and other leaders, this was a strategic decision.3  Devoting 
party resources and tools on these bills would crystallize internal ideological and policy divisions 
within the party (Cox and McCubbins 2005), potentially “waste” their precious political capital, 
and risk their own leadership position and majority party status (Peabody 1967).  The party whip 
was appointed by the majority leader in consultation with the Speaker; rank and file members had 
no mechanism to hold the party’s chief coalition leaders accountable for the use of party 
resources.  And until the adoption of the 1970s reforms, neither the committee system nor the 
Democratic Caucus was structured to promote the participation of liberal members, who were 
                                                          
3 While personally supportive of many “liberal” bills, including legislation protecting civil rights, and 
federal aid to education and housing, there was no a priori consensus between party members about these 
issues.   
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often junior.  And liberals were rarely included in the “informal methods” (e.g. Speaker 
Rayburn’s “board of education”) relied upon by leaders to make policy decisions.4   
The dominant explanations of policymaking changes between the 1960s and 1980s 
emphasize the two mechanisms identified above.  The growing bloc of liberals elected from 
western and mid-western states weakened the urban, big machine-southern, conservative 
Democratic coalition.  This provided an incentive for party leaders to throw their political capital 
and scheduling authority behind increasingly liberal legislation.  These coalition changes also 
motivated the adoption of formal rules changes that shifted the responsibility for policymaking 
from committees to the party caucus and leadership.  As a result, new leaders were elected to take 
the helm at key committees and existing leaders modified their own legislative behavior to keep 
their position (Rohde 1991).   
Liberal Democrats undoubtedly pursued rules changes that shifted the responsibility for 
policymaking from committees to party leaders, as well as the election of more liberal members 
to the House.  But they did not abdicate their own responsibility and participation in 
policymaking until broader shifts developed within their party; rather, liberals structured DSG as 
a separate site of policymaking in Congress from the 1960s-1980s.  Denied the opportunity to 
participate in the development of party policy, liberals organized DSG to provide these 
opportunities.  Informal norms and formal rules limited the ability of junior liberal members to 
contribute to agenda-setting and coalition-building processes within their party.  Liberals used the 
organization’s activities, services, and platform to provide members with the expertise, resources, 
and tools, necessary to meaningfully participate in policymaking in the House.  DSG, I argue, 
                                                          
4 A March 16, 1962 Congressional Quarterly article recounts how “During his tenure as Speaker, Rayburn 
relied primarily on informal methods for arriving at policy decisions. In many cases, he sought no more 
advice before making a decision than that offered by the “board of education,” which consisted of himself 
and various friends with whom he met frequently during the session to discuss party matters.” Background 
Article, pg. 451. DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 6.  
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served as an alternative policymaking site and forum, and enabled the advancement and 
consideration of liberal policy goals in the pre- and post-reform House. 
 I now turn to an analysis of how DSG leaders strategically structured and employed the 
organization to enable junior liberals to participate in policymaking in Congress.   
PART I: 
Processes of Policymaking Change in the 1960s-1980s 
 
 Liberal policy goals animated every action undertaken by DSG leaders – the group’s 
campaign work, procedural reform agenda, leadership training and lobbying.  They were keenly 
aware that their policy priorities – outlined in the “Liberal Manifesto” of 1957 and in DSG’s early 
organizing letters – would go nowhere without stronger liberal unity and increased participation 
in the legislative process.5  If the formal structures of the House were designed to minimize 
member participation in legislative debate and issue framing, and access to legislative 
information and political intelligence, DSG was designed to promote it.  In this section, I analyze 
the process through which DSG enabled junior liberals to effectively participate in policymaking 
by providing them with the legislative tools, resources, and platform necessary for agenda-setting 
and coalition-building in the House.  DSG cultivated and disseminated policy and legislative 
research to inform members about key issues on the agenda, provided a platform to connect with 
key interests inside and outside of Congress, and developed communications networks to 
mobilize support for legislation.  My research of the archival record and interview data suggest 
that these tools and resources were just as critical for the adoption of liberal legislation as formal 
rules changes and the “homogenizing” of the House Democratic Caucus. 
                                                          
5 As detailed in prior chapters, liberal leaders identified labor-management reform, education, housing, 
“slum clearance,” civil rights, area redevelopment, and immigration, as the top issues confronting the 
group.   
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Policy and Legislative Research  
Arguably the single most important and long-lasting policymaking service provided by 
DSG to liberals – and other members – was its policy and legislative research.  Scholars widely 
agree that the committee system is responsible for developing and cultivating information that 
enables members to address pressing national policy problems (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1991).  And yet, as interest group scholars have noted (Hall and 
Deardorff 2004), members cannot exclusively rely on committees for the information necessary 
to pursue their policy goals.  For much of the twentieth century, neither party leaders nor 
committees provided junior liberals with the information necessary to participate in the legislative 
process, or to defend their votes to their constituents.  DSG not only subsidized the cost of 
obtaining this information, but brokered unity over how members thought and talked about policy 
issues.   
Nearly every day, members and their staff received printed literature from DSG, which 
helped focus their attention and framed their views of the issues.6  In an era in which party leaders 
provided little research to members, DSG publications was as much a part of the workweek and 
the legislative process as constituent mail and committee witness testimony.  The majority of the 
pages distributed were prepared from a journalistic perspective with due attention given to both 
(or multiple) sides of an issue, descriptions of legislative history without commentary, and well-
sourced and cited factual information.  Every staffer interviewed in the course of this project 
                                                          
6 The specific publications distributed to member offices varied over time, but DSG maintained a wide 
variety of research publications attuned to the legislative schedule.  On occasion, members requested DSG 
produce reports on specific topics.  For example, Rep. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) requested, “as a Democratic 
Member who supported the original Jones budget,” that DSG put together “a document that compares – in 
fairly specific manner – that [Jones] budget with the multitude of other packages that we have dealt with 
thus far...” Part II, box 133, folder 7.   
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stressed the strong, non-partisan basis for the group’s research.7  And indeed, it is unlikely that 
Republican members would have subscribed to the research otherwise.  Official House 
information channels also relied upon DSG publications – often replacing consultations with the 
committee of jurisdiction or a bill’s sponsor – to inform members about the legislative schedule 
and agenda.8  And of course, the information was often shared with Senate offices as well, and 
senators occasionally inserted DSG reports into the Record.9 
Despite the journalistic underpinnings of the research, each and every publication had 
clear consequences for how members thought about policy issues and evaluated legislation.  DSG 
research epitomized Kingdon’s description of usable information as “predigested, explicitly 
evaluative information which takes into account the political as well as the policy implications of 
voting decisions” (1973, 227). As one DSG staffer described, researchers approached their work 
as “impartiality within a Democratic purpose.”10  Only Special Report – a 20-30 page in-depth 
analysis of a single policy published about once a month – adopted a specific “liberal” 
perspective on policy issues, but all subsidized the cost for members to adopt a “Democratic” or 
                                                          
7 One staffer noted that DSG wrote “arguments for and against a bill, arguments for and against 
amendments” from a journalistic perspective because that was what executive director Dick Conlon was 
trained to do. The staffer went on to say that “maybe a member would want to describe their amendment 
‘aspirationally,’ but we would try to be more factually descriptive – how did it change current law?” 
(September 21, 2015 in-person interview).   
8 The research was so vital for helping members understand what they were voting on, that (inevitable) 
mistakes in DSG publications could lead them to vote inaccurately. For example, after Rep. Dale Milford’s 
(D-TX) amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1977 was mis-characterized in a DSG Fact Sheet, 
the Democratic whip and the House Information Systems used the inaccurate description of his amendment 
in calls from the cloakroom and in the summary of proceedings and debates.  He took to the House floor to 
give a one-minute floor speech to explain the “embarrassing and confusing” situation, and argued that “the 
various official support groups of the House seem to rely on the unofficial DSG factsheet – and one that is 
nearly 1 week old – for their information.” [Congressional Record, “Correction of Amendment to H.R. 
3744,” 16 September 1977, Part II, box 151, folder 4].  
9 For example, Senator Lee Metcalf (D-MT) inserted sections of DSG’s Tax Reform Fact Book into the 
Record. In his floor remarks, he noted that DSG’s report was updated “at my request to reflect final House 
action in many important areas of consideration.” [Congressional Record 22 October 1969, S30971].   
10 August 5, 2015 in-person interview.  
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“liberal” position on legislation they often knew nothing about.11  Legislative Report, for 
example, not only outlined the basic provisions of a bill, but also the position of relevant groups 
(the Administration and affected agencies, as well as interest groups), and committee action and 
views.12  Issue Reports, not only provided a legislative and statutory background on legislation, 
but also the “GOP line” on the bill and a (liberal) “rebuttal of response.”13  Staff Bulletin not only 
shared draft constituent letters to ease staff workload, but encouraged members to talk about and 
defend their position on issues to the public in the same way.    
The political and policy implications of DSG’s research was not accidental, nor was it 
overlooked by other observers of Congress, or even members themselves.  DSG’s executive 
director, Dick Conlon, described the key role information played in coalition-building: “the way 
you change votes is to make it possible for a guy [member] to vote your way…you free the guy, 
give him the ability to defend himself – that’s how you change votes…it’s our operating 
principle.”14  Local and national newspapers emphasized the far reach of DSG’s publications, 
which put the group and its leadership “in a position to influence a huge bloc of votes on every 
major issue.”15  During the nascent years of the Republican Study Committee, Chairwoman 
Marjorie S. Holt (R-MD) stressed the need for a similar research service for Republicans: DSG’s 
“extensive legislative research” had “been too effective in influencing legislation the wrong 
way.”16   
                                                          
11 As one staffer said, Special Reports were “a way to drive an agenda” [March 3, 2016 telephone 
interview].  
12 DSG Legislative Report, DSG Papers, Part II, box 71, folder 2.  
13 Issue Reports Format, DSG Papers, Part II, box 71, folder 1.   
14 Interview with Thomas Mann, DSG Papers, Part II, box 1, folder 13.  
15 Texas Monthly Magazine. 1975. “The Best, the Worst, and the Fair-to-Middlin’: Rating the Texas 
Congressmen From Top to Bottom. But remember, you elected them.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 122, folder 
9.   
16 Letter to Steve Stockmeyer, Executive director of the NRCC, DSG Papers, Part II, box 2, folder 4.  
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The archival record and surveys of member opinion in the 1970s and 1980s suggest that 
members viewed DSG resources as an important resource in their voting decisions, and their 
capacity to oppose Republican policy proposals.  In a survey of members conducted by the 
[Carter] Administration Review Commission in the late 1970s, 35% of all members sought 
information from DSG on legislation considered on the House floor; an additional 22% of all 
members cited DSG as an information source for committee work (Mulhollan and Stevens 1979).  
The New Republic described DSG’s research in 1967 as a bridge “between what the Democratic 
leadership offered, and the heavily-financed, well-staffed Republican operation.”17  Under periods 
of divided government, DSG-provided information was especially helpful for members in helping 
to defeat Republican proposals.  Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) for example, remarked in a 
letter that “Many times DSG had reports out on Republican proposals before the Republicans 
even knew what was in them. I hope DSG has enough midnight oil to last out the congress.”18  
Rep. John Dingell noted that the special advisory DSG put together on the Emergency Energy 
Act in 1973 helped “our colleagues…understand the action of the Republicans, the 
Administration, the gas and oil people, and the opposition of the above-listed to the prohibitions 
against windfall profits included in the conference report.”19  The group’s research services not 
only provided “members with solid, reliable information,” but “good political arguments to make, 
more partisan in attacking Republican proposals.”20  
DSG subsidized the cost for members to evaluate legislation, make voting decisions, and 
justify their votes, based the position of labor groups or environmental groups, or opposition from 
                                                          
17 Weich, Paul. 1967. “Caged Liberals.” New Republic. August 19: 11-12.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, 
folder 9.    
18 July 30, 1981 memo from Rep. Schroeder to Conlon, DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 7. 
19 January 16, 1974 letter from Dingell to Conlon, DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 3.  
20 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.   
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the president.21  The congressional agenda is vast and complex, and heuristic cues such as these 
are part and parcel of the member decision-making (Kingdon 1989).  Members could read the 
short briefings provided by DSG and easily refute Republican rhetoric or opposition to a bill, or 
justify their vote based on the support of the AFL-CIO or the NAACP.  Thus, while the factual 
basis underpinning DSG research should not be minimized, neither should the impact of the 
structure and content provided: DSG made it very easy for members to think about, and talk 
about, legislation in terms of “liberal” interests and “Democratic” constituency groups.   
These issue-framing efforts were aided by journalists, and reinforced by DSG’s 
corresponding campaign support.   
Journalists assigned to Capitol Hill relied upon DSG research publications to keep abreast 
of the major issues before the House.  Journalists ran over in the morning to the Longworth 
mailroom or the DSG office to collect copies of “the Daily Report, the Fact Sheet, [and] whatever 
else we published that night.”22  Another described DSG’s research as “the crib sheet for 
reporters…such that reporters were as much an audience for DSG as were members of 
Congress.”23  It is highly unlikely that journalists produced coverage more favorable to liberals 
simply because they used DSG’s research to understand the upcoming legislative schedule and 
the background of a given bill.  However, their reliance on DSG fostered coverage that included 
labor union’s support or opposition to a given bill, the liberal Democratic rebuttal to the “G.O.P. 
Line,” and potential divisions between committee members.24  DSG subsidized the cost for 
                                                          
21 DSG’s executive committee or task forces sometimes endorsed specific legislation or amendments to a 
bill.  The number of endorsements varied significantly over time.  By the end of summer 1969, DSG task 
forces made 30 legislative recommendations to members.   Status of Legislative Recommendations by Task 
Force, August 10, 1969. Part II, box 36, folder 5. 
22 September 21, 2015 in-person interview.  
23 November 20, 2015 telephone interview.    
24 It is, of course, impossible to measure the impact of DSG on press coverage because background 
information such as this is rarely cited in newspaper coverage.   
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journalists to produce coverage of congressional policymaking that not only covered both sides of 
every issue, but was inclusive of the liberal position on any given bill.     
And of course, in an era in which the Democratic National Committee and the 
Democratic National Congressional Committee (the precursor to the DCCC) distributed few 
resources to members, DSG played an outsized role in providing information services to 
incumbent and non-incumbent candidates.25  The group developed a campaign manual that 
provided young candidates from northern and western states with draft speeches, opposition 
research, and summaries of the most recent legislative record to members.26  DSG produced a 
steady stream of memos on topics like “A Positive Democratic Answer to President Eisenhower’s 
Attack on the Record of the First Session, 86th Congress,” and speech books such as “Lip From 
the Hip,” a response to the official 1964 Republican Congressional Speech Cards that a staffer 
“found” by a printer on the Hill.27  The campaign materials were shared with presidential and 
Senate candidates as well.  The archival record documents letters of appreciation from the 1960 
                                                          
25 Correspondence between Speaker John McCormack and Democratic strategist, Stephen Spingarn, in 
1956 and 1963, suggest that the Speaker believed the Democratic National Committee to be the appropriate 
venue to develop an information service.  Spingarn later said that the “research division [of the 
DNC]…didn’t have the time or the perspicacity” to produce up-to-date “publications about the 
achievements of the 89th Congress” [Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Stephen J Spingarn, Oral 
History Interviews. March 28, 1967].  This is a striking oversight given that the 89th (1965-1966) is 
generally considered to be one of the most significant legislative periods in the twentieth century, and that 
Democrats were incredibly vulnerable in the 1966 mid-term election.   
26 The original effort was headed by Charles U. Daly immediately after the end of his service as an APSA 
Congressional Fellow in 1959. Daly, who would go on to serve as President Kennedy’s congressional 
liaison, described the organization of the effort: “After the congressional session ended, with some money 
collected by the Study Group (a group of liberal Democrats on the House side) and with some union 
support, I left the Senate office and went over to a building behind the Library of Congress, collected a 
couple of Rhodes Scholars-to-be and a Woodrow Wilson Fellow or two, and put together a campaign 
manual for congressional Democrats, particularly the younger ones from the North and West.”  
27 In an August 22, 1964 letter to candidates enclosing the original 1964 Republican speeches, DSG warned 
candidates and their staff not to share the speech cards, which they claim to have “found” next to the 
printers in a Capitol Hill office: “Maximum exploitation of the Republican “Speech Kit” in all districts will 
depend on the good judgment exercised by each person in its use. Please use it with discretion and guard 
against revealing that it has fallen into our hands.” In an October 5th memo, DSG informed members and 
candidates that “your Republican opponent has finally been alerted to the fact that you are in possession of 
his “speech kit.” Part II, box 37, folder 3.  “Lip From the Hip” was prepared in consultation with the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (but not the DNCC) [Part I, box 17, folder 8].   
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Kennedy presidential campaign staffers, as well as from Ted Kennedy personally in his 1962 
special election to fill his brother’s vacant Massachusetts Senate seat.28  The widespread 
dissemination of the same set of speeches and responses to Republican “attack lines” by DSG 
brokered a coordinated, liberal consensus about how Democratic candidates for office talked 
about policy issues.   
Network of Policy Allies 
The second facet of DSG’s legislative work was the group’s development of a network of 
policy allies inside and outside of Congress.  These relationships are widely recognized as part 
and parcel of the legislative process, but we do not typically ascribe the responsibility of 
cultivating these linkages to members themselves.29  Rather, it falls to the lobbyists for the 
NAACP, advisers to the president, or the Agriculture Undersecretary, to initiate and nurture 
relationships with individual members if they want to influence congressional policymaking 
(Walker 1991).  Members accept support offered by groups because they have informational 
needs (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Hall and Deardorff 2004), but we rarely conceive of 
members as soliciting this support themselves.  Yet in an era and institutional environment in 
which members had few opportunities to participate in policymaking in committee or within their 
parties, junior liberals cultivated these relationships themselves.  DSG fostered a network of 
                                                          
28 Various August 1960 correspondence between DSG staff director, Bill Phillips, and Kennedy’s 
campaign, which notes that “The material you [DSG] are preparing is terrific. We should get together and 
compare notes on what we are doing” [Part I, box 15, folder 8].  November 1962 letter from Ted Kennedy 
to DSG Chairman John Blatnik (D-MN): “…I want to take this opportunity to thank the Democratic Study 
Group for their invaluable help during the campaign. The materials we received were certainly worthwhile” 
[Part I, box 16, folder 6].  In 1960, Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), a liberal leader in the Senate in his 
own right, wrote to Phillips to thank him for sending DSG’s research material. He congratulated Phillips, 
DSG chairman Chet Holfield (D-CA), and “all the others who are responsible for the formation of the 
group that is making such vital material available to members of the Congress, and thereby strengthening 
the cause of democracy in our legislative halls.” Part I, box 51, folder 7. 
29 Indeed, interest group journal articles include titles like “Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom 
to Lobby in Congress” (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, emphasis added).   
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relationships between not only members, and key actors and groups outside of Congress, but 
between members themselves.  Absent a forum or platform of their own to meet and discuss 
legislation with their natural allies, DSG developed their own.   
Interest groups were among some of the most significant policy linkages brokered by 
DSG.  These relationships enabled a “trade-off in resources,” in which DSG provided a targeted 
audience, information, and legislative strategy, while interest group lobbyists supplied political 
clout (Mann, Stevens, and Miller 1973).30  In a pre-internet era where identifying information 
about candidates from across the country was difficult, interest groups relied on DSG to identify 
“good” liberal candidates for office whom they could then funnel their financial support. Once 
members were in office, DSG provided a platform to strengthen these relationships through 
events such as new member orientation sessions and “social hours,” which regularly brought 
labor unions, civil rights, and other liberal groups, such as the AFL-CIO, International 
Association of Teamsters, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, to Capitol Hill to meet 
with DSG members.31   
Interest groups also constituted a key constituency for DSG’s research publications.  
Groups were reliant on this information – in contrast to some dominant congressional theories 
(Hall and Deardorff 2004) – because, as one labor union attested, “we obviously don’t have and 
can’t finance our own independent research on these issues.”32  The exchange of information was 
                                                          
30 DSG Papers, Part I, box 7, folder 1.   
31 September 9, 1971 Dear Colleague letter from DSG Chairman Phil Burton (D-CA): Burton informed 
members that DSG “social hours” were intended to “give our key outside allies and supporters an 
opportunity to meet informally with DSG members on a regular basis” DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 
2].  
32 Letter from Legislative Researcher, United Steelworkers of America, DSG Papers, Part I, box 57, folder 
7. The letter went on to note that “Each of them [research reports] also could provide the basis for 
discussion purposes at a future meeting of the Legislative Representatives when hopefully we will have 
time to study them with an informed resource person.” In a 1968 letter, the legislative liaison for the AFL-
CIO recounted a recent legislative meeting, in which DSG’s whip “supplement was passed all around the 
table and treated as the Bible. In fact, I had trouble getting it back.” 1968 letter to Dick Conlon, DSG 
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often reciprocal.  Interest groups were invited to brief members about the needs of the 
constituency group they represented, and even sometimes about legislation in which members 
were uninvolved.33  At other times, interest groups invited DSG staffers and leaders to their own 
meetings to “discuss strategies, issues, and formulate policies.”34   
From the 1960s-1990s, DSG comprised a critical forum for the exchange of legislative 
and political resources with the executive branch.  DSG’s executive director, Bill Phillips, 
communicated regularly with the staff of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.  
Congressional liaison Charles U. Daly requested Phillips send him “detailed briefings on major 
issues before the Congress and the Nation.”35  Subsequent Administrations – Democratic and 
Republican alike – enjoyed this same privilege.36  For Administration officials, DSG’s published 
                                                          
Papers, Part I, box 37, folder 1.  In another example, a Hogan and Hartson lawyer, Jerome Sonosky, sent a 
copy of DSG’s Special Report on Gramm-Rudman to two corporate clients, the Freightliner Corporation 
and Mercedes-Benz of North America, noting that “If you have any questions about how Gramm-Rudman 
will work, the enclosed [DSG] analysis…he found it “as good an explanation as any I’ve seen.” [December 
16, 1985 letter, DSG Papers, Part II, box 115, folder 8].  
33 For example, Rep. Charlie Wilson (D-CA) took to the floor to describe “a special meeting with members 
of the Democratic Study Group yesterday [May 12, 1969], the Rev. Ralph David Abernathy and members 
of the Poor People’s Campaign [where they] outlined their demands and explained the deplorable 
conditions which the poor in this Nation endure.” [Congressional Record 13 May 1969, H12418]. In 
another example, Rep. Don Edwards (D-MI), chairman of DSG’s civil rights and minority affairs task 
force, invited the National Council on Indian Opportunity to discuss the “general problems of Indians 
today” with members.  Part I, box 53, folder 5. 
34 Letter from ADA requesting Conlon’s help at a strategy session to “help plan our simultaneous campaign 
to educate liberals…discuss strategies, issues, and formulate policies which will enable us to move 
aggressively and constructively into this field.” Part I, box 53, folder 5. 
35Memo from Daly to Phillips, DSG Papers, Part I, box 52, folder 2. Communication between Lawrence 
O’Brien, special assistant to President Johnson (and Kennedy adviser), and Phillips also suggests that the 
two staffers met regularly on legislative matters.  Daly was responsible for working with northern and 
western members of Congress.   
36 For example, an April 6, 1981 letter from Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, to 
DSG executive director Dick Conlon, documents his request to be placed on DSG’s mailing list (and 
Conlon’s offer to have the materials regularly messengered over by a staffer) [DSG Papers, Part II, box 
133, folder 6].  I did not find a letter documenting the receipt of materials by President Jimmy Carter’s 
Administration, however I did identify other communications suggesting Carter and his top officials were 
in receipt of DSG materials.  In May and June 1978, letters between Conlon and William Cable, Deputy 
Assistant for Congressional Liaison, Cable criticized Conlon’s decision to “authorize” a DSG fact sheet on 
the White House Staff Authorization bill.  He blamed Conlon personally for the bill’s failure [Part II, box 
133, folder 4]. In addition, letters document Carter’s personal addition to the DSG mailing list after he left 
office via a request from Cable [February 2, 1981 letter from DSG Chairman Dave Obey (D-WI) to 
President Carter, Part II, box 133, folder 6].  
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materials provided a window into the most important issues before the House and how liberal 
members of Congress thought about them.  It subsidized the cost for the executive branch to 
identify those issues where they could work with, and count on, liberal support.  Daly, for 
example, routinely requested that Phillips have members insert White House-provided material 
into the Record.37  The archival record also documents numerous instances in which Johnson 
Administration officials employed DSG to distribute vital, agency-provided information to 
members and rally support.38  A 1977 survey of executive branch congressional liaison conducted 
by the Office of Management & Budget revealed that agencies often strategically employed DSG 
publications to influence member attitudes on legislation.39  DSG’s network of contacts was so 
well-respected that N.A.T.O. even asked the group to co-sponsor and help organize a 1983 “fact-
finding mission” of freshmen members to Brussels and Germany.40  
And of course, the group provided a platform through which the average member could 
lobby – and be lobbied by – the executive branch.  Briefings by cabinet officials on issues such as 
civil rights, gasoline shortages, anti-poverty programs, health care, and the Agriculture bill were 
routinely arranged by DSG or executive request.41  In other cases, DSG provided the auspices for 
                                                          
37 Various communication between Daly and Phillips, DSG Papers, Part I, box 71, folder 13.  Of course, at 
other times, the materials provided a ready resource to attack liberal members.  President Reagan, for 
example, cited a “recent special report put out by the Democratic study group [that] makes plain they are 
considering many other options to raise your taxes” during an April 9, 1983 radio address from Camp 
David [Part II, box 167, folder 3].   
38 For example, Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, sent a letter to DSG Chairman James O’Hara 
(D-MI) thanking him for the group’s assistance in the passage of the Emergency Food Assistance for India 
resolution (H.J. Res. 267). [May 10, 1967 letter, DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 1].  
39 For example, as Mulhollan and Stevens (1977) detail, “An example of the agency transmitting 
information to the informal group in order to shape Member attitudes is the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s efforts to ensure that the DSG fact sheet on passive restraints contained 
information necessary for the presentation of its side of the debate.”  The study was commissioned by 
President Jimmy Carter on October 22, 1977 and surveyed the organization, management, and coordination 
of congressional liaison operations in 32 departments and agencies.   
40 April 14, 1983 letter from U.S. Liaison officer to DSG Chairman Matt McHugh (D-IL). The letter asked 
DSG to serve as the Democratic co-sponsor of the trip, which would “take the form of initial contacts with 
congressmen to determine interest, availability and best dates.” Part I, box 53, folder 7.   
41 June 26, 1979 letter from Obey to James Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy requesting that DOE present a 
factual briefing on the gasoline shortage for DSG members before July 4th recess (short turnaround time) 
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members to pressure the President to act.  For example, DSG sent at least four letters to 
Republican President Richard M. Nixon between February and August 1969 to pressure him to 
enforce civil rights procedures at what was then known as the Department of Housing, Education 
and Welfare (HEW) under Secretary Robert Finch, as well as to protect funding for school 
desegregation in the Labor-HEW appropriations bill.42  And in turn, Nixon Administration 
officials, including the Treasury and Transportation secretaries, often coordinated with DSG to 
set up briefings for members.43   
The strength of the DSG-Administration policy networks varied over time and by 
president.44  However, they returned in the early 1990s under new President Bill Clinton.  The 
                                                          
Attached long list of questions that members had [Part II, box 133, folder 5].  January 7, 1965 memo re 
meeting with Sargent Shriver on the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 [Part II, box 38, folder 3]. August 
4, 1965 memo: Agriculture secretary, WH assistance Lawrence O’Brien, and Agriculture legislative aides 
will attend briefing session. DSG could not officially take a position on the bill because of “mixed reaction 
by members.” part ii, box 38, folder 5. Attorney General briefed DSG membership on civil rights act of 
1966. July 15, 1966 memo. Part ii, box 39, folder 3. 
42 February 1, 1969 Dear Mr. President letter drafted by Reps. Fraser (D-MN), Brademas (D-IN), and 
Corman (D-WI).  June 27, 1969 Dear Mr. President letter from Reps. Fraser, Brademas, Corman, and Don 
Edwards (D-MI), chairman of DSG task force on civil rights, re enforcement of school desegregation and 
adherence to executive order banning federal contracts to companies with records of discrimination.  
August 15, 1969 Dear Mr. President letter from Reps. Fraser, Brademas, and Corman.  DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 133, folder 1.  March 5 Dear Mr. President letter, Part I, box 38, folder 8.   
43 DSG prepared a Fact Sheet in anticipation of a briefing with Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe, 
sponsored by DSG Transportation Task Force Chairman, Rep. Edward I. Koch [DSG Papers, Part II, box 
171, folder 9].  Charles E. Walker, Treasury Undersecretary, sent a June 4, 1969 letter to John Brademas to 
set up a meeting with himself, the Treasury Secretary (David Kennedy), and DSG. Walker notes that “We 
believe that we believe we have a persuasive case to make” and thanks him for “your fair mindedness in 
offering us this chance to state our case to you and your colleagues.”  Part II, box 167, folder 2.  DSG 
ultimately held several membership meetings, prepared an 81-page research report, and established a task 
force on tax reform.  The group initiated a successful effort to block action on the proposed extension of the 
tax surcharge unless it was “coupled with legislation to close tax loopholes” [June 10, 1985 Press Advisory, 
Part II, box 167, folder 4].    
44 Generally speaking, the relationship was stronger under a Democratic presidency, although liberals in 
DSG had an especially hostile relationship with President Jimmy Carter’s Administration.  Nevertheless, 
members of Congress and Administration officials always have an incentive to interact with each other.   
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archival record documents requests by senior White House staff for DSG research on health care 
and entitlement programs, as well as joint meetings between staffers and DSG.45    
DSG’s task force system often formalized these policy linkages between members, 
Administration officials, interest groups, and policy experts outside of Congress.  Task forces 
were specifically designed to enable members to address policy issues for which there was no 
Democratic consensus, or where opposition within the committee of jurisdiction was especially 
high.46   
For example, between 1963 and 1965, DSG established a steering committee on foreign 
affairs to promote member education and participation in the development of foreign aid policy.  
Conservative opposition within the Appropriations committee, especially from Foreign 
Operations subcommittee chairman Rep. Otto Passman (D-LA), continually threatened foreign 
aid funding.  Under chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN), the steering committee arranged meetings 
with the administrator and deputy administrator of the foreign aid program, the congressional 
liaison for the Department of State, as well as Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and circulated materials prepared by State to educate 
members.47  Eventually, “pro-aid Republicans” were invited to participate and DSG’s public 
sponsorship of the group was dropped.  The committee brokered a network of engaged and 
                                                          
45 May 18, 1993 memo from DSG executive director Scott Lilly to George Stephanopoulos re Nunn-
Domenici Entitlement Cap. March 3, 1993 letter from Lilly to Mack McLarty, Clinton’s (first) chief of staff 
re McLarty’s attendance as a DSG executive committee meeting.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5.  
46 DSG chairman Matt McHugh described the purpose of task forces during a 1977 executive committee 
meeting: when there is a “great divergence of opinion among DSG on issues,” the group should establish 
task forces to let interested members work on an issue (rather than adopt a formal position or endorsement).  
Part II, box 7, folder 1. 
47 March 10, 1965 Meeting Agenda: The objectives of committee action include, 1) “education of members 
of the committee and other members of the DSG about foreign aid,” 2) efforts to bring other members of 
the House into contact with foreign aid personalities and issues,” 3) “public discussion of key foreign aid 
questions using various means including special orders and speeches during debate on the legislation,” and 
4) “insuring attendance of pro-aid members during consideration of amendments to the bill.”  William 
Gibbons, director, congressional liaison, State Department, sent a March 5, 1965 memo to distribute 
publications.  Part II, box 147, folder 5. 
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knowledgeable members who worked together to protect foreign aid and built support for 
President Johnson’s funding proposals despite continual committee opposition.48   
In the first full two years after the task force’s creation, fiscal year 1965 and 1966, the 
House rejected Passman’s attempts to significantly cut appropriations from the authorized 
amount.  These two years corresponded with a significant reduction in the inevitable drop-off 
between the Administration’s request and congressional appropriations.  In the 1950s, the drop 
off percentage averaged about 20.6%; in fiscal year 1964, the drop off was 33.8%.  However, in 
fiscal years 1965 and 1966 – during the task force’s operation – it averaged only 7.6 and 6.9%, 
respectively (CQ Almanac 1965, 441-48).    
Policy & Legislative Mobilization   
The final aspect of policymaking promoted by DSG is the mobilization of member 
support for specific legislative proposals.  The congressional literature provides considerable 
evidence that these mechanisms are typically provided by party leaders (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Meinke 2016) and interest groups (Hall and Deardorff 2004) who each have a political and 
policy interest in ensuring that members support legislation on their agenda.  The textbook era is 
unique in that the leadership did not support the robust development of coalition building tools 
and resources themselves – a reflection not only of the party’s status as a procedural coalition 
(Schickler and Rich 1997), but also Speaker Sam Rayburn’s (D-TX) preferred strategy of 
                                                          
48 August 24, 1963 letter from DSG Chairman John Blatnik (D-MN) to Fraser (D-MN): “This is to express 
my personal thanks for the tremendous job that you…have done during the past several weeks. Your efforts 
to build support for the bill by inserting items in the Record, Special Orders, contact work, and in rallying 
votes on the crucial amendments Wednesday and Thursday contributed greatly toward the passage of as 
good a bill as possible under very difficult circumstances….Your continued efforts will help make possible 
favorable action on these important parts of President Kennedy’s legislative program.” Part II, box 147, 
folder 5.  
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“withheld power.”49  Instead, liberal Democrats developed their own resources and tools to foster 
support for legislation through floor speeches, co-sponsorship, and amendment and final roll call 
votes.   
Beyond disseminating information on the legislative schedule, DSG research publications 
provided a mechanism for members to rally support for legislation and legislative initiatives, and 
subsidized participation in floor debate.  Staff Bulletin, for example, was widely used by staffers 
and members to advertise for co-sponsors for legislation; signatories for a letter to be sent to 
federal agencies, the Administration, the leadership or other offices; to announce inter-office staff 
meetings called by individual offices; as well as other “special legislative efforts.”  This 
substantially subsidized the cost of reaching out to other members for their support.  Typically, 
staffers might have to spend considerable work time drafting and circulating a Dear Colleague 
letter or conducting a series of phone calls to other offices to solicit support or announce a 
meeting initiated by their boss.50  Instead, a liberal member could use these communications 
networks to broker support for their policy goals.   
And of course, members often carried Legislative Report and Fact Sheets with them to 
the floor to make a speech in support or opposition to a bill.  The publications provided ready, 
valid, fact-based arguments that members could easily incorporate into a short speech in defense 
                                                          
49 Rayburn’s close ally and protégé Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) described his mentor’s view of power in 
his book, House Out of Order: “He [Rayburn] subscribed to the belief that oftentimes withheld power is 
preferable to committed power that may not carry the day” (1965, 69).  In other words, unexercised power 
is better than power wielded unsuccessfully.  Rayburn’s institutional power was weaker if he developed 
and employed resources to support legislation that ultimately failed, then if he did nothing to support the 
failed legislation whatsoever.    
50 This is true in both the historical and contemporary eras, and particularly after the removal of limitations 
on the number of cosponsors any bill might have (previously, it stood at 25 members).  Staffers can spend 
hours of work time personally calling other offices to seek out support for legislation.  DSG also sometimes 
sent memos or letters to members urging them “to support our colleague…by introducing it [legislation] 
under your own name” (June 23rd Memo to Members Re Consumer Protection Bill, Part II, box 39, folder 
3]. 
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or opposition to a given bill. DSG-provided “arguments for the bill [that] would make a pretty 
good floor speech.”51  Members had ready access to arguments on a wide range of policy issues 
that were “as concise as possibly” can be, such that each argument “resonates with folks.”52   
The most significant of DSG policymaking mobilization tools however, was the group’s 
whip system.  It filled a mobilization void created by party leaders who were reticent to poll 
members on controversial legislation, and believed individual members – not the party – were 
personally responsible for learning about imminent votes.53  In an era and institutional 
environment in which junior liberals’ participation was more consequential on the floor than it 
was in committee, the abdication of mobilization by the leadership was especially harmful for 
liberal interests.54         
Indeed, floor debate during the textbook era was a double-edged sword for liberals 
because it provided opportunities for liberals and conservatives alike.  It was defined by prolific 
open rules in which legislation was subject to a wide range of controversial strengthening and 
weakening amendments on the floor (Polsby 2004).  In an era in which committees provided few 
opportunities for substantive participation, open rules guaranteed liberals a theoretical chance to 
shape legislation line by line.  And depending on the committee of jurisdiction, open rules 
provided liberals with the opportunity to “liberalize” conservative legislation via amendment, or 
rendered liberal legislation vulnerable to conservative amendments on the floor.  If open rules 
provided a rare guaranteed participation opportunity for liberal members, it also provided yet 
                                                          
51 September 21, 2015 in-person interview.  
52 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.   
53 Comments of Speaker John McCormack (D-MA), Journal of the House Democratic Caucus, March 18, 
1970, House Democratic Caucus Papers, box 2, folder 21.  
54 The increase in congressional careerism and the competitiveness of many liberal districts in this era 
ensured that liberal members were also especially busy.  As one member said, “Ask any liberal. We don’t 
have time to legislate” (Kingdon 1973).  Conservative members, in contrast, tended to be elected from safe 
districts, which enabled them to spend more time attending to their official legislative duties.  
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another conservative veto point for liberal policy goals.  DSG’s whip system was therefore 
alternatively responsible for bringing “members to the Chamber to vote on amendments which 
could seriously change the intent of the bill,” and on “measures on which the party leadership 
does not agree with the DSG position” (Kingdon 1973).55   
As originally designed, DSG whips were responsible for initiating a series of round-robin 
whip calls to ensure that members knew a vote was about to take place.  The group’s first 
Secretary-Whip, Frank Thompson (D-NJ), would place a call from the cloakroom to his office to 
trigger the system; the goal was to notify all “contactees” within 20 minutes that a vote was 
imminent.56  “Contactees” were informed that the system would not “conflict in any way with 
regular whip calls” – an assurance rooted more in the absence of official whip activity, rather than 
policy differences between Democratic and DSG whip activity.57  On high-profile legislation, 
DSG worked in consultation with gallery “spotters” or “watchers.”  These individuals were 
interest group representatives responsible for sitting in the House gallery and observing member 
attendance; if their assigned members did not show up on the floor to participate during key 
votes, groups made a personal visit to members’ offices (CQ 1965). 
Repeated close teller votes revealed significant flaws in the system.  Among the flaws: it 
took far too long to contact member offices, and staffers were oftentimes unfamiliar with whip 
calls (and the information they were intended to convey) altogether.58  Gallery spotters were also 
                                                          
55 John Morgan, noted in a February 17, 1966 speech before the Government and Foreign Affairs 
Association, DSG Papers, Part I, box 34, folder 6.   
56 January 30, 1960 organizational meeting for DSG whips, Part I, box 71, folder 9.   
57 Memo to DSG Members re DSG Whip System in the 89th Congress, DSG Papers, Part I, box 71, folder 
10.  
58 The 20-minute target did not protect against the loss of a vote. As staff director, John Morgan, noted in a 
February 17, 1966 speech before the Government and Foreign Affairs Association, “Each amendment on 
the floor has 5 minutes of debate time for each side, then is quickly voted on by voice or teller. If our side 
has absentees, and there were a few losses last year because of absence, an important vote can be lost or a 
bad amendment adopted” [DSG Papers, Part I, box 34, folder 6].    
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often poorly equipped to monitor member attendance.  Many had never met the member whose 
attendance they were assigned to monitor, and/or had flawed relationships with members, and in 
some cases, might have campaigned against the very member they were assigned to target in the 
prior election.59   
In late 1963, freshman representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) developed the “buddy 
system” to address these deficiencies.60  Fraser’s plan leveraged members’ personal relationships 
and patience to build successful floor coalitions.  Instead of an ad hoc system of round-robin 
phone calls and “ineffectual” gallery spotters, DSG members themselves would be responsible 
for monitoring their colleagues’ attendance on the floor.  Each DSG whip was assigned 4-6 other 
members whose attendance they were responsible for keeping track of; whips did not keep track 
of how members voted.  Given that whips and member targets were in constant contact during 
long hours of debate, assignments were only made between members with strong personal 
relationships.61  Whips were responsible for reporting to “reporters,” who managed overall 
member attendance at the front of the teller line as a final verification that members indeed voted.  
Interest groups were generally only included as a formal partner every couple of years or so on 
the most controversial of legislation (i.e. those bills likely to be subject to the most amendments 
on the floor).     
                                                          
59 Oral history interview with Kennedy staffer. “Almost always they were marked by how incredibly 
ineffectual they were despite some lofty pay levels….lobbyists would create an atmosphere of interest in a 
bill. Particularly, if you had a civil rights thing, with church groups or labor you could create sentiment. But 
by and large, they are not effective. The lower types had one or two pet congressmen they’d trot out when 
the boss came to town and go down to Paul Young’s or something.  But that really isn’t the way to 
influence legislation.”   
60 Fraser developed the plan in partnership with Rep. Neil Stabler (D-IA).  
61 Undoubtedly, this helped decrease potential resentment or annoyance on the part of members frustrated 
by another member keeping track of their every move during a busy legislative day.   In contrast, 
Democratic zone or geographic whips are elected by majority votes of the “constituency” served by the 
whip.   
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In addition to mobilizing votes, the whip system initiated polls, which were especially 
helpful in lobbying the leadership to bring controversial legislation to the floor.  Party leaders, of 
course, have a strong incentive to avoid using party resources in support of legislation that 
internally divides party members (Cox and McCubbins 2005).62  When leaders could or would 
not act to support liberal policy goals, DSG filled the void.  Leaders abdicated responsibility for 
the whip operation in support of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
because of the controversy the bills provoked within the Democratic Caucus (CQ 1965).  
Sometimes the leadership explicitly delegated vote counting responsibilities to DSG.  In 1979, the 
leadership asked DSG to carry out a whip check on H.R. 1, a bill providing for public financing 
of congressional elections.  In 1987, the leadership requested that DSG survey potential revenue-
raising options to help “develop a consensus position” and guide the Ways & Means 
Committee.63  DSG was even occasionally asked to poll seemingly non-controversial issues, such 
as a request by a staffer for Democratic whip (and former DSG chairman) Thomas Foley (D-WA) 
on a joint resolution to double food stamp appropriations.64   
DSG’s impact on floor outcomes was strongest when their efforts to poll and mobilize 
members complemented the work of party leaders.  For example, DSG chairman Mike Lowry (D-
WA) employed the group’s infrastructure in 1987 to develop an amendment to the Coast Guard 
Authorization Bill signaling Congress’s disapproval of President Ronald Reagan’s reflagging of 
                                                          
62 It is important to note that while the actions of the leadership comport with Cartel theory, the willingness 
of junior liberals to advance these issues does not. 
63 June 4, 1987 memo from DSG Chairman Mike Lowry (D-WI) to Democratic members. July 7, 1987 
letter from Lowry to un-identified list of members.  July 7th letter indicated that 100 members have 
responded to the survey so far, “but we would like to get as many additional responses as possible in order 
to ensure that the survey results are fully representative of the views of House Democrats.” Part II, box 166, 
folder 3.  
64 The whip check on H.J.Res. 934 was requested so that Foley could persuade Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-
MA) that it was non-controversial enough that it could be placed on the next Suspension calendar. Bills 
considered under suspension of the rules require a two-thirds majority vote of passage and are not subject 
to amendment; by definition, they almost always require bipartisan support.  Part I, box 53, folder 6. 
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Kuwaiti oil tankers.65  Lowry worked in close partnership with Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) in 
support of his amendment to bring Reagan’s foreign policy in compliance with the War Powers 
Act.  Foley appointed a special whip task force headed by DSG executive committee member 
Rep. Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN) and Rules committee member Bart Gordon (D-TN), and he 
arranged a meeting with the White House to discuss the reflagging issue.66  The stated 
unwillingness of the Reagan Administration to compromise and consider a delayed 
implementation of the reflagging policy helped party leaders pressure rank and file members to 
support Lowry’s proposal (CQ Almanac 1987, 252-64).   
The leadership solicited broad support for executive compliance with the War Powers 
Act, DSG while DSG focused on developing specific legislative language that would be 
supported by a diverse group of members (Hammond 2005).  Executive director Conlon tested 
different language, which helped Lowry develop a “moderate” proposal with majority support.  
Lowry’s amendment ultimately called for a 90-day delay (pre-dated to begin on June 1) before 
implementation of the Administration’s reflagging plan.  He then recruited Armed Services 
member Charles Bennett (D-FL) to offer a flat ban of reflagging on the floor to strategically 
frame his proposal as more moderate (CQ Almanac 1987, 252-64).67  On July 8th, 1987, the joint 
DSG-leadership effort succeeded.  While Bennett’s amendment was rejected 126 to 283, Lowry’s 
                                                          
65 “Reflagging” refers to a practice of bringing another country’s vessels under the protection of the United 
States by reflagging them as U.S. vessels.  Kuwait “sought assistance from the United States and the Soviet 
Union in protecting its vessels and maritime commerce.” In March 1987, the Reagan Administration 
complied by reflagging 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers (Wachenfeld 1988).  There was a significant fear among 
Democrats in Congress that reflagging left the U.S. open to retaliation from Iran with “methods that left no 
clear “fingerprints” that would justify [U.S.] retaliation against Iran” (CQ Almanac 1987, 252-64).   
66 June 25, 1987 DSG executive committee meeting. DSG Papers, Part II, box 8, folder 5.   
67 July 1, 1987 Dear Colleague letter from Toby Roth and Mike Lowry requesting members’ support for the 
Lowry-Roth amendment. DSG Papers, Part II, box 176, folder 8.   
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amendment was adopted 222 to 184; his proposal received support from a majority of 
Democrats.68 
The archival record documents the important role legislative sponsors believed the whip 
system played in mobilizing members to support their amendments on issues like foreign aid and 
housing subsidies.69  Members who could not request support from the leadership employed 
DSG’s experienced whip system to corral their likeminded colleagues to show up to a vote.   
Part II: 
Evaluating the Role of Liberal Organization on Policy Outcomes 
 
Liberal Democrats were motivated to organize DSG to increase the capacity of the House 
and the Democratic Caucus to respond to their own and their constituents’’ policy goals.  The 
archival record, interviews, and secondary sources, reveal that liberals carefully structured and 
employed the organization of DSG to promote the participation of liberal members in the 
legislative process.  This section examines how liberals applied these policymaking resources and 
tools in the textbook Congress, and evaluates their impact in three policy areas.  Prior research 
has argued that policymaking change in the Democratic Caucus is a product of the adoption of 
                                                          
68 Republicans successfully filibustered a similar 90-day delay bill sponsored by Senator Brock Adams (D-
WA), and Lowry’s amendment was never implemented. In response, Lowry filed a lawsuit against Reagan 
in federal court to force him to comply with the War Powers Act.  While the suit was ultimately dismissed, 
114 other members of the House and Senate were listed as plaintiffs in the lawsuit.   
69 For example, Rep. Edward Boland (D-MA) wrote to Morgan to thank him for DSG’s “cooperation and 
assistance” amidst consideration of his motion to restore $20 million in housing subsidies to the HEW 
appropriations bill.  “The teamwork was grand and produced the desired result, both in the Teller Vote and 
on the Roll-Call Vote” [DSG Papers, Part II, box 132 folder 8]. In another example, Henry Gonzalez, Chair 
of the Subcommittee on International Finance (Banking and Currency Committee) wrote to thank DSG on 
February 2, 1972 “for the assistance and support provided by the Democratic Study Group during House 
consideration of S. 748, S. 749, and S. 2010…[providing for]…$1.96 billion for the soft loan facilities of 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Development 
Association respectively…Your help was most beneficial, especially during the crucial vote on the Archer 
amendment to S. 2010, and I am sincerely grateful for your efforts” [DSG Papers, Part II, box 133, folder 
2].   
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rules changes and the homogenization of the Democratic Caucus (Rohde 1991).  Here I evaluate a 
third mechanism of policymaking change – group organization.  
 Specific and concrete public policy change is the most difficult, but important, facet of 
institutional change.  And liberals’ emphasis on the development and dissemination of legislative 
resources and tools motivates several expectations about the allocation and function of group 
organization on policymaking in Congress.70  Whereas party leaders allocate legislative resources 
based on the level of controversy and interest among their fellow partisans, I expect that groups 
will allocate their resources and tools based on their interests alone.71  And if agenda-setting 
power is the power to disseminate legislative resources and tools to support specific issues, then I 
expect organization will empower groups to insert issues onto the congressional agenda and build 
coalitions in support of their policy goals.  In short, DSG should mobilize its resources in support 
of those policy areas most prioritized by their constituents in urban districts and/or western states, 
and the group will be effective at securing floor votes and substantive debate on their policy goals 
regardless of the support of party and/or committee leaders.      
 Liberal Democrats were especially cautious about formally endorsing a specific agenda 
out of a fear that doing so would fracture or fragment the membership (see Appendix 5 for the list 
of policy endorsements adopted by DSG from 1960 to 1974).  Every staffer interviewed in the 
                                                          
70 The focus here is on the relationship between group organization and group policy goals.  I do not 
explore whether individual members’ policy goals are furthered through group organization, which is an 
important future extension of this research.  I expect that group organization will enable individual 
members to pursue their policy goals by widely disseminating policymaking resources and tools normally 
denied to them in the formal structures of the House.  Members of organized groups should garner more 
cosponsors on legislation they drafted and should be more likely to receive floor votes on legislation they 
sponsored than non-group members.   
71 Indeed, if groups emerge to challenge the status quo, they are more likely to allocate resources on issues 
that provoke controversy within their party, than on those issues that do not.   
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course of this project was quick to emphasize that the group did not have a policy agenda.72  And 
yet, liberals clearly viewed themselves as responsible for advancing a liberal agenda inside 
Congress – their efforts were simply conducted quietly, unobservable via most political science 
methodologies.  In 1966, DSG’s Secretary-Whip Henry Reuss (D-WI) described DSG as “the 
instrument of the national Democratic party…we are largely responsible for the legislative 
product.”73  Fifteen years later, DSG Chairman William Brodhead (D-WI) noted that 
“DSG…concentrates on the nitty-gritty, behind-the-scenes tasks required to pass legislation 
rather than on the more visible activity of advocating a liberal position on every major bill that 
comes along.”74   
Observing hidden legislative machinery such as this is problematic.  As Victor and Ringe 
(2013, 185) note, the indirect, diffuse nature of group activity, and the sticky nature of policy 
outcomes, makes it extraordinarily difficult to isolate the impact of specific groups or actors: 
“making the case that a particular amendment was introduced as a result of discussions in an 
intergroup or tracing a policy initiative back to ideas first raised in a congressional caucus will 
almost always be difficult and will often be impossible.”  In short, rejecting the counterfactual 
with “certainty” is impossible.  This project is not immune to these issues.  Thus, in order to 
examine the relationship between group-developed legislative machinery and policy outcomes, I 
focus on individual policy areas and legislation.  If agenda-setting power is the power to decide 
which policy goals will receive the benefit of legislative resources and tools (Cox and McCubbins 
2005), then I examine how DSG, the Democratic leadership, and committees, allocated resources 
                                                          
72 One staffer replied, “I wouldn’t say that DSG had a policy agenda…” [September 21, 2015 in-person 
interview]. Another staffer said “They would not take formal positions, in truth because it would simply 
fragment the membership. They would not do that.” [September 23, 2015 telephone interview].  
73 Comments of Rep. Henry Reuss (D-WI) in Kole, John W. 1966. “Kastenmeier Among Democrats 
Disenchanted With Liberal Group.” Wall Street Journal. October: 5. DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 
9.  
74 August 14, 1981 Letter to the Editor of The Nation from Rep. William Brodhead, DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 132, folder 3.  
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and tools to pursue specific goals in three policy areas: civil rights, defense, and campaign 
finance policy. This approach allows me to observe not only how different sites of informal and 
formal power in Congress interact to shape legislation, but also how groups overcome – and fail 
to overcome – the hurdles to policy change and legislative influence.  I employed available 
archival documents, the Congressional Record, Congressional Quarterly, interviews (where 
available) and other secondary and primary sources, to reconstruct how key congressional 
policies were developed in the 1960s-1980s.  This focused examination of individual policy areas 
enables a close comparison of legislative resource allocation by DSG, party leaders, and 
committees in each policy area.   
The policy areas analyzed here are interesting and significant in their own right.  They 
include policies often thought by political scientists to motivate the adoption of procedural 
reforms in Congress (civil rights, defense), as well as those that do not (campaign finance).  And 
the policies comprise key points of dissension within and between the two parties in Congress 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  These policy areas were selected because they 
were not only highly prioritized by DSG, but historically, outside groups, leaders, and 
committees, as well as both political parties, played important roles in shaping their development.   
Across all three policy areas, liberals established task forces, drafted and introduced 
legislation, mobilized its whip system, worked with relevant interest groups, formally endorsed 
legislation, and conducted and disseminated research to members.  And of course, these policies 
were also the subject of considerable attention and resources by “formal” sites of power in 
Congress.  In the next section, I briefly examine the allocation of legislative resources across all 
policy areas.  Defense and civil liberties were the beneficiaries of both formal (committee, party 
leaders) and informal (DSG) legislative resources, although the quantity and quality undoubtedly 
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varied.  Campaign finance reform did not emerge on the congressional agenda as a major issue 
until the early 1970s, and thus is not represented in the available data.75   
The mutual investment by DSG, committees, and the leadership, in each of these policy 
areas strengthens the validity of the analyses conducted below.  The archival record (DSG, the 
Democratic Caucus), the Congressional Record, Congressional Quarterly, committee reports, 
and other available primary and secondary sources (newspaper accounts, oral histories, and 
interviews with staffers, when available), provide observable evidence of decision-making and 
action by each power site.  If evaluating the role of “informal” groups in policy outcomes requires 
accounting for the actions and involvement of “formal” sources of power (i.e. committees and 
party leaders) (Victor and Ringe 2013), then the three policy areas analyzed here allow me to 
draw stronger conclusions about how party groups influence policymaking processes in Congress.    
                                                          
75 It is however, the rare issue that received time and resource investment by not only DSG, committees, 
and party leaders, but the executive as well.   
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Distribution of Legislative Resources.  
Table 7.1 presents data on the distribution of legislative resources across different policy 
areas by DSG, the leadership, and committees from 1967 through 1970.76  DSG not only devoted 
more mobilization resources than did the Democratic leadership, but they did so across a wider 
range of policy issues.  Over the four-year period, Democratic leaders emphasized labor and 
economic issues to the detriment of all other issues save government management and foreign 
policy.  Leaders did not mobilize Democrats around a single bill in the areas of energy and 
                                                          
76 The comparisons here are limited to the 89th and 90th Congresses because, unfortunately, comprehensive 
DSG whip data is only available for these years.  However, additional congresses would likely only 
magnify observed differences in policy priorities.  Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) barely used the 
Democratic whip system; in some congresses, Rayburn only mobilized members 5 times (such as the 86 th).  
His successor, Speaker John McCormack (D-MA), used the whip system more frequently, but continued to 
refrain from using party resources on controversial policy issues.   
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natural resources, transportation, or congressional reform.  The leadership’s absence is striking 
given that this period aligns with the adoption of major legislation in each of these areas, 
including the 1970 Clean Air Act (which established the Environmental Protection Agency), the 
1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act (which extended civil rights, labor, and environmental 
protections to the federal highway system), and the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see 
prior chapter for major provisions).  And the sole housing mobilization effort was not undertaken 
until after the House passed the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which outlawed housing discrimination.  
The absence of official party resources on all but the least controversial of policy areas is 
unsurprising given the strong incentive to avoid promoting issues that divide the party.  But it 
nevertheless reveals a striking vacuum in policy leadership in an era of major policy change.   
In contrast, DSG was active across every policy area – more closely mirroring the 
distribution of legislative resources observed in the committee system.77  The group mutually 
prioritized a wide range of policy issues, including legislation in the areas of social welfare, labor 
and the economy, education, urban affairs, civil rights, and foreign policy.  Here the data suggests 
that DSG effectively supplanted the leadership as the major supplier of legislative mobilization in 
the House.  The group mobilized members more frequently and around a greater number of 
policy issues.   
The distribution of resources by legislative context also illuminates key differences in 
legislative machinery between groups and party leaders.  Table 7.2 presents data on DSG and 
leadership whip activity by legislative context.  DSG mobilization focused almost exclusively on 
the amendment stage of the legislative process (comprising 60% of all whip activity), while party 
leaders focused almost exclusively on member support for the final roll call vote (comprising 
                                                          
77 Unfortunately, comprehensive committee hearing data is only available from 1970 (i.e. the second 
session of the 90th Congress).  As a result, comparisons between committees, DSG, and the leadership 
should be interpreted with caution.   
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66% of all whip activity).  Again, these differences are unsurprising given the leadership’s strong 
incentive to avoid promoting controversial policy issues; conservative and liberal amendments 
considered in the Committee of the Whole were among the most contentious votes cast by 
members.  But in an era of open rules in which any member had “virtually absolute freedom” 
(CQ 1986, 29-35) to participate on the floor prior to the final roll call vote, the allocation of 
DSG’s legislative resources were better matched to the institutional environment than party 
leaders’ resources.   
The agenda-setting and coalition-building activities analyzed above illuminate patterns in 
resource allocation by liberals, Democratic leaders, and committees, between policy areas, but 
they do not enable comparisons within specific policy areas.  How did DSG, party, and committee 
leaders apply their legislative resources and tools to pursue specific policy goals?   
I now turn to an analysis of three policy areas that were highly prioritized by DSG, and 
the beneficiaries of legislative resources from both party and committee leaders: civil rights and 
civil liberties, defense, and campaign finance.  
 
Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 
Debates over civil rights and civil liberties dominated Congress in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Yet innovations in civil rights policy in the twentieth century are typically understood almost 
exclusively through executive branch leadership and interest group pressure.  Congress’s role is 
largely obstructionist – exemplified by the Senate filibuster and the House Rules Committee.  But 
legislative leadership was critical to the transformation of federal civil rights policy, perhaps best 
exemplified by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  These bills provoked 
a hostile response from southern conservative Democrats in the House (and the Senate), which 
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significantly limited the official support they received from party leaders who were reticent to 
expend party resources on controversial legislation.  And Judiciary Committee chairman Emanuel 
Celler (D-NY) played a vital role in marshaling the civil rights legislation through committee, but 
liberals fulfilled a critical leadership vacuum before and after legislation was reported from 
committee.  DSG developed partnerships with key interests inside and outside of Congress, 
pressured Republicans to sign discharge petitions and support the legislation, polled members on 
key provisions to broker a bill with majority support, and coordinated an extensive on-the-floor 
whip network to combat conservative amendments to water down the bill.78   
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In 1963, as President Lyndon B. Johnson and interest groups 
promoted the adoption of a strong civil rights bill by applying political pressure outside of 
Congress, DSG played a critical leadership role mobilizing action inside of Congress.  
Throughout 1963 and 1964, DSG conducted whip counts of member support for the bill; 
developed research materials for members and key partnerships with the White House and the 
LCCR; and mobilized members to come to the floor when the Civil Rights Act came to a vote.  
And while the Judiciary Committee was responsible for drafting the legislation, the group’s civil 
rights task force wrote the language for the fair employment provisions of the bill (Title VII) – a 
compromise between the Judiciary and Education & Labor committees.  And after the bill was 
reported from committee, liberals’ efforts protected the bill from a “seemingly endless number of 
teller votes” designed to weaken the bill on the floor.79   
                                                          
78 The archival record includes other evidence of DSG’s important coalition-building work on civil rights 
legislation in the 1960s.  For example, on April 29th, 1968, Sherwin Mackman, Assistant to President 
Johnson, sent a letter thanking Dick Conlon and enclosing a pen which Johnson used to sign the bill.  
Mackman noted that “The President thought you might like to have” the pen.” DSG Papers, Part I, box 37, 
folder 1.  
79 December 22, 1965 letter to former Democratic presidential nominee (U.N. Ambassador) Adlai 
Stevenson, from congressional liaison Charles U. Daly: “…when, for a variety of reasons the House Whip 
System faltered a bit during the long battle for a civil rights bill, the Study Group was of valuable 
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In June 1963, President John F. Kennedy proposed a civil rights bill providing additional 
support for school desegregation, extending the tenure of the Civil Rights Commission, 
guaranteeing access to public accommodations, and empowering the Attorney General to file 
suits to enforce the law, among other provisions.80  Shortly thereafter, DSG whips carried out a 
questionnaire on what was then known as the 1963 Civil Rights Act (see Table 7.3).81  DSG 
conducted the poll because the leadership could not devote official party resources to a measure 
that provoked such controversy within the party (Cox and McCubbins 2005).  Absent DSG, the 
poll likely would have been conducted by interest groups whose counts were notoriously 
inaccurate, or by Administration officials who were likely to inquire only about those provisions 
in the Administration’s original bill (provisions added in Congress were likely to be ignored).82   
                                                          
assistance to those fighting to preserve the bill in the face of a seemingly endless number of teller votes.”, 
DSG Papers, Part I, box 23, folder 3.  
80 Kennedy’s package also called for cutting off federal funds to any program where discrimination is 
practiced, limitations on discrimination in federal contracts, and establishing a Community Relations 
Service to broker resolution within local communities (CQ Almanac 1964).   
81 1963 Civil Rights Questionnaire, DSG Papers, Part I, box 43, folder 6.  
82 Kennedy and Johnson Administration congressional liaison Charles U. Daly recalled that church, civic, 
business, and labor groups “were marked by how incredibly ineffectual they were despite some lofty pay 
levels.” [recorded interview, April 5, 1966, JFK Oral history program].    
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Instead, DSG emerged to provide Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Celler (D-NY) with a 
coalition-building partner.  The group helped Celler craft a bill that would receive majority 
support, as well as to identify the most effective legislative strategy to move the bill from 
committee to the floor.  Whips asked members if they would vote for a civil rights bill “if it 
comes to the House floor”; if they would sign a discharge petition if “the Rules Committee 
refuses to act”; if they would support a leadership-backed floor amendment to insert a provision 
providing for the Federal Employment Protection Committee (F.E.P.C.) if Judiciary did not 
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include it; and whether the member would vote in favor of floor amendments “designed to water-
down strong committee-approved provisions.”  
 Only 43 copies of the questionnaire survived the past fifty years, and the remaining 
responses should not be interpreted as representative of all liberals or western members.  
However, the responses provide evidence that not all targeted members agreed with each other 
about the bill’s content or legislative strategy a priori; a majority coalition had to be developed 
over time.  Indeed, the comments section of the questionnaires underscores members’ electoral 
concerns about the bill: Rep. Thomas Morris (D-NM) was “Very worried re political effect of this 
vote.”  Rep. Victor Wickersham (D-OK): “He’s a little frightened.”  Rep. Wayne Aspinall (D-
CO) was “…getting some heat from back home.” And Rep. Compton I. White (D-ID): “He’s 
getting lots of heat on public accommodations and is worried.”   
One of the provisions included in DSG’s poll but not in the Administration’s bill was the 
establishment of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) covering most labor 
unions and corporations.83  This provision would come to comprise Title VII, the fair 
employment section.  While the bulk of the bill was a joint Administration-Judiciary product, this 
section was a compromise brokered by DSG between the Judiciary and Education & Labor 
committees.  Civil rights task force chairman James Roosevelt (D-CA) worked closely with the 
leadership of both committees to draft this title (he served on Education & Labor) and testified 
before the Judiciary committee hearings in support of it (CQ 1965).84  Celler appears to have 
                                                          
83 Kennedy briefly mentioned employment discrimination in his two civil rights radio-television addresses 
in 1963. While the questionnaire is phrased in such a way as to indicate the committee bill had already been 
reported, DSG carried out the poll before the Judiciary Committee reported the bill.   
84 When the bill came to the floor, Roosevelt specifically mentioned Education & Labor Chairman Adam 
Clayton Powell (D-NY), Celler, James Corman (D-CA), James O’Hara (D-MI), as well as several other 
Democrats and Republicans (CQ 1965).  Gale, Dick. 1965. “N.J. Solon Heads Powerful Group.” Courier-
Post, Camden, New Jersey. April 1. Congressional liaison Charles U. Daly described Roosevelt as having 
“pushed very hard on FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Commission] and other factors.” April 5, 1966 
oral history interview.   
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adopted a limited role in the initial drafting of this title with the expectation that he could later use 
his position as floor manager to rewrite the title to his preference.85   
The Judiciary Committee reported the bill on November 20 – a mere two days before the 
assassination of President Kennedy.  It included all but two of the provisions inquired about by 
the DSG poll – left out were provisions providing for the F.E.P.C. and a Community Relations 
Service.  As a successful (and embarrassing) discharge petition (filed be Chairman Celler in 
December 1963) became increasingly likely, Rules Chairman Howard Smith (D-VA) relented, 
scheduled hearings, and eventually reported an open rule for the bill on January 30th.86  This gave 
conservatives ample opportunity to attack the bill on the floor.   
In preparation for the debate, DSG chairman Chet Holifield (D-CA), staff director Bill 
Phillips, and task force chairman Roosevelt, met regularly with the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights and White House congressional liaison Charles U. Daly, to develop a legislative 
strategy.87  The Democratic leadership was not present at these meetings; Celler attended 
occasionally.  LCCR and church groups served as key intermediaries to broker necessary support 
                                                          
85 Celler offered 7 amendments to Title VII on the floor; all were adopted. He offered only one other 
amendment to the bill on the floor.   
86 Smith (D-VA) promised that the committee would act on the bill in January, but his own staunch 
opposition to the bill and the impending Christmas recess raised concerns for liberals.  On December 9, 
1963, Celler filed a discharge petition to force the bill out of Rules in anticipation of a series of never-
ending hearings: “We have had 6 months of hearings. All that needs to be said has been said.” Smith was 
moved to act as the petition got closer to the necessary number of signatures.  Comments of Celler on the 
House floor.  Part II, box 161, folder 4: Congressional Record – House, page 2271, Dec 9, 1963 
87 The archival record suggests these meetings began at least as early as January 1963 (January 9, 1963 
letter from LCCR to Bill Phillips thanking him for attending the Sunday evening meeting, DSG Papers, 
Part I, box 43, folder 2).  Southern members viewed the relationship between DSG and these interest 
groups as circumspect.  For example, Rep. Thomas Curtis (R-MO) took to the House floor to note that 
“various civil rights which are sponsoring the political maneuvers of the discharge petition are also working 
closely with…the so-called Democratic study group…to further the efforts of this Democratic liberal group 
to finance its plans to elect more liberals like themselves in the next Congress.”  Curtis inserted a 
newspaper article into the Record, and noted that “any group appropriating for itself the label “liberal” 
should be especially careful about the methods it employs” to support its operations [Congressional Record, 
24 December 1963, H25552].  
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from Republicans (CQ 1965).88  Meanwhile, Phillips worked with a staff of four full-time and the 
two part-time employees to develop at-ready research materials to respond to any request by a 
member about a particular title of the bill.89  The leadership did not provide informational 
resources to members.  
 
House consideration of the bill began on January 31st and continued for nine days 
(through February 10th).90  Prior to the House convening each day, DSG Secretary-Whip Frank 
                                                          
88 Obtaining necessary Republican support for the bill required a strategic balance of pressure without 
alienation.   DSG developed a strategy to “dramatize the failure of most Republicans to sign the discharge 
petition” and express support for the bill, but limiting public attacks against Republicans [August 30, 1963 
memo “Strictly confidential Democratic Strategy in Dealing with Republicans on the Civil Rights Bill of 
1963.” DSG Papers, Part I, box 43, folder 3; Dear Colleague letter requesting attendance at an “emergency 
civil rights meeting, Part I, box 58, folder 12]. In a February 28, 1964 letter from Richard Bolling (D-MO) 
to Sidney Scheuer of the National Committee for an Effective Congress, Bolling wrote, “I want to thank 
you for the significant role that NCEC played during the Civil Rights legislative struggle in the House. The 
contact and coordination with House Republicans provided by your staff was a necessary ingredient to the 
complex operation in support of the bill.” Part I, box 32, folder 7.  
89 In addition to analyzing the specific titles of the bill, these materials also explained the procedural 
strategy used to bring the bill to the floor. For example, Democrats opposed to signing a discharge petition 
in order to protect committee autonomy (not out of an opposition to the underlying bill), suggested using 
the Calendar Wednesday procedure.  DSG distributed letters, memos, and many members even took to the 
floor to explain why the alphabetical call of the committees under Calendar Wednesday was not effective 
given the number of committees that fell before Judiciary (see Transcript of Floor Speech, Rep. Richard 
Bolling (D-MO), 9 December 1963; January 30, 1963 Memo from Blatnik to Members re Upcoming 
Debate on Civil Rights Bill, DSG Papers, Part II, box 38, folder 1).   
90 The House did not convene on Sunday, February 9th.   
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Thompson (D-NJ), Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), Daly, Johnson special assistant Lawrence 
O’Brien, and representatives for the LCCR, met to discuss strategy in Thompson’s office; the 
leadership did not attend (CQ 1965). Thompson was in charge of marshalling members as part of 
the regular DSG whip system, but also the “buddy system.”  He led a system of 19 whips, who 
worked in groups to cover debate on specific bill titles; each team was responsible for 
maintaining the attendance of anywhere from 3-7 members.  Alongside DSG’s whips was a series 
of “gallery spotters” responsible for keeping track of the attendance and votes of 4-5 
congressmen.  This effort was coordinated by Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP, and fulfilled by 
representatives of the various LCCR organizations. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the direct impact of DSG’s whip system on 
member attendance as all amendment votes were unrecorded.  However, average member 
participation in teller votes from February 3-10th (Table 7.4) held steady, suggesting that liberals 
were effective in maintaining member attendance.91  While steep attendance drop offs were 
typical in the 1960s, attendance was strongest when liberals needed it most on February 8th when 
Title VII – which DSG helped draft – was considered.     
In contrast to the close coordination observed among liberals, the Southern Caucus was 
poorly organized.  The group met once on January 30th – the day the Rules Committee reported a 
rule for the bill.  And despite having significant institutional resources at their disposal, the 
group’s own whip system headed by Rep. Thomas G. Abernathy (D-MS) only sprang to action a 
handful of times, and southerners had no staffers on the floor (or groups in the gallery) to assist 
                                                          
91 Standing votes often occur after a voice vote produces an uncertain outcome; members “rise from their 
seats to be counted…Only those present and voting are announced” (House Rules Committee, 2017). In the 
civil rights debate, standing votes were often followed by a teller vote whereby members formed into two 
lines to be counted as “yay” or “nay” by tellers.  Individual members’ votes are unrecorded on both 
standing and teller votes.  Teller votes give members more time to get to the floor prior to the culmination 
of the vote, and thus vote participation levels are inherently higher than with comparable standing votes.   
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them with information and mobilization (CQ 1965).  The difference in organization was so 
notable that Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-LA), conservative Armed Services chairman and staunch 
opponent of civil rights, took to the House floor to address DSG’s efforts: “To my friends who sit 
in this section, known as the study group, let me pay you a tribute and a compliment. You are 
here on the job. I disagree with you but I respect you and I admire your courage and your 
determination to be here and to be counted” (emphasis added).92   
The strong attendance record ensured that liberals did not lose a single vote to 
conservatives; Celler’s bill emerged from the final roll call unscathed.  In total, 122 amendments 
were offered on the floor.  94 amendments, nearly all from southern Democrats, were rejected; 28 
were accepted, all with the support or neutrality of the bill’s floor managers.93  Most of the 
accepted amendments were technical changes to the bill, although two significant amendments 
were adopted.  The first was a surprising proposal by Rules Chairman Smith on February 8th to 
add “sex” to the list of protected classes under Title VII (barring employment discrimination).94  
It was adopted 168-133.  The second was a February 10th proposal to establish a Community 
                                                          
92 Congressional Record, 1908, 5 February 1964.  DSG Papers, Part I, box 43, folder 4. Hebert’s comments 
are especially notable because he was notoriously disrespectful to junior members of Congress, infamously 
referring to the Watergate Babies in 1974 as “boys and girls” before they promptly removed him from his 
chairmanship.   
93 Rep. Curtis (R-MO) again took to the floor to bemoan the “reported attitude of the Democratic study 
group,” which he accused of having “caucused and in effect said they had agreed to oppose all 
amendments, regardless of their merits.”  [Congressional Record, 8 February 1964, H2558].    
94 Smith’s motivation in proposing this amendment has been the subject of considerable debate (Menand 
2014) – did he offer it as a “poison pill” to doom the bill in the House or Senate, or as a genuine 
advancement in women’s rights.  The addition of “sex” to the bill’s titles appears to have been part of a 
broader conservative strategy (southerners offered amendments to Title II, III, IV, and V), but the 
motivation for these efforts is not clear.  All, of course, were rejected, except for Smith’s amendment.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine if Smith’s appeals to the “white men” on the floor to cast a vote 
in favor of “his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister” ultimately appealed to conservatives or 
liberals.  While unrecorded votes make individual-level support impossible to determine, the high voter 
participation rates on the amendment suggest that at least some conservatives and some liberals supported 
it.   
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Relations Service as a new Title X.95  DSG polled members about this provision in 1963 (it 
received significant member support), but Celler dropped it from the committee’s bill alongside 
the F.E.P.C. provision.96   
On February 10th, the bill was finally approved by a vote of 290-130; the Senate began 
several months of consideration before ultimately adopting the bill on June 19th by a vote of 73-
27.  It was signed by Johnson on July 2nd. 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.  After the 1964 election evidenced the persistence of mass 
voting discrimination, civil rights groups launched almost immediate voter registration drives in 
several southern states.  While some minor protections of voting rights were included as part of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title I), they were insufficient to protect against the myriad of 
discriminatory practices in several states.  Their efforts in Dallas County, Alabama received 
national attention when their peaceful protests were met with mass arrests and police violence.97  
DSG helped promote an immediate response by Congress to this pressing public policy problem; 
the Democratic leadership acquiesced any responsibility to the Judiciary Committee, which 
awaited presidential leadership.  From January to July 1965, the group organized a “fact-finding” 
trip to Dallas County, Alabama at the height of police backlash against voter registration drives in 
the area; brokered connections between members and key civil rights groups and activists; and 
mobilized members to come to the floor when the Voting Rights Act came to a vote.  DSG 
                                                          
95 This title provided for the “creation of a Community Relations Service within the Commerce Department 
to aid communities in resolving disputes related to discriminatory practices based on race, color or national 
origin” (CQ 1964).  It was adopted via voice vote.   
96 While the small surviving DSG questionnaires should not be interpreted as representative of all members, 
only 2 of the 43 members expressed opposition to the Community Relations Service.  Meanwhile, 21 of the 
43 members expressed concern or opposition to the F.E.P.C. provision.  No attempt was made by a member 
on the floor to add the FEPC provision back to the bill.   
97 The protests were built around mass voter registration drives in Selma and Montgomery, Alabama 
(which at the time, only allowed citizens to register to vote on two days of each month).  Dallas County 
Sheriff Jim Clark encouraged a violent police response and arrested hundreds of peaceful protesters and 
activists.   
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provided liberals with the legislative platform, resources, and tools necessary to promote member 
interest in voting rights legislation, and constructed a successful coalition in support of the bill on 
the floor.   
After violence broke out in response to protesters in Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, 
Rep. Charlie Diggs (D-MI), chairman of DSG’s civil rights steering committee, arranged a 
February 5th factfinding trip for members to observe the conditions in the state firsthand.  Nearly 
all steering committee members participated in the trip, including Reps. John Bingham (D-NY), 
Joseph Resnick (D-NY), William Fitz Ryan (D-NY), James Scheuer (D-NY), John Dow (D-NY), 
Don Edwards (D-CA), Jeffrey Cohelan (D-CA), Kenneth Dyal (D-CA), Augustus Hawkins (D-
CA), Weston Vivian (D-MI), as well as three Republicans, Reps. Ogden Reid (R-NY), Bradford 
Morse (R-MA) and Charles Mathias (R-MD).98  It marked the first time that a delegation of 
members had gone to observe civil rights protests, and it was the first time many members of the 
predominantly white delegation had even been to the south.  Diggs recalled that the members:  
“had no…real understanding of segregation and how it applied to…Black folks in those 
areas. It was rather academic and so I thought that their coming to Selma at that time 
would give them a deeper understanding of the inequities and the injustices that existed in 
Alabama and other parts of the south.”99  
During the trip, members visited the city jail where protesters were held; met for two and a half 
hours with the mayor, sheriff, and nearly all local elected officials; and conducted numerous 
interviews with local residents and protesters about their experiences.100  They also met with Dr. 
                                                          
98 Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) and Robert C. Nix (D-PA) each sent staffers to represent them 
(Powell also sent his son on his behalf).  Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) was also a member of the Steering 
Committee, but did not participate in the trip.  Handwritten notecard with Civil Rights Steering Committee 
Membership, DSG Papers, Part II, box 6, folder 2.   
99 Interview with Rep. Charlie Diggs (D-MI), conducted by Blackside, Inc. on November 6, 1986, Eyes on 
the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years (1954-1965).   
100 The full list of local officials included the board of registrars, the superintended of education, the circuit 
judge, the probate judge, and the city and county attorney. Diggs credited Rep. Glenn Andrews (D-AL), 
who represented Dallas County, with helping members arrange the meeting.  He also noted the tense tone 
of the meeting: “we were confronted by an uncomfortable-appearing mayor and a very belligerent city 
attorney. The mayor immediately began reading a prepared statement in which he said he did not want any 
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Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, and other activists on the ground.  According to Diggs, 
the goal of the trip was to signal to local officials that they “better start listening” to protesters or 
Congress will act for them; to add “credibility to Dr. King and the entire movement;” and, of 
course, to discuss specific ideas that “the Congressmen were going to take legislatively.”101  
While the Judiciary Committee invited many civil rights leaders to testify before the committee’s 
eventual hearings, it did not organize a trip for themselves or their colleagues to observe the 
events up close; rather the effort stemmed from Diggs’s steering committee.      
Upon their return, the group took to the floor to share their experiences with the 
leadership and other members.102  Diggs, Ryan, Hawkins, Dyal, Scheuer, and several other 
members, spoke of the discrimination they witnessed, and implored their colleagues to 
immediately introduce and support legislation protecting voting rights for all citizens.103  They 
also inserted the “testimony” they took with local residents and protesters while in Alabama into 
the Record; the members conducted at least 13 interviews for the Record.104  This floor activity 
widely disseminated information from members’ most trusted source – other members – and gave 
them ample time to digest it before any eventual legislation came to a vote (Kingdon 1973).  This 
timely, trusted, and pre-digested information provided by liberals was especially significant given 
                                                          
outside help and did not need any help and just generally characterized us [the delegation of members] as a 
group of agitators despite the fact that we are Members of Congress who certainly have a role to play in 
any matter relating to this subject.”  Members asked local residents about their experiences registering to 
vote, including their personal experience paying poll taxes.   Congressional Record 9 February 1965 
H2422-2430.     
101 Interview, Diggs, November 6, 1986. 
102 Dear Colleague letter from Charlie Diggs (D-MI) informing members of his request for a special order 
from Speaker John McCormack (D-MA), DSG Papers, Part I, box 32, folder 7.  
103 For example, whites were given offered assistance to fill out their voter registration forms, and their 
questions about the complicated registration form were answered.  And whites were given preferential 
placement at the front of voter registration lines, while blacks were forced to wait at the end.  Given that 
Alabama only allowed citizens to register on two days each month, this often ensured that the office closed 
at the end of the day without any blacks having successfully registered to vote.   
104 Diggs also inserted Alabama voter registration forms, which required applicants to write from dictation 
a portion of the Constitution, answer questions about the governmental process, read passages of the 
Constitution and answer questions about the passages, and sign an “oath of loyalty.”  
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that critics later charged that the Judiciary Committee’s efforts were a “hastily contrived, 
patchwork response” to the voting problems in southern states.105   
The February 5th trip did not change opinions so much as move “people who were either 
neutral or uninterested…to take active roles.”  Members whose northeastern, western, or mid-
western constituencies were not directly impacted by the events in Dallas County came to 
understand the importance of immediate, strong federal action.   A day after the trip (and as 
violence escalated in Alabama), President Johnson announced that he would send a voting rights 
bill to Congress.  Shortly thereafter, the steering committee went to the White House to meet with 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, and the White House 
counsel (the latter two were responsible for drafting Johnson’s proposed bill).  Members reported 
on their fact-finding trip, and advocated for legislation providing for federal voter registration in 
areas with a history of racial discrimination, and the elimination of “literacy tests” and “poll 
taxes” in local elections.106 
On March 17th, the same day that Johnson submitted his drafted bill, the steering 
committee met to discuss the bill and develop a legislative strategy.107  Over the next two months 
– as the bill made its way through the Judiciary Committee – DSG developed a liaison with the 
LCCR (mirroring the arrangement on civil rights from last year) and repeatedly polled members’ 
preferences.  DSG and LCCR leaders (including Rauh and Mitchell) each attended group 
meetings.108  The liaison enabled strategy discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of the 
                                                          
105 Republican views, Judiciary Committee Report, 1965.   
106 Draft letter to President Johnson from Diggs, DSG Papers, Part I, box 32, folder 7.  February 1965 
telegram to President Johnson, Part II, box 38, folder 3.   
107 Johnson’s bill provided for the appointment of federal examiners in areas where fewer than 50 percent 
of voting age residents were registered to vote on the date (or voted) in the 1964 election, and suspended 
literacy tests. 
108 Various memos re Civil Rights Steering Committee Meetings, including attendance lists, DSG Papers, 
Part I, box 70, folder 2.  
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House and Senate versions of the bill, how to leverage differences in the chambers’ legislative 
processes to produce the strongest bill, and how members should publicly discuss the events in 
Dallas County (and the Johnson Administration’s response to them).  LCCR also used the 
meetings to identify the provisions of the bill that most concerned members so the group could 
prepare and distribute research on those issues to them.109   
Liberals’ early organizing efforts were especially important in stemming moderate 
support for the Republican substitute developed by Rep. William McCulloch (R-OH), ranking 
Republican on the Judiciary Committee.  McCulloch’s bill dropped the poll tax ban, replacing it 
with an authorization for the Attorney General to file suit against discriminatory poll taxes and 
providing for federal voting examiners.  In the absence of an official Democratic count (Boggs 
again abdicated responsibility for the bill), DSG conducted a “nose count” of member support for 
the Administration’s bill and the McCulloch substitute, which was likely to garner genuine and 
strategic support from Republicans and southern Democrats.110  The group also invited AG 
Katzenbach and the Justice Department to brief members on the Administration’s bill and answer 
their questions; and prepared Fact Sheets on the bill and the Republican substitute to empower 
members to cast knowledgeable votes, respond to Republican criticism, and participate in debate 
on the floor.111   
                                                          
109 For example, at a May 18th, 1965 meeting, the DSG executive committee discussed various provisions 
of the bill, including the prohibition of “third party” intimidation in voter registration.  Joseph Rauh “said a 
memorandum being prepared on the “third party” intimidation ban by statute will be sent to DSG for 
circulation.”  [DSG Papers, box 151, folder 6].   
110 Like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Democratic whip Hale Boggs (D-LA) abdicated any leadership role on 
the Voting Rights Act and did not mobilize the party’s whip system to count votes.  The Republican 
substitute, introduced in April.  Minority leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) supported the bill and served as a 
public co-sponsor.  Memo re Nose count on Republican substitute for voting rights bill, DSG Papers, Part I, 
box 70, folder 3.  Unfortunately, the counts are not a part of the archival record. DSG memos suggest that 
counts were delivered to Secretary-Whip Mo Udall (D-AZ), rather than DSG’s offices.   
111 DSG Voting Rights Fact Sheet comparing three different versions of the bill, Part I, box 70, folder 3. 
Memo from John Brademas (D-IN) to DSG Members re Immediate Meeting on Voting Rights Bill, Part I, 
box 70, folder 1.   Comparative Analysis of LCCR, Administration, and Republican voting rights 
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On July 6th, the bill came to the floor after a 5-week delay in the Rules Committee.112 In 
preparation for the vote, DSG Secretary-Whip Mo Udall (D-AZ) organized a 25-person whip 
team and triggered the “buddy system,” assigning each whip 6 colleagues whom they were 
responsible for keeping track of throughout the entirety of the bill’s consideration.113  While the 
voting rights bill would be considered on the floor under similar conditions as the civil rights bill 
the previous year, opponents adopted a different strategy.  If conservatives strategically attacked 
the 1964 bill by subjecting it to a slog of amendments, they attacked the 1965 bill by lining up in 
support of the Republican substitute.  It was, as one southern Democrat described, the less 
“objectionable” of the two voting rights bills.114  Thus the key vote was on the Republican 
substitute.  It was here that early efforts by liberals inside of Congress and interest groups outside 
of Congress to lobby Republicans to support a strong voting rights bill took on a renewed 
importance.  If the Republican substitute was viewed by southern opponents as the “weaker” of 
the two bills, then Republican voting rights supporters were more likely to support the strong, 
Judiciary-reported bill; the substitute was ultimately rejected 166 to 215.  
In total, only 16 amendments were offered on the floor, many of which were directed at 
the Republican substitute.  Only one amendment, which provided for penalties to falsification of 
voter registration information and vote buying in federal elections, was accepted.115  Like the civil 
rights bill the previous year, liberals did not lose a single amendment on the floor and the 
                                                          
legislation (DSG Papers, Part I, box 70, folder 2). March 17, 1965 memo re DSG civil rights steering 
committee meeting minutes. DSG Papers, Part II, box 38, folder 3. 
112 The Judiciary Committee reported the bill on June 1, shortly after the Senate adopted the Voting Rights 
bill by a 78-18 roll call vote.  The Rules Committee granted an open rule on July 1st, which allowed for 10 
hours of debate, and authorized all amendments and the Republican bill to be offered as a substitute for the 
Judiciary bill.   
113 Memo re Plans for Buddy System/Whips during voting rights bill consideration. DSG Papers, Part I, 
box 33, folder 3. 
114 Comments of Rep. William Tuck (D-VA) on the House floor (CQ Almanac 1965, 534-66).   
115 It was sponsored by Rep. William C. Cramer (R-FL), and adopted by a teller vote of 136-132, and a 
253-165 roll call vote.   
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Judiciary Committee’s bill remained intact.  The bill was finally approved on July 9th by a vote of 
333 to 85.  
The 1965 Voting Rights Act represents an unusually quick institutional response by the 
static legislative branch to a pressing national policy problem.116  While interest group pressure 
and presidential leadership continued to play an important role (as in the 1964 civil rights bill), 
DSG enabled liberals inside Congress to engage in the early legislative activities necessary to 
motivate members’ participation and disseminate trusted information about the problem of voting 
discrimination in southern states.  These efforts helped broker Republican support for the 
Judiciary Committee’s bill (over the Republican substitute), and protect against charges from 
critics that the bill was a hasty, ill-conceived response to the events in Selma and Montgomery, 
Alabama.  Indeed, they even helped ensure that the House ultimately adopted a stronger voting 
rights bill than did the Senate.   After a House-Senate conference committee – made necessary by 
the House’s adoption of a flat ban on poll taxes – the bill was signed into law by President 
Johnson on August 6, 1965.117   
1960s-era civil rights legislation is often considered an ‘idea whose time had come’ 
(Purdam 2014), and it is important not to overstate DSG’s role; interest groups, the executive 
branch, public opinion shifts, the courts, the Republican minority, and the Senate, each assumed 
key leadership roles.  The account offered here adds liberal-led innovations in legislative 
                                                          
116 It is important to note that voter discrimination existed long before the 1964 election and the 1964-1965 
events in Selma and Montgomery, Alabama.  However, the protests and violent police response 
necessitated immediate congressional attention.     
117 Both Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and Minority Leader McKinley Dirksen (R-IL) 
warned the House that if they adopted an outright ban on the poll tax, “the Senate will almost certainly send 
that bill to conference,” as Mansfield described (CQ Almanac 1965, 534-66). And indeed, the poll tax ban 
was ultimately dropped in conference.  Civil rights groups ultimately advocated for dropping the poll tax 
ban to ensure support for the conference report. AG Katzenbach circulated a letter from Martin Luther King 
Jr. suggesting that King “indicated that the conference bill should be speedily enacted into law and that 
such prompt ‘enactment is the overriding consideration” (CQ 1965).   
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machinery – developed in partnership with outside groups and the executive – as an additional 
significant factor in the adoption of civil rights legislation.  Legislative innovations made it 
possible for policy “ideas” to adapt to difficult legislative procedure (Gueron 1995) and overcome 
entrenched opposition on the House floor.   In the absence of leadership support and amidst a 
slow committee-led process, liberals developed their own coalition building resources and tools 
to motivate member support and participation to produce legislation that would receive majority 
support on the House floor.  If the civil rights movement provided the motivations and 
justification for members to act (Sanders 1997), DSG enabled House members to transform that 
political will into concrete legislative victories.  Ultimately, their joint efforts ensured that the 
static House of Representatives had the capacity to immediately respond to pressing public policy 
problems.   
Defense Policy 
For much of the 20th century, defense policymaking has historically been not only 
bipartisan, but non-controversial.  It is a policy area shaped by presidential leadership, and 
frequent congressional acquiescence to Administration and military requests.  Conservative 
leadership over the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, and senior party leaders who 
personally remembered World War II, limited substantive debate about the scope, cost, and 
effectiveness of national defense programs for much of the twentieth century.  Neither 
committees nor party leaders expended legislative resources to promote meaningful discussion 
about the pros and cons of specific weapons programs, or the cost of ever-increasing defense 
spending relative to domestic programs.   
In late 1960s and early 1970s, liberal Democrats and Republicans forced floor votes and 
public and congressional debate over the annual defense procurement authorization bill.  Through 
DSG, liberals brokered a network of likeminded allies in the House and Senate to consult with 
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outside experts and study the defense budget, line by line, weapons program by weapons 
program.  Their new-found expertise enabled them to maximize press attention, pre-emptively 
change the Administration’s budget requests, lobby and persuade their colleagues, develop 
amendments, and force sustained debate in committee and on the House and Senate floor.  While 
public opinion had already begun to turn against unbridled military spending, the joint efforts of 
liberals in Congress produced an unusually quick and vast response by the chamber itself.  Their 
efforts enabled junior members to challenge biases in the formal structures of the House before 
any committee reforms were adopted, and transformed congressional debate over military 
spending throughout the 20th century.  
FY1970 Defense Authorization Bill. In the spring of 1969, liberals in the House and 
Senate began actively working together to bypass the Armed Services and Appropriations 
Committees’ seemingly never-ending support of increased military spending. Liberals’ efforts 
emphasized consultations with outside experts; organizing conferences and ad hoc “hearings” to 
study defense spending; mobilizing members to participate in extensive floor debates in both 
chambers; and producing member-authored position papers on the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
cost of individual weapons systems (Sheehan 1969; Unna 1969).  Their policymaking activities 
stood in sharp contrast to the typical authorization and appropriations processes, which 
exclusively emphasized the expertise of Administration and military officials; utilized closed 
door committee hearings; and suppressed opposition and member participation on the floor, 
especially by non-committee members.   
On the House side, liberals initiated their efforts through the establishment of a DSG task 
force on international affairs and defense policy as part of its renewed policy focus in the wake of 
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Nixon’s election.118  It provided a forum for members to learn about and develop policy 
unburdened by the strong opposition within the Armed Services Committee – chaired by 
conservative Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) – to any procurement cuts.  The task force produced 
position papers on Nixon’s Safeguard proposal and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system from 
three different perspectives and distributed them to members.119  Controversy over ABM began in 
1968 under President Lyndon Johnson, but significantly increased in 1969 as the Army began 
investigating new ABM sites throughout the country as part of a proposed expansion under 
Nixon.120  As part of their research into ABM, task force co-chairmen Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) 
and Lucien Nedzi (D-MI) held an “ad hoc hearing” on the effect of fallout from nuclear weapons 
on health. Committees had largely elected to ignore the controversial issue altogether; the last 
official hearing on the topic was held in 1963 – six years earlier – by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy.  While the task force was eventually forced to remove DSG’s name from all 
related materials, discourage the press from attending, and hold the hearing in an “out of the way 
room” in the Capitol, the hearing nevertheless proceeded as planned.121  Absent DSG, no 
legislative resources in the House would have been allocated on this critical policy issue.   
                                                          
118 DSG leaders viewed the organization as the voice of the opposition in Congress. In a letter written 
immediately after the 1968 elections, Fraser said “We lost the White House…and as a result, heavy new 
responsibilities have been thrust on DSG and its members.” DSG Papers, Part I, box 6, folder 5.  
119 Safeguard ABM was an anti-ballistic missile system program developed by the U.S. Army.  It was 
designed to protect the Air Force Minuteman ICBM silos from attack (initially from China, and later, the 
Soviet Union).  Papers advocating against deployment, in support of deployment, and favoring “hard-point 
defense,” but opposing area defense, were widely distributed to members. ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
System DSG Report, May 1969. September 18, 1969 memo from Fraser to DSG Members re Task Force 
Studies of ABM. Various position papers. Part II, box 102, folder 7.  Eventually a position paper authored 
by Rep. Chet Holifield, former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, was prepared and 
circulated as well.   
120 The Army initially examined potential sites (i.e. where radars and nuclear-tipped antimissile missiles 
would be based) near large population centers.  When public opinion exposed opposition to these sites, 
Nixon’s Administration began investigating sites far away from major cities (to blunt the potential fallout 
of counter attacks).   
121 Dear Colleague letter from Bingham and Nedzi (Part I, box 36, folder 10). Summary of activities of task 
force, 91st Congress, Part I, box 36, folder 11.  
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In conjunction with the task force, DSG undertook four broader-scale efforts in the 
summer of 1969.  First, DSG prepared a resolution asking for a “full-scale examination of 
military spending” to be considered at the June meeting of the Democratic Caucus.122 The goal 
was to identify as many defense cuts within the next year as possible without harming national 
security.  In contrast, the Armed Services’ Committee refused to allow even a single ABM critic 
to testify in closed-door hearing (CQ Almanac 1969).  Second, DSG staff began preparing an 
extensive analysis of every new weapons system proposed by the Defense Department.  The deep 
red-printed “Fact Book on Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Budget” described each weapons system, 
the costs associated with procurement, the rationale in support of the item, and a critique of the 
program.123   It was designed for members to easily use on the floor to offer arguments in support 
of, and opposition to, specific military programs. The only other resources available to members 
were the inevitably-biased military budget requests.   
Third, the group conducted a poll of members’ opinion about military spending cuts at 
the request of Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) who served on the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee.  The results revealed that 92% of DSG members favored a reduction of defense 
spending, 67% favored an across the board reduction in spending, and 59% favored the 
establishment of a ceiling on non-Vietnam defense expenditures.124  And finally, DSG organized 
a 6-week seminar on foreign and defense policy in the summer of 1969 to help rank and file 
                                                          
122 June 9, 1969 letter to Caucus Chair Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) re Notice of Plan to Pose Resolution 
Before Caucus. Part II, box 41, folder 4. Unfortunately, I have been unable to confirm whether the 
resolution was adopted.   
123 On September 26, 1969, DSG Chairman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) took to the floor to decry the 
Congressional Record. 26 September 1969, H27316.  
124 Addabbo ranked at the bottom of the subcommittee hierarchy, although he likely believed that firm 
numbers on support for decreased military spending would further his own efforts to decrease 
appropriations from within the committee.  June 10, 1969 DSG memo to Members requesting members’ 
response to the defense spending poll. July 23, 1969 letter from Addabbo re Poll results. Part II, box 41, 
folder 4. When Addabbo became chair of the Appropriations Committee in the 1980s, he frequently 
criticized Reagan’s budget requests, especially on defense.   
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members “explore the relationships between foreign policy and military affairs and their impact 
on defense budgeting and spending.”125  Invited speakers included former executive branch 
officials such as Adrian Fisher, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
and Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, as 
well as outside experts, including political scientist William Kaufmann and mathematician and 
scientist Jeremy J. Stone.  The seminar was a crash-course in the technology and politics of 
defense spending for members – most of whom knew little about the topic.    
Separately, task force co-chairman Bingham worked with 3 representatives and 4 
senators to organize a bipartisan “Conference on the Planning of New Priorities.”126  All of the 
participants were junior members who were frustrated about their inability to participate within 
their respective chambers.127  The Conference was chaired by Arthur Larson, who was head of the 
U.S. Information Agency under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and featured several academics 
and former executive branch officials.  Unlike the position papers that focused on single weapons 
systems, the Conference focused on the overall defense budget and placed it in context of 
domestic spending on programs like food stamps.128  The unvarnished critiques and reflections 
offered by the experts – discouraged by both Armed Services committees and party leaders – at 
the conference were covered by national newspapers (Beckman 1969).   
                                                          
125 June 19, 1969 memo from Fraser to Members re DSG Seminar on Foreign and Defense Policy, Part II, 
box 101, folder 2.  
126 The legislative sponsors include Reps. Bingham (D-NY), Seymour Halpern (R-NY), George W. Brown 
(D-CA), and Richard Ottinger (D-NY), as well as Senators William B. Saxbe (R-OH), Alan Cranston (D-
CA), Harold Hughes (D-IA), and Marlow W. Cook (R-NY).   
127 In a press conference announcing the conference, Bingham criticized the cozy relationships his more 
senior colleagues developed with the military: “Over the years, a majority of the members [of Armed 
Services] have become close to the military and tend to do what the military thinks and wants.” Senator 
Saxbe (R-OH) described their efforts: “We’re all junior and we feel it is up to us to have some influence” 
(Unna 1969).    
128 Senator Saxbe (R-OH) “suggested that one way to help Congress gain a better understanding of the 
country’s real priorities would be to have the senior members of the armed services and appropriations 
committees sit in on a hunger hearing for a change.”  
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Much of liberals’ focus in both chambers emphasized almost immediate spending 
changes in the FY1970 budget.  The authorization bill reached the Senate floor first, and the 
upper chamber spent most of summer 1969 debating Nixon’s ABM proposal.  As Senate liberals 
did not have their own information resources – provided neither by party leaders nor committees 
– they relied heavily on DSG’s research.  When the bill first came to the floor in June, Senator 
Walter Mondale (D-MN) entered DSG’s ABM Fact Book into the Record.  He described the 
report as “a fair, lucid, and factual presentation” of the Safeguard system, and encouraged his 
undecided colleagues to consult the report.129  Mondale also noted that many of his colleagues, 
ABM supporters and opponents alike, had already consulted DSG’s analysis.  After two months 
of debate, the Senate was nearly deadlocked, but ultimately voted 51-49 to reject a motion to 
defer deployment of ABM. 
In the House, Nedzi and four other members – a group of Democrats and Republicans 
known as the “fearless five” – helped lead opposition from within the Armed Services Committee 
(CQ Almanac 1969; Hunter 1969).  They proposed several amendments to cut procurement 
                                                          
129 Congressional Record 20 June 1969, S16738.   
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funds, including to Safeguard ABM; all were rejected.  Nedzi was one of three members (of 39) 
who ultimately voted against the committee drafted bill on September 26th – a significant shift in 
committee unity itself.  He was also one of 5 members who made the then-unusual move of filing 
“additional views” to the committee report decrying the waste and inefficiency of many of the 
authorized programs.  In theory, committee reports provide a pre-established mechanism for rank 
and file members to obtain the information necessary to prepare amendments and participate on 
the floor.  However, the Armed Services report, along with the views of the “fearless five,” did 
not become available until September 29th, two days before the bill came to the floor (which was 
very common during the textbook era).  In the absence of the committee report, DSG Chairman 
Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) entered the DSG “Fact Book” on the Defense budget, as well as the 
shorter Fact Sheet, which compared the House bill with DOD requests and the Senate-passed 
authorization bill, into the Record.130    
Despite the committee’s attempts to suppress them, a contentious and protracted debate 
over military spending and specific procurement programs spilled over to the floor.  21 
amendments from 15 committee and non-committee members were offered to the defense 
authorization bill (see Table 7.5), marking a historic highpoint and a significant increase in 
member participation in defense policymaking over prior years.131  The “fearless five” offered 
amendments to cut spending on shipbuilding, Cobra helicopter gunships, C-5A transport aircraft, 
                                                          
130 In his floor comments, Fraser said that “since the bill itself was reported from committee only last 
Friday and since the committee report did not become available until today – just 2 days prior to House 
consideration – Members will not have the opportunity to give this important bill…careful consideration 
before being called upon to vote on it. I therefore, commend to the attention of all Members the Democratic 
Study Group’s analysis of H.R. 14000 and comparison of the House measure with Department of Defense 
requests and the Senate-passed authorization bill.”  The Fact Sheet was entitled, “H.R. 14000, Fiscal Year 
1970 Authorization, Military Procurement and Research and Development.” Congressional Record. 29 
September 1969, H27570.  
131 20 amendments were offered in the Senate from committee and non-committee members (CQ Almanac 
1969).   
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and the Short Range Attack Missile system, among other weapons systems.132  Each were the 
culmination of months of careful study, negotiation, and mobilization.  While none were subject 
to a recorded vote, liberals forced congressional leaders to justify their support for each weapons 
program.  Committee leaders worked with military allies prior to floor consideration to develop 
research materials to respond to liberals’ critiques.133  Of course, in addition to this fact-based 
evidence, they also offered dramatic, apocalyptic warnings to junior members about the threat of 
nuclear war in the United States.  Speaker John McCormack (D-MA) said, “I wonder how many 
of you realize how close we came to losing World War II? I don’t want to take a chance again.”  
Chairman Rivers concluded his own dire warnings about the possibility of a Hiroshima-type 
attack on the U.S. by saying, “America’s too young to die.”   
Liberals lost each vote – an unsurprising byproduct of unified leadership opposition, 
unrecorded votes, and stark informational asymmetries between members about the underlying 
policies.  The FY1970 bill ultimately authorized a moderate drop in funding – it was $1.2 billion 
lower than the level requested by Nixon (a 6% decrease) and $915 million less than authorized in 
the FY1969 procurement bill (about a 4.5% decrease).134  Nevertheless, liberals’ year-long joint 
effort in the House and Senate marked a transformation in defense policymaking, both in 
substance and process.  It was, as Congressional Quarterly described, “the most exhaustive attack 
                                                          
132 Pike offered amendments to delete $1 billion in shipbuilding funds added to the bill by chairman Rivers, 
as well as an amendment to delete $481 million in funds for procurement of additional C-5A transport 
aircraft. Nedzi’s amendment called for $86 million in cuts for procurement of 17 Cobra helicopter 
gunships. Leggett’s amendment called for cutting $60.4 million for procurement of the Short Range Attack 
Missile (Hunter 1969).  
133 The Washington Post described a memo prepared by Joseph J. F. Clark, Air Force Deputy Director for 
Legislation and Investigation, Legislative Liaison, to aid “allies in their battle against military budget 
cutters.” The memo noted that, in preparation for floor debate, House Armed Services staffer “asked for a 
detailed analysis and rebuttal” to several documents, including reports on military spending prepared by 
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, a bipartisan group led by Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR), and 
the “Fact Book” of the Democratic Study Group, a caucus of House liberals, the memo says.” 
Congressional Record, 5 September 1969, S24591.   
134 Most of these cuts were pre-emptively initiated by Nixon and the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committee.  The FY1970 appropriations bill was  
365 
 
ever on a military authorization bill…critics coordinated their efforts and studied the individual 
programs in order to present a unified, informed opposition.”   
The group’s efforts led to a dramatic shift in defense policymaking – in 1969 and beyond.  
DSG legitimized growing opposition within Congress to never-ending defense spending and 
shifting public opinion, which led the Nixon Administration to pre-emptively initiate its own 
probe of weapons buying practices and reduced its own military budget request for FY1970.  
Nixon’s Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, dryly described congressional authorization of 
Safeguard as “achieved only with the greatest difficult” (1985).  Liberals’ repeated calls for 
unbiased studies of military procurement led to the creation of a Commission on Government 
Procurement, a 12-member panel of experts charged with conducting a two-year study of 
government purchasing practices.135  And denied the opportunity to hold substantive formal 
hearings within the conservative-dominated Armed Services Committees, liberals in both the 
House and Senate worked through their respective chambers’ Foreign Affairs Committees.  
House liberals “reactivated” a Foreign Affairs subcommittee that had not operated in 11 years – 
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments – to initiate an 
examination of defense policy.136  In the Senate, the liberal-oriented Foreign Relations Committee 
held ABM hearings on their own throughout the year – finally giving scientific experts a chance 
to critique the program after the House Armed Services Committee refused to include any ABM 
critics in its hearings (CQ Almanac 1969).     
 FY1971 Defense Authorization Bill. The next year, liberals continued to work together in 
both chambers to shape defense policy, including the proposed expansion of Nixon’s Safeguard 
                                                          
135 The measure passed by voice vote on the House floor.  It was sponsored by former DSG chairman Chet 
Holifield (D-CA) in his capacity as chairman of the Government Operations Subcommittee on Military 
Operations (CQ Almanac 1969, 310-314).   
136 CQ reported that DSG chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) gave up his post on another subcommittee to 
serve on this reactivated body.   
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ABM program.  The group of participating liberal senators and members was comparatively 
smaller (unsurprising in an election year), but their function was the same – develop and marshal 
legislative resources to support their goal of decreased military spending.  DSG chairman Fraser, 
task force chairman Nedzi, along with 4 other members and 6 senators, including George S. 
McGovern (D-SD), Walter F. Mondale (D-MN) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), worked 
together to produce an analysis of the defense budget.137  Liberals proposed substantial cuts ($4.5 
billion) to military spending, including $495 million for a new Navy destroyer, $658 million for 
the purchase of F-14 airplanes, $796 million for equipping Minuteman missiles with multiple 
warheads, and $666 million in Safeguard antiballistic missile procurement funds (Smith 1970).  
While not as comprehensive as DSG’s Fact Book in 1969, the report provided a critical analysis 
of defense spending not provided by legislative committees or party leaders in either chamber.   
On the House side, these joint efforts produced moderate cuts in the House Armed 
Services Committee, but they failed to produce ABM policy changes.138  In a classic legislative 
trade, Chairman Rivers supported the Administration’s proposed expansion of ABM sites in 
exchange for the Administration’s support for additional shipbuilding funds – a key industry in 
his South Carolina district.  Once again however, liberals’ dissemination of legislative resources 
and tools forced a public debate and (unrecorded) vote on numerous weapons programs.  The 
“fearless five” again signed additional and dissenting views opposing the ABM program for its 
ineffectiveness and cost.139  And on the floor, 23 amendments were offered from committee and 
                                                          
137 The full list of participants included Reps. William Moorhead (D-PA), Leggett (D-CA), Abner Mikva 
(D-IL), Emilio Q. Daddario (D-CT) – all DSG members and/or leaders – and Senators Mike Gravel (D-
AK) and Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR).  Press coverage however, made no mention of DSG.   
138 The $20 billion Committee reported bill was $34 million less than requested by the Administration, and 
$473 million less than authorized by Congress in FY1970.   
139 And Nedzi, Pike, and Republican Rep. Robert Whalen also signed minority views attacking the 
committee’s emphasis on “business as usual” while “domestic needs went unmet.”  Committee and floor 
amendments offered by the “fearless five” to cut ABM funding were all rejected (CQ Almanac 1970). 
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non-committee members – an increase over the prior year’s historic benchmark of 21 
amendments.   
In the Senate Armed Services Committee, liberals succeeded in curtailing the expansion 
of the Safeguard ABM program – a significant policy victory.  The committee voted 11-6 to 
delete Nixon’s request to start a nationwide area ABM defense, and limited existing Safeguard 
operations to the defense of Minuteman missile sites.  While not a significant funding change – it 
deleted only $10 million from the budget – it was a major policy change that reasserted 
Congress’s role in defense policy amidst the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 
I) with the Soviet Union in Vienna.  The decision preemptively limited the options available to 
the Administration in its nascent arms negotiations.140  Safeguard never expanded beyond a single 
missile site in North Dakota, which liberals continued to attack over the next several years.  In 
1975, they succeeded; the House Appropriations committee voted to eliminate the Safeguard 
program altogether for its “costliness” and “ineffectiveness.”  The Pentagon disbanded the 
Safeguard program the following year.   
The 1969 and 1970 defense authorization bills illuminate the key role of legislative 
resources and tools in enabling junior members to insert policy issues onto the congressional 
agenda when party and committee leaders refuse to act.  Historically, junior liberals had neither 
the expertise, nor the resources necessary to participate in defense policy.  Armed Services 
Committee chairmen in both chambers held carte blanche power to not only write the defense 
authorization bill, but to frame the presentation of the underlying policies to other members and 
the public.  Debate was limited to piecemeal arguments to increase spending on one weapons 
                                                          
140 A fear of further limiting the U.S.’s leverage in the talks prevented further cuts to ABM. Senate Armed 
Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-MS) said that further cuts to ABM “would deny to our 
President the very item – the major item I believe – of the bargaining arrangement” between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union (CQ Almanac 1970, 383).  The majority of the 11 committee members who voted to limit 
the ABM program had previously voted in support of ABM.   
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program or another.  DSG provided liberals with the resources and tools necessary to challenge 
this agenda monopoly, enabling them to hold public hearings, to offer amendments on the floor, 
and to force a substantive, on-the-record debate in a controversial policy area that was typically 
negotiated exclusively behind closed doors.141  Prior to the adoption of rules changes or apparent 
electoral mandates, they produced policy changes in both the House and Senate.  While the 
Armed Services committees continued to comprise “preference outliers” (Fenno 1973; Krehbiel 
1990), liberals forced committee members to reconcile their constituents’ interests for more 
shipbuilding or helicopter funds with unbiased policy research.  The committees began consulting 
scientists and academics to evaluate weapons programs, rather than relying solely on supporters 
from the Administration and military.  As a result, members and senators became more critical of 
defense programs than ever before (Finney 1975).   
 
 
Campaign Finance Policy 
If politics is said to stop at the water’s edge on defense, then it often floods debates on 
campaign finance.  Members evaluate each and every policy proposal against their pursuit of 
majority party status and individual electoral odds (Jacobson 1979).  After Congress enacted the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (and its amendments in 1974), campaign finance 
emerged as a dominant policy area in each subsequent decade.142  The historically unimportant 
House Administration Committee (responsible for assigning office space, managing 
                                                          
141 It is important to note that the debate – but not the votes – were recorded.  Votes on amendments were 
not adopted until 1970 (implemented the following year).   
142 The 1974 Amendments provided for public financing of presidential elections.  In the 1970s, debates 
over public financing and campaign regulation; in the 1980s, PAC contribution limits; in the 1990s and 
2000s, debates over so-called “soft” money.  
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congressional restaurants, and so forth), took on a new significance.  And party leaders oscillated 
rapidly between offering legislative support, neutrality, and opposition, to campaign finance 
proposals depending on the controversy the issues provoked and the potential impact on 
Democrats’ majority status.  The new and emerging nature of this policy area fostered widespread 
participation by party leaders, committee and non-committee members – each allocated 
significant formal and informal legislative resources and tools to shape policy outcomes.   
Throughout the 1970s, liberal Democrats, the Democratic leadership, and House 
Administration undertook piecemeal efforts to establish public financing of congressional 
elections (such as H.R. 11315 in the 96th Congress).  In late 1978 and early 1979, DSG unified 
these proposals and advanced legislation providing for public financing of House general election 
campaigns.143  After months of work, the House Administration Committee voted not to report 
DSG’s bill – known as H.R. 1 – and liberals could not persuade the leadership to bypass the 
committee and take it directly to the floor.144  The bill ultimately failed because liberals neglected 
to distribute policy research on the impact of public financing on district competitiveness; to 
coordinate their efforts with allies in the Carter Administration, Common Cause, and others; and 
to broker support from other Democrats in Congress.145  In contrast, public financing critics were 
                                                          
143 DSG established a task force headed by Rep. Abner Mikva (D-IL) to produce legislation; symbolically 
raised its profile by adopting a resolution in the House Democratic Caucus prioritizing public financing 
legislation that Congress and lobbying the Speaker to grant Mikva’s bill the designation of “H.R. 1”; 
monitored constituent mail among Democrats to identify opponents’ framing of the issue and prepared 
draft responses to the letters; and recruited liberal Republicans to work with the group to identify 
Republican supporters.   
144 In a June 6, 1979 memo from Dick Conlon to Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI), Conlon recounted how DSG 
conducted a “whip check” at the leadership’s request “to see if there was sufficient support for the Speaker 
and [Rules Chairman Richard] Bolling [D-MO] to move ahead without caucus action” directing 
Democratic members of the House Administration Committee to report the bill [DSG Papers, Part II, box 
109, folder 12].  A few days later, Obey reported that “Speaker announced whip check and that HR 1 is 
dead” [June 12, 1979 executive committee meeting minutes, DSG Papers, Part II, box 7, folder 4].  
145 At executive committee meetings, liberals discussed the fact that “members generally cite need for more 
information so supporters of H.R. 1 can rebut arguments” [March 27, 1979 executive committee meeting 
minutes, DSG Papers, box 7, folder 4].   
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much better organized (Copeland 1984) – opponents at the local, state, and federal level worked 
together to disseminate information and frame the issue, and pre-emptively mobilize constituents, 
the media, and other members in opposition to the bill.146   
Liberals (and to some extent, party leaders) learned from the failure of H.R. 1 and applied 
those lessons to advance legislation limiting PAC spending and providing tax incentives for 
individual campaign contributions to a successful House vote in the future.  While committee 
opposition persisted, liberals employed their policy and procedural expertise, network of allies, 
and mobilization tools, to advance legislation providing for limitations on PAC spending, and 
individual tax credits for small donors.  The group studied the dramatic increase in campaign 
spending in the 1970s; prepared research materials to help members understand and defend the 
bill to their constituents; and coordinated lobbying efforts with the Democratic leadership, White 
House, interest groups, and liberal Republicans.  When possible, liberals shared legislative 
resources and tools with party leaders; when leaders were opposed, DSG enabled liberal to 
bypass both leadership and committee opposition.  Concrete changes often proved elusive 
(largely because of Senate opposition), but DSG repeatedly succeeded in advancing legislation to 
a vote despite the controversy it provoked among conservatives, and even other liberals, in their 
party.     
PAC Spending Limitations.  At the beginning of summer 1979 (and the failure of H.R. 1), 
DSG liberals and House Administration undertook two parallel campaign finance efforts.  The 
Committee began working on the yearly FEC Authorization bill (S.832).  After the contentious 
public financing debate, committee members focused on developing a non-controversial bill 
                                                          
146 See April 6, 1979 Dear Colleague letter from Trent Lott; May 11, 1979 Memo from the Republican 
Study Committee to Parties Interested in the Revised Version of H.R. 1; May 21, 1979 Dear Republican 
Colleague letter – Part II, box 109, folder 12.  
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providing for FEC efficiency improvements, including streamlining campaign expenditure 
reporting.   
Meanwhile, Obey and other liberals began developing a stand-alone bill providing for 
limitations on political action committee (PAC) contributions – known as the Campaign 
Contribution Reform Act, H.R. 4970. H.R. 1 originally included PAC spending limitations, but it 
was dropped because House Administration Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) thought it should 
be considered as a separate bill.147  When Thompson’s hospitalization for “colestoral” surgery 
threatened to delay committee consideration of the PAC bill such that enactment would not occur 
until after the 1980 election, Obey and DSG developed a strategy to speed up the legislative 
process and bypass opposition.  
If House Administration would block any PAC spending limit bill, DSG planned to 
bypass the committee altogether and take H.R. 4970 directly to the floor as an amendment to the 
FEC authorization.  This strategy had two primary benefits.  First, it enabled liberals to bypass 
not only committee opposition, but Senate opposition too.  As the upper chamber had already 
passed the FEC authorization bill, the bill would go straight to conference where liberals did not 
anticipate significant opposition because the bill did not apply to Senate candidates.148  While 
PAC spending on House campaigns had risen dramatically (comprising approximately 25% of all 
campaign receipts), spending on Senate campaigns was stable (with PACs comprising only about 
14% of receipts).  This strategy also, of course, enabled liberals to “catch the opposition off-
guard” when the FEC authorization came to the floor at the end of September.  If conservatives 
                                                          
147 Thompson thought that PAC limits should be separate from a public financing bill for strategic reasons 
– members opposed to public financing might seek to add an amendment providing for PAC limitations as 
a poison pill to limit support for H.R. 1.  Thompson even obtained a ruling from the Parliamentarian that 
any amendment providing for PAC contribution limits were not germane to H.R. 1 (CQ Almanac 1979, 
553). May 30, 1979 executive committee meeting notes. Part II, box 111, folder 8.   
148 June 29, 1979 Update From Obey Re Campaign Finance, DSG Papers, Part II, box 113, folder 10. 
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did not anticipate the PAC bill’s attachment to the FEC authorization, then they could not mount 
an effective, coordinated opposition (as they did for H.R. 1).   
Liberals relied on their good working relationship with Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) – 
and his willingness to allocate leadership resources – for their strategy to succeed.  O’Neill 
promised to advance the controversial legislation if DSG could assure him that the bill would 
survive the floor with minority party support (in contrast to a dominant theory of agenda power in 
Congress (Cox and McCubbins 2005)).  DSG would supply the necessary coalition-building 
support (i.e. carry out an accurate count of the membership), and the leadership would ensure the 
Rules Committee granted a rule providing for consideration of Obey-Railsback.149  The bill was 
scheduled to reach the floor in late September 1979 under a modified closed rule allowing only 
one amendment to Obey-Railsback to be offered by Thompson.150  Immediately before the vote 
on the rule however, Democratic opponents apparently “threatened” to defeat the upcoming 
budget resolution unless the leadership pulled the PAC bill.151  The leadership feared they would 
suffer the second of two high-profile, embarrassing legislative failures in 6 months, and pulled the 
bill.     
                                                          
149 Larry Evans’s dataset does not include any poll commissioned by the leadership on H.R. 4970 or the 
FEC Authorization, which suggests that they did not conduct a poll whatsoever. While O’Neill did not 
activate the leadership’s whip system, he did appoint a large number of DSG leaders to the Speaker’s Task 
Force on the PAC Bill, including Rep. Matt McHugh (D-NY), Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN), James Oberstar 
(D-MN), Bruce Vento (D-MN), and Mo Udall (D-AZ), to help ease cooperation between the two sides.  
[List of Invitees to the Speaker’s Task Force on the PAC Bill Meeting, September 19, 1979, DSG Papers, 
Part II, box 113, folder 12]. September 7, 1979 memo from Dan (DSG staffer) to Dick Conlon Re Rule on 
FEC authorization bill. DSG Papers, Part II, box 113, folder 10.  Memo discussed several potential rules 
(closed, modified closed, open to germane amendments, etc.).  It noted that it “should be ample precedents 
to support the contention that amendments to the PAC bill dealing with subjects other than campaign 
contributions by nonparty multicandidate political committees are not germane.” 
150 The Rules Committee reported the rule on September 19th, rejecting a motion to prohibit consideration 
of Obey-Railsback by a vote of 10 to 5.   
151 September 20, 1979 memo from Obey to DSG Members Re Vote on HR 4970; September 27, 1979 
Memo from Obey to DSG Members Re Pac Campaign Against Obey-Railsback, DSG Papers, Part II, box 
113, folder 10.  
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Liberals spent the next month furiously lobbying to make sure they had the votes for the 
rule, the PAC amendment, and final passage of the bill.152  The tradeoff in legislative resources 
between DSG and O’Neill was maintained; the leadership would provide agenda space if liberals 
provided coalition building support.  On October 17, the rule for the FEC authorization bill was 
finally considered on the floor.  Members debated not only the merits of Obey-Railsback itself, 
but also the precedent it established for the role of committees in developing legislation under 
their jurisdiction.  Opponents argued that Obey-Railsback was “the illegitimate son of H.R. 1” 
and an “incumbents’ protection bill,” while proponents (including Administration chairman 
Thompson (D-NJ)) argued that the bill’s major provisions had already been duly considered by 
House Administration over the past several years.153  Nevertheless, liberals succeeded in 
marshalling a majority coalition in support of the rule – it passed by a vote of 228 to 182.154  In 
order to gain majority support for the underlying PAC limits, liberals relied on an amendment 
offered by Thompson to appeal to first term and PAC-reliant members (CQ Almanac 1979, 556-
58).155   Thompson’s amendment raised the aggregate limit on PAC contributions a candidate 
could accept, as well as the total amount a PAC could contribute to a candidate per cycle.156  The 
                                                          
152 The leadership engaged in a last-minute lobbying effort.  The day before the bill came to a vote, Speaker 
O’Neill, Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX), and Whip Brademas, sent a letter to all Democrats imploring 
them to support the rule, the PAC limitations amendment, and the bill on final passage. October 16, 1979 
Dear Democratic Colleague letter, DSG Papers, Part II, box 109, folder 4. 
153 Rep. Bob Bauman (R-MD) said, “H.R. 4970 [Obey-Railsback] could very easily be called the son of 
H.R. 1, or better yet, the illegitimate son of H.R. 1. It is illegitimate because H.R. 4970 was not considered, 
much less reported, by the Committee on House Administration.” [Congressional Record 17 October 1979, 
H28617].  Republican leader John Rhodes (R-AZ) argued that Obey-Railsback was “nothing but an 
incumbents’ protection bill,” and noted that House Administration Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) was 
“as adept at that art as any man I have ever known.” [CR, H28620].  
154 It is important to note however, that the vote was incredibly close given Democrats’ two-third House 
majority.    
155 As part of their count, DSG also personally reached out to freshmen members who were more reliant on 
PAC money and less likely to cosponsor the bill.  July 30, 1979 Dear First-term Colleague letter, DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 113, folder 10.   
156 Thompson’s amendment raised the total PAC contributions a candidate could receive from $50,000 to 
$70,000, and increased the amount a PAC could contribute to a candidate from $5,000 to $6,000.   
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strategy paid off; Obey-Railsback passed by a narrow vote of 217-198, with Republicans 
comprising the winning margin of victory.   
The vote itself sparked bitter animus between and within both parties – pitting liberal and 
conservative Republicans against one and other, and the Republican minority against the 
Democratic majority.157  And ultimately, conservative House opponents successfully lobbied their 
fellow Republicans in the Senate to threaten to filibuster the conference report.158  However, the 
success of liberals at forcing their colleagues to vote on Obey-Railsback illustrates the key role of 
group resources, tools, and connections in agenda-setting power.  Absent DSG, the bill never 
would have made it to the House floor.  House Administration was opposed to the measure and 
Speaker O’Neill would not use party resources (i.e. the Democratic whip system) to support an 
issue that sparked such controversy among his fellow partisans.  And of course, he would not 
instruct the Rules Committee or bring legislation to the floor with an uncertain outcome.  DSG 
filled these roles – providing liberals with coalition building resources and tools to set House 
campaign finance policy when policy divisions prevented the Administration Committee and 
party leaders from acting.    
                                                          
157 Rep. Trent Lott, Chairman of the Republican Research Task Force, described it as “the first shot in the 
battle which will strangle all opposition, not just Republicans with restrictive rules” [September 24, 1979 
Dear Colleague letter from Lott].  And while Lott warned that the Democratic leadership used the vote to 
begin enforcing party discipline among their ranks, the Republican leadership did too.  Conference 
Chairman John Rhodes publicly criticized and privately castigated the 29 Republicans who voted in favor 
of Obey-Railsback, suggesting that the members put their “loyalty to labor unions or Common Cause” 
ahead of their desire to obtain a Republican majority.  One of those members, Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-
CA) wrote in an October 18, 1979 letter to Rhodes that Republicans “can never hope to be a majority if 
those of my philosophical persuasion are forced out, as is the case of so many liberal Republicans who have 
left the Congress rather than face, on a daily basis, the hostility of the hard-right conservatives.” Part II, box 
113, folder 10  
158 Republican Senators Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR) and Gordon J. Humphrey (R-NH) threated to filibuster 
the FEC authorization bill.  Many liberals in the House believed the filibuster threat succeeded because 
senators did not know that Obey-Railsback only applied to House campaigns; however, opponents clearly 
feared that Obey-Railsback would establish a precedent that would eventually apply to the Senate.   
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 Political Contribution Tax Credit. In 1985-1986, tax reform negotiations between 
President Ronald Reagan, Democratic leaders, and Ways & Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski 
(D-IL), marked the 50% tax credit for small individual donor contributions to federal, state, and 
local campaigns, for elimination.159   The popular credit was established as part of the Revenue 
Act of 1971, and targeted for elimination to compensate for the new lower tax rates.160  The 
leadership gave Ways & Means significant leeway to craft the bill and did not expend their own 
legislative resources to challenge Rostenkowski despite members’ support for the tax provision.  
Liberals marshalled DSG’s careful research on FEC files, procedural expertise, relationships with 
allies on key committees and outside of Congress, and mobilization tools, to force the issue to an 
up-or-down floor vote.  Given committee opposition and leadership reticence to challenge 
Rostenkowski, the tax credit would never have received a vote absent DSG.   
DSG’s research on the political contribution tax credit began in the early 1980s as part of 
the group’s PAC contribution limit efforts.  The group conducted a painstaking examination of 
monthly campaign reports filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC).  In an interview, a 
staffer recalled that DSG executive director Dick Conlon sent “2 or 3 interns [to the FEC]. He had 
them go through all of these records…This was before computers [when] you had to do it all by 
hand. They did it all, month after month after month.”161  The reports allowed Conlon to produce 
an unbiased analysis of emerging patterns in PAC and individual contributions in the operation of 
congressional campaigns.162   The House Administration Committee’s opposition to increased 
                                                          
159 The Revenue Act of 1971 established a 50% tax credit for donations to federal, state, and local 
candidates and party organizations up to a limit of $12.50 or $25 for joint filers (adopted alongside a 100% 
deduction for the first $50 of federal, state, or local contributions or $100 for married couples filing 
jointly).  Between 1975 and 1979, the deduction was deleted and the credit was incrementally increased to 
a 50% credit up to $50 per individual or $100 for joint filers (Cmar 2004).   
160 December 10, 1985 Washington Post editorial, “Tax Credits for Campaign Money.” Part II, box 115, 
folder 8. 
161 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.  
162 Conlon even presented the findings at academic conferences, including the American Political Science 
Association, and corresponded with political scientists and Republicans about the findings. For example, 
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PAC regulations created stark informational asymmetries on candidates’ reliance on PAC and 
individual contributions; members were likely familiar with their own campaign contributions, 
but they were unaware of broader trends in congressional campaigns.  DSG’s research concluded 
that members were “becoming “dangerously dependent” on Washington PAC money while 
relying less and less on small contributions from people in their home states and districts.”163   
In 1982, the research provided the justification for then-DSG Chairman Matt McHugh 
(D-IL) to introduce a proposal co-sponsored by Republican Barber Conable (R-NY) to expand 
the existing 50% tax credit to a 100% credit for contributions by an individual to a campaign in 
their home state.164  Continued opposition within Administration – now chaired by Rep. Frank 
Annunzio (D-IL) – to campaign finance reform prevented McHugh’s proposal from receiving a 
vote.  Tax reform negotiations in 1985 provided an unlikely window of opportunity finally force a 
floor vote on the issue.  Although Rostenkowski and the Reagan Administration marked the 
credit for elimination, Ways & Means was inherently more-friendly towards the credit than the 
Administration Committee; Rostenkowski himself even personally supported the underlying 
policy.  Thus, McHugh developed an amendment to the tax reform bill that would provide for a 
100% tax credit up to $100 for contributions made to a candidate for federal office in a taxpayer’s 
                                                          
political scientist Gary Jacobson wrote to Conlon describing the data collection as “a real service [for 
political scientists]…something the FEC should be doing, but since they won’t, I’m glad you took on the 
task.” In an April 23, 1985 letter from Rodney A. Smith, Treasurer/Executive Finance Director for the 
National Republican Senatorial Committee, Smith described it as an “impressive report on campaign 
financing…no doubt it’s a scholarly piece of work,” and recommended that DSG strategically advocate for 
a 200% tax credit in hopes of obtaining a 110% tax credit.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 3, folder 3.  
163 Undated 1985 Press Release, “PACs Replacing Small Donors as Prime Source of Campaign Funds.” 
Part II, box 134, folder 1.  
164 Statement of Matt McHugh, DSG Chairman, House Administration Committee Hearing, 1982. DSG 
Papers, Part II, box 115, folder 1.  
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home state.  His proposal increased value of the credit, while decreasing the scope of affected 
taxpayers (and thus the amount of revenue “lost”).165 
However, unlike Obey-Railsback, Democratic leaders would not expend party resources 
to help liberals pressure Rostenkowski to revise the bill, or instruct the Rules Committee to make 
it in order on their behalf.  Instead, liberals relied on relationships brokered through DSG with 
Ways & Means committee members, liberal Republicans, the press and activists outside of 
Congress, as well as rank and file Democrats, to force a vote on the issue.  Rep. Bob Matsui (D-
CA), a DSG member who served on Ways & Means, was recruited to offer McHugh’s version of 
the tax credit as an amendment to the bill during markup.166  Matsui, along with several DSG 
leaders, lobbied Ways & Means members to support the amendment.167   And Republican Rep. 
Thomas Tauke (R-IA) was recruited to immediately assumed Rep. Conable’s (R-NY) position as 
the bill’s chief co-sponsor.168  Tauke’s co-sponsorship continued DSG’s access to a network of 
other Republicans who regularly comprised the margin of victory on the group’s policy goals.    
Relationships such as these became even more important when Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI) 
and Common Cause came out in opposition to McHugh’s amendment at the last minute.  Obey 
was not opposed to a 100% tax credit on principle, but believed it should be part of a 
“comprehensive finance proposal” rather than a stand-alone policy.169  Common Cause also only 
                                                          
165 The tax credit eliminated by the committee provided a 50% tax credit up to $50 ($100 for joint filers) for 
all campaign contributions.  Ways & Means estimated eliminating the credit would save about $1.5 billion 
in revenue over the next 5 years.  
166 Matsui would go on to serve on the executive committee in the 101st Congress.   
167 Talking points on the amendment were distributed to members to lobby their colleagues about the 
proposal, including Reps. Dennis Eckart (D-OH), Mike Lowry (D-WA), and James Oberstar (D-MN).  
“Strategy re 100% tax credit, October 1985,” Part II, box 134, folder 1.  
168 Conable retired in January 1985. He had a longstanding relationship with DSG, and he often shared 
critical, first-hand insight about the position of his fellow Republicans (e.g. March 20, 1979 notes from 
Conable’s phone call with Rep. Bill Frenzel (R-MN), Part II, box 114, folder 6)).   
169 In a November 20, 1985 letter to Ways & Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, Obey urged him to 
“reject it as bad public policy and highly detrimental to Democrats…I believe…[it] would be disastrous 
public policy and disastrous for Democrats and the Democratic Party.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 107, folder 
4. Ironically, this argument is the opposite of Administration chairman Thompson’s position on campaign 
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favored a comprehensive bill, although DSG suspected that their opposition stemmed more from 
the fact that the bill did not have their “name on it.”170  Their opposition gave Rostenkowski the 
political cover he needed to justify his refusal to amend the bill.  The committee rejected Matsui’s 
amendment 20 to 6.171   
Immediately after the committee vote, DSG developed a strategy to bypass Ways & 
Means and bring McHugh’s amendment directly to the floor.   McHugh and Oberstar collected 
enough signatures from rank and file Democrats to call a special meeting of the Democratic 
Caucus to vote to instruct the Rules Committee to make the tax credit in order as an amendment 
to the tax bill.172  The leadership’s reticence to challenge Rostenkowski necessitated this strategy.  
Rostenkowski maintained an iron grip on consideration of his committee’s bills; Ways & Means 
bills always came to the floor under a closed rule barring any amendments.173   
DSG recruited allies outside of Congress to bring public attention to the issue, and raise 
the stakes for Democrats prior to the Caucus.  The group asked Ralph Nader to argue on behalf of 
the proposal.174  Three days later, Nader sent a letter to all Democratic representatives imploring 
them to vote to instruct the Rules Committee, or risk being seen as uninterested in reducing “their 
                                                          
finance in 1979.  At the time, he advocated for separate campaign finance bills, rather than a 
comprehensive approach.     
170 In an August 12, 1986 Dear Democratic Colleague letter, McHugh and DSG chairman James Oberstar 
(D-MN) noted that Common Cause “wants its version of campaign finance reform, or nothing.” [Part II, 
box 107, folder 6]. In a memo to file re Common Cause, executive director Conlon noted that the group’s 
presumptive motives for opposition are “Doesn’t have CC name on it. CC would rather no progress than 
have something enacted which it not part of.” Part II, box 107, folder 8. 
171 Most committee members “were reluctant to challenge the President and the chairman on such a 
relatively minor topic” (Rosenbaum 1985).   
172 November 29, 1985 Dear Democratic Colleague letter from McHugh and Oberstar, DSG Papers, Part II, 
box 107, folder 4.  
173 One staffer described the Rostenkowski’s policy this way: “He [Rostenkowski] knew the tax code better 
than anyone else, and he always felt that you can’t let anybody else offer amendments because nobody 
knows it like he does” [September 23, 2015 telephone interview].  
174 December 6, 1985 letter from Dick Conlon to Ralph Nader re the 100% tax credit.  Conlon enclosed 
DSG’s research materials and noted that “The point we want to get across is that a vote against the credit or 
against making it in order would be clearly self-serving. The credit is designed to provide an alternative to 
PAC money, 75% of which goes to incumbents.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 134, folder 1.  
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excessive dependence on special interest money” – the same argument DSG requested he use.175  
DSG also reached out to the editorial board of the Washington Post.  On December 10, the day of 
the Democratic Caucus, the Washington Post published an editorial endorsing “the Democratic 
Study Group proposal,” and encouraging Democrats to “give the whole House a chance to vote 
on it.”176  Later that day, their efforts succeeded; the Democratic Caucus voted 127 to 41 to 
instruct Democratic members of the Rules Committee to make McHugh-Tauke in order as a floor 
amendment to the tax reform bill.177  In an interview, a DSG staffer recalled the vote as a “really 
big deal,” noting that “you don’t roll Rosty very often.”178  Of course, liberals also rolled the 
leadership who did not favor bringing the tax credit to the floor.  
On December 17, the amendment came before the House.  Supporters argued that the 
credit was “an invitation to our constituents to participate more actively in the financing of our 
elections” (Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA)); opponents argued that the amendment was an 
“audacious request” (Rep. Harris Fawell (R-IL)) in a time of rising annual deficits and amounted 
to little more than “a special tax exemption for Members of Congress” (Rep. Joe Barton (R-
TX)).179  The measure’s chief opponent, Rep. Bill Frenzel (R-MN) denounced the “Democrat 
study group” proposal as an undeserved benefit for members and “their rich friends.”  
Nevertheless, liberals succeeded in mobilizing support for the amendment; McHugh-Tauke was 
adopted 230 to 196 – 13 more votes than Obey-Railsback garnered 5 years earlier.  Even 
Rostenkowski, who was not opposed to the principle of the tax credit, voted for the McHugh 
amendment on the floor.   
                                                          
175 December 9, 1985 Dear Democratic Representative letter from Nader, Part II, box 109, folder 7.   
176 “Tax Credits for Campaign Money.” Washington Post. December 10, 1985: A20.  
177 July 25, 1986 letter from Conlon to AFL-CIO, DSG Papers, Part II, box 107, folder 5.  
178 September 23, 2015 telephone interview.  
179 Congressional Record 17 December 1985, H37375-H37378. 
380 
 
Similar to Obey-Railsback, the Senate did not include the credit in its own bill, which 
ultimately made it vulnerable to elimination during conference.  Nevertheless, liberal 
organization enabled them to overcome leadership apathy, committee – and even some liberal – 
opposition, to force a floor vote on a key policy goal.  Absent DSG’s legislative resources and 
tools to mobilize member support, it is highly unlikely liberals would have been able to overcome 
Rostenkowski’s absolute power over the tax reform agenda.   
 In the late 1970s and 1980s, campaign finance policy was one of the most contentious 
policy issues on the congressional agenda – provoking dissension both within and between the 
two parties.  And broader institutional changes rendered it difficult for individual members or 
groups to participate in policymaking.  By the mid-1980s, Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) had 
transformed the floor “into a much more efficient legislative machine, with most major bills 
brought under procedures barring more than a handful of amendments” (CQ Almanac 1986, 29-
35).  And yet, group organization enabled liberals to overcome committee opposition and the 
strong incentives of party leaders to suppress policy issues that brokered controversy within the 
party.  In the two decades after the Watergate-instigated campaign finance reforms, the only 
campaign finance related measures to pass either the House or Senate were proposed and 
developed by DSG.   
Conclusion 
Across all three policy areas analyzed above, liberal Democrats significantly shaped the 
direction and outcome of policymaking on the House floor.  In the absence of official party 
and/or committee support for their policy goals, DSG provided liberals with legislative resources 
and tools necessary to insert issues onto the agenda and build legislative coalitions.  The evidence 
provided above suggests that policymaking change in the Democratic Caucus in the 1960s-1980s 
was not simply the result of rules changes or electoral mandates.  Indeed, many of the policies 
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examined in this chapter occurred under divided government, and/or before the adoption of major 
committee reforms.  Instead, liberal Democrats successfully developed and disseminated policy 
research, brokered relationships with key allies (including liberal Republicans), and mobilized 
members to support their agenda when the issues came to a vote.  Open rules provided a double-
edged sword for liberal interests, enabling conservative attacks on liberal committee bills (e.g. 
civil rights) and liberal attacks on conservative committee bills (e.g. defense authorization).  
Ultimately, liberal policy goals only failed (e.g. Obey-Railsback, McHugh-Tauke, poll tax ban) 
when they failed to coordinate with liberals in the Senate; close cooperation with the other 
chamber enabled liberal Senators to step up on behalf of their colleagues and compensate for the 
failure of House legislation (e.g. ABM expansion).   
 The group’s strategy of developing and disseminating legislative resources and tools to 
promote a distinct policy agenda has significant implications for theories of policymaking, as well 
as responsiveness to group interest in the contemporary U.S. Congress.   
 Legislative resources and tools have long been recognized by congressional scholars as a 
key component of leadership agenda-setting (Cox and McCubbins 2005), legislative 
entrepreneurship (Wawro 2000; Evans 2004), and interest group pressure (Hall and Deardorff 
2004).  This chapter provides evidence that it is also a key component of group-driven policy 
change in Congress.  While agenda-setting power is the power to decide where to devote 
legislative resources and tools (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Peabody 1967), it is not delegated 
solely to party leadership offices.  Group organization fosters agenda-setting power by 
disseminating legislative resources and tools typically denied access to rank and file members.  
Across each of policy areas and time periods analyzed here, DSG enabled liberals to shape the 
congressional agenda when party and/or committee leaders refused to expend internal resources 
382 
 
on issues that divided their fellow partisans.180  In short, DSG enabled congressional 
responsiveness to policy problems when party and committee leaders could not, or would not, act.  
The group forced their colleagues to go on record in support of, or opposition to, specific 
legislation.     
This nuanced view of policymaking explains how and why the static legislative branch 
will respond to pressing, controversial policy issues that divide the majority party.  Party factions 
subsidize the cost for parties to address controversial policy issues that would otherwise be 
suppressed.  Ungoverned by rules and norms that require leaders to justify the usage of limited 
legislative resources or risk their position of power, groups can mobilize to develop and support 
legislation often opposed by a sizable portion of their fellow partisans.  Thus, if the formal 
structures of the House and legislative parties are designed to slowly incorporate new interests 
and ideas, group organization inside Congress promotes a faster, more meaningful responsiveness 
to new interests and ideas.   
Today, members frustrated by their inability to receive a committee hearing or have their 
amendment to a major bill made in order on the floor, or by their colleagues’ lack of familiarity 
or knowledge with social movements outside of Congress, can promote responsiveness by 
developing and marshaling their own legislative resources and tools.  Formal changes to rules and 
norms and the election of more of their likeminded allies are critical, but group organization 
provides an important, alternative mechanism of policymaking change too.   
                                                          
180 These findings are in keeping with much of the congressional caucus literature (although see Victor and 
Ringe 2013 for an exception).   
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8 | Conclusion 
 
  
 
The causes, consequences, and contours, of institutional change in the U.S. Congress has 
dominated the congressional literature since the adoption of the 1970s reforms.  The preceding 
chapters re-analyzed this critical case of institutional change through the lens of the group that led 
the campaign for reform – the Democratic Study Group (DSG).  I examined how liberals’ strong 
organization shaped nearly every facet of the House and the Democratic Caucus – everything 
from the mobilization and coordination of liberal interests, to the development of future party and 
committee leaders, to agenda-setting power, and ultimately, to rule and procedural reform in 
Congress.   
This chapter assesses group organization in the pre- and post-reform House.  I evaluate 
the tenure of DSG in the House, and the response by other factions in the Democratic and 
Republican parties to the group’s strategical organizational development.  I examine the 
representation of group interests and the changing institutional environment in the post-reform 
era, including the transition to a Republican majority in 1995 and the contemporary U.S. 
Congress. And finally, I summarize the major findings of the dissertation, and outline potential 
pathways for congressional reform today, as well as future avenues of research on the drivers of 
institutional change.   
I begin by reviewing DSG’s tenure in the House of Representatives; their success and 
failure at precipitating leadership, procedural, and policy, change; and the consequences of the 
group’s organization for the development of other Democratic factions and the Republican 
Conference.    
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Assessing the Tenure of DSG: Before, During, & After the Reform Era 
 The basic theory advanced in the preceding chapters is that organization promotes action 
in the House of Representatives.  Organization enables groups desiring to expand leadership 
pathways, reform legislative procedure, and set policy agendas, to overcome the significant 
hurdles to institutional change in Congress.  Thus, it is worth revisiting the considerable tenure of 
DSG before, during, and after the reform era.   
When DSG formed in 1959, liberals outlined a slate of three goals, including the 
expansion of the Rules Committee (by one (western) member), reinstating the 21-day rule, and 
decreasing the number of signatories necessary for discharge petitions to 150 (from 218).1  These 
three proposals provided an initial template for liberals to address entrenched institutional 
problems in the committee system, but DSG’s reform agenda would soon grow to include far 
more expansive changes to the House.  Figure 8.1 summarizes DSG’s major reform proposals 
that were written into House and Caucus bylaws between the group’s founding in 1959 and 1976 
(generally considered the end of the “reform era”).  The 87th Congress provided liberals with their 
first success.  Despite Speaker Sam Rayburn’s (D-TX) initial opposition, DSG ultimately secured 
his support to expand the Rules Committee.  On January 31, 1961, H.Res. 127, which enlarged 
the Committee from 12 to 15 members, was approved by a vote of 217 to 212 and over 
opposition from Committee Chairman Howard “Judge” Smith (D-VA).  While the change was 
initially temporary (valid only for the 87th Congress), it was made permanent in 1963 at the start 
of the 88th Congress (again, over Chairman Smith’s objections).   
 
                                                          
1 Memo from Holifield re his telephone call with Speaker Rayburn. DSG papers, Part I, box 55, folder 3. 
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In 1965, liberals achieve the second item on their original agenda when Democrats 
permanently reinstated the 21-day rule, which empowered the Speaker to recognize any 
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committee chairman (or ranking majority committee member) to call up a measure for House 
consideration if it has been before the Rules Committee for 21 or more days without receiving a 
rule.  Despite the permanent change in the rules, it was abolished from the rules package adopted 
two years later.  However, the timing of this singular rules change after President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s landslide election was critical.  As newspapers noted at the time, “The result was a 
breaking of the Rules Committee dam, a veritable flood of social legislation – from the Medicare 
program to the War on Poverty and all the Great Society proposals” (Pisor 1966).2  DSG also 
succeeded in their efforts to pressure the Democratic Caucus to act on their October 2, 1964 
“Statement on Democratic Party Unity in the 1964 Election.”  The Statement, which a group of 
liberals entered into the Congressional Record discouraged Democrats from supporting the 
Republican Goldwater-Miller presidential ticket, and warned members of the potential 
consequences, including punishment by the Caucus, of those that did.  The Caucus stripped the 
seniority of two members who supported Goldwater – Reps. John Bell Williams (D-MS) and 
Albert W. Watson (D-SC).3  The sanctions did not require passage of new rules as party bylaws 
already expressly forbid actively campaigning for, or endorsing, any candidate of the opposing 
party.  But it overcame a strong conservative effort in support of Williams and Watson, and 
established a precedent that placed southern conservatives on notice.  The seniority system was 
not sacrosanct and DSG would challenge conservative violations against mutual party goals.  In 
1967, DSG succeeded in preventing Rep. Williams from regaining his seniority after his re-
election to the House.  In 1969, their efforts to place conservatives on notice continued when 
DSG moved to strip Reps. John Rarick (D-LA) and L. Mendel Rivers’s (D-SC) seniority as 
                                                          
2 December 11, 1966, The Detroit News, Robert L. Pisor. DSG Papers, Part II, box 129, folder 9.  
3 Williams was re-elected as a Democrat in 1966, and sought to have his seniority restored at the start of the 
90th Congress.  His efforts failed and in 1967, he was elected as governor of Mississippi.  Albert resigned 
his seat shortly after losing his seniority, and ran in the special election to fill the seat as a Republican.  He 
won the election with 59.1% of the vote and served in the House until 1971.   
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punishment for endorsing American Independent Party presidential candidate George Wallace in 
the 1968 election.  While ultimately unsuccessful, these efforts continued to send conservatives 
the message that seniority was not resolute.   
In 1969, DSG began a 6-year long effort to strengthen the power of the Democratic 
Caucus, and the capacity of the House to challenge President Richard Nixon’s new, more 
conservative policies, especially on civil rights.  They successfully negotiated with Speaker John 
McCormack (D-MA) to begin regular, monthly meetings of the House Democratic Caucus – a 
crucial reform which was first advocated by DSG in 1958.4  McCormack agreed as part of a 
compromise with liberals not to protest Rep. William Colmer’s (D-MS) chairmanship of the 
Rules Committee (they had advocated for #2 ranking Rep. Ray J. Madden (D-IN)).  Liberal 
leaders in DSG lobbied the leadership to create a committee within the Caucus to study problems 
in the committee system, including how to make chairs more responsive and accountable to the 
party.  They succeeded in March 1970.  Majority Leader (and soon to be Speaker) Carl Albert (D-
OK) introduced a modified version of DSG’s Caucus resolution to create an 11-member 
committee to study the rules and practices of the House – including the seniority system.  The 
resolution was approved and the new committee – known as the Hansen Committee after its 
chairwoman, Rep. Julia Butler Hansen (D-WA) – was ultimately stocked with many so-called 
“DSG regulars,” including Frank Thompson (D-NK), Phillip Burton (D-CA), and James O’Hara 
(D-MI).5  And when the Hansen Committee Report was issued in 1970 (and approved in 1971), it 
provided for a separate vote on any nominee from the Committee-on-Committees on demand of 
10 members, a ratio of at least 3 Democrats for every 2 Republicans on each committee, and 
                                                          
4 November 12, 1958 letter from Thompson, George Rhodes, and Lee Metcalf to John E. Moss, DSG 
papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1.  
5 Thompson and O’Hara previously served as DSG chairs, and Burton served as chair two years later.  
 
388 
 
limited committee membership to 2 committees and (member) chairmanships to 1 committee.6  
The new procedure calling for votes on committee chairmen received its first test almost 
immediately during an unsuccessful effort to depose Rep. John McMillan (D-SC) as chairman of 
the District of Columbia Committee, which failed by a vote of 126 to 98.7    
From 1969 to 1970, DSG singlehandedly reshaped the Legislative Reorganization Act 
(LRA).  As initially crafted, the bill which ostensibly represented the most significant reform 
effort in the House since the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act – but it lacked any teeth, 
especially on issues related to legislative transparency in Congress.  DSG drafted vital 
amendments included in the final bill, including providing for recorded teller votes in the 
Committee of the Whole and open committee meetings.  The group led the campaign inside and 
outside of Congress in support of their slate of amendments, all of which were eventually 
included in the bill when it passed in September 1970.  As amended by DSG, the LRA provides 
the foundation for how the public, the media, and interests groups engage with and view the inner 
workings of the House of Representatives today (Schudson 2015).   
DSG continued to oversee significant institutional changes in the 93rd and 94th 
Congresses, overcoming both their minority status within the party and leadership opposition.  In 
1973, DSG led the effort in the Caucus to change the rules regarding votes on committee chairs 
yet again.  The new rule provided for automatic votes on all committee chairmen nominees 
without demand on a single master ballot.  They also introduced measures to reconstitute the 
Steering & Policy Committee with leadership and regional representation.  And in 1975 at the 
                                                          
6 December 16, 1970 Recommendations of the Hansen Committee, DSG papers, Part II, box 125, folder 2.  
7 After the failed Caucus vote, a small number of liberals unsuccessfully attempted to force a floor vote in 
January on whether McMillian should continue as chair.  Despite many Democrats and Republicans’ 
staunch disapproval of McMillian and his leadership of the District Committee, they were opposed to 
allowing the House floor – both Democrats and Republicans – decide what they considered to be the right 
and prerogative of the majority party.  Nevertheless, the effort represented the lack of a consensus on 
whether seniority reforms were the prerogative of party caucuses or the House floor.    
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start of the 94th Congress, the Democratic Caucus approved the most significant slate of party 
reforms in modern House history.  Arguably the culmination of DSG’s campaign for institutional 
change, the Caucus approved numerous DSG-proposed rules changes.  Among them, the Caucus 
voted to move the party Committee-on-Committees, which made recommendations for 
committee assignments and chairmanships, from the (Democratic members of the) Ways & 
Means Committee to the party Steering & Policy Committee.  Also approved was a proposal to 
empower the Speaker to appoint Democratic members of the Rules Committee – stunningly, over 
Speaker Carl Albert’s (D-OK) opposition to the proposal.8  And the new Caucus rule providing 
for automatic votes on all committee chairmen nominated by the (new) Committee on 
Committees was finally tested – a move which resulted in the overthrow of three ineffective, 
unrepresentative, and/or autocratic committee chairs: Reps. F. Edward Hebert (D-LA) (Armed 
Services), Wright Patman (D-TX) (Banking & Currency) and W.R. Poage (D-TX) (Agriculture).  
The Democratic Caucus’s organizing meeting for the 94th Congress provides considerable 
evidence that DSG’s strategic, incremental plan to make committees more responsive and 
representative of the Caucus was effective.   
The bulk of these reforms remain in effect today.  The majority party still maintains a 
significant advantage on the Rules Committee; the Democratic Caucus still meets monthly; 
committee chairs are still nominated by the Steering & Policy Committee and voted on by the full 
Caucus; and the Speaker (minority leader) still appoints Democrats to the Rules Committee.  And 
arguably the most wide-reaching reform proposed by DSG remains still in effect– creating a 
                                                          
8 Speaker Albert was opposed to empowering himself to appoint majority party members of the Rules 
Committee and spoke out against the rules change immediately before the Caucus vote approving it 
(“Many House Democrats Critical of New Leaders,” New York Times, June 6, 1973, DSG papers, Part II, 
box 122, folder 8: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Pierson, John, “Shaking Up the House: Will It 
Help?”, Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1974.). 
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process and mechanism through which rules reforms could be considered within the Democratic 
Caucus.   
In the 1950s, the Democratic Caucus lacked a self-reflecting mechanism to assess the 
state of the party and the impact of current rules and procedures on party policy goals.9  When 
DSG negotiated regular monthly meetings of the Democratic Caucus in 1969, they reconfigured 
the Caucus from a once-a-Congress procedural coalition to a regular site of collective 
introspection about the relationship between members and their party and committee leaders, and 
between institutional procedure and policy outcomes.  In the decades that followed, it was the 
Caucus that became the mechanism of change in the House – the site where rank and file 
members could raise issues and concerns, and debate them with other members and their leaders.  
The site where votes were cast on critical changes to the rules throughout the 1970s – rules 
governing the type, form, and quality of representation ultimately provided by the legislative 
branch.  And DSG’s resolution providing for the creation of a Caucus body – the Committee on 
Organization, Study and Review (OSR) – created a permanent site and forum (albeit imperfectly) 
through which members can voice their concerns about the function and state of the House; the 
leadership and members can engage with each other about opportunities for legislative 
participation, the committee system, and other organizational issues; and of course, where 
members and party leaders can consider and meaningfully debate changes to legislative rules and 
procedures.10  
                                                          
9 The original OSR in 1970-1971, known as the Hansen Committee for its chairwoman, Rep. Julia Butler 
Hansen (D-CO), was an 11-member committee.  Three DSG chairmen served on the committee, including 
Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ), James O’Hara (D-MI), and Phil Burton (D-CA). Thompson and O’Hara 
served as DSG chairmen in the two prior congresses (1965-1968), and Burton in the following congress 
(1971-1972). Their membership on OSR helped maintain DSG’s first mover advantage and gave DSG 
proposals a boost during Caucus debates on committee and leadership reforms in the early to mid-1970s.     
10 OSR is arguably more of “a place to receive and discuss ideas and specific reform proposals submitted 
by Members, rather than to generate an agenda of its own.” [Scott Lilly Comments, May 20, 1992 meeting 
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The next fifteen years oversaw a significant, albeit inevitable, slowdown in the 
consideration and passage of rule and procedural changes. But DSG remained vigilant in 
monitoring the enforcement of existing rules and proposed a new slate of rules changes nearly 
every Congress (except for the 100th and 101st), including proposals to enact term limits on 
leadership positions, raise the number of signatories on discharge petitions involving 
Constitutional amendments, limit consideration of non-germane Senate amendments in 
conference reports, limit subcommittee assignments, and strengthen the policy-setting functions 
of the Steering & Policy Committee.  DSG was intimately involved with monitoring, evaluating 
and amending the proposals of Rep. Richard Bolling’s (D-MO) (House) Select Committee 
charged with reviewing committee jurisdictions in the mid-1970s, Rep. Dave Obey’s (D-WI) 
(House) Commission on ethics reform in the late 1970s, and Rep. Martin Frost’s (D-TX) 
(Caucus) OSR Committee on party reforms in the mid- to late-1980s.11  And in 1984, DSG finally 
succeeded in transforming the lowest rung on the “automatic elevator” to the speakership when 
the Democratic Caucus voted to make the whip an elected – rather than appointed – position.  
This singular change removed the power of the Speaker and Majority Leader to appoint the whip 
and transferred this power to the Caucus as a whole.  It was a significant power shift in favor of 
the rank and file as several whips eventually became Speaker, including Speakers Tip O’Neill (D-
MA) and Thomas Foley (D-WA). The Caucus now had a voice in who would be placed on the 
pathway to the Speakership (and all the requisite formal and informal advantages that came along 
with it).   
                                                          
minutes of the DSG Reform Task Force, DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 2]. And regardless, the power 
of OSR to initiate changes in House rules is a function of majority party status.   
11 DSG’s executive director, Dick Conlon, was routinely invited to attend and participate in meetings of 
Frost’s OSR Committee.   
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The tragic death of DSG’s longtime executive director Dick Conlon in 1988 inherently 
brought about a necessary reconsideration of DSG’s role within the House.12   Conlon’s 
replacement, Scott Lilly (a longtime staffer for Rep. Dave Obey (D-WI), incorporated a number 
of internal changes to professionalize and institutionalize the organization, while a new 
generation of executive committee members refocused DSG activities towards House and party 
reform.13  In conjunction with the establishment of a 1992-1994 Democratic Caucus Committee 
on Organization, Study, and Review, and a 1992-1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, DSG organized a series of two reform task forces.14  The goal of the task force was 
DSG’s longest-running reform goal – the creation of a robust Steering & Policy Committee.  
Members envisioned S&P was a mechanism within the Caucus to develop party policy, and 
coordinate a legislative program between committees, party leaders, and rank and file members.15  
The party reforms proposed by the task force ultimately represent a long overdue attempt to 
reconcile the contradictory set of institutional arrangements produced through the 1970s reforms 
(Schickler, Sides, and McGhee 2003).  DSG was largely unsuccessful at achieving either goal 
                                                          
12 During his 20-year tenure, Conlon was DSG’s chief procedural strategist and a towering figure within the 
organization and the House.  He left his editorial imprint on every piece of research distributed by the 
group, and was, of course, the primary linkage between the research and advocacy wings of the group.12  
Conlon was so critical to the everyday activities of DSG that his replacement would undoubtedly produce 
significant changes within the organization. Greenhouse, Linda. 1988. “Richard Conlon Dies in Accident; 
Head of Democratic Unit Was 57.” New York Times. June 23.  
13 Among the changes, Lilly secured regular salary and benefits for staff, which were often prone to 
fluctuations in clerk-hire availability.  He dramatically increased the number of Republican subscribers, 
who grew to constitute a significant portion of the DSG budget.  Lilly also created a 501c(3) headed by 
former DSG staffer Roy Dye “to expand DSG’s influence,” which was part of his effort to reorient DSG’s 
research priorities to emphasize issues outside of Congress, as well as longer-term issues.   These efforts 
also carried over to the daily and weekly research publications of the group.  One staffer described Lilly’s 
goal here with an analogy between two longstanding Capitol Hill newspapers: “The [DSG] legislative shop 
was extremely short-term…Scott Lilly…was frustrated by that. He was much more of a fan of National 
Journal than CQ. CQ equals minutia; the National Journal was a big thinker” (August 5, 2015 Interview).   
14 This represents a significant reassertion of the group’s procedural and organizational reform role.  DSG 
did not even circulate a list of executive committee-endorsed rules changes in the 100th and 101st 
congresses (1987-1990).   
15 These efforts date back to a 1961-1962 resolution offered in the Democratic Caucus, which led to the 
creation of a Steering Committee chaired by Rep. Ray J. Madden (D-IN).  
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(see chapter six), but the task forces provided another means for ambitious junior members, to 
learn about House procedure and the tradeoffs necessary in any procedural reform effort. Task 
force members that later assumed formal leadership positions include Reps. Nancy Pelosi (D-
CA), Rosa DeLauro (D-NY), and Nita Lowey (D-NY).16   
The second significant shift observed during the reform era was the expansion of 
leadership pathways in the House (see chapter five).  Liberals in DSG recognized that as pivotal 
as procedural reform was to representation of their interests, long-term institutional change 
depended on the expansion of leadership pathways.  Rather than simply wait for their strongest, 
most ambitious allies to accumulate seniority, DSG dramatically expanded the informal 
leadership positions and training experience available to junior members in the House.  To the 
formal leadership pathways shaped by seniority and recruitment from existing leaders, DSG 
introduced an alternative. The group directly provided junior members with the policy expertise, 
visibility and connections, coalition building experience, and institutional prestige and cachet 
necessary to be competitive for elected and appointed leadership positions.  Denied access to 
formal leadership positions because of their seniority and policy preferences, ambitious liberals 
could serve on DSG’s executive committee or in the group’s task force system.   
In the post-reform era (1975-1994), DSG produced 1 Speaker (and majority leader), 3 
whips, and 3 Caucus chairs and vice-chairs.  From 1985 to 1994, DSG leaders occupied between 
33% to 55% of the top Democratic leadership positions.17  In the 1970s, DSG-Democrats had a 
                                                          
16 Pelosi has served as Democratic whip, minority leader, and Speaker.  DeLauro has served as Assistant to 
the Minority Leader, chief deputy whip, and chair of the Democratic Steering & Policy Committee.  And 
Lowey served as DCCC chair and is currently the ranking member on the House Administrations 
Committee.   
17 Calculations of the top party leadership holders are based on the Speaker, majority leader, majority whip, 
caucus chair, caucus secretary/vice chair, chief deputy whip, and whip task force chairmen (introduced in 
1987).    
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greater probability of advancing into subcommittee chair positions than non-DSG Democrats, and 
into whip team positions in the late 1980s and 1990s.  DSG was especially successful in those 
rare cases of committee chair seniority violations. Of the 9 violations voted on by the Democratic 
Caucus between the 94th and 103rd Congresses, 5 advantaged DSG leaders and an additional 2 
benefitted DSG members.18 And even after Democrats lost the majority in 1994, DSG leaders 
never constituted less than 50% of the top Democratic leadership positions through the 109th 
Congress, with former executive committee members like David Bonior (D-MI), Vic Fazio (D-
CA), Chet Edwards (D-TX), Ed Pastor (D-AZ), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), and 
Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), continuing to hold the top party leadership positions.19   
And of course, DSG fulfilled a critical policy leadership vacuum throughout the group’s 
tenure in the House (see chapter seven).  Liberals learned quickly that party leaders’ reticence to 
allocate party and legislative resources on legislation that provoked opposition among their fellow 
partisans was as damaging to their policy goals as existing rules and norms.  DSG bridged this 
critical resource gap prior to the emergence of a liberal majority within their party or the elevation 
of party leaders unbridled by the fear of a conservative backlash.  The group widely disseminated 
policy and legislative research, provided a platform to engage with key interests inside and 
outside of Congress, and managed communications networks to mobilize support for legislation.  
This legislative machinery enabled liberals to bypass the hurdles posed by the formal structures of 
the House, and directly participate in the legislative process in the pre- and post-reform eras.  
                                                          
18 Committee chair seniority violations will be analyzed in detail in chapter four.  The DSG leaders who 
were advantaged are Reps. Thomas Foley (D-WA), Henry Reuss (D-WI), Les Aspin (D-WI), Charlie Rose 
(D-NC), and David Obey (D-WI). DSG members Reps. Melvin Price (D-IL) and Ronald Dellums (D-CA) 
were also the beneficiaries of committee chair seniority violations.   
19 Prior to Democrats winning back the majority in 2006, DSG leaders occupied 67% of the top party 
leadership positions (in the 109th Congress).  Calculations of the top party leadership holders are based on 
the minority leader, minority whip, caucus chair, caucus vice chair, chief deputy whip, senior chief deputy 
whip (beginning in 2003), and assistant to the minority leader (beginning in 2001).  DSG members also 
continued to hold leadership positions, ranging between 17% (in the 109th) to 50% (in the 106th).   
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When party leaders and committees would not act to advance important legislation, DSG was 
responsible for carrying out vital whip polls, brokering negotiations between natural allies 
(including liberal Republicans), developing and distributing the research necessary to arm 
members in defense of their proposals, and protecting major bills from conservative amendments 
on the floor.   
Throughout the 1960s-1980s, DSG consistently marshalled its legislative resources and 
tools to insert – and mobilize support for – the most controversial policy issues.  When the 
leadership abdicated responsibility for marshalling floor coalitions on the civil rights legislation 
in the 1960s, liberals stepped in to fill the gap.  DSG conducted whip polls and mobilized 
members to participate on the floor during consideration of the 1960, 1964, 1966, and 1968 Civil 
Rights Acts, and the 1964 Voting Rights Act.  The group crafted and led the campaign for home 
rule for Washington, D.C. for 10 years until the legislation was finally signed into law in 1973.  
DSG was an active participant in the major foreign policy and defense policy debates throughout 
the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, including leading critical debates about the Safeguard Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) program and Vietnam War funding under the Nixon Administration, and 
Iran-Contra and the Persian Gulf conflict during the Reagan Administration.  Liberals also drafted 
and mobilized a majority floor coalition in support of the only campaign finance reform measures 
to pass the House in the late 1970s and 1980s.   
 Liberals marshalled their collective procedural and policy expertise to enforce party rules 
protecting majority policy goals, and democratize access to information in the House.  When 
party and/or committee leaders were opposed to liberal legislation, DSG invoked a party rule 
(Caucus Rule 7) empowering a super-majority of Democrats to instruct committees to report 
legislation reflective of the majority of the Caucus.  Among the important applications of this rule 
was a 1972 instruction to the Foreign Affairs Committee on Vietnam War funding, and a 1985 
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instruction to the Rules Committee to make a political contribution tax credit in order on the floor 
(bypassing Ways & Means).  And DSG’s information services provided a single, trusted source 
of information attuned to the nuances and demands of public office and the congressional 
schedule (Klein 2011).  Members (and their staff) relied on DSG to quickly learn about a bill’s 
content, the constituency groups impacted by the underlying policy, where major interest groups 
stood on the bill and the position of the Administration (Kingdon 1989).  This information 
enabled members to cast informed votes, but it also fostered a unified Democratic position on 
specific policies, and for individual Democrats sympathetic to liberal policies to defend their 
votes to their constituents with reputable, verifiable information.   
 Some of the changes outlined above are arguably historically bounded; their causes and 
effects confined to a specific point in time.  But the group’s most significant accomplishment 
remains in effect today.  Over a thirty-five-year period (1959-1995), DSG not only led a complete 
transformation of the House and the Democratic Caucus, but the group created the capacity for 
future change in the contemporary era.  The House of Representatives is an ornery and static 
institution that is not readily adaptable or inclusive of new groups and ideas.  And like many 
institutions, the House does not have built-in, automatic mechanism of self-reflection to address 
and study those specific issues plaguing the effectiveness and efficiency of the institution.  The 
rules may be adopted anew each year, but the small number of temporary committees convened 
to study the organization of Congress – in 1945-1947, in 1965-1966, and in 1992-1993 – is a 
testament to how rare and difficult it is to achieve mass institutional change.  The House is an 
institution where amidst years of complaints by members of both parties about the undemocratic 
seniority system, there was no definitive agreement within the institution about whether potential 
reforms to unwritten seniority norms should be the prerogative of individual party caucuses or the 
House floor.  DSG did not merely increase the capacity of liberals to force their party to 
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effectively address pressing issues like this, the group’s strategy increased the capacity for the 
institution itself to address its own shortcomings.    
Despite the seeming absence of leadership and committee involvement or leadership in 
many of the activities and change processes described above, DSG did not develop or operate in 
an institutional vacuum.  Indeed, the group ultimately spurred the development and organization 
of other factions within both parties.  I now turn to a discussion of those responses.   
 
Push & Pull: The Response by Democratic and Republican Factions 
The decision by liberals to establish DSG was rooted in the belief that other members’ 
policy, electoral, and power goals were better subsidized by the party and institutional structures.  
Yet liberals were never especially concerned with confronting a coordinated opposition.  DSG 
staff memos in the late 1960s document internal discussions about the potential repercussions of 
challenging conservatives for majority status.20  It was possible of course, that conservatives 
would ‘band together’ to fight back, and a sufficient number of defections could sway control of 
the House to Republicans.  The memo suggested that Democrats were split about this potential 
consequence – some believed that the loss of the House “should be avoided at all costs”; others 
believed it might be “an essential first step to restoring the party’s health and vitality.”  However, 
liberal reformers clearly never viewed the risk of large numbers of Democratic defections to the 
GOP as likely – it would have been harmful to the Republican party’s “young, modern, 
concerned-but-businesslike” brand (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).21  An organized 
                                                          
20 March 3, 1969 from executive director Dick Conlon to DSG Chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN) re 
Proposed DSG Voting Study Strategy. DSG papers, Part II, box 175, folder 7.   
21 And of course, the existence of the memo itself is a strong indicator that conservatives at that time had 
not already ‘banded together.’   
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conservative base within Congress was never liberals’ main foil; in the 1970s, the group did not 
even confront a coordinated opposition within the Democratic Caucus.22   
The Democratic Response. Organized opposition to DSG and the group’s monopoly on 
rules reform eventually materialized in the growth of rival organizations on the left and right.23  
The congressional literature has widely documented the significant growth in the congressional 
caucus system throughout the 1970s and beyond (Hammond 1991, 2001).  Much of this growth is 
due to members’ recognition of the key role of organization and information for cultivating new 
leaders, negotiating with (and sometimes challenging) current leaders (Kernell 1997), and 
unifying members behind a coherent agenda.  Members across the ideological spectrum observed 
the success of liberal activism in DSG and attempted to re-create it – or for the group’s critics on 
the left and right, supplant it – with varying degrees of success (Mulhollan and Stevens 1980).   
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) organized in 1971 at the start of the 92nd 
Congress and amidst the election of a historically high number (13) of black representatives in 
Congress.  Many of the group’s founding members, including Reps. Charlie Diggs (MI), William 
(Bill) Clay, Sr. (D-MO), and Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), had previously served in leadership roles 
within DSG.  The motivation to form CBC in part stemmed from a widely perceived “activism 
gap” on the part of largely-white liberals in DSG. Chisholm’s reflection of her impressions of 
DSG in a newsletter is illustrative of this perspective:  
“One unexpected disappointment for me was a group that I expected to embody the best 
in the House, the “liberal bloc” organization called the Democratic Study Group…The 
DSG talks a good game, but it lacks conviction. It never seems to get together and do 
anything.”24   
                                                          
22 In the 1960s, the biggest hurdle to achieving their agenda was the structure of the House and the 
Democratic Caucus – institutions designed to make change to the status quo incredibly difficult.  
23 Opposition also materialized as a refusal to attend meetings of the Democratic Caucus (preventing a 
quorum), which limited the role and power of the Caucus as a mechanism of party agenda-setting.  See 
chapter three for a longer discussion of these issues.    
24 The Majority Report, Vol. 1, No. 11, pg. 17, DSG papers, Part II, box 122, folder 9.   
399 
 
The archival record suggests that many CBC members shared Chisholm’s concerns about the role 
of DSG within the House and the Democratic Party.  In an interview with The Philadelphia 
Inquirer prior to the organization of the CBC, founding member Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) said:  
“We’ve been slowly moving towards a bolder phase of parliamentary activity. We need 
more imaginative maneuvers to push the old procedures over, to dramatize to the country 
how those procedures stop the work of the House. We can no longer blame the Southern 
Democrats and the Republicans for conservatism in the House. Our Democratic 
leadership is right with them. Even the Democratic Study Group has degenerated into an 
arm of the leadership” (emphasis added).25  
Conyers’ comments came before the adoption of many of the most significant committee and 
leadership reforms in the 1970s, but they are representative of a fundamental difference in 
strategy between liberals in Congress.26  DSG emphasized careful study and research of its 
agenda items, and avoided conflict on the House and Caucus floor (electing to settle conflict 
between members a priori).  As then-DSG Chairman Frank Thompson (D-NJ) told the Camden, 
New Jersey Courier-Post in 1965, “We [DSG] have found that the best way to be effective 
around here is to know what you are doing and to keep your mouth shut.”27 This strategy was at 
odds with members who cut their teeth on civil rights and social movements of the 1960s and 
1970s outside of Congress.  One DSG staffer interview remarked how “the CBC in some sense 
replace the leadership as kind of the other power center that DSG needed to watch…a wariness 
that they are not coming from the same place, different constituencies and different priorities.”28  
                                                          
25 July 14, 1970. “There’ll be Fireworks From Radical Left.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. DSG papers, Part 
II, box 122, folder 8.  
26 In another example, founding CBC member (and DSG executive committee member) Rep. Charles 
Diggs (D-MI) wrote in a letter to DSG chairman Donald Fraser (D-MN), “The DSG has been moving 
rather cautiously with respect to issues which it has either raised or supported at the Democratic Caucus…I 
believe that the organization is wise in using its powers in that forum (the Caucus) prudently.” DSG papers, 
Part II, box 125, folder 1.   
27 Gale, Dick. 1965. “N.J. Solon Heads Powerful Group.” Courier-Post, Camden, New Jersey: April 1. 
DSG Papers, Part II.  
28 August 6, 2015 interview. This staffer noted how many in DSG were critical of the CBC’s efforts to put 
together a budget, remarking that “They didn’t have to deal with how you were going to pay for it.” The 
staffer went on to say that there was not much staff cooperation, “but we always dealt with them on their 
budget and wrote it up. You can’t vote against it, but he [executive director Conlon] thought it was naïve 
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By the mid- to late 1980s however, each group’s chairmen were invited to attend and participate 
in the others’ executive committee meetings.29  CBC and DSG would never see eye to eye on the 
seniority system in Congress (which eliminated potential racial bias in committee leadership 
selection), but the group made for important allies when their interests aligned.   
In turn, moderate and conservative Democrats formed the United Democrats of Congress 
(UDC) and the Democratic Research Organization (DRO), respectively.  Both UDC and DRO 
originally formed as leadership platforms for individual members – UDC for B.F. Sisk (D-CA) 
and DRO for Joseph Waggonner (D-LA).  Sisk, a Rules member since the expansion of the 
committee in 1961, ran unsuccessfully for several leadership posts in the 1970s, including 
majority leader and Democratic Caucus Chair.   
UDC formed in 1973 as a group of about 50 members (roughly analogous in size to DSG 
at its founding in 1959). It was chaired by Sisk; Gillis Long (D-LA) was made vice chairman, and 
Robert Giaimo (D-CT) was made secretary-treasurer.  In newspaper coverage of the group’s 
founding, the group was described as the center of the Democratic party – “to the right of Sen. 
George McGovern (D-S.D.) and left of Alabama’s George Wallace.”30  It eventually counted 
Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) as a member (Hammond 1991, 283).   
DRO formed around the same time in 1973.  It was widely viewed by liberals as an 
attempt to undercut DSG, especially during the conservative resurgence under the Reagan 
Administration.  In the early 1980s, the group attempted to establish a “legislative network” of 
members who would serve on the principal subcommittees in the House in order to affect a wide 
                                                          
and not serious. All along, neither side wanted to alienate each other, but the CBC in some sense replaced 
the leadership as kind of the other power center that DSG needed to watch…” 
29 February and March 1991 correspondence between DSG chairman Bob Wise (D-WV) and CBC 
Chairman Edolphus Towns (D-NY). DSG papers, Part II, box 134, folder 4.  
30 Gillis Vice Chairman of House Demo ‘Center’ Group, The Town Talk, July 26, 1973, pg. 7.   
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range of policies from the ground-up.  In response, DSG chairman Dave Obey (R-WI) wrote that 
“There is no question they are trying to set up a parallel organization to move in” on DSG.31  
Both UDC and DRO empowered their leaders to serve as the face of moderate and 
conservative Democrats, respectively – and negotiate as a bloc with the leadership on behalf of 
their interests.32  Archival accounts of these groups are most likely to emerge in presidential 
papers, suggesting that Democratic and Republican Administrations in the 1970s viewed the 
groups as representatives of different voting blocs within the Democratic Caucus.  For example, 
Ford aides recommended that the president meet with representatives from DRO (an “ad hoc 
group of moderate to conservative Democratic Members”) because DRO members “provide 
strong support for Administration initiatives and legislative positions, and their assistance is 
crucial in efforts to successfully sustain vetoes.”33  Carter Administration records similarly 
document meetings with UDC members, who were described as “Carter Democrats.”34   
Neither group made lasting efforts to unite their members around a coherent platform, 
and it is not surprising that their tenures were relatively short-lived.  DRO arguably adapted to the 
                                                          
31 March 31, 1981 memo to Conlon from Obey.  
32 Hammond (1991, 288), for example, cites a UDC participant’s recollection of how the group enabled 
negative agenda-setting: “Let’s say the leadership of the UDC…feels strongly about a piece of legislation. 
Very quietly they go to the Speaker, or invite the Speaker down for a very candid, off-the-record discussion 
of what membership is willing to do. The Speaker [has] learned it is very important to pay very careful 
attention to UDC…UDC is most influential in continuing to remind the leadership that there are Democrats 
who may not share their same views.”  
33 The memo indicated that Waggonner and Rep. Dave Satterfield (D-VA) “believe it [the meeting] would 
be most beneficial” and recommend continuing to periodically meet with the President (Schedule Proposal, 
March 24, 1976, from Tom Loeffler re Congressional Leaders of the Democratic Research Organization 
(DRO), Loen and Leppert Files, box 30, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library).    
34 Digitized records of the Carter Administration, as well as newspaper accounts at the time, suggest that 
the President Carter and his staff regularly met with members of UDC.  Staffers viewed UDC as Carter’s 
strongest supporters in Congress: “The potential political value of such an organization to this 
Administration is obvious. This group has a higher support rate than any other.”: Briefing Paper, August 1, 
1979, Meeting With the United Democrats of Congress, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Office of Staff 
Secretary, Presidential Files, Box 126, Folder August 2, 1979. Carter also held dinners in honor of UDC at 
the White House: Roberts, Steven V. 1979. “Carter, After Defeats in Congress, Vows New Discipline for 
Democrats.” New York Times. September 22nd.   
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conservative resurgence and repeated budget battles of the 1980s better than UDC.35  The group 
provided an organizational front for its leaders, including DRO chairman (and Budget committee 
member), Rep. James Jones (D-OK) to negotiate on behalf of Democrats with Republicans in 
budget battles (White and Wildavsky 1990, 93).  Jones’ position as the face of DRO strengthened 
his capacity to speak on behalf of southern conservatives, while also helping him to keep the 
“boll weevils” in line for the leadership.   
While UDC’s downfall is arguably more a reflection of its focus as a leadership platform 
for individual members (especially Rep. Sisk), DRO’s fate was linked to the presence and size of 
southern conservatives in the Democratic Caucus.  As their numbers declined throughout the 
1980s and the 1990s, it is not surprising that the group itself declined.  The birth of the Blue Dogs 
Caucus in 1995 amidst the loss of the Democratic majority provided a new voice for moderate 
and – to the extent they were still represented in the party – conservative Democrats (Hammond 
2001).   
Of these three groups, the CBC is undoubtedly the most successful, both in terms of the 
longevity of the group and their role within Congress.  The group’s specific legislative goals are 
seldom achieved, but the CBC always has a seat at the leadership table, and their annual budget 
proposal often shifts members’ attention to different spending priorities (Hammond 2001, 83).  
The CBC is also the only Democratic group to start their own comprehensive information 
services for members as well (although it has never come close to rivaling the breadth and depth 
of DSG’s services).  The “Legislative Research Service” began in 1982 and was specifically 
designed to aid members with “substantial black and minority populations in their district.”  The 
CBC’s research portfolio included a newsletter, in-depth research on long-term legislative 
                                                          
35 It also regularly provided informational resources for members, while UDC did not (Hammond 1991).   
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proposals and policy issues, “outreach” on behalf of members publicizing their legislative efforts 
“in support of CBC,” and access to the CBC “Braintrust” of important figures in a range of areas 
outside of Congress.36   
The Republican Response. The processes analyzed in the preceding chapters focus on 
the role of a single organized faction of junior liberal members within the Democratic Party.  But 
a small cohort of junior liberal Republican members were key partners at nearly every step.  
While they led their own simultaneous challenge to the status quo within the Republican 
Conference (Elder 1970; Oleszek 1975), they served as key resources, contacts, and votes, for 
many of liberal Democrats’ policy and procedural goals.37   
In nearly all of the policy areas analyzed in the previous chapters, including civil rights, 
voting rights, defense, D.C. home rule, campaign finance, among others, liberal Republicans 
helped DSG develop and mobilize a majority floor coalition.  A small group of Republicans, 
including members like Rep. Tom Curtis (R-MO), Barber Conable (R-CA), and John Anderson 
(R-IL), routinely worked with DSG to disseminate the group’s policy research to their colleagues, 
and to mobilize their likeminded allies to sign discharge petitions and support key amendments 
on the floor.  As liberal Democrats remained a minority in the House throughout the 1960s-
1980s, liberal Republicans consistently provided the winning margin of victory on legislation that 
brokered opposition from southern conservatives.   
                                                          
36 May 4, 1982 memo from CBC Chairman Walter Fauntroy to Members of Congress re Subscription to 
CBC Legislative Research Service. DSG Papers, Part II, box 154, folder 8.    
37 The major difference is that, as the minority party, the leadership was far more involved.  Republican 
leaders saw the adoption of reform as integral to their pursuit of majority party status (Cox and McCubbins 
2005). The Republican party “could not afford to let the other take credit for reforming the seniority 
system” (Oleszek 1975, DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 3). Leaders were persuaded that “it would be 
smart politically for the Republicans to get the jump on the Democrats and propose a better way to run the 
House” (Elder 1970). DSG Papers, Part II, box 163, folder 6.  
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Republicans were also, of course, critical to the adoption of rules reform on the House 
floor.  In many ways, their role is easy to overlook – the majority party sets House rules and 
procedures; the minority-Republican party theoretically played no role in crafting and approving 
rules reforms.  Nevertheless, Republicans significantly shaped liberal Democratic reform efforts.  
Liberal Republicans cast key votes on a variety of reforms in the 1960s and 1970s.  And the 
Republican leadership supported DSG’s preferred strategy of transforming party caucuses into 
the site of rules reform by crippling the piecemeal attempts of errant liberals to force floor 
consideration of committee reforms.  Later, Republican leaders helped stem the increasing power 
of the Democratic Caucus when it threatened to limit minority party influence – with significant 
long-term consequences for the power of the body to set Democratic party policy.  
Among the historic Democratic-led reforms adopted with Republican support is the 
temporary expansion of the Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members in 1961 (made permanent, 
again with Republican support, in 1963).  Most Republicans, including then-Minority Leader 
Charles A. Halleck (R-IN) opposed the Rules expansion, but its adoption would not have passed 
without the support of a plurality (22) of Republicans.  Rep. Tom Curtis (R-MO) led the group, 
and even attempted to persuade Halleck to remain unopposed to the plan.38  Curtis believed it 
would put Democrats “on the spot” and ensure they would be held accountable for the success – 
and failure – of the party’s legislative program.39  While the full Conference voted to oppose the 
Rules expansion, Republican support nevertheless enabled its adoption 217-212.  On January 9, 
                                                          
38 As detailed in chapter six, Curtis also served as a crucial partner to DSG in the joint effort to compile an 
up to date compendium of House procedure and precedent (known as “Project Saltmine”).   
39 Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), Speech, Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 
Columbia, Missouri, March 11, 1961.  DSG papers, Part II, box 159, folder 2.  
 
405 
 
1963, the expansion of the Rules Committee was made permanent (H.Res 5) by a vote of 235 to 
196; 28 Republicans joined Democrats to support the proposal.40 
Republicans also helped assure the passage of the 21-day rule in 1965.41  Despite a 295-
140 majority in the 88th Congress, Majority Leader Carl Albert’s (D-OK) rules package passed 
224-202.  The 16 Republicans who supported the package were critical for the adoption of the 
rules package, including the 21-day rule.  The 21-day rule was overturned two years later, but its 
adoption coincided with the passage of several historic Great Society programs under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Administration.42 
Five years later, Republican support helped lead to the adoption of recorded teller voting 
on amendments in 1970.  It is difficult to precisely identify Republican support for this reform as 
– somewhat ironically – the approval of recorded teller voting on amendments was adopted via an 
(anonymous) voice vote on an amendment to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act.  But not 
only were the 182 cosponsors of the recorded teller vote amendment to the LRA roughly equally 
split between Democrats and Republicans, Schickler (2001, 216) found that Republicans were 
more likely to support the amendment itself than Democrats.     
Strategic Republican opposition (or perhaps more accurately, neutrality) was also critical 
for ensuring seniority reforms remained off the House floor – thereby elevating each party’s 
caucus as the primary legislative site and forum through which committee and leadership reforms 
                                                          
40 In 1963, Rep. Melvin R. Laird (R-WI) offered his own proposal to reform the Rules Committee as an 
amendment to H.Res 5. Laird’s proposal would have maintained the expansion, but altered the ratio 
between the majority and minority party.  The Republican leadership did not support Laird’s proposal 
(which never received a direct vote on the merits), and opposed the expansion of the committee altogether 
as “packing.” The ranking Republican on the Rules Committee, Rep. Clarence J. Brown (R-OH) argued 
that it was “ethically and morally wrong” to “pack” the committee.   “Criticism of Congress Provokes Few 
Changes.” 1964. In CQ Almanac 1963, 19th ed., 369-76.  Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.     
41 “House Rules Changes Enhance Majority Rule.” 1966. In CQ Almanac 1965, 21st edition: 585-90.  
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.   
42 See chapter six for a longer discussion of the adoption of the 21-day rule.   
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are debated.  Party caucuses are the unquestioned site of rules reform today, but their role as a 
mechanism of legislative reform was by no means a settled matter in the 1960s.43  The seniority 
system was a mere norm in the 1960s, unwritten in the Constitution, House rules, or party bylaws 
– a fact that many members were unaware of.  Members of Congress of both parties testified 
before the 1965-1966 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress about the problem posed 
by the seniority system.  And the corresponding 1965-1966 House Republican Task Force on 
Congressional Reform & Minority Staffing considered seniority reform proposals that would 
have provided for committee chairs to be elected by secret ballot by committee members.44  
These events suggest that Republicans (as well as many Democrats) believed the House had the 
prerogative to consider seniority reforms. 
The eventual decision by liberals to pursue committee leadership reforms through the 
Democratic Caucus was strategic – as a voting bloc, liberals constituted a larger portion of the 
Democratic Caucus than the full House.  But Republicans played a key role in keeping seniority 
reforms off the House – and enabling this strategy to be successful.  Minority Leader Gerald R. 
Ford’s (R-MI) comments during floor debate on a challenge to Rep. John McMillan’s District 
Committee chairmanship in 1971 underscores Republicans’ support for reserving party 
                                                          
43 This is perhaps not surprising given that the (majority) Democratic Caucus did not even meet regularly 
prior to 1969.   
44 The task force was organized in response to Republicans’ frustration about Democratic dominance of the 
Joint Committee, as well as the limited capacity of the Committee to provide recommendations on House 
rules and procedures (as provided for in the resolution).  A compendium of selected proposals offered by 
the House Republican Task Force includes a proposal by former Rep. John Lindsay (R-NY) who endorsed 
chair election by committee members over election by party caucuses (although he acknowledges it would 
decrease party power) (1966, 31).   
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prerogative on committee leadership selection.  Ford’s comments came after liberals’ motion to 
strip McMillan of his chairmanship had already failed in the Democratic Caucus.45  He said:  
“The Democratic caucus made a decision on committee chairman. Whether we on our 
side agree with it or not, by precedent that is a matter within the ranks and prerogatives 
of the majority party. The Democratic Party was chosen to be the majority party in the 
92nd Congress…that was the judgment of the American people last November, and if they 
are to carry out as they see fit the mandate given them, the Democratic Party in the House 
of Representatives ought to have the right in a democratic process to choose the 
individual on each of the standing committees who should serve as the chairmen of those 
committees. By precedent and otherwise, we on our side should not get into the 
procedures and prerogatives of the majority party….the matter is one for the Democrats 
to decide and not for us” (emphasis added).46   
If Ford – or a sizable number of rank and file Republicans – chose to side with Waldie and 
support his resolution, they could have upended years of precedent – and potentially shifted 
institutional control within the House. 47 Many Republicans shared Waldie’s frustration with 
McMillan’s leadership of the District Committee, especially his steadfast opposition to D.C. 
home rule.  Instead, Ford gave an impassioned argument in support of majority party prerogative.  
In the process, he foreclosed any further consideration of Waldie’s resolution, as well as any 
potential coalition between junior Democrats and the Republican leadership.   
 Republicans also helped to shape the discourse around DSG’s efforts to strengthen the 
Democratic Caucus – and thus, how many Democrats came to view some of the reforms 
themselves.  For the minority party, the increased power of the Caucus did not just cut into 
                                                          
45 Liberals, including Reps. Donald Fraser (D-MN) and Charlie Diggs (D-MI) – both DSG leaders and 
District Committee members – failed to successfully remove McMillan as chairman.  Later, Rep. Jerome R. 
Waldie (D-CA) introduced a motion to remove McMillan as District chairman on the House floor.   
46 Congressional Record, 4 February 1971, H1711.   
47 Republicans organized their own reform committee within the Republican Conference that proposed 
reforms to the party’s selection of ranking committee members, as well as full committee chairs (in 
anticipation of the party’s eventual majority status).  Indeed, Republican activities on seniority reform 
helped spur the Democratic leadership to act.  Although DSG’s proposal to create the Committee on 
Organization, Study and Review (OSR) within the Democratic Caucus was on most members’ radar for 
several months before Republicans announced their activities, it was not fully considered or adopted by the 
Caucus until after the Republican leadership announced their own committee.   
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committee power, but their own power too.  On November 25, 1974, Republican Conference 
Chair John Anderson (R-IL) spoke out on the House floor against many of DSG’s proposals to 
strengthen the Caucus:  
“Mr. Speaker, I have obtained a copy of a secret Democratic document which outlines 
proposals aimed at increasing the stranglehold of the Democratic Caucus over the 
legislative process in the 94th Congress.  This document is a 14-point set of so-called 
reform proposals drawn up by the Democratic Study Group to be offered at the early 
organization meeting of the caucus on December 2.”48  
Anderson branded these proposals as a return to the “King Caucus,” the historical congressional 
body responsible for selecting party nominees for the presidency prior to the dual developments 
of the modern two-party system and the presidential primary process.49  His comments came on 
the heels of the election of the Watergate Babies – a class of 75 new Democrats elected amidst 
the Watergate scandal and a national push for greater government transparency and accountability 
– and were in line with the position of some outside liberal groups, including Common Cause.   
The Republican response to the growing power of the Democratic Caucus forced liberals 
to reckon with an inherent tension in their reform campaign.  Liberals fought to enforce 
transparency on the committee system and the House floor while simultaneously strengthening 
the power and role of a party body that operated exclusively behind closed doors.  Moreover, 
Anderson’s (R-IL) comments foreshadowed a Republican response to the reforms that liberals 
might face in their own future re-election campaigns.  How could young liberals elected with the 
                                                          
48 Anderson also criticized DSG’s proposal to provide a permanent 2-1 majority-minority ratio on the 
Rules, Ways & Means, and Appropriations committees, declaring that “this action would disenfranchise a 
portion of the minority party on these all-important committees whenever its ratio is greater than one-third 
of the House.” November 25, 1974, Richard D. Lyons, “Democratic Plan Assailed by G.O.P.,” The 
Washington Post.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 140, folder 1.  
49 Some Democrats agreed with Anderson’s categorization of the Democratic Caucus. Representative 
Joseph L. Fisher (D-VA) wrote a letter to the editor of the Washington Post arguing that “The Caucus 
should not be used for a referendum every week or two when 50 members don’t like what a committee 
seems to be doing. This is an appeal to King Caucus…” (Wolfsinsburger 2005, 9).   
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promise to ‘open up’ Congress reconcile their support for “closed” party meetings with their 
support for “open” committee and floor proceedings?   
Republican criticism of “closed” party meetings was not limited to rhetoric; on April 29, 
1975, the Conference voted to open their own meetings to the public.  In practice, ‘open’ 
meetings (which were usually held on the House floor by both parties) meant that the press was 
invited to attend the meetings and the official record was available to the public.50  Along with the 
pressure of outside liberal and good-government groups, Republican efforts helped to embolden a 
strange coalition of conservatives and young liberals to support the adoption of “open” 
(Democratic) caucuses.51  Rep. Bill Chappell (D-FL) obtained the required 40-plus signatures to 
place the motion to open party meetings on the Caucus agenda, and on September 9, the Caucus 
voted to approve it.52   
Young liberals felt they needed to push ‘open’ caucuses to uphold the promises they 
made to their constituents, as well as the pledge most were spurred to sign from Common 
Cause.53    Conservative Democrats, for their part, supported ‘open’ caucuses because they 
believed it would hinder the efficacy of the Caucus.  If controversial or divisive issues had to be 
                                                          
50 Democrats recorded the official account of the proceedings in the Journal of the House Democratic 
Caucus.  Of course, the most problematic component of ‘open’ caucuses was the presence of the press.  As 
there are no official House rules governing the management of party meeting records, the Journal of the 
House Democratic Caucus is often woefully incomplete.  Rather than transcribing every word of debate, 
oftentimes the official record simply notes that “the resolution was debated.”  
51 DSG was officially silent on the proposal to open caucuses to the press and others, but did not support 
them.  
52 At this same meeting, the Democratic Caucus voted to abolish the rule providing that a two-thirds vote of 
the Caucus could bind members’ vote on the House floor (the Caucus maintained its power to bind 
committee members’ votes, however).   
53 For example, 8 freshman Democrats wrote a January 18, 1971 Dear Colleague letter that signaled the 
pressure they felt to act on the platform they developed as candidates:  “Many of us ran on platforms that 
called for Congressional reform, and this was a major element in our election. We received a clear mandate 
from our constituents for significant changes in Congress to more truly mirror the needs and aspirations of 
all Americans.” Signed by Abourezk, Abzug, Badillo, Dellums, Aspin, Mitchell, Rangel, and Roush. 137, 
folder 1.  
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debated and voted on by Democrats publicly, it would simply be less likely that these issues 
would be addressed whatsoever (in keeping with Cox and McCubbins 2005).54  Many of these 
same members would eventually came to view the opening of Caucus meetings as a mistake – but 
one that took years to rectify.55   
 The examples cited above underscore Republicans’ belief in majority party power as a 
legislative principle, as well as their strategic consideration that increased legislative transparency 
is especially helpful for the minority party.  In the short-term, open committee and party meetings 
were helpful for Republicans who believed greater transparency would provide fodder against 
Democratic opponents in their own (re)elections.  And like many conservative Democrats, 
Republicans believed transparency would make it more difficult for the party to address 
controversial or divisive topics.  If a member is forced to go on the record on a thorny policy 
issue, party leaders will seek to protect their members and simply not address the issue 
whatsoever. 
                                                          
54 It is also important to note that support among Democrats for certain reforms was repeatedly driven by a 
pressure to keep up with the progress Republicans made in adopting progressive changes to party 
organization.  For example, Caucus chairman Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) justified his support for a 
full-time caucus staff by noting that the Republican Conference already had 2 staffers solely devoted to 
party work (DSG papers, Part II, box 136, folder 11).  Rep. Julia Butler Hansen (D-CO) suggested that 
OSR’s timeline for completion of its report should not extend past the deadline set by the Republican 
committee on (seniority) reform headed by Barber Conable (R-NY) (DSG papers, Part II, box 163, folder 
5).  And when liberals argued on behalf of an elected Democratic whip position in the mid-1980s, one of 
their chief arguments was that Republicans had adopted an elected whip many years prior (DSG papers, 
Part II, box 162, folder 1).   
55 The remarks of two members of the 94th Class – Reps. Toby Moffet (D-CT) and Robert Edgar (D-PA) – 
in a 1980 meeting of the Democratic Caucus exemplify this learning process.  Moffet was specific about 
how his first-hand experience had shaped his perception of open vs. closed caucuses: “I think one of the 
nice things about a closed Caucus is that we can be candid and I think some of us, particularly those of us 
who came in 1974 have, I suppose the word is, I should say, grown a bit, in terms of the way we look at 
things like closed Caucuses” (emphasis added).  Edgar’s comments underscore the broader learning process 
that young liberals elected in 1974 underwent during their first few years in office.  He noted that he was 
part of a class that “thought of ourselves as sort of a group of reformers who were looking to reform the 
institution of the House and to try to make the system more efficient…we struggled perhaps sometimes 
because of not knowing how the system worked. I think after six years…a number of us have some ideas 
[now] about how the House of Representatives ought to function.”   
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And of course, the Republican party’s interests were better served over the long-term by 
protecting the right of the majority party to organize the House as they saw fit to implement their 
agenda.  Republicans in 1971 could not have predicted another 20-plus years of Democratic rule 
of the House (the party would not regain the majority until 1994).  But whenever they retook the 
House, they wanted to enjoy the same rights and privileges normally afforded to the majority 
party – including control over the Rules Committee and the selection of committee chairs. It was 
simply not in the Republican Party’s interests to upend years of precedent protecting each party’s 
power to choose their own leaders, or the right of the majority party to organize the House.  In the 
meantime, factions in the Republican party focused on strengthening their own capacity to oppose 
the majority, both within their own party and in the House.  In this crucial area, DSG provided a 
model of how a minority group could affect the legislative process.   
In 1963, liberal Republicans established the Wednesday Group (Rae 1989).  The group’s 
decision to organize was driven by the same institutional dynamics that spurred liberal Democrats 
to form DSG.  Liberal Republicans had a limited role in developing party policy, and their 
seniority and ideology made it difficult to ascend the leadership hierarchy.  Moreover, their 
support for the 1961-1963 increase of the Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members – crucial for 
the reform’s passage – provoked punishment from the Republican leadership, who remained 
staunchly opposed to the expansion.56  The group had a decidedly liberal and northeastern tilt at 
its founding.  Rep. Silvio O. Conte (R-MA) described the group’s shared interests: “At the time 
we felt that we were like skunks at a lawn party, so we might as well stink together” (Rae 1989, 
164).   
                                                          
56 Rep. John V. Lindsay (R-NY) recalled the leadership’s response: “…under the Kennedy administration, 
we had a showdown vote on expansion of the Rules Committee. A handful of Republicans broke ranks and 
voted to expand the committee – about 12. The Republican leadership were incensed and they took steps to 
retaliate. Bradford Morse of Massachusetts was blackballed by the Acorns and other established clubs. So a 
small group of us founded the Wednesday Group” (Rae 1989, 164).    
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The conservative Republican response to DSG developed in 1973 with the founding of 
the Republican Study Committee (RSC).  The RSC was intended “to give conservatives a more 
immediate and coordinated impact on the legislative activities of the House of Representatives” 
(Rae 1989, 172).   
Of the two groups, the Wednesday Group represents the more cogent Republican 
response to the multi-faceted role of DSG in promoting information dissemination and 
participation among party members.  Over time, the Wednesday Group adopted a more service-
oriented, research-driven position within the Republican Conference.57  The group’s reports 
helped drive U.S. policy toward China and the volunteer army in the 1970s, and towards Japan 
and environmental policy in the 1990s (Hammond 2001, 82).  Unlike DSG however, which was 
explicitly designed to promote the advancement of junior members to leadership positions, the 
Wednesday Group’s leadership was consistently “a very heavyweight group in terms of seniority 
and ability” (Rae 1989, 191).   Meanwhile, the RSC instituted leadership structures very similar 
to those in place at DSG –  group chairs are nominated by a committee of previous chairmen 
(“the Founders”) and voted on by the full group; existing chairmen are guaranteed a position on 
the group’s leadership (“Steering Committee”) as long as they serve in the House.  The result was 
a two-track system for ambitious Republicans.  Members interested in rising through the 
leadership ranks were more likely to join the RSC, while members interested in developing and 
implementing policy were more likely to join the Wednesday Group.58 
                                                          
57 The Republican Study Committee soon became more service and research-oriented as well.  One long-
time DSG staffer said in an interview, “The real successor to the DSG was the RSC – solid information to 
serve an ideological purpose” (August 5, 2015 Interview).   
58 In recent congresses, many RSC members assumed formal party leadership roles, including former 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), current Conference Chairwoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), 
and current Rules Committee Chairman/former National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman 
Pete Sessions (R-TX).   
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Of course, like DSG, the Wednesday Group and the Republican Study Committee 
presented challenges for party leaders (Kernell 1997).  Leaders protect the party brand and their 
own institutional power through control over career advancement opportunities for junior 
members, as well as access to policy and political information (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; 
Peabody 1967).  Organized groups such as these limit the capacity of leaders to control the 
agenda, or even protect their own legacy by choosing their own successor(s).  These debates 
carried little significance however, under a Democratic majority.  In 1994, the success of 
organized party groups – including DSG and the RSC – at shaping policy, procedure, and 
leadership within the House of Representatives became a liability. 
 
Group Organization in the Aftermath of the 1994 Election 
“We knew we were going to lose a lot of seats…I don’t remember us 
 talking about us being out of a job. I don’t remember a lot of questions  
about what’s going to happen to the DSG if they win.”59 
 
“He’s [Gingrich] going to keep coming after us, and at some point,  
we’re not going to be able to hold.”60 
 
“The Democratic membership went into a fetal position.”61 
 
The restoration of a Republican majority after 40 years in the minority produced 
sweeping changes in the power of party leaders, factions, and information in the House.  If the 
Democratic reforms of the 1970s produced a gradual, incremental shift towards centralized party 
leadership power in the House, the formal and informal institutional changes adopted to the 
House after the 1994 election were anything but.  Newly elected Republican Speaker Newt 
                                                          
59 September 21, 2015 in-person interview with former DSG staffer.  
60 October 28, 2015 telephone interview with Scott Lilly.    
61 August 5, 2015 in-person interview with former DSG staffer.  
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Gingrich (R-GA) immediately began enacting major changes to the committee system, floor 
procedure, and other administrative changes (Smith and Deering 1997).  He asserted leadership 
control over the committee system by personally interviewing and selecting chairs himself 
(Aldrich and Rohde 1997).  And he also took steps to change “the context in which he led” 
(Strahan and Palazzolo 2004) by embedding the abolition of legislative service organizations 
(LSOs) in the Republican rules package adopted in December 1994.  The abolition of LSOs 
removed the capacity of members to formally share legislative resources and tools, significantly 
limiting the power of Democratic and Republican factions to challenge the Speaker.    
Scholars, members, and other observers of Congress have alternatively described DSG, 
the RSC, and the CBC, as the “targets” of Gingrich’s decision.  Even among DSG staffers, there 
is no firm consensus.62  But the group likely would have limited Gingrich’s ability to suppress the 
Democratic opposition, and control the more moderate members of his own Conference.  When 
Scott Lilly became executive director of DSG following Dick Conlon’s death in 1988, he 
prioritized the accumulation of Republican research subscribers.  Nearly 50 Republicans 
subscribed to DSG’s research publications by 1994, each paying several thousand dollars per year 
to receive information prepared “with a Democratic purpose.”63  Many of them did so under the 
(real or perceived) threat of retaliation by Republican leaders.64  In 1993, Republican Conference 
Chair Dick Armey sent a letter to Republicans imploring them to neither join DSG nor subscribe 
                                                          
62 DSG staffers were divided about whether the abolition of LSOs by Gingrich targeted DSG.  Some 
staffers interviewed, including former executive director Scott Lilly, thought that Gingrich was simply “an 
intellectual that opposed free access of information.” Others were unequivocal – “the decision about LSOs 
was targeting DSG.”  Scholarly research on the Congressional Black Caucus offer similarly opposing views 
of the true target of Gingrich’s decision (Singh 1998) 
63 August 5, 2016 Interview.  
64 Lilly recalls that “Gingrich and Armey were not only discouraging Republicans form subscribing but 
threatening them – “we know who you are and we’re not going to do you any favors if you want to change 
committees or anything else.” Lilly’s comments are in keeping with political science theories about how 
party leaders incentivize adherence to good behavior by party members (Pearson 2015).   
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to the group’s research services using their personal office funds.65  In fiscal 1993, Republicans 
alone contributed $160,000 to the DSG budget in subscriber fees.  Armey argued that:  
“Republican support for the DSG is not a harmless use of official funds, solely entitling 
subscribers to bill summaries and amendment information. Republican support for the 
DSG has greater implications, as well as consequences, for all House Republicans.”  
According to the Republican leadership, these members were subsidizing DSG’s partisan goals to 
the detriment of the broader party’s interests.  Armey’s argument that Republicans rely on the 
research provided through the Conference suggests that the leadership was interested in 
controlling the information rank and file members used to understand policy issues and 
legislation.   
The abolition of LSOs ensured that neither Democrats nor Republicans could contribute 
to DSG’s procedural, policy, or leadership goals.  It was also a backdoor way to regulate minority 
staffing levels – a fitting coda to decades-long debates between Democrats and Republicans about 
guaranteed minority staffing levels.   The two parties went back and forth for decades over 
guaranteed minority staffing levels, and they were essential to the debates of the 1965-1966 and 
1992-1993 Joint Committees on the Organization of Congress, as well as the 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act. (Binder 1997).  Ironically, DSG frequently opposed Democratic leadership 
efforts to restrict Republican staff levels; former DSG Chairman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-NJ) 
even offered the amendment to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act to guarantee the minority 
one-third of committee investigative staff.   In real terms, it removed 18 full-time, highly trained 
staff members whose procedural and legislative expertise, and press and interest group contacts, 
would have enabled the Democrats to oppose the new Republican majority.    
                                                          
65 DSG bylaws did not allow Republicans to become “members,” though they could become research 
subscribers.  DSG Papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5.  
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The archival records and interviews reveal a five-month effort to save DSG after the 
election.  Out-going chairman Rep. Mike Synar (D-OK) originally proposed increasing DSG’s 
subscription fee to compensate for the loss of 53-dues paying members.  But after the Republican 
Conference voted in early December to eliminate LSOs, this strategy became moot.  150 
Democrats signed a letter imploring Gingrich “to recognize the legitimate role that DSG has to 
play in a healthy, honest, and open debate.”66  Despite the proliferation and fragmentation of 
member loyalties between multiple member groups in the late twentieth century (Kernell 1997; 
Hammond 1991), Democrats were especially loyal to DSG.  It was the only group Democrats 
rallied to save.   
The rally was short-lived, however, and the group would not survive the first three 
months of the new Republican majority.67  On January 25, 1995, DSG moved out of the 
Longworth offices they had occupied since 1958.68  According to a longtime DSG staffer present 
for the move, it was an ugly experience.  Republican staffers destroyed DSG property: “We had a 
whole printing operation – 2 or 3 printers. They [Republicans] seized everything.  Even though 
we bought it, they just destroyed it.”69  In the intervening period, staffers worked in House annex 
#2 (“the step-child building”) to continue producing materials for Democrats.70  Absent access to 
                                                          
66 December 8, 1994 letter to Gingrich from 150 Democrats. DSG Papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5.  
67 Shortly after Democrats sent Gingrich a letter requesting that he reinstate DSG as the Democratic LSO, 
DSG held their last leadership elections. See chapter five for a discussion of these events.   
68 January 25, 1995 letter from Joel Johnson to Inspector Reginaldi of the U.S. Capitol Police, DSG papers, 
Part II, box 186 (previously restricted access, Part II, box 3, folder 7).   
69 August 5, 2015 interview.  This DSG staffer’s comments are in keeping with the interviews conducted by 
Hawkesworth (1997) with black women members.  Rep. Barbara Collins reflected on the forcible removal 
of the Congressional Black Caucus during this same period: “They confiscated our money. They said it was 
Congressional money anyway, because we paid out CBC dues form our operating budgets…then they took 
the furniture, including our typewriters and Xerox machines, and auctioned it off…then they changed the 
locks on the doors…we were under siege” (538).    
70 One staffer recalls working with blankets in darkness because “they [Republicans] turned off the lights” 
and heat. This would have been especially difficult for DSG as a considerable portion of the group’s work, 
including the editing, printing, and compilation of research reports, for members, occurs in the late evening 
and early morning hours.   
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clerk-hire funds, DSG secured a $300,000 grant from AFL-CIO, which paid the group’s bills and 
staff salaries (though several payrolls were skipped).  Under these limited resources and the 
leadership of new chairman David Skaggs (D-CO), the group continued to conduct policy and 
legislative research for members, although it was a fraction of the services provided for members 
previously.71   
By March, new Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) had hired a DSG researcher 
to develop an information service within the Democratic leadership.  And the other dozen or so 
DSG staffers were hired by Congressional Quarterly to launch what is now called “House Action 
Reports,” a legislative briefing that mirrors DSG’s Fact Sheet in both form and content.  
Interviews with DSG staffers provide slightly different accounts of the exact sequence of events 
between the January move and March (and the archival record is sparse).  Each affirms however, 
that DSG’s research division fulfilled the information needs of both the Democratic leadership 
and the press outside of Congress.  The new, resource-poor leadership was responsible for 
immediately providing increased information services to members, while CQ (like many 
newspapers) had come to rely on DSG’s research publications to maintain their coverage of the 
complex legislative schedule. 
One staffer attributes the hiring of two DSG researchers – Kit Judge and Margaret 
Capron (O’Connor 2009) – by Gephardt to Rep. Dave Obey, a former DSG chairman and staunch 
ally of the group.  She said, “He [Obey] convinced them [the leadership] at the beginning, you 
need to get at least a little bit of the brainpower of the DSG.”72  Other accounts suggest that 
staffers believed Gephardt “would come to our rescue,” and when he did not, they had to look out 
                                                          
71 August 5, 2015 interview with DSG staffer.   
72 September 20, 2015 Interview with DSG staffer.  
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for their own livelihoods.73  CQ provided a stable, professional opportunity that allowed staffers 
to continue conducting research and writing on the important policy issues and legislation of the 
day.  The imprint of DSG staff on the Democratic leadership and CQ continues today.74  The 
absorption of some of DSG’s services by the Democratic leadership was a significant unintended 
consequence of Gingrich’s decision to abolish LSOs.  The centralization of policy and political 
information within the Democratic leadership is a major source of leader power, and arguably 
polarization, today (Sinclair 2011).  Gingrich intended to centralize power in the Speakership, but 
he unequivocally aided in further centralizing power within the Democratic Caucus as well.   
The failure of DSG to survive 1995 while other groups continued to remain relevant and 
active in subsequent Congresses is, at least on the surface, puzzling.  The group was the most 
professionalized of all member groups on Capitol Hill, with the largest staff and resource base, 
and strongest party support.  But the abolition of LSOs forced liberals to re-evaluate whether it 
was still in their interests to organize independently of the leadership.  Over a several-decade 
period, “liberal” interests had become “Democratic” interests.  And ultimately, the failure of DSG 
to survive 1995 is more of a reflection of the successful tenure of the group in the House than the 
inability of liberals to pool clerk-hire and research subscriber fees to pay the bills.  If liberals in 
the late 1950s organized because the party did not subsidize – and sometimes thwarted – their 
policy, electoral, and power goals, then liberals in 1995 did not face the same institutional biases.  
The party subsidized the pursuit of liberals’ policy, electoral, and power goals.  Participation 
opportunities were plentiful.  Committee leaders were accountable to, and the leadership was an 
ally of, liberal Democrats. 
                                                          
73 August 5, 2015 Interview with DSG staffer.  
74 Capron remains a policy researcher for Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).  And Chuck Conlon, the 
son of DSG’s longtime executive director Dick Conlon, now runs House Action Report for CQ (long-time 
DSG staffer Kerry Jones was in charge for over two decades until his retirement).   
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 Junior Democrats in the 1950s relied on an amateur party organization that offered few 
rewards for membership or good behavior, and did not subsidize legislative work.  Democrats in 
the 1990s were supported by a professionalized and empowered leadership that provided a range 
of services to members, including coordinated party messages on policy, draft speeches, official 
travel support, and an expansion of the suspension calendar.75   These developments were aided 
by a significant increase in legislative branch appropriations for party offices.  Between 1971 and 
1991, funding for the Democratic Steering Committee and Democratic Caucus grew from a 
combined $56,000 to $1,476,000 (an increase of 2,536%), and for the Majority Floor Leader’s 
office from $322,700 to $1,137,000 (and increase of 252%).76   The Democratic Caucus finally 
received a budget of its own in 1976; previously, the party chair subsidized the few resources 
provided by the Caucus out of their own personal office budget.  
Democrats in the 1950s had an amateur whip organization that frequently failed to 
consult or inform them of upcoming floor votes (Ripley 1964).  Democrats in the 1990s had a 
highly professionalized and active whip system comprising nearly half the Caucus that regularly 
kept members abreast of changes in the legislative schedule and consulted them about their policy 
preferences (Price 1992; Meinke 2016; Sinclair 1989).  From 1971 to 1991, legislative branch 
appropriations for the whip increased from $371,300 to $1,338,930, an increase of 261%.  The 
whip position was also now elected by, and thus accountable to, members (Peabody 1986).   
                                                          
75 January 29, 1985 Dear Democratic Colleague letter from Rep. Bill Alexander (D-AR), Chief Deputy 
Whip, DSG Papers, Part II, box 162, folder 2.  Internal DSG memo, “Ways in Which Speaker Has Been 
Strengthened in Recent Years.” Part II, box 105, folder 5.  
76 The Democratic Caucus did not receive appropriations for full-time staffers until the adoption of H.R. 
6950, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for 1976.  "Congress Appropriates $827.5-Million for 
Itself." In CQ Almanac 1975, 31st ed., 847-56. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1976.; H.R. 
2506, Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1992, 102nd Cong., Congress.gov (enacted); “Notes 
regarding leadership funds.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 105, folder 5. 
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Junior Democrats in the 1950s had few opportunities to assume committee and 
subcommittee chairmanship positions, and had no control over the selection of those members 
that did.  In the 1990s, committee chairs were not only accountable to other Democrats, but high-
ranking committee members had the opportunity to assume the chairmanship over the most senior 
member.  Subcommittees also proliferated in the 1990s; and party limits on the number of 
chairmanships (and memberships) any one member could hold provided numerous opportunities 
for junior Democrats to assume policy leadership roles (Loomis 1984).    
Junior members in the 1950s were dependent on the whims of the Parliamentarian and 
chance access to parliamentary precedent to develop procedural expertise, and protect their 
individual rights to participate.  Junior members in the 1990s had regular access to an up-to-date 
compilation of House procedure and precedent (Kravitz 1990, 392), as well as opportunities to 
develop first-hand parliamentary experience through service as floor leader managing the 
consideration of a bill.   
Democrats from marginal districts in the 1950s were stymied by a campaign committee 
that disproportionately gave monies to safe-seat, southern members, and generally failed to 
distribute information, such as draft speeches and opposition research.  Democrats in the 1990s 
had developed a professionalized campaign committee that effectively targeted resources and 
services towards the members who needed them most (Glasgow 2002).   
Committee and subcommittee chair positions in the 1950s were dominated by 
conservative interests, while liberals dominated committee leadership positions in the 1990s 
(Becker and Moscardelli 2008).  And if party leaders in the 1950s represented the longstanding, 
yet tenuous coalition between urban, big machine Democrats and southern conservatives, party 
leaders in the 1990s were among the strongest liberals (Harris and Nelson 2008).  Indeed, during 
the 103rd Congress, committee and party leaders were as liberal as DSG’s leadership (see chapter 
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5).  And of course, the 1994 election produced a far more homogeneous – and liberal – 
Democratic Caucus than existed in any prior congress.   
Undoubtedly, individual members continued to face some challenges asserting their 
influence.  The leadership had yet to develop a robust party information services, and members 
were often forced to vote blindly on legislation.77  The stark increase in closed or modified closed 
rules made it difficult to participate in policymaking on the House floor (CQ Almanac 1986, 29-
35).  Some committee chairs remained incredibly powerful and Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) 
acquiesced to their demands far more than liberals would like.78  And the party continued to focus 
too much on short-term policy goals, often failing to develop long-term policy agendas that 
would unite the broader party (see chapter six).    
But liberal Democratic interests were now firmly embedded in congressional and party 
institutions.  The institutional dynamics that had driven liberals to organize in September 1959 
and throughout the 1960s and 1970s were no longer present.  If factions or groups organize 
because of the party’s failure to subsidize members’ pursuit of their policy, procedural, and 
electoral goals, the loss of the majority shifted the calculus for individual Democrats.  In 1995, 
the hurdle to influence no longer lay with committee chairs or their leaders, or even other factions 
in the party, but with the new Republican majority.79  A letter sent by 150 Democrats, including 
                                                          
77 For example, DSG Chairman Bob Wise (D-WV) said during a May 20th, 1992 Reform Task Force 
meeting that there was a “problem of major bills coming to the floor with Members having little knowledge 
of what’s in them. A Caucus meeting [to brief members] just before the floor vote, as with today’s meeting 
on the Energy bill, is crazy.” DSG Papers, Part II, box 126, folder 3.     
78 In an interview, Scott Lilly said that “There was a small group of very powerful members who…had 
been close to [Speaker] Tip [O’Neill] and they were putting boxes in front of [Speaker] Tom Foley.” He 
also noted that by the 1990s, “There were clearly a number of committee chairmen who were frankly dead 
soldiers. They were too old or enfeeble to really do their jobs, and in some instances, the power and 
prerogative of the chairmanship were being exercised by staff members who did not have responsibility and 
accountability, and were at constant risk of embarrassing the institution.”  
79 The abolition of LSOs impacted all party groups with an LSO designation, which meant that liberals 
would likely face less organized competition from other groups.    
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new minority leader Richard Gephardt, after the December 1994 LSO vote underscores the 
immediate shift in liberal priorities produced by the election:   
“We can only view it as an effort to censor opposing views, and to deny the primary 
source of information to the Minority party as we embark upon a furious legislative 
schedule….Given that DSG helps Members to maximize the use of House resources, 
eliminating DSG must be seen as an effort to stifle debate and criticism of legislation that 
the new Republican Majority produces.”80 
Liberal interests were not DSG’s interests, but minority party interests; they were not ideological, 
but partisan.  And of course, absent the responsibility and privilege of organizing the House, 
intra-party battles over the distribution of power and the capacity of the party to put forward a 
coherent agenda were largely arbitrary.   
 The party groups that survived persisted because their respective parties continued to 
poorly (or at least, inadequately) subsidize their goals.  The Republican Study Committee (RSC), 
for example, initially folded in the wake of the abolition of LSOs, but it re-emerged as the 
Conservative Action Team (CAT) after some members grew concerned about the centralization 
of all legislative resources in the Speaker’s office.81  “The founders,” as they are known, were 
skeptical of the conservative credentials of Gingrich and other party leaders, and anticipated the 
party would not advance many of their policy priorities.82  They strategically bypassed LSO 
regulations by rotating single employees between each of their offices monthly.  Their focus was 
inherently critical of the leadership – providing members with “objective analyses on leadership-
endorsed legislation.”   
                                                          
80 December 8, 1994. DSG Papers, Part II, box 134, folder 5.  
81 Rep. Ernest Istook (R-OK) said, “It can’t be healthy for all the resources to be concentrated in the hands 
of party leadership” (Alberta 2013).   
82 This group included the RSC’s most recent chairman, Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN), as well as three junior 
members, Reps. Istook (R-OK), John Doolittle (R-CA), and Sam Johnson (R-TX). The members initially 
served as chairman on a rotating basis every 4-6 months.   
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  The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) operated consistently despite the new resource 
restrictions.  Previously supported by a budget of $250,000, the group now relied exclusively on 
heavily restricted support from the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (CBCF) (Singh 
1997; Yang 1995).83  The CBCF was also responsible for providing the types of research 
previously provided by the CBC.  The 40-member CBC continued to fulfill an important 
legislative role, but its efforts were more symbolic – serving as the “conscience of Congress.”84  
However, unlike the RSC which valued ideological purity, the CBC adopted a new strategy of 
strategically developing partnerships with other allies, including the elderly, poor, and middle-
class whites, as well as Asian American, Hispanic, and female members of Congress (Yang 
1995).   
Some new groups emerged in the post-LSO atmosphere as well, including the Blue Dogs 
Caucus, which formed in 1995 to strengthen their members’ capacity to influence the Democratic 
agenda, especially during budget negotiations (Hammond 2001, 218-219). The Blue Dogs 
originally numbered 23, and the group’s founding co-chairmen, Reps. Billy Tauzin (D-LA) and 
Jimmy Hayes (D-LA), eventually switched to the Republican Party.   
 Today, member groups such as these register as “Congressional Member Organizations” 
or CMOs with the House Administration Committee.  CMOs are similar to LSOs such that they 
are groups of likeminded members united in some shared interest, or personal or professional 
background.  In the 114th Congress, 464 member groups registered as a CMO with the House 
                                                          
83 This model was adopted in part by other groups as well.  For example, the bipartisan Women’s Caucus is 
managed by Women’s Policy, Inc. Today, it is known as the Women’s Congressional Policy Institute.  It is 
not formally associated with the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues (CCWI), although “the two 
organizations share similar goals” (Women’s Congressional Policy Institute, 2017).  
84 Comments of Rep. Donald M. Payne (D-MD) (Yang 1995).   
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Administration Committee.85  Among these groups include the Agriculture and Rural America 
Taskforce, the Congressional Academic Medicine Caucus, the Congressional Caucus on the 
Internet of Things, the Congressional Cut Flower Caucus, the Congressional Second Amendment 
Caucus, and the Ronald Reagan Caucus.86  Some of these groups have a large leadership board 
and several shared staffers, but all face significant restrictions on their use of official House 
resources.  CMOs may not have a separate website or office space, access to franking privileges, 
or stationary resources.  CMOs are allowed to “utilize employees…and official resources under 
the control of the [CMO] Member to assist the CMO in carrying out its legislative objectives, but 
no employees may be appointed in the name of a CMO.”  In other words, a member’s staff may 
devote some official work-time to a CMO, but it cannot constitute their primary professional 
responsibilities (the majority of their worktime must be spent elsewhere).      
 
Group Organization in the Contemporary U.S. Congress &  
the Rise of the House Freedom Caucus 
The 1980s-2000s oversaw the rise of strong, leadership-driven political parties.  As 
Speaker, Tip O’Neill (D-MA), “saw the floor evolve into a much more efficient legislative 
machine, with most major bills brought under procedures barring more than a handful of 
amendments.”  This centralization continued under Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) – who added 
partisanship to O’Neill’s legislative machine – and to a lesser extent under Speaker Tom Foley 
(D-WA).  Newt Gingrich (R-GA) strengthened the already strong Speaker’s office by centralizing 
                                                          
85 These groups include 442 “caucuses”, 6 “coalitions,” 6 “working groups,” 6 “task forces,” and 1 
“delegation.”  
86 114th Congress Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs), December 1, 2016, House Administration 
Committee.  
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all information within the Speakership and decreasing the independent role of the Republican 
Conference.   
Today, nearly every facet of the legislative branch is designed to discourage member 
participation in the legislative process.  Leaders are incredibly powerful and possess an array of 
resources and tools to enact their agenda, and reward and punish members who disagree with 
them (Pearson 2015).  Rank and file members are discouraged from learning about legislative 
procedure.  While the House parliamentarian used to provide introductory seminars to new 
members to help them develop parliamentary expertise, they have almost no in-depth discussion 
with new members about legislative procedure today.87  Most legislation is authored by the 
leadership and a small group of leadership allies (Sinclair 2011), and committees often play an 
insignificant role in the development of legislation.  And the abolition of legislative service 
organizations has made it incredibly difficult for members to share resources and work together 
on policy issues, or to gain the skills and experience necessary to be competitive for leadership 
positions in the future.   
The dual decline of committees and abolition of legislative service organizations has 
made rank and file members even more dependent on party leaders for information.  It is not only 
more difficult to develop expertise in a particular policy area via your committee assignment, but 
members cannot easily share and develop their own informational resources (Ringe and Victor 
2013).  Leaders rely on a very small staff to provide their fellow partisans with information on 
every issue and piece of legislation on the legislative agenda.88  And of course, a significant 
portion of these informational resources are sample press releases, talking points, and what Rep. 
                                                          
87 February 16, 2016 in-person interview, former House Parliamentarian Charles Johnson.   
88 One current leadership staffer described her workload as “I have half the world…I’m spread very thin.”  
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Martin Olav Sabo and a Democratic leadership staffer separately described as “spin.”89  
Collectively, this information vacuum ensures that members vote blindly on most legislation 
(Curry 2015).   
For many members and observers of Congress, the pendulum has flung too far much 
towards absolute party leadership power.  If committee chairs in the 1950s and 1960s exercised 
veto power to the detriment of substantive debate and the expression of majority views, party 
leaders often play a similar role in the contemporary U.S. Congress.  Junior Republicans hold few 
leadership positions, and junior Democrats have very limited access to party leadership positions 
(French 2016).  They have little power to influence substantive policy outcomes, or receive votes 
on legislation they authored.  Taken together, foreclosed leadership pathways and limited 
participation opportunities hinder members’ electoral odds as well.  Once again, for many junior 
members, neither the Democratic nor Republican parties subsidize pursuit of their policy, 
electoral, or power goals.      
In January 2015, these institutional conditions gave rise to another majority party faction, 
the House Freedom Caucus (HFC).  Future work merits a close in-depth analysis of the HFC, but 
a brief examination of the emergence, organization, and impact, of the HFC in the contemporary 
U.S. Congress provides additional support for the theory of group-driven action offered in the 
preceding chapters.   
The initial emergence of HFC is rooted in members’ complaints with a coalition forged 
between the Republican leadership and the Republican Study Committee, and the party’s 
perceived failure to subsidize their participation and goals in Congress.  Among their complaints, 
                                                          
89 November 20, 2015 in-person interview.  Another former leadership staffer noted that “members feel like 
when they get materials from the leadership, they are being spun. And they are being spun some” [March 3, 
2016 telephone interview].  
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members charged that Republican leaders did not promote legislation representative of the views 
of the majority of the party; Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) often relied on Democratic votes to 
pass legislation.  The group of conservative junior Republicans were frustrated by their limited 
access to leadership positions and quality committee assignments.  Only one founding members 
of the HFC held a subcommittee chairmanship, and many had been punished by Boehner for 
voting against him for Speaker and/or his policy priorities on the floor (Fuller 2016; CQ Almanac 
2015).  In the first six months of the 114th Congress alone, 2 members lost their position on the 
Rules Committee, 3 were removed from their whip positions, 1 lost his subcommittee 
chairmanship, and another was “prevented” from serving as GOP freshman class president 
(Taylor 2017).90   
HFC members argued that the leadership’s actions were damaging to their electoral goals 
as well – limiting their access to some of the inherent institutional benefits for re-election 
(Mayhew 1974).  Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC), for example, charged that a group with 
“leadership ties” had begun running television ads against him in his district (CQ Almanac 2015).  
Others faced electoral repercussions for the loss of good committee assignments.  Rep. Tim 
Huelskamp (R-KS) lost his position on the Agriculture Committee – a position important to his 
rural farming constituency – for voting against Boehner in 2013 (and later in 2015 as well) 
(Sherman and Bressnahan 2015).  As a result, he received a primary challenge in 2014 and 2016, 
                                                          
90 In late 2012, Boehner exercised his power to deny several Republicans their preferred committee 
assignments.  At the beginning of the following Congress, in January 2015, 25 Republicans voted for 
someone other than Boehner.  In the immediate aftermath of the vote, Boehner removed Reps. Daniel 
Webster (R-FL) and Richard Nugent (R-FL) from their choice position on the Rules Committee.  3 
members (Reps. Cynthia M. Lummis (R-WY), Steve Pearce (R-NM), and Trent Franks (R-AZ)) were 
removed from the whip positions; HFC member Mark Meadows (R-NC) lost his chairmanship of the 
Government Operations Subcommittee (CQ Almanac 2015, 43-47).  Taylor (2017) also reports that Rep. 
Ken Buck (R-CO) was prevented from becoming the GOP freshman class president.   
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ultimately losing in 2016 to a challenger who repeatedly criticized his inability to advocate on 
behalf of the district’s interests (Chokshi and Mele 2016).   
Their frustrations were codified in Rep. Meadows’s (R-NC) ‘motion to vacate the chair,’ 
which was a procedural move designed to force Speaker Boehner to resign.  The resolution 
charged Boehner with the diminishment of Congress relative to the executive and the judiciary; 
using leadership power to punish members, and limit meaningful debate and member 
participation (especially the use of scheduling power to limit participation, informed voting 
and/or pressure members to support legislation) (CQ Almanac 2015, 43-47).91  None of these 
conditions were new in 2015.  But whereas junior Republicans could previously channel their 
frustrations with the formal structures of the House into the Republican Study Committee (RSC), 
conservatives could no longer exercise that option – the RSC’s leadership and the Republican 
leadership quietly worked together to fold the group into the formal leadership structure.    
For decades, the RSC carefully structured itself to avoid leadership control or influence.  
When the group was reconstituted in 1995, the group decided to forgo RSC leadership elections 
out of a fear that they might “allow “moderates” to infiltrate the organization at the behest of the 
leadership and push a party loyalist for the chairmanship” (Alberta 2013).  Instead, RSC leaders 
are selected from a group of prior chairmen known as “the founders”; eventually elections were 
instituted as a rote stamp of group approval of the founders’ nominee.  In 2013 however, Rep. 
Steve Scalise (R-CA), who was viewed by some as “too cozy with the leadership,” beat the 
founders’ choice, Rep. Tom Graves (R-GA), to become RSC chairman (Alberta 2013).  Scalise’s 
election came on the heels of a protracted period of conflict between Speaker Boehner and the 
                                                          
91 The motion was originally drafted in February 2015 and re-introduced in July 2015.   
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RSC over debt ceiling negotiations; RSC executive director Paul Teller was accused of 
undermining these efforts (and was later fired by Scalise).92   
Scalise’s helm marks a turning point in leadership-RSC relations.  After Rep. Eric 
Cantor’s (R-VA) forced resignation and Scalise’s election as whip in 2014, the RSC organization 
followed him into the official party leadership apparatus.  The group boasts 11 staffers (while 
other groups like the CBC have none), and has dedicated office space denied to all other CMOs.93  
Unfortunately, legislative branch appropriations bills do not specify any formal sources of 
funding for the Republican Study Committee.94  But the group is no longer registered as a CMO 
with the House Administration Committee – a striking lapse that suggests the group operates in a 
fuzzy institutional and organizational space.95   
The HFC grew out of this newfound arrangement.  After Scalise’s election as whip in 
2014, several members began discussing the formation of a new group to counter the RSC, which 
they described as a “shadow conference” of the leadership (French 2015).  Other RSC members 
referred to it as a “puppet of House Republican leadership that no longer stands for conservative 
values” (Caygle and Bade 2016).  For the founding members of the HFC, party resources did not 
constitute “golden handcuffs” that limited their capacity to express their views (Clarke 2017); 
instead, the party simply failed to provide many of these resources to junior conservatives 
                                                          
92 According to Scalise, Teller was fired for leaking members’ private conversations with conservative 
groups outside of Congress in an effort to mobilize members against the budget deal brokered by House 
and Senate Budget chairs Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA).  He was fired over the 
objections of conservative groups like The Heritage Foundation and the Conservative Action Project, and 
he later went to work for Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX).   
93 According to the House Administration Committee, CMOs are not allowed to have their own official 
office space.  However, nearly all groups list the address of its chairman or chairwoman as an official 
mailing address.  But while the RSC chairman’s office is located at 1305 Longworth HOB, the Republican 
Study Committee’s office is at 1541A Longworth HOB (this address was formerly held by Rep. Billy Long 
(R-LA)).    
94 The group collects $5,000 dues from members as sanctioned by its CMO designation.   
95 As of July 11, 2017, the RSC is not registered as a CMO; the group last registered as a CMO in 
December 2014 for the 114th Congress.  It is worth noting that the Tea Party Caucus is also not currently 
registered as a CMO.   
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altogether.  This real or perceived failure of Republicans party leaders to subsidize the policy, 
electoral, and power goals of junior conservatives drove them to organize the HFC.  The 9 
founding members sent out a press release announcing the formation of the “House Freedom 
Caucus” on January 25, 2015.  Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, the organization was 
intended to serve as a positive legislative force – enabling the leadership to draft and build 
support for conservative legislation (French 2015).   
In the two and a half years since its founding, the HFC succeeded in driving all three 
facets of institutional change in the House.  The group forced the resignation of Speaker John 
Boehner (R-OH), and single-handedly fostered the election of his successor, Rep. Paul Ryan (R-
WI), over current Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA); secured the appointment of a 
Conference task force on congressional organization (Sherman 2016); forced the leadership to 
reschedule and later change the content of the proposed 2017 Republican health care bill (Roll 
Call 2017; Fram and Taylor 2017); and shaped leadership negotiations on several other issues, 
including tax reform (McPherson 2017) and the debt limit (Krawzak 2017).  
The effectiveness of the HFC at attracting steady media attention, and shaping policy 
outcomes, leadership races, and rules debate, has taken many observers of Congress by surprise.  
And it has largely been explained by “simple arithmetic” (DeSilver 2015) – given the size of the 
Republican majority, the 30-40 members of the HFC can sway outcomes on the floor if they vote 
together as a bloc.  Nevertheless, this explanation alone does not explain the wide-ranging 
influence the group has managed to exert in an institution environment and era in which junior 
members should have little power.  The emergence, activity, and influence, of the HFC also 
remains largely unexplained by dominant political science theories of parties (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005; Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995; Bawn et al. 2012).  The rewards and 
punishments thought to keep party members in line and suppress embarrassing public divisions 
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neither deterred the establishment of HFC nor has it limited the group’s activities.  Moreover, 
interest group pressure and public opinion spurred the establishment of the Tea Party Caucus by 
Rep. Michelle Bachmann (R-MN) in 2010, but outside group pressure did not similarly spur the 
emergence of the HFC.    
Often overlooked in these conventional views is that the HFC is not simply a voting bloc 
– they are a highly organized faction.  The group’s first meeting on January 25, 2015 immediately 
established a dues-paying structure and initiated plans to hire 3-4 staff members (French 2015).96  
The HFC developed and adopted a set of bylaws to structure group decision-making, and govern 
the membership.  Policy and leadership endorsements by the group require a vote by 80% of 
members, and are binding on group members.  The HFC is led by a 9-member “board of 
directors,” each of whom is elected by the full membership; the chairman is elected from the 9-
member board to a single (though not term-limited) one-year term in late November (Scott 2016).   
And HFC members must be invited to join the group by an existing member (known as a 
“sponsor”), but the HFC will not disclose membership lists (of course, individual members can 
choose to do so).  While I do not analyze the group’s membership here, others have found that 
HFC members are more junior (72% average 1-3 terms in office) and more conservative (median 
DW-NOMINATE score of 0.659) than other Republicans (DeSilver 2015); are more 
obstructionist and less reliant on leadership campaign support (Taylor 2017); and are elected from 
districts that are more Republican than their colleagues (Bialik and Bycoffe 2015).97  In addition, 
the HFC has developed strong press and interest group contacts (Taylor 2017); the group’s 
members and leaders make regular appearances on news, talk show, and radio programs; and 
                                                          
96 The group later hired Justin Ouimette to serve as executive director. Ouimette previously served as 
legislative director for Rep. Mark Sanford (R-SC), a HFC member (French 2016b).     
97 54% of all Republicans have served 1-3 terms in office, and the median DW-NOMINATE score is 0.457 
(or as DeSilver (2015) notes, roughly in line with the ideology of Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-
CA)).     
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allies like the Heritage Foundation helps support members’ efforts outside of Congress.  The 
group also developed two political action committees – the House Freedom Fund and the House 
Freedom Action Fund – to channel financial resources towards conservative challengers.     
And of course, the group also has the nascent stages of their own information systems – 
developing and marshaling legislative resources to work towards their common goals.  For 
example, although Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC) February-July 2016 “motion to vacate the chair” 
was widely analyzed through the lens of party politics, the careful procedural research and 
expertise necessary to produce it went largely unnoticed.  The strategy, structure, and content of 
Meadows’ “motion” required considerable procedural study, which suggests that the HFC is 
developing an intimidate familiarity with the rules that shape legislative power.98  And during the 
spring 2017 health care negotiations, chairman Mark Meadows (R-NC) marshaled the group’s 
resources to commission an outside study of the health care amendment he drafted with Rep. Tom 
MacArthur (R-NJ) of the moderate Tuesday Group (Bade 2017).  This was important to winning 
the support of wavering HFC members when Congressional Budget Office analyses were not yet 
available.   The HFC not only endorsed the bill, but 30 voted for it on the floor (Soffen, Cameron, 
and Uhrmacher 2017).99   
These organizational features do not simply provide a formal structure to the group’s 
activities – each plays a role in enabling junior conservatives to overcome the common pitfalls of 
group coordination and the realities of the legislative environment.  Invitation-only membership 
rules ensure that the HFC does not suffer from the oft-fatal internal debates between dogmatic 
purity and pragmatism (Schwartz 2006; Weinstein 1967) – a fate which arguably befell the RSC 
                                                          
98 Interview with former House parliamentarian Charles Johnson, February 16, 2016.   
99 April 26, 2017, Press Release, Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC), “House Freedom Caucus Announces 
Support for House AHCA Bill with MacArthur Amendment.”  
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– while the secrecy of HFC membership lists prevents electoral opponents from using association 
with the group against members in future elections.100  HFC leadership elections provides an 
authoritative voice for group interests – giving members a weekly seat at leadership meetings 
(Scott 2016) – and ensures that the group continues to function even when members are busy or 
less-invested in the given issue at hand.  And the group’s press and interest group relationships, 
PAC donations, and information services, are selective benefits that encourage members to 
participate in, and contribute to, the HFC (Olson 1965).   
The emergence and effectiveness of the House Freedom Caucus in the 114th and 115th 
Congresses merits close in-depth analysis in future work.  And indeed, the group provides a 
strong test of the theory offered here.  The contemporary House has significantly limited the 
capacity of members to share resources and work together – in short, to develop organizationally.  
Partisan polarization and ideological homogeneity within both parties has foreclosed prior 
historical pathways (alternatively) predicated on bipartisan cooperation and coalition, and 
ideological cleavages within the majority party.  Yet the efforts of the HFC suggest that members 
do indeed possess some agency and responsibility for the responsiveness of the legislative branch 
to pressing national problems, and its function within the federal system.101  While observers of 
Congress rightly debate the efficacy of the HFC’s policy positions, their effectiveness in an era 
and institutional environment in which individual members are theoretically powerless to affect 
the legislative body underscores that members themselves are not passive, subservient actors.  
                                                          
100 Notably, the group has experienced several high-profile resignations, including Reps. Tom McClintock 
(R-CA) and Reid Ribble (R-WI) (DeSilver 2015).   
101 While I do not comment on the efficacy of the HFC agenda here, it is important to note that the 
strategies adopted by HFC often hinder the function of the legislative branch while the purported 
procedural goals of the group are, at least in theory, intended to improve some aspects of the legislative 
process.    
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When party organization and leaders are not fulfilling their responsibilities to members and the 
public, members can choose to work together with one and other to affect change.   
 
Congressional Reform in the Contemporary U.S. Congress 
 The ultimate goal of this project is to identify concrete pathways to institutional change in 
the static legislative branch.  What hurdles do members of Congress face in adopting new rules 
and procedures?  And how can members successfully overcome them?  The return of LSOs – or a 
similar practice in which groups could receive line item appropriations from members’ personal 
office budgets – will undoubtedly help members overcome some of the significant hurdles to 
challenging the status quo.  But it is not necessary for meaningful group impact.  Others have 
advocated for a set of changes to the rules governing congressional elections, as well as 
congressional and executive power, in order to improve the function of the legislative branch 
(Mann and Ornstein 2012).102  Instead, this project suggests that members in the contemporary 
U.S. Congress can take small, active steps to increase their capacity to shape leadership pathways, 
policy outcomes, and procedural rules – steps that are crucial to improving the responsiveness 
and representativeness of the legislative branch.  These effective strategies include:  
 Learn legislative procedure.  Developing legislative expertise is one of the single most 
important skills for individual members and groups to pursue their policy and procedural reform 
goals.  Party leaders today discourage members from learning about legislative procedure, but the 
House parliamentarian’s office is a resource available to all members.103  While the 
                                                          
102 For example, Mann and Ornstein suggest a variety of voting reforms, including easing voter registration, 
holding elections on weekends, and compulsory voting; and instituting citizen-led redistricting 
commissions, as well as new lobbying rules and restrictions.   
103 February 16, 2016 in-person interview with former parliamentarian Charles Johnson.   
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parliamentarian him/herself is a speaker-appointed position, the office’s staffers are lawyers who 
maintain an attorney-client relationship with members and their staff.  The office is available to 
provide orientation sessions for members when they begin their congressional service, to provide 
legislative strategy advice at their request, and to assist them on the floor.  Members should also 
request (though it may not be granted) to serve as a floor manager for legislation; this provides 
them with in-depth experience about how complex rules are applied in specific legislative 
context.     
 Recruit new members from non-incumbent candidates.  Members’ allegiances today are 
often fragmented between many groups and constituencies, which makes agenda-setting difficult 
(Kernell 1997).  Early recruitment of new group members before they are even elected to 
Congress is one of the most effective strategies to garner member support and loyalty, especially 
given that few have significant contact with party leaders before or after their initial election to 
the House.  DSG used their early contact with non-incumbent liberal candidates to win their 
support for leadership races, and influence their votes during consideration of the rules package, 
prior to the start of each congress.  More recently, the HFC has also adopted this strategy.  
Several recent candidates announced that they plan to seek to join the group if they are elected to 
Congress, including new Rep. Ralph Norman who was elected in June 2017 to replace new OMC 
Director (and former HFC member) Mick Mulvaney in South Carolina.  One of the HFC’s PACs, 
the House Freedom Fund, contributed to Norman’s campaign; Norman announced during the 
campaign that he planned to join the HFC if he was elected to Congress (Golshan 2017).  And as 
both DSG and the HFC undoubtedly found, non-incumbent candidates with state legislative 
experience is especially beneficial for groups seeking to shape legislative rules and procedure.104  
                                                          
104 Nearly all DSG leaders drew on their prior experience serving in their home state legislatures, and the 
HFC has been greatly influenced by Rep. Daniel Webster’s (R-FL) experience serving as Speaker of the 
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These members’ first-hand experience with legislative procedure in the states will infuse new 
ideas about congressional organization, and strengthen appeals for support from their colleagues 
in Congress.    
 Educate & broker coalitions with interest groups. Member groups should educate 
likeminded interest groups about the importance of procedural reform for their shared policy 
goals, and partner with them to support and mobilize their colleagues.  These partnerships provide 
a “trade-off in resources” that simultaneously advantage both members and outside interests 
(Mann, Stevens and Miller 1973).  DSG routinely worked with liberal groups, including the 
National Committee for an Effective Congress, the AFL-CIO, and the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights, to fundraise on behalf of (non-)incumbent liberal candidates, and to pressure their 
colleagues to support shared goals.  Today, the HFC works closely with outside interest groups 
like the Heritage Foundation, which has provided a strong public defense of the group’s 
aggressive strategies, and sponsored events on behalf of the group’s policy goals.105  These 
partnerships are especially important in the contemporary era as congressional reform is not a 
salient issue for most interest groups.  Indeed, while outside groups often have political resources 
and policy expertise, they rarely possess procedural expertise.  Yet, groups constitute a crucial 
linkage between institutional structures and broader public opinion and cultural shifts outside of 
Congress (Polsby 2004; Zelizer 2004).   Members have a responsibility to work to educate their 
                                                          
Florida legislature (Webster was repeatedly nominated by group member to serve as House Speaker (over 
Speakers John Boehner (R-OH) and Paul Ryan (R-WI)).   
105 For example, in June 2017, the Heritage Foundation sponsored an event entitled “Principles for Tax 
Reform: A Conversation with the House Freedom Caucus.” The event featured HFC chairman Rep. Mark 
Meadows (R-NC), as well as Reps. Dave Brat (R-VA), Warren Davidson (R-OH), and Jim Jordan (R-OH).  
The Heritage Foundation’s former chairman, former Sen. Jim DeMint, regularly used his position to defend 
the “small band of conservative House members [who] had the audacity to challenge the status quo in 
Congress” (2015).   
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natural group allies about the importance of procedural reform in the pursuit of their shared 
policy goals. 
 Develop an information service. The development of a group information service is an 
especially effective strategy for groups interested in garnering support from members and 
inserting policy and procedural issues onto the agenda.  Liberals used DSG’s information and 
research services as a selective benefit to encourage members to pay yearly dues, to promote their 
participation in debate on the floor, and to persuade them to support specific procedural reforms.  
Members today are still in need of a single, trusted source of information, which is not provided 
by committee or party leaders (Curry 2015).  A 2017 survey by the non-partisan Congressional 
Management Foundation found that members do not have enough resources to participate in the 
policymaking process, staff “knowledge, skills, and abilities” were insufficient to perform their 
jobs, and Congress needs to “improve member and staff access to high quality, nonpartisan policy 
expertise within the legislative branch” (Akin 2017).   Member groups can develop and marshal 
legislative resources such as these to incentivize membership, and as well as to promote 
participation in the legislative process.  Member-generated information is not only the most 
trusted information source in Congress (Kingdon 1984), but it is especially valuable in the 
information age: “Information [framed] specifically around pending votes, in a timely fashion, 
and in language and terms that worked for legislators,” as political scientist Norm Ornstein 
described (Klein 2011), would fill a vital information vacuum in the House.  Members are 
perennially busy and have little time to expend pursuing issues with no immediate pay-off or 
pressing deadline (which in part explains why re-election activities are often members’ top 
priority (Mayhew 1974)).  Legislative rules and procedures epitomize low-salience issues for 
most members; group-generated research and information services provides a mechanism through 
members’ attention and energy can be refocused on necessary congressional reforms.    
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Link congressional reform to members’ personal goals. And finally, groups will be more 
effective at persuading other members to support congressional reform if they link specific rules 
changes to members’ personal goals (Fenno 1973), rather than broad principles of “good 
government” or personality conflicts between members.  DSG carefully crafted its arguments and 
circulated research to inform members about the impact of specific rules reforms on their own 
pursuit of leadership positions, their prospects for re-election, and their ability to advocate on 
behalf of their own and their constituents’ policy goals.  None of the 1970s reforms were adopted 
under the pretense of improving small-d democracy or to settle personal conflicts between 
members.  Indeed, despite their legitimate claims about the diminished role of committees and 
rank and file participation opportunities, the aggressive, at times hostile, strategy pursued by the 
HFC has limited support among their Republican colleagues who may have otherwise supported 
them.  The HFC’s arguably personal vendetta against Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) harmed the 
“party brand,” potentially risking members’ electoral goals (Mayhew 1974; Cox and McCubbins 
2005).  Groups interested in promoting congressional reform need to persuade their colleagues 
that rules changes are in their personal interest if they want to garner their support.   
This project reveals concrete ways that members can work towards the pluralistic ideal 
enshrined by the founders in American political institutions, and oft-championed by American 
political theorists (Dahl 1961; Truman 1951; de Tocqueville 1835).  Pluralism requires the 
representation of multiple, diverse interests in the policymaking process – preconditions poorly 
served by the two-party system, the sharp rise in partisan polarization and ideological 
homogeneity, and the centralization of party power.  The declining competitiveness within and 
between the two parties obscures the crucial role that members themselves play in promoting 
informed, substantive debate about the best way to approach and solve national policy problems.  
Members are not passive actors subservient to a very specific set of institutional conditions; they 
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have a responsibility and agency to affect the structure, leadership, and outcomes, of the 
legislative branch.   
The recent rise of the House Freedom Caucus has led many observers of Congress to 
question the power wielded by a minority coalition of arch conservatives whose views are 
unrepresentative of the majority of Republicans or the public (Schriock 2015).  Yet this view of 
group power and representation obscures a significant factor in the declining competition between 
party groups – few factions in either party are organized.  The HFC is unusual because its 
members have committed significant effort to develop their capacity to work together to 
challenge their party leaders and the status quo in Congress.  Its emergence has merely 
crystallized the absence of a moderate Republican alternative outside of the leadership.106      
Ultimately, the 1960s and 1970s reforms are the product of increased competition 
between party groups.  Liberals were empowered to serve as critical ‘agents’ of change in 
Congress because strategically chose to focus on developing their own organization in DSG to 
advocate on behalf of their collective interests.  Absent a numerical majority in Congress, 
organization increased liberal Democrats’ competitiveness with the conservative faction in the 
party and their party leaders (Key 1964).  If members today want to insert new issues onto the 
agenda, build legislative coalitions in support of their policy goals, overcome potential leadership 
opposition, cast more informed votes, and increase participation opportunities in the legislative 
process, they need to be organized.  The timing, scope, and direction, of future institutional 
changes – as well as engaged, meaningful policy debates – in the House of Representatives 
requires conscious group coordination, member participation, and strong leadership.   
                                                          
106 The moderate Tuesday Group might play this moderating role (Cadei 2017), although its relatively 
amateur organization may stem their capacity to serve as a “counterbalance” to the HFC (for example, the 
group does not make policy endorsements regardless of how unified the membership).  
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Next Steps: Future Research on the Dynamics of Institutional Change 
 I would be remiss if I did not conclude with a brief discussion of future research avenues.  
The methods, data, and analyses employed in this study of institutional change in the U.S. House 
emphasized the details, context, and content, that is often obscured in other research approaches.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, this approach generated many new research questions along the way.  
Others inevitably got pushed aside.  Two of these questions deserve closer investigation in future 
work.     
The Role of State Legislatures. One of the more unexpected questions raised throughout 
this project concerns the role of state legislatures as ‘laboratories of democracy’ for procedural 
reform.  As a scholar of the U.S. Congress who views politics through a national lens, I expect 
that state legislatures should take their institutional and structural cues from the U.S. Congress, 
rather than the other way around.  And indeed, this is congruent with some research on state 
legislative reforms adopted in the 1970s and beyond (Squire 2012; Caldwell 1947).  Instead, this 
project has raised questions about the key role of state legislatures in shaping the U.S. Congress.  
Archival documents and interviews repeatedly suggested that members’ experience serving in 
their home state legislature motivated their interest and preferences on procedural reform.   
Meeting minutes, Dear Colleague letters, congressional testimony, and speeches on the 
House floor reveal that members drew on firsthand experiences in their home state legislatures to 
develop and persuade their colleagues to support specific legislative reforms.  Up-or-down votes 
on committee chairs and electronic voting, for example, were first “tested” in legislatures like 
Colorado, Minnesota, and California.  Members drew on their own legislative experience to 
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advocate for other proposals, including term limiting or rotating committee chairs.107  The 
members most likely to be interested in procedure were those who had served in highly 
professionalized legislatures that simply functioned better than the U.S. Congress.108  And of 
course, a cursory review of the members who were the most active reform leaders in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and drafted specific reforms, reveals that nearly every single one had some state 
legislative experience.   
Ultimately, this anecdotal evidence is not surprising given that state legislatures 
professionalized long before the Congress, and it was not uncommon for members to return home 
to continue serving in their home state legislature after a few years of congressional service 
(Smith and Lyons 1977).  In more recent years, the House Freedom Caucus has relied on 
members’ state legislative experience to advocate for specific reforms in Congress.  HFC member 
and former Florida House Speaker Daniel Webster (R-FL) has argued for adopting many of the 
same institutional changes he pushed in Florida, including eliminating subcommittees and 
decentralizing control of the floor schedule (DeBonis 2015).  It seems likely that state legislative 
experience not only motivates members’ interest in legislative procedure, but that state 
legislatures provide a testing ground for major institutional changes in the U.S. Congress.  Thus, I 
expect that historical and contemporary reform efforts in both parties will be led 
disproportionately by members with prior state legislative experience; that most rule and 
procedural reforms adopted by the House will initially be adopted in state legislatures; and that 
members will use their own and their colleagues’ experience in specific state legislatures as 
evidence to persuade members to support reform efforts. In theory, this could suggest a parallel 
                                                          
107 Republicans eventually adopted term limits on committee chairs.   
108 August 6, 2015 in-person interview with leadership staffer.  In a November 20, 2015 interview with 
Congressman Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN), he recalled observing the Appropriations process in the House 
for the first time and realizing that it was much better organized in his home state of Minnesota.  Sabo 
pointed to the ability of members to offer amendments on the floor to appropriations bills as particularly 
problematic.   
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theory of institutional change in Congress with procedural reform as a function of reform efforts 
in state legislatures and the proportion of majority party members with state legislative 
experience.   
 Group Organization in the U.S. Senate.  One obvious extension of this research is to 
examine the role of group organization in enabling group influence in the U.S. Senate.  At the 
beginning of this project, it seemed unlikely that the theory offered here would hold in the upper 
chamber.  Junior members do not face the same hurdles to influence in the Senate as they do in 
the House – nearly all majority party senators chair a subcommittee or committee (and by 
extension, nearly all minority party senators serve as a ranking member); the smaller size of party 
caucuses ensures that all senators can secure a meeting with their party leaders; all senators enjoy 
outsized media attention and a significant public platform; and Senate rules (e.g. the filibuster) 
provide stronger minority protections (Sinclair 1989; Koger 2010). These features strongly 
suggest that not only are the incentives for members to band together through group organization 
simply not present in the Senate as they are in the House, but that organization might actually be 
contrary to their interests.  The filibuster, the muddied role of committees, and the inherently 
disorganized legislative process that empowers individual senators to shape legislation on the 
floor, suggests that formal, conscious coordination with their likeminded colleagues might make 
individual senators less powerful.     
Throughout this project however, anecdotal evidence has emerged to challenge this 
assumption.  Historically, senators faced many of the same hurdles as junior House members, 
including informational and power asymmetries with their more conservative colleagues who 
chaired key committees and/or had access to information that they did not.  Some of the policy 
areas examined in this research (see chapter 7) provide evidence that groups of senators banded 
together to develop and share information resources, and build relationships with key allies inside 
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and outside of Congress.109  Instead, it seems likely that group organization simply looks different 
than it does in the House, but is no less important.   
 I expect that organizational mechanisms, tools, and resources will be important in the 
Senate, but the groups themselves will be less formalized (lacking a designated name), have a 
shorter tenure (often lasting no longer than a few years), will be more bi-partisan (reflecting 
existing Senate rules and norms), and as a result, have a narrower agenda (reflecting fewer areas 
of ideological agreement).  In recent years, popular perceptions of the Senate have dominated by 
“gangs” of 6 or 8 (or some other such number) that emerge every couple of years to work on 
legislation in a narrow policy area (Bolton 2009; Calmes 2011; Ornstein 2015; Gehrke 2015).  
Today, Republican senators share many of the same frustrations as Freedom Caucus members 
about the inability to participate in shaping key legislation; Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s 
(R-KY) 2017 health-care bill drafting process is merely the most recent example (Sullivan 2017).   
 
 
                                                          
109 Among these policy areas are defense policy, including the Nixon era military budget work and the 
Reagan era policy of reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers.  
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Appendices 
 
Detailed information on the concepts and variables employed in the statistical models 
throughout the previous pages, as well as additional archival materials, are detailed below.  
Appendix 1 
Information on the coding, measurement and data sources for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the analyses presented in Table 3.1 (pg. 74) are detailed below.   
The following district-level variables were collected from the Scott Adler’s 
Congressional District Dataset (based on the 1960 U.S. Census): Black population is an internal 
variable measuring the percent of African-Americans in a member’s district. Blue collar is an 
interval variable measuring the percent of individuals employed in blue collar professions in the 
district.  Union membership is an interval variable measuring the percent of district residents who 
are union members.  Unemployed is an interval variable measuring the percent of unemployed 
individuals in the district.  Urban is an interval variable measuring district density, or the percent 
of residents that reside in an urban area of the district.   
The following variables were collected from the Congressional Research Service: Non-
white is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member identifies as non-white (0 otherwise).  
Female is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member identifies as female (0 otherwise).   
The following variables were collected from CQ Almanac: Seniority is an interval 
variable measuring the number of years a member has served in the House (the mean number of 
years served is 10, or about 5 terms).  Party Unity is an interval variable measure the percent of 
votes (ranging from 0 to 100) that a member votes with a majority of their party against a 
majority of the opposing party.  Committee Leader is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the 
member serves as a full committee or subcommittee chair in that Congress (0 otherwise).  
Marginal Seat is an interval variable measuring the percent of the vote the member received in 
their district in their most recent election to the House.  Data for this variable was collected from 
the CQ Voting and Elections Collection.  
 
Appendix 2 
Information on the coding, measurement, and data sources for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the analyses presented in Table 4.1 (pg. 132) are detailed below.  
The following variables were collected via CQ Almanac: Attendance (dependent 
variable) is an interval variable measuring the percent of all roll call votes in which a member 
voted “yea” or “nay.”  This variable is a proxy measure of a member’s floor attendance because 
members must be present on the floor in order to be recorded as “yea” or “nay.” Committee 
Leader is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the member serves as a full committee chair in that 
Congress (0 otherwise).  Subcommittee Leader is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the member 
serves as a subcommittee chair in that Congress (0 otherwise).  Seniority is an interval variable 
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measuring the number of years a member has served in the House (the mean number of years 
served is 10, or about 5 terms). Members who had served less than one year in a given Congress 
were recorded as having served one full year.  Party Unity is an interval variable measure the 
percent of votes (ranging from 0 to 100) that a member votes with a majority of their party 
against a majority of the opposing party.   
The following variables were collected from the 87th and 93rd Congressional District Data 
Book: Urban Population and African-American Population are interval variables that measure 
the percent population of a member’s district that lives in urban areas or identifies as African-
American, respectively.  The data reflect the district demographics during the 1960 and 1970 
Census data. District Distance is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the member’s district is 
located more than 1000 miles away from Washington, D.C. (0 otherwise).  In the rare cases 
where parts of a member’s district is located less than 1000 miles away and other parts are 
located more than 1000 miles away from the capitol, the variable was coded based on the location 
and distance of a majority of their district.  District boundaries were collected from the Data 
Books, but the distance between the district and D.C. was calculated from Google Maps.  
The following variables were collected from the Congressional Research Service: 
African-American is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member is African-American (0 
otherwise).  Female is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member is female (0 otherwise).  
These variables are coded based on data presented in “African American Members of the United 
States Congress: 1870-2012 (November 26, 2012, Jennifer E. Manning and Colleen J. Shogan) 
and “Women in the United States Congress, 1917-2014: Biographical and Committee 
Assignment Information, and Listings by State and Congress” (October 31, 2014, Jennifer E. 
Manning and Ida A. Brudnick).   
The following variables were collected from the DSG Papers at the Library of Congress: 
DSG Member is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member is a dues-paying member and/or 
whip target of the Democratic Study Group (0 otherwise).  DSG Leader is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if the member served on the DSG executive committee in a given Congress (0 
otherwise).  DSG bylaws mandated that leaders rotated every two years (leaders could not hold 
consecutive leadership positions).   
 
Appendix 3 
Information on the coding, measurement and data sources for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the analyses in chapter five are detailed below.   
The following variables were collected via CQ Almanac: Whip is a dichotomous variable, 
coded 1 if the member serves as a Democratic whip in that Congress (0 otherwise).  Committee 
Leader (Dependent variable in Table 5, model 2) is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the 
member serves as a full committee chair in that Congress (0 otherwise).  Subcommittee Leader 
(Dependent variable in Table 5, model 1) is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the member serves 
as a subcommittee chair in that Congress (0 otherwise).  Seniority is an interval variable 
measuring the number of years a member has served in the House (the mean number of years 
served is 10, or about 5 terms).  Party Unity is an interval variable measure the percent of votes 
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(ranging from 0 to 100) that a member votes with a majority of their party against a majority of 
the opposing party.   
The following variables were collected from the Congressional Research Service:  
African-American is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member is African-American (0 
otherwise).  Female is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member is female (0 otherwise).  
Non-white is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the member identifies as Latino(a), Asian-
American, or African-American (0 otherwise).   
The following variables were collected from various data sources (as identified below):  
Legislative Entrepreneurship is an interval variable measuring members’ legislative activity in 
the immediately preceding congress.  I collected data on the number of bills a member served 
from Congress.gov, and lagged it by one year to create a measure of legislative entrepreneurship. 
Thus a member who introduced 5 bills in the 96th Congress would receive a score of 5 for the 97th 
Congress. If the member served non-consecutive terms in the most recent Congress, the variable 
reflects the number of bills introduced in their most recent term in the House.  Freshman 
members receive a value of 0 on this variable.  District Marginality is an interval variable 
measuring the percent of the vote the member received in their district in their most recent 
election to the House.  Data for this variable was collected from the CQ Voting and Elections 
Collection.  DSG Leader is a dichotomous variable measuring members’ prior service on the 
executive committee (1= DSG leader, 0 otherwise).  I collected executive committee membership 
lists from the DSG papers at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and created a lagged 
variable measuring whether a member served on the executive committee in a prior Congress.   
Appendix 4 
The full text of the 14-point plan developed by DSG in support of the 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act (referenced in chapter 6, pg. 279) is reprinted below.  
1. Letter from DSG Executive Committee “calling attention to crucial importance of the 
Legislative Reorganization bill and the dangers involved, etc. Letter would note that DSG 
has undertaken top priority effort to “democratize” the House and prevent adoption of 
amendments which would worsen the situation. Letter would announce questionnaire and 
cooperation.”  
2. Questionnaire to be sent at same time or immediately after Executive Committee letter.  
3. “Meeting with DSG AA’s shortly after mailing of questionnaire to solicit their assistance 
in getting their Members to cooperate, etc.”  
4. “As soon as possible, request leadership to schedule bill at least three weeks in advance 
so that Members can arrange schedule to be on hand during amending process 
5. “Report from DSG Congressional Reform Task Force calling on House to end secrecy 
and undemocratic procedures. Report should be geared to obtain maximum news and 
editorial attention.”  
6. Activate press organizations and other groups to stimulate local editorials urging their 
Congressman to be on hand and support reform measures, etc.  
7. Make discussion of proposed amendments, etc., top item at June 16 DSG Meeting.  
8. Activate liberal, labor, student and peace groups to lobby for reform measures, especially 
record vote in the Committee of the Whole.”  
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9. DSG Fact Sheet on bill and Special Report on Records Votes in Committee of the Whole.  
10. Tabulate and publicize (if beneficial) questionnaire results.  
11. Assign Members to teams responsible for various amendments in accordance with 
preferences indicated on questionnaire.”  
12. Set up special “buddy-type” whip system.  
13. Conduct whip check to ascertain which Members will be present, etc. 
14. “Pray” 
Source: “Proposed Plan Of Action,” DSG Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Part II, 
box 114, folder 8.   
 
Appendix 5 
The full list of formal policy endorsements undertaken by DSG in the 1960s and 1970s 
(referenced in chapter 7, pg. 334) is reprinted below.  
Congress  Legislation 
1960 1.Social Security Amendments (HR 12580) 
2.Area Redevelopment Bill (S722) 
3.Civil Rights Bill 
4.Interests on Long-Term Government Bond (Oppose) 
 
87th  
(1961-1962) 
1.Administration Education Bill 
2.Atomic Energy Authorization (HR 7576) 
3.Administration Housing Bill  
4.Area Redevelopment Act (S 1) 
5.D.C. Home Rule 
6.Manpower Development & Training Act (S 1991) 
7.Welfare & Pension Plans Disclosure (HR 8723) 
 
88th  
(1963-1964) 
1.Community Mental Health Centers 
2.Higher Education Facilities Bill (HR 6143) 
3.D.C. Omnibus Crime Bill (HR 7525) 
4.Reorganization Act Extension (HR 3496) 
5.Accelerated Public Works Bill (HR 11579) 
6.Downtown Urban Renewal in DC (HR 6177) 
7.Amendments to Foreign Assistance Act (HR 7885) 
 
89th  
(1965-1966) 
1.National Teacher Corps 
2.D.C. Home Rule Bill 
3.Labor-HEW Appropriations 
4.Immigrant Act Amendments 
5.Public Works & Economic Development Act 
6.Repeal of Taft-Hartley Section 14(b) (Oppose) 
7.Voting Rights Bill 
8.D.C. Minimum Wage 
9.Housing and Urban Development Department Act of 1965 
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10.Bill to establish HUD Department 
11.Extension of Reorganization Act of 1949 
12.Food Stamp Program 
13.Poll Tax Ban 
14.Medicare Program 
15.Older Americans Act 
16.Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
17.Inter-American Development Bank Bill 
18.Mortgage Insurance for Group Practice Facilities Bill 
19.Indiana Dunes Bill 
20.Civil Rights Bill (amendments to Title V, criminal interference 
with rights) 
21.Rent Supplement Program 
 
90th  
(1967-1968) 
1.OEO Authorization Bill 
2.HUD Appropriations Bill 
3.Rat Extermination Act 
4.Appalachian Regional Development Act 
5.Civil Rights Act 
6.D.C. Reorganization Plan 
7.Amendments to Law Enforcement Act 
8.Atomic Energy Commission Authorization 
9.Busing Amendment 
10.Housing Amendment 
11.Civil Rights Amendments 
12.EEOC Amendment 
13.Off-shore Oil Leases Amendment 
14.HUD Appropriations Bill 
15.Civil Rights Bill 
 
91st  
(1969-1970) 
1.Aviation Facilities Expansion Act 
2.Education Funding Amendment 
3.Amendments to Export Control Act 
4.Amendments to Public Broadcasting Act 
5.Amendment to Clean Water Act 
6.Amendment to Student Loan Act 
7.Antibusing Amendment (Oppose) 
8.Installment Loan Interest Bill (Oppose) 
9.Amendment to HUD Appropriations 
10.Amendments to Cigarette Smoking Act Legislation 
11.Amendments to Medical Facilities Act 
12.Civil Rights Amendments 
13.Amendments to Education Act 
14.Draft Reform Amendment (Oppose) 
15.Education Veto Override 
16.HUD Veto Override 
17.Expansion of Voting Rights Act 
18.Vote for 18-year olds 
19.Amendments to Labor-HEW Appropriations 
459 
 
20.Civil Rights Commission Funding 
21.SST Amendment 
22.Military Sales Act Amendment 
 
92nd (1971-
1972) 
1.Equal Employment Opportunities Act 
2.Emergency Detention Act 
3.Members Allowances Resolution 
4.South African Sugar Quota 
5.Emergency Employment Bill 
6.Hospital and Medical School Grants Bill 
 
93rd  
(1973-1974) 
1.Appointment of a Special Prosecutor  
2.D.C. Self-Government Act 
3.Mutual Cooperation and Development Act 
4.Amendments to Labor-HEW Appropriations 
5.Tax Reform Amendments 
6.Vietnam Fund Cutoff Amendment 
7.Budget and Impoundment Control Bill 
8.Foreign Disaster Assistance Act 
 
Source: “DSG Policy Endorsements by Congress, 86th – 93rd Congresses,” DSG Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C., Part II, box 151, folder 6. 
